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ABSTRACT
NEW TYPES OF FINANCING FOR A NEW FINANCIER: A THEORY OF CHINESE 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
Scott Caldwell Wingo 
Avery Goldstein  
Why are some development finance packages issued on stricter terms than others? I in-
vestigate this question for the important case of China using a mix of quantitative meth-ods 
and case studies. Chinese organizations use a wide variety of financial arrangements 
including grants, zero-interest loans, freelance contracting, equity investment, tied loans, 
and resource-backed loans. In the event that loans are not repaid, China then turns to a 
secondary set of options including debt forgiveness; debt restructuring or deferment; debt-
equity swaps; and non-renegotiation. Many of these tools have not been treated in depth by 
the literature to date. I address this gap by sorting them into a hierarchy of strictness, find-
ing that Chinese diplomatic and geostrategic motivations are associated with laxer terms, 
but that Chinese commercial interests are associated with stricter ones. I further find that 
geostrategic and commercial interests become associated with progressively stricter terms 
as political risk increases. These findings expand existing theories of development finance 
to better fit a major actor which puts greater emphasis on commercial interests in its de-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Narratives surrounding China’s contributions to global development finance are frequently
contentious and contradictory. Proponents see it as more even-handed in its treatment of
fellow developing countries, contrasting its hands-off approach with World Bank or West-
ern organizations’ imposition of economic policy requirements as a condition for loans.
These observers usually see China’s emphasis on horizontal “business” dealings over verti-
cal donor-recipient ”aid” relationships as an empowering step in the right direction (Moyo,
2009; State Council of the People’s Republic of China [-N∫⌘qå˝˝°b], 2011).
Pessimists counter that China’s focus on large loan packages over grants and more tradi-
tional aid arrangements is essentially exploitative and aimed at securing access to natural
resources or even geostrategically important logistical facilities at host countries’ expense
(Abi-Habib, 2018; Naím, 2009).
Many of these tropes are based on particular components of China’s overseas development
finance but rarely reflect all of it. Chinese construction of hospitals, schools, and much-
needed infrastructure at host countries’ request is very real and often beneficial. At other
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times, China can be very tough in its developing-world dealings, demanding that countries
channel a majority of loan packages to Chinese firms or even put up precious natural re-
source deposits as collateral. China has a variety of tools in its financial toolkit, some of
which are more likely than others to be appreciated in recipient countries.
This leads us to a much broader research question: why is development finance sometimes
done on stricter terms, and sometimes on laxer? This question has been more thoroughly
answered for more established, mostly developed-world or multilateral donors with longer
track records in development finance. Academic research, though, has only taken limited
steps toward comprehensively analyzing the various tools of Chinese development finance
and has done little to integrate them into existing theory. Indeed, the task is difficult. The
Chinese system is geared toward opacity, including but not limited to non-disclosure of
reliable data. Still, it is worth doing. This is both because China’s sheer heft in global
development finance can no longer be ignored and because its practices diverge substan-
tially from those espoused by more established developed-world organizations. Figure 1.1
shows total outflows of official grants and loans from China as compared to members of
the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development’s (OECD) Development
Assistance Committee (DAC), a thirty-country grouping of major developed economies1
which establish shared practices for development finance.
China has not surpassed the DAC’s outflows, but it competes in its own right, despite be-
ing one large country being compared to thirty (mostly) smaller ones. Academic theories,
though, are largely based on the developed-world organizations which have been major
actors for longer. One early attempt at comprehensively analyzing Chinese overseas devel-
opment finance has come from (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018), who use interest rate
1Including both many smaller countries and major ones like the United States, Japan, Germany, etc.
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Figure 1.1: Official Grants and Loans from OECD Development Assistance Committee
and China, 2000-2014
OECD in Blue; China in Red
OECD data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018). Chinese data from
Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018), excluding canceled projects or unconfirmed projects listed under the
“Pipeline: Pledge” category.
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and payback period data (where available) to sort Chinese grants and loans into the cat-
egories of “Overseas Development Assistance” (ODA) or “Other Official Flows” (OOF),
categories established by the OECD which loosely correlate to ideas of what is favorable
enough to the recipient to count as “aid” (ODA). While this is a welcome means to compare
Chinese and other development finance, it has several serious limitations. First, the division
of projects into ODA and OOF—roughly, “aid” and “non-aid”—is based on a mathematical
formula agreed to by a committee of which China is not a member. Per the DAC formula,
a project found to be roughly 24 percent grant-based relative to market rates is not ODA
(aid), but a 26 percent discount is. This line could have just as easily been drawn at a higher
or lower number, and while many Western aid agencies are structured to treat it as a more
real distinction, China’s are not.
This leads to a second area where further research is necessary: China’s own internal bu-
reaucratic fault lines. Grants and zero-interest loans—certainly the most concessional tools
in China’s toolkit—are run through the Ministry of Commerce in concert with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance. Interest-bearing loans, on the other hand, are
most often handled through one of two designated “policy banks,” state-owned organiza-
tions with mandates to lend to projects that may not make money immediately and that
might be overlooked by more traditional banks. These loan arrangements are also often
products of input from Chinese firms, many of which are state-owned and enjoy positions
of strength in the Chinese economic establishment. A loan from the Export-Import Bank of
China, one of the two policy banks, might be concessional enough to meet the DAC defini-
tion of aid, but from a Chinese perspective, it is qualitatively different from the government
ministries’ grants and zero-interest loans and is more likely to go to larger, more complex
projects with higher risk profiles and (sometimes) greater salience to China’s foreign policy
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goals.
Then, another gap in the literature exists outside the familiar area of grants and loans. The
(Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018) study and dataset focuses on grants and loans, but
in China’s more statist political economy, a number of other arrangements are possible.
Over 30 percent of Chinese loans are collateralized with natural resources due to a state-
owned commodity firm. This practice is sometimes used by Japan and Korea but seldom
by Western governments and is typically overlooked in the academic development finance
literature. The Chinese government can also sponsor equity investments by state-owned
firms—a possibility in some developed countries, but a much smaller part of the picture.
Some Chinese firms may win contracts to build projects on their own, at times with in-
direct help from routine subsidized state credit. This is not outwardly even an extension
of development finance from China to the recipient, but Beijing’s subsidization of con-
struction firms (and the firms’ low cost to begin with) may imply an unrecorded but very
real subsidy to the buyer. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, these less
conventional tools of Chinese development finance have been treated in some studies inde-
pendently from one another but not typically in a comprehensive, unified way. Exceptional
cases such as Bräutigam (2011) and Cheng Cheng [↵⁄] (2018) tend to be more descrip-
tive and less theoretically oriented. A quantitative-leaning, theoretically oriented literature
drawing on the West’s experience and a qualitatively focused literature on China remain
mostly separate.
In this dissertation, I address this gap by sorting China’s tools of development finance by
stringency and predicting which of China’s national interests will lead to more or less strin-
gent treatment. This allows us to expand existing theories of development finance to incor-
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porate the Chinese case and perhaps those of other non-OECD countries.2 The remainder
of this chapter will briefly introduce 1) the independent variables (China’s national inter-
ests); 2) the dependent variable, development finance stringency; and 3) the methodology
to be used to determine the relationship between the two, as sorted by chapter.
1.1 Independent Variables: China’s National Interests
A previous body of literature focused on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank (the “Bretton Woods institutions”) finds a tradeoff between donor national interests
and financial stringency. All else equal, the Fund and Bank often use “policy conditions,”
or requirements that borrower countries deploy certain economic policies in exchange for
credit. These typically conform to liberal ideals prevalent at the Fund in particular but also
tend to maximize the odds that creditors are repaid. For example, limiting government
budget deficits lowers the probability of default, and requiring an open capital account
means that creditors will not find their money frozen in place during a potential crisis.
These conditions are generally unpopular in borrower countries, which would all else equal
rather have more latitude to make their own decisions. For countries important to the
interests of major donors to the organizations, though, fewer conditions are often imposed
(Kilby, 2009; R. W. Stone, 2008).
Existing studies typically use measures such as voting alignment at the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) to measure foreign policy significance. This is reasonable in
2Scholars such as Stuenkel (2015) and Sierra (2017) place China in the context of the BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) or other non-OECD countries such as Turkey or the Persian Gulf
states. Many of these cases do bear some parallels with China in their emphasis on less concessional loan
terms and corresponding de-emphasis on traditional aid. Still, I focus on the Chinese case both because it is
uniquely able to act as a peer competitor to Western organizations and because its statist domestic political
economy is fairly distinctive and merits analysis in its own right. The latter point is covered in Chapter 2.
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that is readily comparable across many donor countries, but in this dissertation I find it to
be a generally weaker indicator than donor-specific variables. A median UNGA vote may
not matter all that much to most of the countries voting, but most have issues that they find
particularly significant. Alesina and Dollar (2000), for example, find that American aid
is uniquely drawn to Egypt and Israel. France maintains strong relationships with many
former colonies. This section elaborates what China’s particular interests are.
Diplomatic interests are fundamental to development finance. Bartering economic assis-
tance for diplomatic support is a well-established game. In China’s case, there is a clear
hierarchy of diplomatic interests. At the top of the hierarchy are issues of territorial in-
tegrity, notably the Taiwan and South China Sea disputes. The People’s Republic of China
(PRC) sees Taiwan as a rebelling province and has since the 1960s successfully convinced
most of the world’s countries to maintain embassies in Beijing and not Taipei. The Taiwan
issue is only salient to countries which continue to recognize Taiwan or might be tempted to
switch for the right price, but in these specific cases, it is Beijing’s overwhelming priority.
Following Taiwan, the South China Sea is a second priority. Beijing claims many islands
and features in the South China Sea as its own territory, and its claims overlap with those
of many of its Southeast Asian neighbors. Development finance could be used to persuade
rival claimants to less actively pursue their claims; non-claimants in Southeast Asia to sup-
port China’s position at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the regional
body that acts as the primary forum for the dispute; and typically less interested countries
outside the region to support China, which has become a more difficult task particularly
since an international tribunal ruled in the Philippines’ favor.
A series of other issues which do not relate to China’s territorial integrity take on secondary
significance. Tibet has always been a topic of conversation in multinational fora but of late
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has been eclipsed by Xinjiang, where China is engaged in a campaign of repression, intern-
ing hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. This is less sensitive for
Beijing because, unlike Taiwan and the South China Sea, PRC sovereignty over Xinjiang
is not actively contested. The same goes for Hong Kong, where protests have garnered
international sympathy but cannot actually threaten Beijing’s control over the city. Then,
toward the bottom of the hierarchy of diplomatic interests is a general orientation toward
non-interference in others’ affairs. This is popular in many developing countries which
have their own internal disputes paralleling China’s. These issues are found to play a weak
supporting role after the more central Taiwan and South China Sea disputes.
Shows of diplomatic support are not the only reason that China might want to maintain
good standing in developing country capitals. China has a series of geostrategic inter-
ests in especially Eurasian countries whose domestic politics have direct implications for
China’s domestic stability. Some countries along China’s periphery are home to insurgent,
extremist, or criminal groups which could spill over into China. Extremist groups in areas
bordering Xinjiang are of particular concern; as will be discussed in Chapter 7, these have
indeed established limited ties with anti-Beijing groups within Xinjiang. Then, instability
could also threaten safe passage of goods across Eurasian countries to and from China. The
Belt and Road Initiative began as a series of Eurasia-focused connectivity projects which
simultaneously provide trading outlets for China’s less developed western provinces and an
overland emergency escape route in case maritime traffic is compromised by events at the
Strait of Malacca or elsewhere. The ability to import commodities and export manufactured
goods is central to regime stability, and development finance could plausibly both stabilize
transit countries and make their governments more willing to grant access to China in a
crisis.
1.2. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DEVELOPMENT FINANCE STRINGENCY 9
Then, of course, there are the more obvious commercial interests behind development
finance. Securing Eurasian throughways is helpful for trade, but does nothing for access to
raw foreign materials at the point of production or to export markets at the point of sale.
The twin priorities of commodity imports and manufactured exports bear less explanation
but are nonetheless significant to the world’s factory floor.
Finally, China must balance all of these priorities against local political risk. Some states
have inconsistent rule of law and a track record of reneging on agreements, encroaching on
foreign investments, or failing to repay debts. Avoiding risk is not a “national interest” in
the sense that it can motivate a project by itself, but once the decision to commit financing
has been made, it can play a significant role in structuring projects, especially in higher-risk
countries.
1.2 The Dependent Variable: Development Finance Strin-
gency
China does not use economic policy conditions like the Bretton Woods institutions, but it
does use a series of other tools, some of which (to varying degrees) also manage political
risk by placing impositions on recipients. These are not always handled by the same parts
of the Chinese establishment. In the following list, I note not only what the tools are, but
who issues them and toward what types of projects.
Government agencies led by the Ministry of Commerce issue grants and zero-interest
loans as the most recipient-friendly tools in China’s toolkits. Grants are obviously the
least stringent but are also the most limited in what they can accomplish: they are usually
reserved for very small projects, especially those in “social sectors” like health and edu-
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cation. Zero-interest loans may be slightly larger and are still a net transfer of wealth to
the borrower: after accounting for inflation, most borrowers pay back less than they orig-
inally received. Zero-interest loans are the second-friendliest of China’s financing mecha-
nisms.
Grants and zero-interest loans would not be financially sustainable for larger projects such
those in infrastructure or resource extraction, both major Chinese strengths. These require
a different set of tools. Equity investment is relatively favorable to the recipient. While
legal ownership could be considered an imposition, it also means that the investor holds
related debt and project downside risk, which in most developing countries have historically
been larger issues. Indeed, many countries compete to attract foreign investment. More
stringent than equity are interest-bearing loans. The lion’s share of these are handled by
two state-owned “policy banks” which operate on terms different from traditional banks.
Namely, their interest rates are generally lower than the market rate, but with the negative
to borrowers of non-competitive procurement. Both of these banks “tie” loans to the use
of Chinese contractors, meaning recipients lose some decision-making power and might
be forced to accept high pricing and/or lower quality. The toughest of China’s tools is
resource-backed loans, a special type of tied loan which is repaid in or collateralized
with commodities. Many developing countries rely heavily on commodity exports for their
state budgets and general livelihoods, and placing a mortgage on them is a particularly strict
measure. Not to be left out, there is the non-interventionist option of freelance contracting,
meaning that Chinese firms win project bids on their own without any project-specific state
support. This could be considered a control case to be compared with projects that are
directly state-funded. It in some instances also represents a flow of wealth from China
to the recipient in that many Chinese firms are subsidized through cheap credit to their
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customers’ benefit.
A secondary set of tools is used only for distressed deals. If borrowers cannot repay loans,
China can respond in a series of more or less stringent ways. The least stringent is a simple
write-off: this is essentially the same as a grant. Next in the hierarchy is restructuring,
either through delaying the payback period, breaking the loan into smaller payments, or
both. How favorable a restructuring package is to the borrower will vary from case to case.
In some cases, restructuring may also involve a degree of outright forgiveness, although
it is useful to think in ideal types for theoretical purposes. Then, debt-equity swaps are
stricter than restructuring. In this arrangement, China forecloses on the concerned asset,
writing off debt in exchange for legal title. This is better for the borrower than demanding
repayment in full but may leave a bad taste with some. The toughest option is to hold
out for repayment, declining to renegotiate at all despite knowing that the borrower cannot
repay. This leaves the borrower in a state of acute short-term crisis and is likely to engender
negative reactions in the recipient country capital.
1.3 Methodology and Chapter Outline
Some national interests mandate less stringent forms of finance, while others mandate
more. In Chapter 3, I predict that stringency has a negative relationship with geostrategic
and diplomatic interests. Convincing a partner country to vote alongside China or allow
strategic access requires a softer touch, and demanding financial return would be coun-
terproductive. The opposite is true for commercial interests and risk management: tough
terms such as tied procurement and resource collateralization can secure access to natural
resources, lock down revenues for Chinese firms, and protect firms against the vagaries of
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local politics.
The rest of this work tests these predictions in much greater detail using a mixed-methods
framework. Drawing on Lieberman’s (2005) “nested analysis,” I use quantitative methods
to establish broad correlative patterns in the data and case studies to observe causal mech-
anisms and ensure that quantitative findings are not spurious.3 Most of the chapters begin
with statistical models of relevant types of financing and then include two case studies. The
case studies are paired to be similar to one another across most dimensions except one of
interest—e.g., rich in natural resources and geostrategically less significant, but with dif-
ferent degrees of political risk. I here outline each chapter’s role in the dissertation.
Chapter 2 begins with the big picture, conveying what we know about development finance
in general and the Chinese case in particular. It begins with a series of tradeoffs faced by
all development financiers. The earliest academic debates on development finance often
focused on the balance between sending money where it most needed versus where it is
most pertinent for donor national interests. Over time, this morphed into where funds are
most useful for national interests versus where they will be best put to use, meaning recip-
ients with strong domestic institutions. Since the 1990s, the focus has turned away from
the aggregate volume of development finance and towards the terms: the aforementioned
debate over policy conditionality then entered the picture. This latest iteration of the de-
bate over global development finance presents a rough draft of a theory of development
finance stringency to be modified to fit the Chinese case. Then, before looking at China,
I also introduce the state of research on equity investments by private multinational firms.
While not actually state development finance, these present a useful comparison point for
Chinese state-backed equity investments which face similar challenges with respect to re-
3Lieberman (2005). See also Brady and Collier (2004).
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cipient country political risk but must also take greater care to accommodate their home
governments’ interests as well.
The second half of Chapter 2 turns to what is known about China. Just as World Bank
and IMF conditionality grew out of the West’s liberal thought and practice, China’s inter-
national development finance system is in many ways an outgrowth of its domestic expe-
rience. I begin with the aforementioned independent variables, China’s national interests,
and then proceed to several ways in which China’s system differs with implications for in-
ternational development finance. First, China is a latecomer to international development.
As such, it is often left with the toughest environments, but is not bound by existing agree-
ments on financing practices, meaning it has a free hand to pursue tough risk management
measures such as tied lending which are barred by the OECD. Second, it has a much more
statist political economy characterized by the use of debt as a form of resource allocation
to important but lossmaking projects at its best, or patronage at its worst. These same pat-
terns of loss-making debt and state use of capital are replicated overseas. Third, China
does not strictly adhere to the rule of law. While this has obvious negatives for businesses,
one positive is that Chinese organizations are able to quickly respond to changing circum-
stances in high-risk environments without being entirely bound by previous agreements.
This greater degree of flexibility gives China an advantage in the world’s most difficult
business climates.
Chapter 3 builds on the background introduced in Chapter 2 to introduce this dissertation’s
dependent variable theory. As explained above, the dependent variable is a continuum of
development finance options arranged by stringency; these are enumerated in much greater
detail in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 also formally spells out the hypotheses to be tested in the
rest of this work.
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Chapter 4 begins the substantive analysis with the simplest cases: grants and zero-interest
loans. These “aid”-like projects are run though government ministries proper and have
more similarity with Western aid in their focus on social sectors like health and education.
I begin with quantitative analysis, finding that they are more useful for general diplomacy,
with the caveat that zero-interest loans can substitute for grants and serve as a signal of
Chinese displeasure short of actually withholding aid. This is an iteration of the theory
of development finance stringency as played out within the confines of the Ministry of
Commerce. I then apply this analysis to the specific cases of Burundi and Rwanda. These
are both less complex cases from China’s perspective in that they have few natural resources
and little geostrategic importance, meaning that only diplomatic objectives and commercial
goals are really part of the picture. But, they differ in terms of governance risk. I find that
while China’s strategy in the two countries is not actually all that different, Burundi has
been much more inclined to support China in international fora for the simple reason that
its internal governance record has led many international donors to keep their distance,
leaving China in a greater position of relative strength.
Chapter 5 adds a layer of complexity by shifting from small aid projects to larger items
involving Chinese firms and (sometimes) banks. Firms can bid on contracts without ex-
plicit state support; win contracts with support from state-owned banks; or make equity
investments. Chapter 5 assesses which of these are best for China’s various foreign policy
goals and why. In general, debt is better able to secure commercial interests and protect
Chinese firms against political risk. However, it does so by transferring downside risk to
borrower governments and is thus typically less appreciated in recipient capitals than the
other more hands-off options. I test this first through cross-national quantitative analysis
and then by continued comparison of Burundi and Rwanda, where the lack of complicating
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geostrategic or resource interests continues to be of use. In more stable Rwanda, Chinese
firms often engage in freelance contracting activity which is only possible in Burundi in iso-
lated pockets supported by concerned international organizations like the World Bank and
African Development Bank. Chinese equity investors also enter Rwanda frequently, but not
Burundi. Furthermore, Rwanda is home to subnational variation between higher-risk deals
involving firms connected to the military or ruling party and lower-risk deals elsewhere;
Chinese organizations’ responses to these varying circumstances present a microcosm of
Chinese strategy in countries with different levels of political risk.
Chapter 6, though, does take resource security into account. It also introduces resource-
backed loans as the toughest tool in China’s toolkit. This is done both through quantitative
analysis and through side-by-side comparison of Ecuador and Peru. Quantitative analysis
shows that tied loans are targeted at countries with higher political risk and commodity
significance to China; resource-backed loans, even more so. The case studies confirm
this. In the era in which China has had appreciable international financial heft, Ecuador
has continually presented higher political risk than Peru, and the administration of Rafael
Correa posed particular challenges to foreign investors. This left a void for a more risk-
tolerant actor to fill, and China entered with resource-backed loans. This illustrates two
different causal mechanisms connecting development finance stringency to political risk:
China used tougher terms both because it was necessary to push firms into Ecuador’s oil
market, a priority for state interests, and because Ecuador’s lack of alternatives left them
with little choice but to accept demanding deals. Peru since the 1990s has been more
stable, and apart from some pockets of political risk surrounding deals connected to elected
officials typically operates more according to the rule of law. Here, Chinese firms have
entered Peru’s lucrative copper market as equity investors, acting in much the same way as
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their private multinational peers. With a relatively favorable market reputation, Peru felt no
need to mortgage the centerpiece of its economy, and investors felt no need to make such
a demand. Geostrategic interests also make a limited appearance in Chapter 6 with two
proposed overland corridors bypassing the Panama Canal, although neither has happened
as planned.
Geostrategic interests are instead the focus of Chapter 7. Following the results of Chapter
6, I find that geostrategic interests also interact with political risk. China faces incentives to
be as friendly as possible to geostrategically important countries so as to maintain strategic
access, but in the presence of high political risk might have to use debt or tougher tools to
build major throughways. This shows up as a negative interactive term in the quantitative
results but can be seen in greater detail in case studies of Kazakhstan and Pakistan, where
overland routes to Europe and the Indian Ocean, respectively, have drawn major Chinese
loan packages. However, recipient national priorities like Pakistan’s electricity sector have
instead received fairly favorable treatment. This certainly serves bilateral relations and per-
haps offsets the fiscal impact of debt for strategic throughways. Kazakhstan and Pakistan
both border China and are home to major navigational projects but differ in that Kazakhstan
is also home to major oil deposits. So, we can observe geostrategic interests in isolation or
in competition with resource interests.
While Chapters 4-7 effectively cover China’s market entry options, Chapter 8 turns to
what happens if borrowers cannot repay. China’s secondary tree of options parallels the
initial entry decision in that it ranges from very strict (not renegotiating at all) to very lax
(writing off debt). Because the universe of cases of renegotiated debt is relatively small,
I do not do statistical analysis for this chapter, instead grouping known cases by indepen-
dent variables involved—geostrategic, resource, or none of the above. I find that China
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is extremely tough when renegotiating resource-backed loans, slightly more forgiving for
geostrategically important countries, and at its most forgiving in countries where neither of
the above are important and diplomatic interests come to the forefront.
Chapter 9 concludes by summarizing the findings and proposing areas for future re-
search.
Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
China’s development finance activities are quite diversified. The Ministry of Commerce
handles grants, zero-interest loans, and low-interest loans; policy banks such as the Export-
Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank issue less concessional loans;
state-owned firms make equity investments and bid on overseas construction contracts;
and so on. Some of these financial flows are more demanding of borrowers than others.
To understand how the various components of Chinese development finance serve differ-
ent purposes, we first turn to theories of development finance allocation and stringency
which have been generated based on empirical activity by more established financiers.
This chapter will outline what we know about the determinants of quantitative and qualita-
tive variations in development finance based on previous studies of these better-established
actors. These include developed country governments; the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, henceforth the “Bretton Woods” institutions after the New
Hampshire resort at which they were created; and private multinational firms, which are
not typically considered part of the global “aid” regime but provide a useful counterpoint
18
19
to Chinese state-owned firms which frequently participate in state-sponsored development
initiatives.
I introduce this literature in six stages. First is an introduction to the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) concepts of “official development assis-
tance” (ODA), or government-sponsored grants and concessional loans, and “other official
flows” (OOF), which are government-sponsored credits deemed too demanding of recipi-
ents to count as ODA. These concepts are the OECD’s standard measure of stringency of
financing terms and are important both to understand OECD member state activities as well
as to contrast with China’s conception of development finance in Chapter 3. Second is a
literature on the determinants of ODA flows from major developed donors with a partic-
ular focus on the tradeoff between donor national interests and recipient need. This body
of work sometimes touches on stringency of terms, particularly when comparing ODA to
OOF, but is more significant in that it establishes the role of donor national interests in
development finance. Third, I continue to later studies development finance flows not so
much as a tradeoff between donor national interests and recipient need per se, but instead
as a tradeoff between donor national interests and targeting recipients with strong domes-
tic institutions, which are an important factor in determining whether aid can successfully
promote local development. Dealing with risk from weak local institutions is a factor in
Chinese strategy as well. Fourth, I apply this tradeoff between promoting national interests
and avoiding governance risk to the Bretton Woods institutions. The IMF and World Bank
often attach policy conditions—–requirements to maintain balanced budgets, open capital
accounts, and the like–—to their loans. These conditions promote the Fund’s and Banks’
preferred types of governance, lower the risk of recipient default, and (quietly) exclude
borrowers who would rather lose access to Bretton Woods credit than meet the conditions.
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They constitute not just a quantitative difference in the amount of lending, but also a qual-
itative difference in the stringency of lending. Studies of conditionality have found that
countries of significant importance to major Bretton Woods shareholders (especially the
United States) tend to receive less stringent loan packages. This tradeoff between prop-
ping up friendly governments with concessional deals and enforcing loan repayment with
tough ones is paralleled by China’s ability to choose between a series of lax or strict de-
velopment finance instruments; these will be detailed in Chapter 3. Fifth, I examine how
private multinational investors respond to governance risk. These firms face the same diffi-
culties as other actors doing business in high risk markets and provide a contrast to Chinese
state-owned firms which share private firms’ imperative to manage risk but also answer to a
state which sometimes pushes them to sacrifice their own financial interests for the greater
national good. Sixth, I add concluding thoughts.
2.1 The Established Actors: The OECD, the Bretton Woods
Institutions, and Private Multinational Corporations
2.1.1 “Aid” and “Business”
This dissertation’s outcome of interest, stringency of development finance arrangements,
has deep roots in both the developed world’s aid regime and the academic literature that
studies it. Most developed world actors classify financial flows as either “aid,” a less strin-
gent mechanism with limited expectation of repayment, or “business,” which implies a
greater degree of profit. This heuristic is a means of simplifying the wide array of financial
flows that can promote a country’s development. This distinction, however, is not nearly as
clear in practice as in our imaginations. Take a comparison between a grant and a loan. A
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grant, a unilateral transfer of wealth, comports well with popular conceptions of “aid” as a
one-way flow from haves to have-nots. A loan to be repaid with interest does not. However,
what of in-between cases? What if half of a loan is to be repaid, and half is a gift? What
if eighty percent of the loan is to be repaid? What if all of the loan is to be repaid, but at a
lower interest rate and over a longer payback period than commercial banks would offer?
Is this favorable enough treatment to count as “aid”?
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a Paris-based
multilateral group composed of most of the world’s high-income countries,1 has attempted
to address this issue by formally codifying the distinction between “aid” and “business”.
The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines “overseas development
assistance” (ODA) as any official flow with a grant element of more than 25 percent and
“other official flows” (OOF) as official flows with grant elements less than this number.
In other words, if a loan represents a twenty-five percent discount relative to what a com-
mercial bank would offer, then it is concessional enough to count as ODA; if not, it might
be OOF. Apart from “grant element,” the other operative word is “official,” implying gov-
ernment involvement.2 Private banks and investors count toward neither ODA nor OOF,
although government guarantees for or loans to private entities might. OECD members re-
port their development finance activities to a central database using these categories.
Drawing on the work of Baldwin (1985), this dissertation treats ODA, OOF, and other tools
of various stripes as part of a menu of options available to governments. Baldwin writes
that in any given instance, policymakers can choose from one of several options as part of a
“policy contingency framework,” or range of conceivable policies which could respond to
1Almost all of the OECD’s members are classified by the World Bank as high-income countries, with the
exceptions of middle-income Mexico and Turkey.
2This is computed according to a standardized mathematical formula. For more detail on the formula
itself and its history, see Scott (2017).
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a given situation. Baldwin’s focus is on “economic statecraft,” to use his term—–the use of
economic means to promote state ends. Economic statecraft could contain any number of
different financial tools, of which in any given situation some will be more useful than oth-
ers. Take, for example, a simple thought experiment comparing grants and loans. Grants,
or giveaways of cash and/or goods, are the simplest type of financial flow. Loans may be
subject to a debate over the terms of repayment; grants involve no such annoyances. How-
ever, this is not to say that grants are not repaid in any form. Baldwin makes the case that
all grants have some kind of ulterior motive (293, 299).3 For example, grants can be used
as encouragement to adopt friendly diplomatic positions, safeguard investments by donor
country firms, or stabilize a country whose security situation poses risks to the donor. More
specifically, the power of these grants is not so much in their issuance as in the specter of
their future cutoff (306). Once a grant is disbursed, there is a time inconsistency problem:
the recipient country already has the money, and there is no real way of enforcing that
it holds up its end of the bargain. The promise of future funding can alleviate this prob-
lem: perhaps this year’s aid package is already water under the bridge, but next year’s is
contingent upon the recipient acting as hoped. This stands in contrast to loans or equity
investment, which expect some degree of financial return. Of course, in practice, some
loans or equity deals may have motives other than profit. A loan to a defense partner at a
reduced interest rate, for example, involves a mix of profit and security motivations. We
can imagine a continuum of transactions between grants and concessional loans aimed at
differing mixes of profit and other national interests.
3Mauss (1925) sees gifts as part of a pattern of reciprocity underpinning much of society. Typically, Mauss
says, the giver of a gift expects to receive something in return as part of an exercise in relationship-building.
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2.1.2 Aid from the OECD
A longstanding literature uses OECD members’ reported volumes of ODA as a proxy for
transactions at the more concessional end of the spectrum. Many earlier works on foreign
aid present donors as facing a tradeoff between serving selfish and altruistic ends. All
else equal, the story goes, a more altruistic donor will give more money to poorer states.
Targeting aid to those most in need may come at the expense, however, of donor interests
such as safeguarding trade and commercial interests or supporting military allies or former
colonies.
McKinlay and Little (1977) posit two mechanisms linking aid to geostrategic interests:
commitment and dependency. In an argument reminiscent of Schelling (1966), they hold
that aid can be used to signal commitment to a partner country. Talk is cheap, but money is
not, and especially in the context of the Cold War it was useful for great powers to signal
that they would stand by their partners in the event of a war or attempted coup d’etat. Their
second argument is more similar to Baldwin’s as described above and is less specific to
cases of high geopolitical tension. As they put it:
A dependency relationship exists when one party relies on another without the
reliance being reciprocated. While one party can terminate the relationship
with little or no cost, the other can do so only at significant cost. The reliant
party, therefore, operates in a subordinate or dependent position. A dominant
state establishes dependency relationships because they generate a degree of
control or influence. The main utility of the dependency is the potential for
control. This control can be used for a variety of ends dictated by the dominant
state. (62)
Aid’s power is less in its giving than in the threat of its withholding. This threat can be used
as leverage for any number of ends. McKinlay and Little find that the United States used aid
to compete with the Soviet Union for the loyalty of non-aligned countries, and that larger
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outflows were targeted at countries with larger populations and militaries. They find only a
weak correlation between American aid and poverty or need. Maizels and Nissanke (1984)
follow up with the finding that bilateral aid is highly correlated with both arms transfers and
private investment stocks. In the post-Cold War era, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that aid
is positively correlated with geopolitical alignment as approximated by voting alignment at
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Berthélemy (2006) makes a similar case
for commercial interests, finding that aid is frequently correlated with trade between the
donor and recipient. He further finds that this relationship is stronger for some donors such
as France and the United States, but weaker for others such as the Scandinavian countries.
This would appear to suggest that larger donors with more global interests will use aid
to defend them, while smaller donors tend to be more altruistic, although there are some
imperfections in this correlation (such as Italy scoring among the most selfish countries).
Fleck and Kilby (2010) revert to a focus on security interests, finding that in the 2000s, the
War on Terror replaced the Cold War as a major motivator of American aid.
Others have framed donors’ choices as not between self-interest and altruism per se but be-
tween self-interest and fostering strong recipient institutions. Burnside and Dollar (2000,
2004) find that aid is more likely to lead to economic growth in countries with institu-
tions such as strong rule of law and private property rights as well as policies such as
balanced budgets and openness to trade. In countries with favorable institutions, aid in-
flows should have a multiplier effect on growth by enabling recipients to invest more in
productive projects than they would have otherwise, but in a poor institutional environ-
ment, they are just as likely to be squandered. Alesina and Weder (2002) assess how much
donors weigh the strength of local institutions vis-à-vis their own interests. They find no
correlation between recipient country corruption and aid receipts. However, they find that
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the relationship varies by donor country. The Scandinavian countries tend to target less
corrupt countries, while the United States actually sends more aid to more corrupt coun-
tries. Alesina and Weder do not argue that the American government necessarily wants to
enable corrupt leaders so much as that many important geostrategic partners of the United
States happen to be corrupt, and that the American leadership shrugs and tolerates this fact.
Countries like the United States with global geopolitical interests face a devil’s tradeoff
between ignoring corrupt friends and losing their allegiance or continuing to enable them
knowing that the money will be squandered.4
Dollar and Levin (2006) use the end of the Cold War as a natural discontinuity in recip-
ient strategic importance over time. They find that during the Cold War, donors targeted
countries with weaker rule of law, presumably to curry favor with leaders whose allegiances
were up for grabs. However, this pattern flipped after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with multi-
lateral donors preferring countries with stronger rule of law, and bilateral donors exhibiting
no preference. Bermeo (2016) continues by analyzing the effects of aid on institutions.
She finds that aid flows inhibited democracy during the Cold War, but not after it. In the
absence of pressure from Soviet competition, Western donors began to pay attention to how
their money was being spent. This turn toward focusing on governance was embodied in a
1996 speech by then-World Bank President James Wolfensohn, who spoke of a “cancer of
corruption” eating many poor countries from the inside (Wolfensohn, 1996).
4This is similar to the finding of Berthélemy (2006) that many larger donors tend to score as more selfish
in terms of trade interests.
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2.1.3 The Bretton Woods Organizations
Indeed, the World Bank became front and center in a new crusade for good governance.5
After the end of the Cold War, both the World Bank and the IMF began to make much
more use of policy conditions in their lending. Like bilateral donors, they also face a trade-
off between supporting donor interests and supporting recipients with good institutions.
However, unlike previous studies looking mostly at the absolute volume of financing, these
studies look at qualitative differences as well. Namely, financing packages to diplomatic
friends of major Bretton Woods shareholders on average include fewer policy conditions,
which otherwise would have been meant to promote the Bretton Woods organizations’ pre-
ferred type of domestic institutions. This section begins with caveats about how multilateral
organizations are imperfectly comparable to bilateral development agencies, continues with
an explanation of policy conditionality and how it is viewed by borrowers and lenders, and
concludes with a review of the literature connecting conditionality to the national interests
of multilateral organizations’ major shareholders.
The IMF and World Bank are the centerpieces of the debate over conditionality, and they
differ from the national aid programs described in previous sections of this chapter in im-
portant ways. First, they concentrate on loans over grants. The IMF’s stated mission is
providing emergency liquidity for countries in financial crises. This involves lending them
money until they have weathered the storm, but not issuing grants such that there is little
incentive to avoid future crises. The World Bank is responsible for promoting development
in lower- and middle-income countries, but as the name implies, it is a bank, focusing on
loans over grants. Given its core mission, the Bank is a more natural comparison case for
national aid programs than the Fund. However, we will here discuss it alongside the IMF
5Much more detailed accounts of the Bank’s evolution can be found in Kapur, Lewis, and Webb (1997)
and Stiglitz (2002).
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because the literature on the two institutions is intertwined and based on similar logics.
Previous sections of this chapter established that loans are less useful than grants for pro-
moting unrelated goals because they offer less of a carrot to the recipient, but this is not to
say that they can serve no such purpose at all. In the era of policy conditionality, the strin-
gency of conditions attached affects how concessional or “aid”-like a loan package can be
considered.
This leads us to the second important difference between the Bretton Woods institutions
and bilateral aid agencies: the Bretton Woods institutions are multilateral organizations
and do not have clear “national interests” per se. One might expect multilateral organi-
zations to avoid geopolitics in their decision-making; for example, Maizels and Nissanke
(1984) show that arms transfers are associated with bilateral aid, but not multilateral. How-
ever, subsequent studies have demonstrated that the geopolitical interests of major donors
do sometimes influence multilateral organizations’ decisions. The IMF and World Bank
are governed based on a quota system resembling a corporate shareholding system. Mem-
ber state voting power is based on an allocation of “quotas”–—essentially, shares. This
allocation is nominally based on the size of member states’ economies, but in reality has
historically favored established industrialized powers over faster-growing developing mar-
kets. The United States has de facto veto power over major decisions, and when voting as a
unified bloc, European states do as well. The World Bank President is also by tradition al-
ways an American; the Chair of the IMF, a European. Barro and J.-W. Lee (2005) find that
United Nations voting alignment and trade ties with major IMF shareholders are associated
with receiving credit from the Fund. Fleck and Kilby (2006) make a similar observation
for trade ties at the World Bank, while Andersen, Hansen, and Markussen (2006) find a
correlation between United Nations voting alignment with the United States and alloca-
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tions from the International Development Agency (IDA), the concessional lending wing
of the World Bank. Winters (2010) finds that shareholder interests matter more at IDA,
which handles concessional lending and requires periodic replenishment by donors, than at
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which lends at higher
interest rates and is mostly financially self-sustaining.6
Shareholder national interests affect not only the quantity of loans issued, but also the qual-
ity thereof. Policy conditions such as limiting fiscal deficits, maintaining an open capital
account, and privatization of state-owned industries have become more common since the
end of the Cold War. These policies are rooted both in a desire to minimize the risk of
default and in liberal ideas dominant at the Fund and Bank. Maintaining conservative fiscal
policy in borrower countries means that they are less likely to accumulate unsustainable
debts and default on loans, including both those owed to the Bretton Woods institutions
and to private investors, many of whom are based in the Fund’s and Bank’s major share-
holder countries. In addition, the Bank and Fund work closely with borrower Ministries
of Finance and keep tabs on government bookkeeping both to monitor compliance with
conditions and to safeguard against misappropriation. Maintaining open capital accounts
means that private investors are able to move money out of the country if they so choose.
Privatization of inefficient state-owned firms can take pressure off of the national budget
and make it easier to repay loans. Lower taxes, strong property rights, and minimal cor-
ruption will reduce the erosion of investor wealth over time regardless of macroeconomic
6This debate has come into focus recently, especially at the IMF, where up into the 2010s China had
less voting power than Belgium. Any changes in quota allocation must be approved by a vote of members,
meaning that the United States Senate was able to stall an increase in China’s voting power for some time.
Many American policymakers believe that this was a major motivator behind China’s decision to create its
own multilateral financial organization in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in which China
has a 50 percent voting stake. Interviews with retired senior American diplomat and retired senior American
World Bank official, Washington, DC, July 2018.
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conditions (Stiglitz, 2002; Woods, 2006).
Any lenders worth their salt will worry about avoiding default, but not all of them place
conditions on local macroeconomic policy. China does not, instead opting for a different
set of risk management tools to be discussed in Chapter 3. Policy conditionality has roots
both in organizational politics and ideational factors which we should keep in mind when
comparing the Bretton Woods institutions to Chinese lenders. The Bretton Woods insti-
tutions and especially the IMF encourage internal conformity to liberal doctrine. Kapur
(n.d.) writes that World Bank research draws heavily on academic theories developed at
institutions in the global North without making room for much in the way of local inno-
vation; these Northern institutions tend toward neoclassical economics. The IMF tends to
be stricter, for a variety of reasons. Woods (2006) argues that career incentives within the
Fund force staffers to advocate liberal policies in order to have a chance at career advance-
ment. The Fund’s own Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) polled staffers and found that
most felt pressured to adhere to a certain ideology and that there was not enough room
for local developing country input (International Monetary Fund, 2011). Chwieroth (2009,
2013, 2015) adds that IMF staffers are largely selected from high-ranking North American
and British economics departments in which liberal ideas are taken as orthodoxy, and that
once at the Fund, these staffers will sometimes informally consult with local governments
officials with similar views to avoid the greater heterogeneity of thought in the formal ne-
gotiation process.
Developing world borrowers are often much less sanguine about policy conditionality. Crit-
ics such as Stiglitz (2002) see conditionality as inherently intrusive of borrowers’ sovereignty.
Chang (2003, 2006) argues that conditionality takes away “policy space” to implement
the kind of state-led growth policies that are needed for developing countries to close the
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gap with stronger competitors; Kapur and Naím (2005) conceptualize this type of strong-
arming from above as inherently undemocratic.7 On a more strictly economic note, Barro
and J.-W. Lee (2005) estimate that IMF loans actually depress economic growth in the five-
year period following their issuance.8 Optimists would counter that this period of painful
adjustment is necessary for better outcomes in the long run, but either way, conditionality
is not particularly popular in most developing countries.
The degree of policy conditionality attached to Bretton Woods loans is not constant across
all cases. Mosley (1987) conceptualizes the variation in policy conditionality as the result
of a “bargaining process” between borrowers and lenders.9 This tug-of-war could go either
way, but for the role of other parties. Namely, national government shareholders in the
Bretton Woods institutions are in a position to tip the scales. There are reasons that they
might lean toward either stronger or weaker conditions. On the one hand, we have estab-
lished that donors will want to offer favorable deals to important partners. For example,
a donor will not want to impose strict conditions on a military ally, both to maintain the
security relationship and to inhibit even a short-term weakening of the partner’s economy.
However, they also share an interest with the Bretton Woods institutions in maximizing the
chances of loan repayment both via their financial stake in protecting the Bretton Woods
institutions’ balance sheets and because the Bretton Woods institutions can prevent default
on debt owed to private creditors based largely in the global North. Donor states must make
a choice between using stricter conditionality to safeguard their economic interests or less
stringent terms more amenable to maintaining geopolitical and security partnerships. This
7This is similar to the argument of Wade (2003) that the World Trade Organization (WTO) takes away
“development space” from the Global South through rules regarding contentious areas such as intellectual
property and foreign investment protection.
8See also Dreher (2006).
9Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991) later explicitly apply this framework to the World Bank.
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is a permutation of the familiar tradeoff between promoting national interests and promot-
ing good governance. Countries with weaker institutional and property rights regimes are
unlikely to comply with strict conditions and thus will be unlikely to receive Bretton Woods
institutional credit, unless a powerful shareholder decides otherwise.
Empirical studies demonstrate this tradeoff in action. Dreher and Jensen (2007) find that
countries which vote more often with the United States in the UN General Assembly re-
ceive fewer conditions as part of IMF packages; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2015) follow
up with the finding that UN Security Council members also receive fewer conditions from
the IMF. R. W. Stone (2008) finds that General Assembly voting alignment is actually a
weaker predictor than receiving aid from the United States. Either way, American interests
are making their way into loan terms. Kilby (2009) applies the same logic to the World
Bank, finding that enforcement of World Bank conditionality is weaker for countries which
vote more often with the United States at the UN General Assembly. In some cases, re-
cipient countries may be important to more than one major power, meaning that they can
play the different parties against one another to extract a better deal—to “use the barbar-
ians to control the barbarians” (Â767), as an old Chinese proverb goes. D. Hernandez
(2017) finds that countries which receive more development finance from China in turn
receive fewer conditions on World Bank loans. X. Li (2017) further finds that even when
World Bank conditions are imposed, Chinese financing means that their usual democratiz-
ing effect disappears; Tseng and Krog (2017) add that this counter-democratizing effect is
strongest in resource-rich countries.
This brings us to the present day in development finance. The debate over conditionality is
a proxy for the older conflicting relationship between donor national interests and recipient
country governance. However, it was never set in stone that policy conditions were to be
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the only way to address this tradeoff. A group of financiers with a different history and
ideational foundations might well use different tactics to tackle similar problems. We now
turn to two such groups: international private investors and the Chinese state.
2.1.4 Private Multinational Firms
At first glance, it might not appear that private multinational investors fit very well into a
story about development finance. They have no fixed “national” interests and are primarily
concerned with profit above all else. However, they are worth including in this analysis for
two reasons. First, they must face many of the same issues of poor local governance as
providers of “official” development finance, to use the term of art for financing from gov-
ernments or multilateral organizations. Second, firms in China are more directly connected
to the state and its development finance apparatus, and most Chinese do not think of firms’
activities as inherently separate from more traditional governmental aid flows like grants.
The activities of private multinational corporations, most of which are headquartered in
more marketized economies, provide a useful comparison case to Chinese state-owned
firms.
The observation that foreign investors care about governance is hardly new. In a classic
work that has underpinned much of the literature since, Vernon (1971) posited that foreign
investors face the problem of an “obsolescing bargain” with host governments. During
negotiations for a new investment, the host government will typically promise treatment
on par with that given to local firms, or perhaps even better. However, once investors are
drawn into the host country, the host government could violate the terms of the previous
agreement without immediate consequences. In the 1970s, the primary fear was direct
expropriation of assets. However, host governments quickly learned that such dramatic
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action would deter future investors, and the literature now focuses more on “indirect expro-
priation” of investor wealth through measures such as gradual increases in regulation and
taxes, enforced technology transfers, or even informal demands for bribes and contrived
“fees.”10
These risks are lower in countries with well-defined property rights backed by reliable
legal systems. Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that foreign direct investment tends to flow
to countries with stronger rule of law; Wei (2000) finds the same to a limited extent for less
corrupt countries. In a head-to-head comparison of several governance-related measures,
Busse and Hefeker (2007) find that government stability, the absence of violent conflict,
and the rule of law are all major draws for FDI, and that democracy and corruption are
secondary factors.11
The challenges faced by foreign investors parallel those faced by aid donors who know
that their funds will be more effective in countries with better property rights and legal
regimes, or those faced by Bretton Woods technocrats hoping to get their money back from
dodgy borrowers. Policy conditions are not exactly on the table for most multinational
corporations, but they have developed some instruments to deal with this risk. Bilateral
investment treaties can attempt to address the deficiencies in law enforcement inherent to
an international system. In countries with little constraint on executive and high levels
of corruption, corporate investors can also simply opt to take lower stakes in investment
projects. Partnership with better-connected local firms may provide some protection from
unscrupulous government officials. Or, alternatively, partnership with firms connected to
10In practice, the distinction between “indirect expropriation” and routine host government regulatory
activity is a topic of some controversy. For a synopsis of thinking and law surrounding the issue, see Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004).
11Many of these factors are explored in an edited volume by Jensen et al. (2012) examining how various
political factors can influence multinational firms’ investment decisions.
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the state itself might be enough of a carrot to the government to stave off direct or indirect
expropriation (Delios and W. Henisz, 2000; W. Henisz, 2000, 2002).12 Finally, there is
the most powerful tool of all: simply choosing to invest in safer countries over riskier
ones.
This chapter so far has looked at grants and loans from national governments, conditional
loans from multilateral organizations, and equity investments by private firms. These actors
must all worry about risks to financial return to the degree that it is expected. This can be
accomplished a variety of different mechanisms including policy conditions, joint ventures
with the local government, and simply allocating capital to safer markets. Where nation-
state financiers are concerned, however, managing risks to financial return is often at odds
with using economic tools to reward friendly states.
2.2 China
The Chinese state is a complicated, multifaceted organization serving a variety of interests
through a variety of ministries. Some of these interests are mutually reinforcing; others are
in competition with one another. The same goes for the ministries themselves. This chapter
will not provide a thorough accounting of the Chinese system—volumes have been written
on this complex topic—but will instead focus on issues immediately relevant to develop-
ment finance. It will do so by addressing two interrelated questions. First, toward what
national interests might China use development finance? The first section lists China’s per-
tinent national interests, the primary independent variables for this dissertation. Second,
what features of China’s politics and economy predispose it to use certain tools of devel-
12This last possibility parallels the findings of Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, et al. (2014), who find that Chinese
development finance in Africa disproportionately flows to leaders’ home regions.
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opment finance? The second section identifies China’s latecomer status to development
finance, its statist political economy, and its emphasis on particularistic relationships over
stable rule of law as important factors shaping what kinds of development finance it uses
abroad.
2.2.1 The Independent Variables: China’s National Interests
This dissertation’s primary independent variables are, as in the case of most previous works
on development finance, donor national interests. However, the exact nature of the interests
being considered is somewhat different in the Chinese case. Prior studies have focused on
national interests which are readily comparable across donors: for example, diplomatic
interests as measured by United Nations voting, security interests as measured by arms
transfers, or commercial interests as measured by trade and investment volumes. King,
Keohane, and Verba (1994) write that studies of single cases can make up for having a
sample size of one by looking at variation within the case. A common example would be
scholars of American politics comparing the fifty states. I use a similar strategy. The “usual
suspects” of development finance regression models are readily comparable across donors
but are not particularly deep or detailed indicators. United Nations voting alignment, for
example, provides a rough indication of coincidence of interests, but it masks variation in
the types of interests shared. For example, a donor and recipient attempting to address
transnational threats along a shared border might use different financial arrangements than
a donor-recipient pair more concerned about balancing a common state rival, or another
pair worried about freedom of navigation through an important chokepoint. Looking at a
single donor allows us to differentiate finer grains of detail in national interests.
Sutter (2016) offers a nutshell summary of the Chinese leadership’s primary goals:
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[. . . ] Chinese leaders continue to share certain overarching objectives:
• They seek to perpetuate their power and avoid the fate of the Soviet Union
and other Eastern European communist regimes.
• They pursue territorial unification and integrity, especially with Taiwan,
and to a lesser degree, claims in the East China, South China, and Yellow
Seas and claims regarding India.
• They also seek to modernize China’s economic, technological, and mili-
tary capabilities and improve social conditions while maintaining stabil-
ity. (33)
This passage is a simplified snapshot drawn from a much more detailed volume, but it does
serve as a heuristic for thinking about basic Chinese interests. The first order of business is
always regime survival; the second two bullet points flow from here. “Territorial unifica-
tion” is about maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Zhao, 2004). “[Improving]
social conditions while maintaining stability” is a nod to the performance legitimacy earned
by the regime in exchange for economic growth, stable employment, and (increasingly) en-
vironmental and governance concerns.13 These concerns could affect development finance
via the following channels: 1) diplomatic objectives; 2) geostrategic concerns; and 3) com-
mercial interests; and 4) management of governance-related risks to loan repayment and
returns on investment.
2.2.1.1 Diplomatic Interests
China’s pertinent diplomatic interests are of two types. First are issues of national terri-
tory, namely claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea. From China’s perspective, these
are both domestic issues, but convincing other countries that they are domestic issues is a
matter of diplomacy, often of an economic variety. Second are more general interests in
13China’s domestic economic concerns are most central to this dissertation, although there may be some
environmental benefits to China in using development finance to offshore dirty industries such as coal power
generation and steel.
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maintaining diplomatic alignment in fora such as the United Nations, especially on con-
troversial issues regarding human rights. International reactions to Chinese treatment of
domestic dissenters is on some level a question of territorial integrity, especially with re-
gards to Tibet and Xinjiang, where China’s sovereignty is not always viewed in a positive
light. However, human rights issues in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Han-majority areas are less sen-
sitive than the South China Sea and (especially) Taiwan for the simple reason that China
exercises uncontested control over its claims on the Asian mainland, but only partial control
over the South China Sea and much less over the de facto independently governed island
of Taiwan. Both sets of interests are here discussed in turn.
Territorial Claims: Taiwan and the South China Sea Beijing traditionally views Tai-
wan’s status as a “core interest” (8√) ); to China, the unresolved legacy of the Chinese
Civil War is a domestic issue and as such is not negotiable on the international stage. This
issue has receded with respect to most recipient countries. As of this writing, only sixteen
countries still recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but the Taiwan issue is quite
important to mainland Chinese policy in these countries and a few others which might con-
sider switching recognition back to Taipei. All but the Vatican are developing countries,
and a game of rival aid disbursements has resulted in the People’s Republic of China (PRC,
or the “mainland”) peeling away most of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2019). Rigger (2011) sees this as part of the main-
land Chinese government’s legitimacy, writing that “PRC leaders have turned the Taiwan
issue into a yardstick by which their own performance is measured. No leader can afford to
appear irresolute in protecting what the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] defines as a core
interest of the Chinese nation” (174). Chinese sources make a similar point, albeit typically
without direct reference to the relationship between regime and citizens. Diao Li [ â]
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and He Fan [U⌃] (2008) write that “the Taiwan question always has a direct influence
on China’s diplomacy and foreign development assistance policy. Much Chinese foreign
assistance is aimed at curbing ‘Taiwanese independence’.”14 (6) Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et
al. (2018) find that diplomatic recognition of Taiwan leads to fewer Chinese grants and
loans. Cheung, Haan, et al. (2014) find that in countries which recognize Taiwan, fewer
construction projects are contracted to Chinese firms, although they fail to account for the
distinction between projects backed by Chinese banks and instances in which Chinese firms
compete for externally funded bids. Mattlin and Nojonen (2015) write that this constitutes
a type of “political conditionality” attached to Chinese loans.
China’s claims to the uninhabited islands and reefs of the South China Sea are a second-
order concern relative to Taiwan, but they also make an appearance in China’s international
development finance policy in the relevant countries of Southeast Asia. Beijing claims
islands and features across the South China Sea whose related exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) would encompass much of the Sea; these claims overlap those of Brunei, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.15 The Southeast Asian claimants, especially the
Philippines and Vietnam, have tried to strengthen their hand against their larger neighbor
via regional solidarity at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a diplo-
matic organization. China has used tools of economic statecraft to win the loyalties of
some local governments and prevent the possibility of a united ASEAN front on the South
China Sea dispute. Chinese aid can convince some Southeast Asian governments not to
14Author’s own translation. Scare quotes around “Taiwanese independence” in original. Original Chinese:
“~Óò Ù˘-˝Ñ §å˘ Ù©?V Ù•ÑqÕ,-˝Ñ∏⇢˘ Ù© @O6‘Ï’Ñ
⇤Q⇥”
15China also includes on its official maps a “Nine-Dash line” around much of the South China Sea. This
line’s meaning has never been fully clarified and could arguably mean that Indonesia is also a disputant.
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding Indonesia’s Natuna Islands appears to overlap with the
Nine-Dash Line, and while Beijing has wavered on clarifying exactly where its claim’s boundary lies, the
Indonesian government is increasingly wary on this front. See Hunt (2017).
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vote for a joint statement in favor of Southeast Asian interests which per ASEAN tradition
would require unanimity (O’Neill, 2014a; Pang, 2017).16
Other Diplomatic Interests Because China does not fully control Taiwan or the South
China Sea, they are particularly sore subjects, but some less sensitive issues also touch
upon the all-important goals of territorial integrity and regime legitimacy. China has al-
ways been highly cognizant of the equalizing implications of the UN’s “one country, one
vote” principle and has historically used development finance to cultivate likeminded part-
ners across the world. During the Cold War, this meant reaching out to postcolonial states
in Bandung-esque South-South solidarity. While the Cold War may have faded, Beijing
and many developing world leaders still share a certain emphasis on sovereignty and non-
interference.17 Beijing does not want international organizations looking into an African
state’s internal problems any more than it wants them paying attention to Tibet or Xin-
jiang, and strong voting alignment between China and developing countries, particularly in
Africa, reflects this fact (Eisenman, Heginbotham, and Mitchell, 2007; Shinn and Eisen-
man, 2012).
16The South China Sea could also be considered a geostrategic issue, given the large volume of trade that
flows through it and its importance to Chinese naval power projection (China Power, 2017). This distinction
between diplomatic and geostrategic objectives, however, does not much matter in this case. Either way,
China will try to use favorable financing terms to win over partner countries.
17This may be beginning to fade. The construction of a naval base in Djibouti, more active territorial
disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam, and the 2018 takeover of the management of Sri Lanka’s Ham-
bantota Port do not square well with China’s image as a country which never interferes in others’ affairs
or sends troops overseas. On a more positive note, China is contributing substantially to peacekeeping and
peacebuilding operations, especially via the United Nations, and is increasingly comfortable with the role of
mediator in security disputes. However, Beijing’s diplomatic rhetoric has not changed, and it is still probably
too soon to tell how much recent events will ultimately affect China’s image. See Alden and Large (2015)
and C. Zheng (2016).
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2.2.1.2 Geostrategic Interests
Geostrategic significance is a mainstay of the development finance literature, and it is worth
enumerating what it means in China’s case. Nathan and Scobell (2012) conceptualize
China’s security strategy in a series of concentric “rings” around the homeland, with ar-
eas closest to home being most important. Geopolitical issues surrounding countries nearer
China often have some bearing on China’s internal social stability via cross-border secu-
rity concerns; those further away, more often through the geopolitics of securing trade
routes.
The “ring” of countries bordering China includes unstable places about which Beijing has
understandable concerns. The Central Asian republics are home to friendly governments
and unfriendly jihadist movements. The governments of Central Asia are reliable allies
in China’s own fight against terrorism, but Beijing has long feared collaboration between
Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang and militant groups in neighboring countries, and these
fears have materialized in recent years. Murphy (2017) sees economic cooperation between
China and the Central Asian states as a joint effort at maintaining stability all sides of the
region’s borders, lest a problem spot in one country spill over into its neighbors’ territo-
ries.18 This concern is much more immediately relevant for China’s policy in Afghanistan
and Pakistan (T. Miller, 2017). Similar, if less dramatic, dynamics are at play with respect
to Myanmar. Especially before Myanmar’s 2012 transition from military to civilian rules,
China struggled to contain cross-border ethnic insurgencies. Narcotics and human traffick-
ing flows from the lawless regions of northern Myanmar are still an issue. China faces
incentives to use economic resources to keep Myanmar’s employment figures strong and
18Recent events in Xinjiang could hypothetically interfere with these relationships, although this seems to
be the case in some countries much more than others. Many Central Asian leaders fear jihadist movements
in their own territories and are loath to refuse Chinese support even as hundreds of thousands to millions are
interned in Soviet-style reeducation camps.
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insurgencies and criminal organizations weak (Yun Sun, 2017a).
The potential for cross-border security problems fades with increasing distance from China.
Lum et al. (2009) and Nathan and Scobell (2012) find that economic concerns predomi-
nate over security in China’s policy in further-flung regions like Africa and Latin Amer-
ica. China’s previously mentioned commercial concerns regarding resource security and
access to export markets generate navigational concerns as well, especially as regards to
westward transportation of goods between China and markets in Africa, Europe, and the
Middle East.19 Closest to home, this insecurity contributes China’s stance in the aforemen-
tioned South China Sea dispute; here, diplomatic and geostrategic motives overlap. Further
afield, China is concerned with shipping in the Indian Ocean. Yung and Rustici (2014) see
China building a series of “dual-use logistics facilities” around the rim of the Indian Ocean.
These small facilities, typically attached to Chinese-built commercial ports, would not be
survivable in a major power war, but would suffice for routine resupply needs, small local
conflicts, counterpiracy, rescue, and evacuation operations. China’s 2016 establishment in
Djibouti of its first overseas naval base is consistent with this assessment. Of course, it will
likely be decades before China can effectively compete with American or Indian forces in
the Indian Ocean, but there are other ways around China’s navigational problem.20
The naming of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”–—formerly known as “One Belt, One
Road”—–says as much. The “Belt” crosses overland from China to Europe, while the 21st-
Century Maritime Silk “Road” is the aforementioned series of ports originally concentrated
in the Indian Ocean, but increasingly dispersed globally.21 Some of the ports along the
19The trans-Pacific route to the Americas is also important, but the lack of major inhabited landmasses in
the North Pacific means that economic policy is not a viable means of securing this route.
20For a more in-depth discussion of the trajectory of Chinese naval strategy and force structure over time,
see Cole (2012).
21The Belt and Road has since been expanded to include virtually every region of the globe, but its Eurasian
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Maritime Silk Road are in strategically important locations such as chokepoints, although
by no means all or even most. Many are more unambiguously commercial in nature. The
overland “Belt” is further divided into six “economic corridors” (œNp ):22
1. The “New Eurasian Land Bridge” (∞'ö'Fe) connecting the western border of
Xinjiang in northwestern China to Kazakhstan, Russia, and on to Europe.
2. The “China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor” (-ôƒp ) running north from the Chi-
nese border into Mongolia and Siberia.
3. The “China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor” (-˝—-ö—öp ) connect-
ing (again) Xinjiang to Kazakhstan and on through the other Central Asian states,
Iran, and Turkey.
4. The “China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor” (-˝—-WJõp ) starting at
China’s southern border and continuing through Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia,
and Singapore. Vietnam is now also mentioned as part of the corridor, although this
was not clear at first.
5. The “China-Pakistan Corridor” (-Ùp ), also referred to in English as the “China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC). This corridor begins in Xinjiang and traverses
the length of Pakistan down to the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar.
6. The “Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor” (_-p⇧p ), often referred
to in English by the less unwieldy “BCIM.” Older projects along this route connect
southwestern China to central Myanmar and onward to the Myanmar port of Sittwe.
roots still reflect China’s transit security concerns. The English-language name change from “One Belt, One
Road” to “Belt and Road Initiative” was at least partially due to many foreign observers’ confusion as to how
limited the initiative was to Eurasia; the name in Chinese has remained the same. I use the newer term here.
22Listing of corridors taken from the official Belt and Road Portal [-˝ & ÔQ] (2018).
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Figure 2.1: Map of Belt and Road Economic Corridors and Cities Along Routes
Map prepared by State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping [˝∂Kÿ0⌃·o@] in 2016 and found at
Belt and Road Portal [-˝ & ÔQ] (2018). The above English title is the author’s translation of the
original Chinese title. Per legend at bottom left, orange represents overland cities and routes, and blue
represents maritime.
A newer initiative connects the Myanmar projects to Bangladesh and eastern India.
These connectivity projects bring the stated benefits of stimulating growth in landlocked
Central Asian countries as well as China’s poorer interior provinces, but they also carry
strategic significance. K. Yu (2017) states that “Chinese authorities are concerned that
the country’s trade routes, which are surrounded by U.S. allies, could possibly be cut off
in extreme circumstances” (34). In particular, China worries about the Strait of Malacca,
where the United States Navy could disrupt shipping traffic. Energy pipeline and other
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connectivity projects across Central Asia and Russia allow China to diversify away from
overreliance on the Strait of Malacca, as do two ongoing Chinese-funded overland pipeline
and transportation projects linking western China to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar and
Pakistan (Kugelman, 2017; Rolland, 2017).
These transportation corridors facilitate the movement of goods, but do not guarantee that
markets at the opposite end of the road will be open and friendly, or that China will be
competitive there.23 These interests require attention not just along the road to partner
countries but also at the roads’ termini. I now turn to Chinese financing to address these
concerns.
2.2.1.3 Commercial Interests: Raw Imports and Processed Exports
China’s position in the global economy as the world’s “factory floor” means that it is depen-
dent on both foreign raw materials, of which it has little at home, and export markets for its
manufactured goods. As of 2016, China imported 66.8 percent of its oil and 34.4 percent
of its natural gas (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017). These numbers are not
unusual among industrialized states—–countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea
all have it worse–—but are still a source of concern for a regime focused on maintaining
steady employment and social stability. The numbers are starker for many metals. As of
2016, China accounted for 73.9 percent of global imports of unagglomerated (unprocessed)
iron ore, 21.9 percent of agglomerated iron, 43.3 percent of raw copper ore, 35.3 percent
of refined copper, and 43.0 percent of cobalt (United Nations, 2018).
Secure access to these resources underpins Chinese employment levels and social stabil-
23S. Chen (2011) makes this point for global energy markets: measures facilitating the production of oil
and gas do not necessarily guarantee its safe arrival in Chinese harbors, and safer transportation networks
may not address risks to production.
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ity. It is accepted conventional wisdom at this point that access to natural resources is a
major part of China’s economic engagement in the developing world (E. Economy and
Levi, 2014; Moyo, 2012; Zweig and Bi, 2005). Perhaps somewhat underappreciated is the
parallel exigency of generating business for Chinese construction firms. The “Going Out”
initiative to encourage firms to expand internationally has become much more important
since China’s own economic slowdown from 2010 through the present, as the government
fears the effects of industrial-sector bankruptcies on domestic employment and social sta-
bility (Arnson, Heine, and Zaino, 2014; Ellis, 2014; Rolland, 2017). The literature on
Chinese overseas economic engagement in the 2000s tended to prioritize resource secu-
rity, but export motivations are gaining in importance. China’s labor force is no longer as
cheap as during the boom years of the 2000s, and the government and firms alike are in the
midst of a push to upgrade to higher technology industries which typically require fewer
raw materials. The Made in China 2025 initiative is the centerpiece of this development,
committing state resources to develop such technologies as artificial intelligence, electric
cars, high-speed rail, and renewable energy. Making room for these new industries makes
offshoring the old all the more important (Kennedy, 2015).24 Johnston (2019) adds a de-
mographic component: China’s population is aging rapidly, and it makes sense to move
labor-intensive industries to younger, lower-income countries.25
24The ongoing US-China trade war makes this exigency even more urgent.
25This trend could in the long run lead to lower Chinese demand for commodities. Even if demand growth
slows, limited domestic reserves mean that China will be reliant on foreign oil and gas for the foreseeable
future, but metals usage could fall substantially depending on the degree of structural transformation in the
Chinese economy. This trend could have some bearing on future Chinese development finance. This (along
with other future trends) will be discussed in the conclusion chapter.
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2.2.1.4 Managing Governance Risk
Perhaps the most obvious interest of any lender or investor is being paid back or maintain-
ing their investment’s value, respectively. This chapter has established the choice between
putting money into countries with stable business environments or finding ways to manage
risk in those without. Governance risk is difficult to define. For the purposes of this dis-
sertation I will draw on the work of Bergara, W. J. Henisz, and Spiller (1998) to define it
as susceptibility to arbitrary encroachment by the recipient government on lender and/or
investor interests. This can include direct expropriation, indirect expropriation (via tactics
such as conjuring unanticipated taxes or “fees” once a company has already invested), and
corruption. China has its own ways of managing these risks, but its calculus varies substan-
tially by type of financing. I will discuss China’s tools in more depth in the next chapter on
China’s different types of economic engagement.
2.2.2 The Chinese Case: Enablers and Constraints
The previous section has outlined the dissertation’s primary independent variables, China’s
national interests. However, before moving on to the dependent variable—–stringency in
China’s international development finance—–some explanation of the Chinese domestic
system is in order. The literature on the Bretton Woods institutions operationalizes fi-
nancial stringency as the number of policy conditions attached, which is an appropriate
measure for those institutions. However, conditionality was the product of the confluence
of prevailing liberal ideas, especially after the end of the Cold War. During the time period
when conditionality rose to its current stature in global development, China did not have
the resources to act as more than a minor player in global development finance, and most
of its development institutions were domestically focused. These institutions’ approach to
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doing business abroad carries the legacies both of China’s successful drive to develop at
home and of the sheer fact that they arrived on the international financial scene much later
than many counterparts.
China is different in three ways that affect its modalities of development finance. First, it is
a latecomer to global development finance, meaning it must either compete against estab-
lished actors in lucrative markets or operate alone in more difficult ones. Second, China’s
domestic political economy is the product of an incomplete transition from communism
to market capitalism. The heavy role of the state in financial markets opens the door to
both positives such as long term-oriented projects backed by state-owned banks which can
afford to wait for results, and to negatives such as the use of state credit as a form of pa-
tronage. Third, China does not have a strong tradition of domestic rule of law. So, Chinese
financiers tend less toward making deals according to firm contracts and letter of the law,
and more toward informal mechanisms such as using access to bank credit as a form of
insurance and flexible interpretation of handshake deals. As we shall see, Chinese com-
mercial actors bring many of these tendencies to their overseas dealings. The rest of this
section will explain these points in greater detail.
2.2.2.1 Latecomer Status
China, like many other emerging markets, is a latecomer to development finance. China
has contributed small amounts to global development finance since the dust settled in the
years following the 1949 revolution that brought the Communist Party to power, but for
the remainder of the 20th century was simply too poor to keep up with industrialized donor
states. This all changed around the turn of the millennium, as the Chinese leadership recog-
nized the need to put to use rapidly growing stockpiles of foreign currencies earned via the
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factory export boom. In 1999, the Chinese government announced a policy of “Going Out”
(p˙ª) encouraging firms to do business abroad (General Office of the State Council of
the People’s Repubic of China [-N∫⌘qå˝˝°bûlÖ], 2006). This general
reorientation toward corporate internationalization coincided with the impressive growth in
official development finance outflows shown in Figure 1.1 of the previous chapter.
Because its development finance regime did not fully take shape until relatively recently,
China is not subject to a series of agreements governing international aid and other official
flows. Many international customs regarding development finance are issued by the OECD,
of which China is not a member. One such convention is that delineating “aid” (ODA) from
non-aid (OOF). China was not at the table when it was decided that all flows with a grant
element of more than 25 percent will be considered aid, and it does not take the distinction
particularly seriously.26 Another convention of importance is the OECD’s stance against
“tying” aid, or requiring that projects be carried out by firms from the donor country. This
practice was once a widespread means by which donors used aid to support their own mer-
cantile interests, but has been phased out over time. Studies such as Jepma (1991) have
found that tying aid can inflate costs by somewhere between 10 and 30 percent, depending
on the circumstances. This is not surprising, since the policy is designed to inhibit com-
petition from potentially more efficient rivals. Because of this problem, OECD members
have pledged to phase out tied aid as part of the 2005 Paris Declaration (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005).
China, on the other hand, ties virtually all of its grants and loans. The Export-Import
Bank of China and the China Development Bank, China’s two major development finance
lenders, require that 50 percent of contract value go to Chinese firms (Bräutigam, 2011;
26This point will be elaborated further in the Theory section as part of a discussion of how most Chinese
experts do think about development finance.
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Export-Import Bank of China [-˝€˙„ˆL], 2000; Feigenbaum, 2017). A look
through the Chinese development finance projects listed by AidData’s Global Chinese Offi-
cial Finance dataset reveal only a handful of clear exceptions, many of which involve loans
from Chinese banks to local microfinance or small business-oriented banks and could not
be easily done by a Chinese construction contractor (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018).27
In practice, the actual percentage of contract value tied to Chinese firms is typically well
above the 50 percent legal minimum. Exact figures on this topic are scarce, but Cheng
Cheng [↵⁄] (2018) reports that concessional loans are between 70 and 90 percent tied
and grants and zero-interest loans are 100 percent tied (104-105).
China’s willingness to profit from development finance deals is frequently trumpeted as a
strength by Chinese officials. Most Chinese official documents on the subject make heavy
use of catchphrases such as “win-win” (Ãb) and “mutual benefit” (í‡í)) as well as
references to national sovereignty. The promotion of “win-win” deals implies that there is
no shame in doing well by doing good. Chinese sources have historically avoided terms like
“donor” and “recipient,” instead opting for the more horizontal development “partner” (⇡
4). The message is fairly clear: while the developed nations favor a vertical relationship
between rich donors and poor recipients, China favors a horizontal relationship between
two parties who both get something out of the deal (Moyo, 2009; State Council of the
People’s Republic of China [-N∫⌘qå˝˝°b], 2011; Mawdsley, 2012; Cheng
Cheng [↵⁄], 2018, pp. 2–5). Chinese sources tend to play up this approach’s respect for
developing countries’ sovereignty concerns, which as a fellow developing state China is in
a position to understand.28 This can be contrasted to the greater degree of interference in
27Another notable exception involves energy and mining dealings in Kazakhstan, where Chinese state
lenders have issued direct loans to local firms. This unusual case will be covered in the Kazakhstan case
study.
28For prominent examples of official Chinese doctrine on foreign assistance, see State Council of the
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domestic affairs inherent to policy conditionality.
Much less openly heralded is the issue posed by Chinese public opinion. Foreign aid can be
controversial in many donor countries. Political conditions do not permit reliable polling in
China, but since its income per capita is a fraction that of most developed nations, sacrific-
ing wealth for others is harder to justify to a Chinese citizen than to a developed world peer.
This point makes it into very few Western works—–Christensen (2015) is an exception—–
and is too sensitive to be stated in most Chinese works, but is typically among the first
issues raised in conversations with Chinese specialists and is pervasive in conversations
with most Chinese citizens.29
Finally, latecomer status has left China with weaker investment options than countries
which industrialized earlier. Many of the choicest bits of the developing world were al-
ready taken, and China has been left with the difficult parts. Authors such as S. Chen
(2008, pp. 95–96) argue that this means China must operate with additional caution in order
to safeguard its interests, further reinforcing a tendency to maximize benefits to the Chi-
nese side as well as the recipients (“win-win”). As a later developer, China is not subject to
OECD conventions on development finance but is frequently subject to great political risk
in difficult investment environments. These facts combined with lower incomes at home
and a degree of empathy with formerly colonized states generate a different approach to
development finance.30
People’s Republic of China [-N∫⌘qå˝˝°b] (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014).
29Conversations with Chinese academics and central government staff, Beijing, September-November
2018.
30China was never fully colonized, but this point is frequently glossed over in official PRC texts.
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2.2.2.2 China’s Domestic Political Economy
China’s domestic political economy is substantively more statist than those of most other
major development finance providers. This has an effect on how it approaches development
finance. Looking at a sample of OECD countries, Dietrich (2016) finds that countries which
tend to outsource more public services at home to the private sector are also more likely to
outsource overseas aid to NGOs or private firms. Outsourcing is one way to get around the
hazards of giving money to unsavory leaders, but not all countries are equally likely to use
it. Were we to extrapolate Dietrich’s logic to China, we would place China at the far statist
end of the spectrum, beyond any OECD member. China has an authoritarian state with
little room for independent civil society, meaning few NGOs, and a historical normative
preference for state provision of public services. Most large firms are state-owned, and
many large private firms act in some ways as if they were state-owned, participating in state-
sanctioned international development projects and coordinating with government ministries
in ways little distinguishable from their formally state-owned colleagues.31 Outsourcing to
NGOs is not an option for China, and even transactions with domestically based private
firms are not credibly arms-length. The tools at China’s disposal are fairly different from
those used by OECD countries.
These tools have roots in both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of China’s domes-
tic political economy. First is the sheer quantitative heft of the public sector in the Chinese
system. A greater degree of state influence puts the government in a better position to
marshal economic resources toward its own interests, domestic or international, without as
much input from private actors as would be necessary in other systems. Second, the Chi-
31Prominent examples include the telecommunications firms Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunication
Equipment (ZTE), recent controversies about which illustrate the uncertain boundary between private and
public businesses in China.
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nese system is the product of a partial transition from communism to capitalism. The banks
are predominantly state-owned and still issue credit on a highly subsidized basis. This can
allow for credit to go to socially beneficial projects in which the private sector is not inter-
ested, or to prop up many inefficient state-owned firms in the name of domestic stability. At
the international level, subsidized credit allows Chinese firms to take on levels of risk that
others might not. Third, differential treatment of small and large firms leads to different
strategies. National-level state-owned enterprises typically have no problem maintaining
access to low-interest loans from state-owned banks; the way in which China’s political
and economic systems are interconnected guarantees it. Smaller, (sometimes) more effi-
cient local actors respond to their relative disadvantage by routing bank funds through lo-
cal government organizations with the explicit role of furthering the Party’s developmental
goals, and sometimes by using land as collateral in the hopes that debt-backed develop-
ment projects will cause the land to appreciate in value. These strategies are paralleled in
China’s international development finance. Low-interest loans to large state-owned firms
enable these companies to do business abroad at deflated prices, frequently to the delight
of host governments. This less stringent type of deal, however, is not universal. Some
markets are too risky for even state-backed firms to want to brave on their own; in these
cases, China’s domestic experience with using taxpayer funds routed through state-owned
banks to prop up risky local development projects takes an international turn. And, as was
the case for Chinese localities securing loans with land, this sometimes entails the use of
local assets as collateral.
This section treats each of these three issues sequentially.
Sheer Statism: The Chinese State’s Control of National Wealth The Chinese state
plays a larger role in the economy than in most other countries, meaning that it can more
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of Net National Wealth Held by Public Sector, 2015
Figure created by author using data from Alvaredo et al. (2018).
easily marshal resources toward development finance and can more readily direct banks
and firms to participate in development projects. Data on national wealth compiled by
Piketty, L. Yang, and Zucman (2017) provide a useful starting point. They estimate the
Chinese public sector’s share of national wealth at around 31.4 percent. For reference’s
sake, Figure 2.2 illustrates the public sector’s share of national wealth (net of liabilities) for
all countries for which 2015 data is available from the World Inequality Database.32
The 31.4 percent of national wealth held by China’s public sector may not sound like much,
but in the Alvaredo et al. (2018) dataset, it is second only to Norway, whose oil-based
sovereign wealth fund makes it something of an outlier. Large donors Germany, France,
and Japan have fewer public assets and more public debt, meaning that net state control of
national wealth hovers just above zero. The public sectors of Canada, the United States,
United Kingdom, and Italy actually owe more in debt than they control in assets, meaning
that their governments have less fiscal room to maneuver in overseas development finance
32This database was created by Alvaredo et al. (2018), a team of coauthors including Piketty and Zucman.
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(or in any other issue area).
What’s more, this estimate of China’s public sector wealth understates the actual role of
the Chinese government in the economy. First, it is based on the assumption that housing
is privatized; a debatable assumption, given that all land is still technically publicly owned.
“Homeowners” actually hold titles to seventy-year leases which can be unilaterally can-
celed by the state (State Council of the People’s Republic of China [-N∫⌘qå˝˝
°b], 1990). If one ignores housing, which in any event is less relevant to international
development finance, we are left with the authors’ two other sectoral categories: the cor-
porate sector (66 percent publicly owned) and the residual “other domestic capital and net
financial assets,” a potpourri of agricultural, banking, and other assets which is 48 percent
publicly owned.33 In other words, the sectors most relevant to development finance—–
financial institutions which bankroll projects and firms which implement them—–are still
heavily state-controlled. The state also deploys tools to exercise influence over the cor-
porate sector beyond the powers it holds on paper. Scissors (2016) writes that in order
to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) expectations for a country labeled as a
“market economy,” China has carried out incomplete privatization of some firms, retaining
a minority state interest while allowing the majority of shares to be held publicly. Official
Chinese statistics list these firms as private, but the state is still often the largest share-
holder and easily overpowers the dispersed collection of smaller institutional or household
investors who often hold public shares.34 More importantly, the stock market is not central
33The residual category includes farmland, tenant rights to which are fairly tenuous. Farmland vacated by
migrants to the cities turns over to the state, meaning expropriations are more common in the rural areas than
the cities. Cognizant of this fact, the authors treat farmland as somewhere between 70 percent and 40 percent
publicly owned based on time-specific market trends. Because farmland is a small portion of aggregate
national wealth, they find that alterations to the 40-70 percent window do not materially affect total estimates
of public wealth.
34The Chinese stock market is fairly closed to foreign investment.
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to Chinese firms’ success. Most Chinese firms rely more on debt financing than equity, and
the banking system is predominantly state-controlled. The Chinese state is more involved
in the economy than even its share of legal ownership would indicate.
Piketty, L. Yang, and Zucman allude to the implications of public wealth for state policy,
writing that:
The structure of national property has large implications for economic devel-
opment. The size of public property affects the State’s ability to conduct indus-
trial and regional development policy (sometime in an efficient way, sometime
less so). It also has potentially large fiscal consequences: governments with
negative net public wealth typically must pay large interest payments before
they can finance public spending and welfare transfers, while those with large
positive net public wealth can benefit from substantial capital income and fi-
nance more spending than what they levy in taxes. (22-23)
Essentially, governments which control greater shares of national wealth are in stronger po-
sitions to actively influence the economy; those in debt, much less so. The authors shy away
from taking any position on whether this type of state influence in the economy is a good or
bad thing—–to use their words, states act “sometimes in an efficient way, sometimes less
so”–—and in doing so neatly sum up the debate over China’s use of state finances, which
opens up possibilities both positive and negative. Their focus is on domestic developmental
policy, but as we shall see, they could just as easily have been talking about international
development finance.
Financial Repression and Incomplete Marketization These statistics belie the fact that
China’s state used to control an even higher share of national wealth. China has undergone
an incomplete transition from communism to capitalism. Some sectors of the economy are
highly marketized, and others are mostly state-led. As of this writing, further marketiza-
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tion has ground to a halt, and the less efficient state-led sector is propped up by a system
of subsidized credit. The rest of this subsection details how this state of affairs came to
pass, what it means for larger state-owned Chinese firms, and how smaller firms can try to
compete.
Unsurprisingly, Piketty, L. Yang, and Zucman estimate that the Chinese state controls a
much smaller percentage of wealth than in the Maoist years lasting through the 1970s—–
31 percent today, as opposed to 69 percent in 1978. Their choice of starting year is not a
coincidence. In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping took over as leader of China and initiated a
policy of “reform and opening up” (9i >), implementing internal marketizing reforms
and greater openness to external trade and investment. Naughton (1996, 2006) writes that
China has taken a piecemeal, gradualist approach to reform aimed at opening up new,
more productive economic sectors while minimizing the disruption that would come with
destroying the old. Of particular note was Deng’s use of “dual-track” systems (Ãh6).
Under Mao, farms and factories were subject to quotas, meaning that they were expected to
produce up to a certain point for a national distribution organization which would purchase
at a fixed price. However, Deng allowed them to produce past this quota point and sell the
additional output on the open market at market prices, which were typically higher than
quota prices. These firms also gravitated toward areas of Chinese comparative advantage
in labor-intensive light manufacturing, which had been shortchanged by Mao’s desire to
build a heavy industrial base for China’s defense needs. During the 1980s and 1990s, the
new market “track” gained significant clout relative to the fixed-price “track.”
As the real economy evolved, the financial system was under corresponding pressure to
change. When Deng took power, China’s banks were essentially Soviet-style resource
allocation machines taking in state revenues and disbursing them to favored sectors. These
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banks existed (and still exist)35 under a regime of financial repression. Under financial
repression, interest rates are held artificially low, typically below the rate of inflation. This
means that there is a de facto “tax” on bank depositors whose assets lose real value every
year and that banks can then use the proceeds of this “tax” to lend to targeted firms or
industries at subsidized interest rates. Financial repression was a very common strategy for
industrializing countries in the 20th century; in the Chinese case, it dates back to the Mao
era.36 Interest rates were typically very low, and there was no pretense of trying to earn
profits from loans or even strictly demanding repayment—this was not the point (Lardy,
2008; Kroeber, 2016, pp. 131–33).
Even as China’s economy began to marketize, these subsidized loans were targeted at the
old state-owned behemoths and did not always reach the newer, nimbler, smaller market-
oriented firms which became increasingly important. China’s leaders faced an awkward
choice. On one hand, reallocating bank credit from inefficient state-owned heavy industry
to efficient new light manufacturing firms would lead to aggregate gains in output. On the
other, allowing the old giants to flounder or fail could lead to enormous waves of unem-
ployment. McMillan and Naughton (1992) compared this dilemma to that faced by Eastern
European leaders during the “Big Bang” transition from communism to capitalism. They
argued that moving more slowly allows leaders to monitor reform policies and safeguard
against negative unintended consequences while progressively building state capacity to
regulate markets. Given the course of events in Russia in the 1990s, they appear to have
been quite prescient. However, the time did eventually come to make actual cuts to the
35China is currently in the process of liberalizing interest rates, removing state controls for specific types
of deposits and wealth products one at a time. However, even if these controls are lifted, interest rates are still
subject to the monetary policy of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), the central bank. The PBoC is not fully
independent of the state and so far has been cautious about raising interest rates too quickly (Song, 2017).
36See McKinnon (1993) for a discussion of financial repression and liberalization in developing countries.
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inefficient state sector—to borrow the title of Naughton (1996), to “[grow] out of the plan.”
Naughton (2006) writes that by the 1990s, there was an increasing sense that China’s new
economy had grown large enough to absorb some workers were there to be layoffs in the
state sector. However, this would not mean wholesale closing down the largest state-owned
firms—–this would be a taller order than the new light manufacturing sector could fill. So,
the economically focused Premier Zhu Rongji began an effort to “grasp the large and let go
of the small” (·'>✏), curtailing bank credit to many smaller insolvent firms in heavy
industries such as coal and steel which had been favored by the Maoist leadership in the
mid-20th century. In the financial sector, Zhu imposed greater profitability requirements
on the “Big Four”37 state-owned banks, incentivizing them to make fewer non-performing
loans (NPLs)—–essentially, loans that are not being paid back—–to unprofitable so-called
“zombie firms” being kept alive only by a steady diet of state credit.
Some firms indeed went under, but in hindsight, it is now clear that reforms have not gone
as far as some liberal-minded observers might have guessed. As of December 2018, the
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission [-˝ˆL›i—c°⌃‘X⇢]
(2019) estimated that 17.6 percent of assets in the banking system belong to “joint-stock
commercial banks” (°˝6F⇢ˆL), the official term for banks set up as corporations
with private shareholders. This estimate should be taken with a grain of salt. The govern-
ment holds stakes in some joint-stock banks, and some state-owned banks allow minority
stakes to be publicly traded. The Chinese financial system across the board engages in
some activities which are not recorded in government statistics. However, we can take the
official statistics as a rough indicator of the strength of the private sector in the banking
37The Big Four are the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, and




The remaining 82.4 percent or so of financial assets belong to state-owned banks of vari-
ous stripes. These include six “large commercial banks” ('ãF⇢ˆL) which control
35.5 percent of national assets as well as a variety of smaller, often locally or regionally
focused banks. Of special note are China’s three “policy banks,” the Agricultural Devel-
opment Bank of China, China Development Bank, and Export-Import Bank of China. In
1994, as Zhu Rongji’s banking reforms were beginning to ask more of commercial banks in
terms of profitability, these three banks were created to lend at lower interest rates toward
projects of particular social or economic significance. For example, they frequently lend
to infrastructure projects with low rates of financial return but positive spillover effects for
nearby residents and users. Some losses, or at the very least extended periods of initial
unprofitability, are more acceptable for these banks; as we shall see in the following chap-
ter, they have carried this tolerance for risk and loss into many international markets (M.
Chen, 2018; Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013). As of the end of 2017, the most recent year
for which they have published data, the policy banks account for 10.1 percent of China’s
total banking assets.38
How the Big Stay Big and the Small Survive: The Economics of Financial Repression
Meets the Politics of the Party How has a system of state-owned banks and financial
repression managed to endure for so long, despite decades of criticism? The answer to this
question is multifaceted and reflects different sets of circumstances among larger national-
level firms and smaller local ones. Many larger firms may be inefficient legacies of the
38Calculation: (6,221,499,000,000 ADBC + 15,593,000,000,000 CDB + 3,640,596,582,870 Exim) /
252,404,000,000,000 national total RMB. Data on policy bank assets from China [-˝ú⇢—UˆL]
(2018), China Development Bank [-˝ —ˆL] (2018), and China [-˝€˙„ˆL] (2018). Data on
aggregate national banking assets from China Banking Regulatory Commission [-˝ˆL⇢—c°⌃‘X
⇢] (2018).
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communist past, but they employ far too many people to be left to flounder. Local en-
terprises can thrive in a giant-centric financial system by routing funding through local
governments and presenting themselves as designated development initiatives in line with
Party economic goals, or they can use land as collateral for development projects knowing
that the projects themselves will probably cause it to appreciate.
Underlying state-owned banks’ interactions with large and small firms alike is the fact that
they awkwardly serve two masters: profits and the state. On one hand, bank managers face
incentives to show profits to shareholders (even minority ones) and government bosses;
on the other, government bosses might sometimes encourage them to sacrifice profits for
the greater good. Coming out of Zhu Rongji’s reform years of the 1990s, Brandt and Zhu
(2000) noted that while private firms posted better profits, large state-owned firms em-
ployed disproportionate numbers of citizens. Government leaders concerned with social
stability could not ignore this fact, and Zhu Rongji’s “grasp the big and let go of the small”
never progressed past smaller firms. Lin and Tan (1999) make a related observation re-
garding state-owned firms’ “soft budget constraints.” For most firms, losing money would
be considered a problem, and the firms must invest and spend within a “hard budget con-
straint” to avoid losing money. China’s state-owned firms, however, know that if they run
into problems, the government has no choice but to bail them out. This moral hazard prob-
lem means that firms are likely to overinvest in risky projects with the expectation that the
government will pick up the check if things go poorly. Depressed interest rates via financial
repression makes the budget constraint even softer, but Party leaders are loath to directly
address the issue. Allowing interest rates to rise would put unprofitable state-owned firms
in a financial crunch, potentially taking many well-paying jobs and local cadre performance
assessments down with them.
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In hindsight, Brandt and Zhu may have only been seeing the beginnings of things to come.
Because China’s government officials are often judged based on short-term economic re-
sults, they often reinforce the banks’ tendency to keep throwing good money after bad.
China’s political system is a hierarchy consisting of five layers: the central government, the
provinces, prefectures, townships, and villages, in that order. Local officials can be pro-
moted, moved, or demoted based on performance. These personnel decisions are made by
officials at higher levels of government. H. Li and L.-A. Zhou (2005) find that provincial-
level promotion and demotion decisions are significantly based on economic performance.
V. C. Shih, Adolph, and M. Liu (2012) later found that political connections and educa-
tional qualifications are actually more important than economic performance for top central
appointments; Choi (2012) finds that political connections and economic performance both
matter for top positions, but economic performance predominates at the lower levels.
The upshot of this literature is that all cadres are to some degree concerned with economic
performance, but the way in which they address these concerns varies by level of gov-
ernment. Upper-level officials are more concerned with state-owned giants and will ensure
that they continue to receive preferential treatment from the banks. Lower-level officials are
judged more intensively based on economic results than on their typically weaker political
connections, but they face these demands under the constraint of being the banks’ second
priority after the Beijing-based behemoths. In response, local officials blur the line between
state bureaucrat and industrial tycoon. Especially early in China’s development process,
many municipalities had little industry to speak of, and they were typically not going to
be able to compete with well-connected national-level state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for
cheap loans with optional repayment. Instead, they used their own latent economic poten-
tial as collateral. This typically happened through two interrelated mechanisms: land-based
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financing and local government financing vehicles (LGFVs).
Yeh and Wu (1996) and Sanderson and Forsythe (2013) speak of the utility of land as a
means for financing industrialization. Because all land in China is publicly owned, local
governments can borrow money to build up certain areas with new housing and indus-
try in the knowledge that this will cause neighboring plots of land to appreciate in value.
They can then sell the rights to use this nearby land to property developers, many of whom
have bank connections of their own, and then use the proceeds from sales to pay down
their original debts. Peterson (2006) specifies that this mechanism is particularly useful for
building infrastructure. Other projects such as industrial buildings are more likely to gen-
erate enough revenue by themselves to repay debt, but infrastructural projects frequently
struggle to do this. However, highways and the like typically cause the value of neighbor-
ing land to spike, opening the door for land-based financing schemes. Peterson estimated
that, at least as of 2006, many Chinese municipalities financed over half of their infrastruc-
ture budgets in this manner. Sanderson and Forsythe (2013) add that many local growth
efforts are led by local government financing vehicles (LGFVs; 0π?úçDs),
entities owned by the local government which borrow from banks and channel the money
into local investment projects. These organizations often blur the line between public and
private, acting much like privately owned real estate trusts would in more marketized coun-
tries (Y. S. Zhang and Barnett, 2014). Many land-backed development projects are carried
out through LGFVs.
This system—–subsidized credit to national giants, and land- or local government-backed
deals for smaller actors—–has now spread overseas as Chinese commercial actors become
more global. One way to do business overseas is to rely on subsidized credit at home to out-
bid the competition on contracts abroad or to make an equity investment on “sweetheart”
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terms. This type of deal effectively transfers a Chinese state subsidy to the host country and
is obviously desirable from the host’s perspective. However, not all potential host countries
are equally profitable. In those with serious creditworthiness concerns, it may be necessary
to take measures paralleling those used by local Chinese actors to operate within a financial
system which is inherently skewed toward larger peers. Local government financing vehi-
cles (LGFVs) can steer credit toward preferred projects involving local firms; even if these
projects are losers in the long run, they can create local employment. This mechanism is
replicated through the use of tied loans in which credit is steered toward preferred Chinese
companies which will be sure to receive their cut of a project’s proceeds and will leave the
bank and the borrower country on the hook if a project fails. In tougher business environ-
ments, something approximating land-based financing can be used. The land-backed model
is difficult to implement in countries with secure landowner tenure, and only a handful of
Chinese firms have used it overseas.39 However, natural resources are publicly owned in
most countries and can be readily used as collateral or repayment, especially where Chinese
extractive industries are involved.
Before we elaborate upon how these modalities fit into a broader theory of development fi-
nance, we turn to one last important difference between China and most other development
financiers: the lack of the rule of law.
2.2.2.3 Whither the Rule of Law
The rule of law is almost unanimously cited as a positive for virtually any outcome of in-
terest, but there are silver linings to doing without it. While stable adherence to written
contracts is good for investment, it also takes away a degree of flexibility in adapting to
39There is some discussion of this model being used in places including Jamaica and Rwanda, but only in
isolated instances.
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unforeseen circumstances which are disproportionately likely to pop up in rural China or
large parts of the Global South. This subsection traces the history of China’s simultane-
ous promotion of growth and investment and neglect of the rule of law before moving to
explain what a non-legalistic system means for domestic development and, by extension,
how Chinese financial organizations do business abroad.
China’s decades-long effort to foster the growth of new economic sectors and slowly use
them to replace the old was necessarily ad hoc in nature. The two-track pricing system
implemented under Deng—–a lower government-determined price for state requisitions up
to a certain quota and a higher market-determined price for production beyond the quota—–
necessitated bargaining on a case-by-case basis. It would be unreasonable to expect a small
village-based factory, for example, to produce the same amount as a large plant in a major
city. Shirk (1993) writes that Deng and the early reformers used a system of “particularistic
contracts” to address these issues, eschewing a system of universal rules in favor of a series
of individual bargains.
This system unfortunately generated enormous opportunities for rent-seeking and corrup-
tion. Black marketeers could buy at the quota price and sell on the open market. This was
much easier to do if one had political connections, meaning that officials and firm bosses
could collude in corrupt dealings and even (if highly enough ranked) manipulate prices
toward their own advantage. As the ownership structure of the Chinese economy began
to open up, the gains from these dealings put many officials in the position to buy actual
stakes in firms (Manion, 2004). The semi-liberalized financial system made this problem
worse. V. C. Shih (2004b) finds that bank loans tend to go the politically well-connected.
In related works, V. C. Shih (2004a, 2009) continues with the alarming finding that pro-
reform technocrats tend to ignore these dodgy politically motivated loans and instead focus
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their efforts on containing the inflation that naturally results from excessive lending. Even
high-ranking reformist figures such as Premier Zhu Rongji could not guarantee their po-
litical survival were they to take on the financial system underpinning the enrichment of
the elite. Better to treat the symptoms and ignore the cure than to try to treat both and
fail. Even when banks deviate from their state-owned focus and lend to the private sector,
W. Zhou (2009) finds that they disproportionately target firms owned by members of sub-
national legislatures. Pei (2006) speaks of a “trapped transition” in which well-connected
elites benefit from the inefficient state-owned sector and block efforts to reallocate capital
to more productive private firms.40
None of this portends well for the rule of law. As of 2017, the World Bank’s World-
wide Governance Indicators rank China 117th out of 210 countries in the Rule of Law
category, and 112th in Control of Corruption (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2018). This places
China in the middle of the global distribution, but toward the bottom among development
finance donors. Table 2.1 lists Rule of Law and Control of Corruption scores for leading
donors.
40See also Pei (2016).








































































































































































































































































































































There are countries with more corruption and weaker rule of law than China, but most are
not major development financiers. China does not have a historical tradition of rule of law,
and it would be a stretch to say that this ranking is only because of political economy trends
of the past forty years.
There are obvious reasons to see China’s low governance ranking as bad for economic out-
comes, but there are also (less obvious) reasons to see it is a positive. Pessimists point
to a growing mass of non-performing debts held by unprofitable firms or well-connected
people and see an impending crisis (Lardy, 2019; Lu and T. Sun, 2013; McMahon, 2018;
Wright and Rosen, 2018). Others might see these debts as an acceptable price for the
enormous gains that China has made since 1978. How has a chaotic, breakneck accumula-
tion of largely unsupervised loans resulted in one of history’s greatest periods of economic
expansion?
The answer lies in the successful use of that debt—or at least some of it—toward productive
ends. Hall and Soskice (2001) write that in markets in which banks play a larger role in
corporate governance, firms are more likely to take a long-term orientation, while firms
relying on equity will think shorter-term. Stock market investors tend to value firms based
on quarterly earnings reports and do not always plan to stay invested for long enough
to see long-term projects come to fruition. Banks, however, typically provide financing
on a longer-term basis and are more comfortable with a slow-and-steady strategy. Hall
and Soskice’s book focused on advanced industrial economies, contrasting bank-centric
systems in places such as Japan and parts of continental Europe with the equity-heavy
Anglo-American model. China again lies further to one end of the spectrum than these
countries.
Figure 2.3 depicts the ratio of corporate debt outside the financial sector to the total market
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Figure 2.3: Ratio of Non-Financial Corporate Debt to Listed Firm Market Capitalization,
2006-2017
Graph created by author based on data from Bank for International Settlements (2018) for debt and World
Bank (2018c) for equity.
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capitalization of publicly traded firms.41 Germany and Japan are certainly more debt-heavy
than the stock market-focused United States, but China’s underdeveloped stock market and
bank-centered political economy put it in another league. While some take this as a sign of
trouble, others praise the banks’ deployment of “patient capital,” to use Hall and Soskice’s
term. These scholars would argue that there is some utility in allowing companies to move
more slowly.
Lin’s “new structural economics” makes just such a case (Lin, 2011b, 2012).42 The first
World Bank Chief Economist to come from a developing country, Justin Yifu Lin has
become a prominent cheerleader for China’s approach to development. Lin focuses on
the idea of comparative advantage—–hardly a new idea, he says, but one which is not
fully exploited. Lin argues that certain bottlenecks can inhibit market forces from ever
fully making use of a country’s comparative advantage. To be more specific, he states
that:
[. . . ] economic development as a dynamic process entails structural changes,
involving industrial upgrading and corresponding improvements in “hard” (tan-
gible) and “soft” (intangible) infrastructure at each level. Such upgrading
and improvements require an inherent coordination, with large externalities
to firms’ transaction costs and returns to capital investment. Thus, in addition
to an effective market mechanism, the government should play an active role
in facilitating structural changes. (Lin, 2012, pp. 14–15)
41This chart uses loans to non-financial corporations as a measurement of debt. The inclusion of financial
corporations would have led to more listed debt for the developed countries and especially the United States,
where debt derivatives are traded in large volumes with little immediate connection to end users, and govern-
ment bonds constitute a large part of the landscape as well. Since this chart is meant to reflect the role of debt
in corporate governance, it is best to focus on the portion of debt which actually reaches corporations.
42This work is part of a larger body of related works built up over Lin’s career. See also Lin (2009) and Lin,
Cai, and Z. Li (2003). Going further back, Lin’s thought draws on a large literature regarding “developmental
states” in which governments seek to actively guide market behavior to enhance economic growth, especially
in developing countries. See, for example, Johnson (1982), Woo-Cumings (1999), and Kohli (2004). Lin,
Cai, and Z. Li (2003) nod to this fact, comparing the Chinese experience to those of four other East Asian
states.
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It is well known that factor endowments are important to determining economic structure
(Heckscher, 1919; Solow, 1956). For example, a country rich in labor will likely be strong
in light manufacturing; a country with more land, agriculture. Lin argues that these fac-
tor endowments can actually be changed by effective government policy. A poor agrarian
country might stay poor forever unless it builds up factors of production that facilitate a
structural transformation toward a higher value-added form of activity such as light manu-
facturing or services. Because these new industries are weak, financial institutions will not
back them; because financial institutions will not back them, they stay weak. Lin focuses
on actualizing potential comparative advantage in new sectors through building “hard and
soft infrastructure.” Lin and Monga (2012) further specify that “examples of hard infras-
tructure are highways, port facilities, airports, telecommunication systems, electricity grids
and other public utilities. Soft infrastructure consists of institutions, regulations, social
capital, value systems, and other social and economic arrangements.” (168) Better hard
infrastructure can lower firms’ transaction costs and thus allow them to operate and com-
pete for capital more efficiently. However, infrastructure projects are typically not very
profitable, and no less a free marketeer than Adam A. Smith (1776) cited “public works”
as a necessary area for state involvement. China’s debt-fueled buildup operated according
to a similar logic: using government credit to build up infrastructure around which industry
can grow, then using the industries’ profits and sale of surrounding land rights to repay the
debts.
The soft infrastructure part of the equation would be more controversial in China’s case.
China never had much in the way of soft infrastructure, and the manner in which it has
pushed for hard infrastructure has slowed any progress in “softer” areas. China has an
uncomfortable mix of impressive economic results and rent-seeking by central and local
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elites. Proponents of China’s developmental model either do not talk about the disloca-
tion generated by land-based financing and the corruption of the financial system or quietly
acknowledge it as a price of progress. There may even be some benefits to building hard in-
frastructure without soft. One person’s “non-performing loan” might be another’s “flexible
repayment”; lack of strict adherence to debt contracts may well buy slow-moving projects
time to deal with unexpected roadblocks, at the expense of allowing less productive ones
to flounder on. Chummy relations between state-owned banks and state-owned borrowers
amplify this dynamic: they mean more loans to high-risk, low-output projects, but also that
default is easier to avoid. When the state’s left hand is lending to its right, it is easy enough
to simply ignore the debt indefinitely, contracts be damned.43
The Chinese system has generated large amounts of investment and record-breaking eco-
nomic results, but in the process has inhibited the emergence of the rule of law and has
brought about widespread corruption, excess borrowing, and economic overcapacity, not
to mention large social and environmental costs outside the limited scope of this work.
This contradiction at the heart of the Chinese growth miracle is now being international-
ized through cross-border development finance. A loan officer who must choose between
a questionable loan to a well-connected Party member and a safer loan to an unconnected
but promising entrepreneur might be able to empathize with an international development
technocrat choosing between friends of his or her home country with weak institutions or
neutral parties with strong institutions. In some cases, the clientelistic, repayment-optional
deals common to China’s domestic system turn into a form of diplomatic outreach to in-
ternational partners; in other cases, credit to local cadres’ pet projects, sometimes with the
backing of land, turns into stricter cross-border deals in which China has a hand in steer-
43Prasad (2016) sees this factor as significantly reducing the risk that China’s high levels of debt turn into
an overall crisis.
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ing credit toward preferred firms and sometimes putting up local resources as collateral.
Stricter and laxer forms of finance were already in Chinese organizations’ toolkit before
they were major international players.
2.3 Concluding Thoughts
This chapter has established that China balances a range of foreign policy interests in-
cluding the Taiwan issue as well as diplomatic, geostrategic, commercial, and risk man-
agement concerns. Its toolkit to confront these foreign policy challenges is an outgrowth
of an incomplete marketization process characterized by a strong state; an economic dis-
juncture between well-connected but inefficient large firms and marginalized but efficient
small ones; subsidized government support for preferred firms; cronyistic relations between
lender and borrower; the frequent use of land as collateral; and an emphasis on particular-
istic relations over the rule of law. All of these factors will make an appearance in the
following chapter, in which I outline China’s tools of international development finance
and hypothesize which among them will be used toward which types of foreign policy
interests.
Chapter 3
The Dependent Variable and a New
Theory
This chapter outlines the dependent variable and the theory. First, I outline the basic the-
ory and hypotheses. Second, I include a brief section connecting the quirks of China’s
domestic development finance to its international practice. Third, I detail each of China’s
modalities of overseas development finance and connect them to the hypotheses via a se-
ries of expected observable implications. This section also includes summary statistics of
each modality of financing and a brief analysis of how the summary statistics compare to
theoretical predictions. I then conclude with a summary and several disclaimers.
3.1 The Theory
The literature surrounding conflicting priorities in Bretton Woods policy conditionality can
travel to China, with substantial modification. The core idea—–that lenders must bal-
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ance the need for leniency toward diplomatic partners with strictness in order to ensure
repayment–—applies. The underlying assumption is that the donor can either push to get
its money back or curry favor with the recipient government. The donor’s foreign policy
interests include both financial repayment and political goals, and meeting one goal may
come at the expense of the other. However, in some cases, the opposite is true, and financial
repayment may be positively associated with another foreign policy goal. Take the case of
China’s tied loans. Part of the point is to generate business for sectors struggling with do-
mestic overcapacity, and while China’s taxpayers and banks may end up footing the bill for
a construction project if a recipient government has trouble paying, the optimal outcome
for Chinese commercial interests is obviously repayment according to schedule. Similarly,
loans backed by oil are intended to contribute to China’s energy security, and if the bor-
rower is unable to produce enough oil to pay back the loan, then the policy has failed. In
these cases, China will use stricter terms to enforce its own interests. These mechanisms
are not covered in the existing literature for the simple reason that the institutions which
have dominated development finance for decades have not used them in some time.1 The
rest of this chapter lays out what types of national interests are complementary with repay-
ment and lead to laxer terms, and what types are supplementary to repayment and lead to
stricter terms.
We begin with diplomatic interests. All else equal, we would expect diplomatic interests
to lead to more concessional types of financing. The logic here is the same as in the lit-
erature on Bretton Woods conditionality outlined in Chapter 2: the tougher a donor gets
1Japan and South Korea are partial exceptions, especially in the late 20th century. Many Western powers
also used tied aid in the 20th century, but the practice was being phased out by the time the policy condition-
ality literature was beginning to blossom in the 2000s, and policy conditionality scholars overlooked what
then might have seemed to be obsolete. Furthermore, the literature’s recent focus on the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions means that bilateral organizations such as the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) which
do sometimes use tied or resource-backed loans are not frequently covered.
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about financial return, the less happy a recipient is likely to be. However, countries with
viewpoints opposite China’s—–e.g., diplomatic recognition of Taipei or conflicting claims
in the South China Sea—–present something of a dilemma.2 On one hand, China could at-
tempt to win them over with the best possible treatment, but it is difficult to guarantee that
the countries will not “take the money and run” without lasting changes in policy. On the
other hand, China can punish them by withholding assistance, but this may not incentivize
them to change their policies. I hypothesize that China will respond with a combination
of these two strategies. China will usually withhold financing to these countries but will
make an exception if there appears to be an opportunity to sway policy. This means that
the absolute quantity of financing to these countries will be depressed, but when exceptions
are made, the quality will be highly concessional in order to present China’s most generous
possible image. For countries which both recognize Beijing and do not have overlapping
claims with China’s in the South China Sea, the more conventional logic—diplomatic mo-
tives lead to more concessional financing—applies. I hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 1A Countries which recognize Taiwan or whose South China Sea
claims overlap China’s will receive less official development finance from China.
Hypothesis 1B However, countries which recognize Taiwan or whose South
China Sea claims overlap China’s will receive laxer financing terms.
Hypothesis 2 Chinese diplomatic interests other than the Taiwan and South
China Sea disputes will lead to laxer financing terms.
China will also wish to present a friendlier face to countries in which it has geostrategic
interests. In general, it makes sense to be as lax as possible with geostrategically important
countries rather than risk upsetting them with pesky issues of repayment. In China’s case,
2This dilemma is an old one. Baldwin (1966) finds that during the early Cold War, the United States
fluctuated every few years between showering Soviet-leaning non-aligned states with aid and cutting them
off.
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this means giving favorable deals to countries important to border security or navigational
interests.
Hypothesis 3A All else equal, Chinese geostrategic interests will lead to laxer
financing terms.
However, there are exceptions to this rule. In some instances, China will be interested in
not only managing bilateral relations with geostrategically important countries, but also
building projects there that themselves have geostrategic significance. Examples would
be ports along major shipping routes or overland connectivity across Eurasia to the Chi-
nese border. In countries with strong governance environments, Chinese firms can do this
without issue, but countries with high levels of corruption present additional challenges.
China here might use more stringent terms to mitigate credit risk and push their firms into
geostrategically important but commercially risky markets.
This can happen through one of two causal mechanisms. First, firms and lenders will
simply ask for more protection to enter certain markets, and the Chinese government will
be more willing to oblige them in countries of geostrategic significance. Second, countries
with stronger governance are likely to have more available sources of finance and will be
able to use these as leverage to bargain for more favorable terms. In a business school
favorite, Fisher and Ury (1981) coined the term “BATNA,” short for “best alternative to a
negotiated agreement.” Fisher and Ury see the BATNA, or what each party would be left
with were talks to totally fall through, as pivotal in determining negotiated outcomes. A
party with a strong BATNA can credibly threaten to walk away from the table and can thus
extract better terms.
Quantitative analysis can only measure inputs and outcomes and cannot distinguish be-
tween intermediary causal mechanisms. Following Brady and Collier (2004), I instead
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look for causal process observations in the case studies to test for these mechanisms. In
any event, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3B There will be a negative interactive effect between governance
quality and geostrategic importance on the stringency of financing terms.
Last, but certainly not least, we arrive at commercial interests. Primary drivers of Chinese
development finance include both natural resource security and the need to maintain em-
ployment in overcapacity-ridden construction sectors. Berthélemy (2006) argues that more
concessional aid is better for promoting trade interests, the idea being that a steady flow
of aid can convince recipients to keep commercial barriers low. This is certainly a valid
strategy. However, it assumes that repayment of aid and the donor’s commercial interests
are unrelated; as in, grants to curry favor with local officials with power over economic
decision-making. In China’s case, repayment and commercial interests are frequently one
and the same, as deals are structured such that repayment serves Chinese export interests
and (in some cases) Chinese resource security.3 So, we arrive at the following hypothe-
sis:
Hypothesis 4A All else equal, Chinese commercial interests will lead to stricter
financing terms.
As was the case for geostrategic interests, governance risk has a mediating effect on this
relationship. Countries with natural resources and patterns of weak governance will be
unattractive to Chinese firms, which will require extra incentivization to do business there.
Stricter financing terms can mitigate risk and spur them in this direction. Relatively isolated
from global markets, states with reputations for poor governance will more likely accept
3While there are isolated instances of China using development finance as a bargaining chip in trade
disputes—–this has happened in Argentina, for example—it may matter that China’s rise as a development
financier mostly took place in the context of a strong WTO and low global trade barriers.
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stricter Chinese terms that might be turned down elsewhere. (The logic here is essentially
the same as for Hypothesis 3B). The same is true for export or repayment interests: the
more money a Chinese firm or bank has at stake, the harder it will push for stricter terms
which provide it with better insurance, and the more likely the government will be to agree.
Stated simply:
Hypothesis 4B There will be a negative interactive effect between governance
quality and commercial interests on the stringency of financing terms.
Before moving on to the dependent variable, it is worth noting that there is the appearance
of a degree of overlap between geostrategic interests and commercial interests, especially
with respect to natural resources. Resource security is not always thought of as separate
from security of other types. For the purposes of this dissertation, “resource security” in-
volves events in the country in which commodities are produced, while transportation of
said resources back to China (or other importing markets) counts as part of geostrategic
interests. This distinction may be artificial in other contexts but makes sense when analyz-
ing Chinese development finance. The beginning of this section established that financiers
face incentives to be stricter when pursuing interests that can be promoted via financial
terms but to improve bilateral relations via laxer terms otherwise. Some of China’s tougher
loan conditions (especially resource collateralization) are meant to boost its firms’ market
share in commodity producing countries, meaning China may be tougher on these states.
However, these conditions do nothing to safeguard passage of minerals to China or other
importing markets; this passage occurs disproportionately across geostrategically important
countries’ territory. China could hypothetically try to use loan terms to maintain transporta-
tion access as well, but stipulations of this nature would run afoul of territorial sovereignty
and would be of questionable enforceability in a crisis. Instead, China relies more on
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  maintaining friendly relations with countries at geostrategically important locations so as
   to minimize the risk of being locked out of major transportation routes.
The hypotheses included in this section are simple enough on paper, but empirically testing 
them is more complicated. To do this requires 1) understanding China’s conception of de-
velopment finance and what kind of tools are in its toolkit; and 2) how these tools belong to 
different bureaucratic organizations and issue areas. For example, grants and zero-interest 
loans both belong to the Ministry of Commerce and are used for smaller-scale social sector 
projects, meaning they more readily comparable to one another than either would be to 
billion-dollar infrastructure loans from a state-owned policy bank. The next sections cover 
these issues and proceed to testable implications of the theory.
3.2 The Dependent Variable: Development Finance Strin-
gency and Chinese Conceptions Thereof
The political science literature has typically operationalized development finance strin-
gency as either the distinction between ODA and OOF or as the degree of policy con-
ditionality attached to assistance packages. These are logical choices for most OECD
countries and for the Bretton Woods institutions, but the prevailing conception of devel-
opment finance in China includes a wider variety of policy options. Furthermore, Chinese
development finance is less connected to the type of liberal thought that underpins policy
conditionality and makes much less of the distinction between “aid” and “business” that
underpins the ideas of ODA and OOF. This section will briefly introduce leading Chinese
scholars’ conceptions of development finance, with a particular focus on how the idea of
stringency can be applied.
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China’s domestic political economy and developmental model inevitably shape the de-
velopment finance options available to its leaders. Justin Yifu Lin (2011a) has explicitly
acknowledged this fact with a series of works applying his new structural economics to
Chinese outbound development finance. China’s experience in overcoming infrastructural
bottlenecks to structural transformation and growth, he says, could also apply to many
contemporary low-income countries. Cooperation between China and various partners can
help resolve them. Indeed, Bataineh, Bennon, and Fukuyama (2018) write that China’s
willingness to lose money (or at least wait patiently for profits) has propelled the coun-
try to a leadership position in global infrastructure construction. Patience of this nature
is much easier with a domestic political economy characterized by a strong state, greater
corporate reliance on banks than on the stock market, and a willingness to fudge on debt
repayment contracts as unforeseen circumstances emerge. Cheng Cheng [↵⁄] (2018)
uses the metaphor of the body’s circulatory system to describe Sino-African cooperation.
A Chinese-built African transportation network should serve as the arteries and veins car-
rying goods throughout an increasingly thriving continental economy.4
However, “development cooperation” between China and lower-income countries is not
necessarily limited to “aid” in the conventional sense. A latecomer concerned with using
state power to catch up to established financiers and maximize financial returns for its
middle-income citizenry, China does not adhere to the OECD distinction between ODA
(“aid”) and OOF and commercial flows (“business”), instead espousing a business-friendly
“win-win” approach. So, a more expansive definition of development finance is necessary.
Along with World Bank Senior Economist Wang Yan, Lin does just this. Lin and Y. Wang
(2014) conceptualize development finance (“DF”) as a series of four concentric rings. To
4See also Kaplan (2018).
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                 AND CHINESE CONCEPTIONS use their exact words, the four subcategories are:
• DF1 = ODA, as defined by OECD-DAC;
• DF2 = DF1 + OOFs, as defined by OECD-DAC;
• DF3 = DF2 + OOF-like loans (loans from state entities for development
but at market interest rates);
• DF4 = DF3 + OOF-like investment (equity investment by SWFs [sovereign
wealth funds] or enterprises/corporations for development with state in-
volvement through guarantees, etc.) For example, PPP for public infras-
tructure, such as electricity, water, sanitation, transportation, and other
pressing infrastructure bottlenecks. (20)
Lin and Wang explicitly leave the door open for private sector development finance without
direct government involvement.5 Cheng Cheng [↵⁄] (2018) uses their definition, but
alters the scope to “official development finance” (ODF), meaning the same four activities
but with government involvement. Cheng sees ODF as including any state financial flow for
developmental purposes.6 As a political science dissertation concerned with state interests,
this work will use the “official” qualifier, although this is not to discount the growing role
of private investors and philanthropists in China’s outward financial flows.7 Some private
sector deals will be included in the dissertation, but only either because they are supported
by the Chinese state (a form of development finance) or to illustrate what firms do without
strong state connections.
5Technically, they limit the scope to guarantees and indirect state involvement. In the Chinese context,
however, implicit state guarantees are pervasive, and this qualifier does not appreciably narrow the scope.
6In practice, a large majority of financial flows could be fairly labeled as having some kind of develop-
mental purpose, so this not much of a restriction. Because the lack of a clear divider between what does
and does not have a developmental purpose, this dissertation will analyze projects without regard for this
distinction.
7W. Chen and H. Tang (2014) and W. Chen, Dollar, and H. Tang (2016) find that while statistics on
volumes of investment outflows are dominated by large state-owned firms in the extractive and infrastructure
sectors, statistics on numbers of firms skew more toward services and manufacturing. Many private firms and
firms affiliated with subnational governments are moving outward, but often in the shadow of giants.
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This framework is quite broad, and empirical studies to date have only begun to explore
the variation in financing types that can exist within it. Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele
(2011) acknowledge the potential difference between DAC and non-DAC donors and test
the hypothesis that aggregate flows from emerging non-DAC donors will target countries
with weaker institutions than those from OECD bilateral organizations. They find no evi-
dence of this distinction. Dreher and Fuchs (2015) continue this line of inquiry by homing
in on the Chinese case, finding minimal evidence that Chinese aid agencies pay more atten-
tion than their OECD counterparts to factors such as diplomatic goals, natural resources,
and local institutions. Both of these studies, however, miss quite a bit. They lump together
everything from grants of thousands of dollars to multi-billion-dollar oil-backed loan pack-
ages, and their null findings may be an artifact of ignoring within-case diversity. Dreher,
Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018) take a positive step in this direction, using what data is avail-
able on China’s loan terms to sort projects into “ODA-like” and “OOF-like” categories. In
keeping with our theory, they find that ODA-like flows are correlated with United Nations
voting alignment. OOF-like flows, on the other hand, are correlated with commercial in-
terests such as trade and natural resource wealth as well as strong institutions. In other
words, commercial projects are issued on commercial terms with an eye to repayment, but
political projects are not. Landry (2019) adds equity investment to the analysis, finding
that Chinese investors are more tolerant of corruption risk than their peers from developed
countries.
Their analysis constitutes an important first step acknowledging the heterogeneity of eco-
nomic activity encompassed by the Chinese conception of “development finance,” but its
two categories are only scratching the surface of what is actually happening beneath.8 To
8Kitano (2014) refers to these categories as “vague” and insufficiently detailed. Lin and Y. Wang (2017)
are less charitable: “China’s definition of aid differs from that of the OECD-DAC, so direct comparison is
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date, no comprehensive empirical analysis of China’s various financial flows has been done.
I now turn to this topic.
3.3 Tools of Chinese Development Finance and Theoreti-
cal Predictions
Any effort to comprehensively measure Chinese development finance is complicated by
the need to compare flows for different-sized projects of different scales from different
government organizations. For example, small hospitals or schools in low-income areas
are typically done by either grants or zero-interest loans, with one obviously being more
stringent than the other. It would not be financially sustainable to use grants for infrastruc-
ture projects costing hundreds of millions or billions of dollars, so the most concessional
infrastructure projects are still typically tougher on borrowers than the most demanding
public health projects. What’s more, these types of financial flows and projects are han-
dled by different bureaucratic organizations in China. This section lays out how the pri-
mary hypotheses—–e.g., diplomatic motives are associated with laxer terms—–translate
into observable implications once we account for these differences—–e.g., for a small pub-
lic health project, grants will be more associated with diplomatic motives than zero-interest
loans. In practice, Chinese development finance can be sorted into five basic groups. First
are Chinese firms bidding on construction contracts without project-specific state support.
These are not technically development finance, but provide a control group for what firms
will do without their home government providing financial incentives for certain types of
projects. Second are smaller-scale concessional projects. These are typically in the social
pointless” (95). See also Cheng Cheng [↵⁄] (2018, pp. 2–5).
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sectors, are funded by grants or zero-interest loans, and are run primarily through the Chi-
nese Ministry of Commerce. Larger projects in the extractive and infrastructure sectors are
typically funded by either equity investment (the third category), interest-bearing debt (the
fourth), or the special case of resource-backed debt (the fifth). The domestic institutional
responsibility for these is divided between firms, banks, the Ministry of Commerce, and
(for politically high-profile projects) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sixth is the special
category of instruments used to deal with distressed debt; these range from forgiveness to
foreclosure.
3.3.1 Freelance Construction Contracting
In this scheme, a Chinese firm bids for and wins an overseas development contract funded
either locally or by a non-Chinese foreign organization. Despite an at most indirect con-
nection to ministries in Beijing, these activities do actually play a role in China’s economic
statecraft. This section explains how these activities constitute a discount to the buyer, how
this discount can serve as a diplomatic carrot, and how freelance contracting comes at the
cost of a degree of direct state ability to guide control firm activity. The section concludes
with a summary of predicted observable implications of the theory.
Strictly speaking, freelance contracting is not development finance at all—–or, more accu-
rately, it is development finance provided by someone other than China. However, it is still
relevant to our conversation. First of all, it constitutes far and away the largest portion of
China’s overseas economic activity.9 Many are surprised to learn that in Africa, an area
9This is likely also true for many other countries with strong construction sectors, but data in this area is
very sparse. Most countries see freelance activity as the private sector’s responsibility and not closely related
to national policy. China, with its heavy state role in the construction sector and encouragement of its firms
to “go out” (p˙ª), is an exception, and actually publishes data on global construction contract revenues
alongside more traditional categories such as trade and outbound FDI.
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of particular interest for the Chinese construction industry, only 26.7 percent of Chinese-
built project value receives funding from the Chinese government.10 This activity is mostly
driven by firms seeking profits, and ties to the Chinese state are not immediately apparent,
but they do sometimes exist. First, even firms that do not receive explicit project-level fi-
nancing for a given overseas contract typically receive routine operational financing from
state-owned banks as part of China’s cheap credit-centered domestic political economy. C.
Chen and Orr (2009) and Bhaumik and Co (2011) find this to be a driving factor behind
these contractors’ success overseas: routine low-interest financing combines with the fact
that China is a low-cost country to begin with to make Chinese construction firms highly
competitive in international bidding. Firms building construction projects within China
face a problem of moral hazard as they can recklessly borrow and build in the knowledge
that state-owned banks will bail them out later. If anything, this problem is worse overseas.
An overused but informative Chinese proverb holds that “the mountains are high and the
emperor is far away” (qÿá ‹), meaning that China’s central government has fre-
quently struggled to rein in the leaders of its enormous and disparate provinces.11 If it is
difficult to oversee local developers within China, then it is even more difficult to police
them once they go abroad.12 One former developing country ambassador to Beijing stated
that he always suspected that when Chinese firms ran into financial trouble carrying out
risky projects overseas, banks in the home country would be there to back them up. “I
10Calculated based on loan disbursement figures from Atkins et al. (2017) and contract revenue figures
from National Bureau of Statistics of China (2018). Available data on Africa is more complete than for other
regions, for reasons I will discuss in the quantitative analysis chapter. Covers the years 2000-2016.
11Another iteration of this proverb holds that “heaven is high and the emperor is far away” ()ÿá ‹),
although the mountains separating Beijing from many provinces mean that the topographical version is more
pertinent here.
12There is a nascent initiative to try to oversee parts of China’s development finance apparatus through the
new China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) which was announced in May 2018. I
will address this development in the concluding chapter.
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would not be privy to such a thing,” he clarified with a smirk.13
This kind of activity is not directly coordinated by the Chinese state—–several Chinese
interviewees expressed doubts that large parts of the policy apparatus in Beijing are even
able to keep track of the thousands of firm-led projects active at any given time—–but it can
serve a certain foreign policy goal. Cheung, Haan, et al. (2014) find that contract revenues
are disproportionately derived from states which vote more often with China at the United
Nations, but that recognition of Taiwan has no bearing on them. Unfortunately, they do
not separate revenues from projects explicitly backed by Chinese banks, which could act
as a means of state influence over contracting firms, and the majority which are not. To
my knowledge, no one to date has empirically examined this distinction, but I will do so in
this dissertation. Cheung, Haan, et al. (2014) were correct in their assessment that China
does not restrict its firms from doing business in countries that recognize Taiwan. Indeed,
every country that recognizes Taiwan is listed as the source of some construction contract
revenues in the official figures of the China Statistical Yearbook, meaning both that firms
are comfortable reporting their activities in these countries to the Chinese government and
that the government then has no problem with publishing it in an open source document
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018).
Chinese firms’ cost advantage is also more broadly diplomatically relevant. Since Chinese
firms are low-cost even before receiving subsidized credit, their use in developing world
infrastructure projects can be a boon to local government budgets. This could encourage
closer diplomatic alignment. The Chinese government appears to be aware of this fact:
the 2013 official white paper entitled “China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation”
(⌦-˝ ^2Ñœ8 \↵) even mentions construction and engineering contracts as a
13Interview, Washington, DC, June 2018.
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selling point alongside investments and more conventional aid arrangements (State Council
of the People’s Republic of China [-N∫⌘qå˝˝°b], 2013).
As McKinlay and Little (1977) and Baldwin (1985) both found, however, the real power of
grants is in the threat of their withholding.14 This threat is particularly strong in countries
which recognize Taiwan, and to some extent in those with rival South China Sea claims.
Beijing allows its firms to do business in these countries but is clearly keeping tabs on
their activities and could hypothetically shut down their operations were the host country
to take too vocal a stance. Allowing firms to do business in these countries is a clever
means of making diplomatic forays there without directly supporting them, which would
contradict China’s traditional policy of non-engagement with states with which it does not
have official diplomatic relations. Of course, direct financial support is waiting for any
country which chooses to switch.15
So, our observable implications connecting freelance construction contracting to the main
hypotheses are as follows:
Table 3.1: Observable Implications for Freelance Construction Contracting
Hypothesis Independent Variable Predicted Correlation
H1A Territorial claims (recipient is disputant) +
H2 General diplomatic interests +
H3A Geostrategic interests +
Legend: “--” = most negative; “-” = negative; “+” = positive; “++” = most positive
The option not to deploy development finance is a part of China’s policy contingency
framework, but it will not take care of all of its national goals. Firms acting in their own in-
terest will sometimes foray into areas which happen to suit state interests, but this is hardly
14This point is made in more detail in Chapter 2.
15As Schelling (1966) would have put it, China is showing strength while still leaving some force in
reserve.
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guaranteed. The state can use tools of development finance to address the gaps between
what firms will do when following market incentives and what the state would like them to
do. The remainder of this chapter covers these tools.
3.3.2 Smaller-Scale Concessional Flows: Grants and Zero-Interest Loans
China’s two most concessional types of financing are grants and zero-interest loans. Bräutigam
(2011) writes that “China’s foreign aid grants and zero-interest loans are managed by the
Ministry of Commerce and usually promote broad diplomacy objectives” (755). Grants,
here defined as simple giveaways of cash and/or goods, are obviously as concessional as
one could get and per our theory are unsurprisingly useful diplomatic tools. Zero-interest
loans, many of which have very long or flexible repayment windows, come in second place
for least stringent. What’s more, grants and zero-interest loans typically back similar types
of projects in the social or government sectors and are both run through the Chinese Min-
istry of Commerce.16 The naturally controlled contrast between the two provides a useful
test case for this dissertation’s theory. If the theory is correct, then grants will be better
for diplomatic and geostrategic motives (other than specific assets) than are zero-interest
loans. The following subsection reviews the literature on grants and zero-interest loans
before proceeding to testable theoretical predictions.
The less a donor demands in explicit financial repayment, the more it can demand in other
areas, meaning that grants are ideal for other diplomatic or geostrategic motives. Some
scholars frame China’s aid program in terms of cultural studies. Before contact with West-
ern imperialists, China was at the center of a “tributary system” in which neighboring states
16As of this writing, responsibility for these programs is being transferred to the new China International
Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), although this change is still in early stages of implementation
and did not affect the time period being studied.
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such as Korea and Vietnam sent emissaries with gifts to the capital as part of a hierarchi-
cal system in which the smaller states accepted Chinese superiority in exchange for being
mostly left alone. Pan and Lo (2017) cite this as an influence in China’s widespread use
of aid, and indeed, China sends grants to virtually every developing country that does not
recognize Taiwan. Y. Jiang (2011) is more skeptical, arguing that China’s lack of eco-
nomic development and internal divisions over when and where to use aid inhibit the rise
of a “benign hegemonic” system. Dreyer (2015) wonders whether most developing states
would ever sign on to such a hierarchical system or if it is even logically consistent with
China’s emphasis on national sovereignty. At any rate, the idea of grants as drawing upon
imperial-era Chinese traditions is consistent with our expectation that they will encourage
diplomatic friendship.
Sometimes called “interest-free loans,”17 zero-interest loans (ZILs) are exactly as they
sound: loans with no interest attached. After accounting for inflation, recipients typi-
cally pay back less than they originally borrowed. In some cases, there is no set payback
date, and in more than a few cases there is no publicly stated project designation. This
arrangement is obviously quite favorable to the borrower, but like grants, it is not finan-
cially self-sustaining. These loans are usually small in size and go towards similar types
of projects—–small hospitals, schools, etc.—–as grants. Of course, zero-interest loans are
not quite as concessional as grants, even if they go to similar types of projects. China’s
aid program is active in most developing countries. In what seems to be the only aca-
demic treatment of ZILs to date, Bräutigam (2011) writes that “because external assistance
is an instrument of diplomacy, every developing country with which China has diplomatic
ties receives offers of grants and zero-interest loans, even those that are wealthier on a per
17The Chinese literature also uses two terms: ˆo7>(zero-interest loans) and ‡o7>(interest-free
loans). I will use “zero-interest loans,” although there is no actual difference in meaning.
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capita basis” (755). However, not all countries necessarily receive offers on the same terms.
Indeed, grants and ZILs might be substitutes for one another. We might expect more small-
scale projects to be funded by grants in countries diplomatically closer to China, and ZILs
in more aloof states.
For outreach to diplomatic or geostrategic partners, then, China will typically want to use
more grants and fewer zero-interest loans to demonstrate its generosity. For countries with
which China has frostier relations, replacing grants with zero-interest loans can signal dis-
pleasure without completely cutting off aid. In the cases of rival South China Sea claimants
or countries which recognize Taiwan, China is unlikely to commit very much money of any
kind, but when it senses an opportunity to change leaders’ minds, grants will be a more ef-
fective form of persuasion than zero-interest loans.
Those expecting a commercial use for grants might point to the fact that they are run
through the Ministry of Commerce, albeit with input from the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (Kobayashi, 2008). D. Zhang and G. Smith (2017) write that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has de facto veto power over most major projects.18 This leads to an internal bu-
reaucratic version of the tradeoff between foreign policy and commercial goals, and there
is a general consensus that relations between the Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Af-
fairs are not very good. However, these mechanisms are at the end of the day somewhat
less useful for commercial projects. They are inherently not financially sustainable un-
less disbursed in small quantities, and so many go to smaller items such as construction of
small hospitals, schools, and government buildings; or donations of agricultural or med-
ical equipment. They are not well suited to large infrastructure or industrial projects.19
18The Ministry of Finance is sometimes involved as well.
19In other words, grants go to the social sector, and loans to productive sectors. See J.-Y. Wang (2007,
p. 21) and State Council of the People’s Republic of China [-N∫⌘qå˝˝°b] (2011).
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The Ministry of Commerce will sometimes get its way, but more often via other financing
mechanisms.








H1A Territorial claims (recipientis disputant) - --
H1B Territorial claims (recipientis not disputant) + -
H2 General diplomatic inter-ests + -
H3A Geostrategic interests + -
Legend: “--” = most negative; “-” = negative; “+” = positive; “++” = most positive
3.3.3 Equity Investment
If China is to use development finance to guide its firms’ behavior, grants and ZILs are
unlikely to do the job by themselves. A smattering of small projects here and there is
a drop in the bucket for corporations which can net hundreds of millions of dollars on
individual projects. Dahl (2007) wrote that “A has power over B to the extent that A can
get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. The government will have to put
real money on the table to induce firms to take on projects that do not maximize their
profits, and large disbursements will require remuneration to sustain themselves in the long
run, or at least keep losses within bounds deemed acceptable the government. This can
happen via equity or interest-bearing debt. Both are stricter on borrowers than grants or
zero-interest loans; for that matter, they also make China appear tougher on borrowers than
would allowing freelance contractors to take the lead and leaving the messy business of
financing to someone else. Furthermore, I argue that debt is more stringent than equity.
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This section explains why equity is less taxing on recipients than debt and what observable
implications we can expect from the theory.
Chinese firms, like most other economic actors discussed in this dissertation, worry about
poor local governance. Countries with weak property rights and rule of law present height-
ened risk to firms. Subcontractors might shirk on their obligations or cut corners on quality.
Governments might demand bribes or try to renegotiate contracts after work has already be-
gun. Because of their routine low-interest operational financing, Chinese firms have it eas-
ier here than most, but all else equal would generally still prefer safer markets to riskier. For
projects of a larger scale, especially in the extractive and construction sectors, the govern-
ment can incentivize firms to take these risks by prodding them to make equity investments
or can provide project-specific loans for items or countries of particular interest.
Equity is more amenable to most developing countries’ interests than debt. This position
contradicts the existing literature. Lin and Y. Wang (2014) and Cheng Cheng [↵⁄] (2018)
see equity as part of the least concessional fourth of four development finance categories,
behind loans at market rates. One can understand how this might be true in some optical
sense: corporate ownership gives off an air of “business” rather than “aid,” while a loan
from a Chinese government-owned organization might seem more like a deal between de-
velopment partners. In practice, however loans are much more demanding of the recipient.
Cross-national debt has a long and storied history of generating friction from the 1980s
Latin American financial crisis to Africa’s stagnant period of the 1990s and the 1997 Asian
financial crisis. The term “debt crisis” rolls off the tongue, but there is a reason that the
terms “equity crisis” or “investment crisis” are rarely uttered.20 If a debt-funded project
generates less return than expected, the borrower country might be in a fiscally difficult
20There is an exception for “hot money” portfolio investments of the type that proved destabilizing during
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, but Chinese state-owned firms tend to invest on a more stable, long-term basis.
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position, while the lender wonders if they will ever get their money back. If the same hap-
pens to an equity-financed project, then the project might generate fewer jobs and profits
for the local economy, but without the specter of repayment hanging over local finances.
(Or, if there is debt to be repaid, it is held by the foreign investor.) The current backlash
to Chinese debt underscores the point: loans simply have more downside risk to the recip-
ient than equity, and they have more of a latent or actualized negative impact on bilateral
relations.
At the same time, equity represents a longer-term commitment than debt. After a project
is complete and the related loan repaid, the lender has no obvious continuing connection
to it.21 This is not true where ownership stakes are taken. Y. Wang and D. Li (2019) write
that “equity investment allows companies to lock in long-term partnerships, acquire local
resources in a lower-cost way, and ensure quick or steady growth in a foreign market.”
Whether a firm is interested in natural resources or local market potential, equity invest-
ments give them a more lasting gateway to new markets than would debt contracts. This
could be taken as a positive in recipient capitals in that it implies a more reliable long-term
stream of economic benefits and signals greater commitment on China’s part.
So, equity occupies a middle tier in China’s policy contingency framework: not as con-
cessional as grants or zero-interest loans, but not as strict as interest-bearing debt. This
middle tier itself contains a spectrum of possible arrangements, as Chinese firms doing
business abroad are quite diverse. On the one hand, many provincial and local state-owned
firms carry out business on a small scale with little or no coordination with the central
government. While most models of the dollar value of Chinese outbound FDI demonstrate
21Chinese firms can actually act as operators on a contract basis with or without taking an equity stake.
These “build-operate-transfer” (BOT) and related schemes are increasing in prominence within Chinese de-
velopment finance and may represent a middle option between debt and equity, but the data on them is
regrettably very sparse to date. See Leutert (2019) and Y. Wang and D. Li (2019).
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attraction to natural resources, W. Chen and H. Tang (2014) and W. Chen, Dollar, and H.
Tang (2016) find that models of the number of investing firms show a larger presence in the
service and trading sectors and tend to go to the most profitable sectors of a given coun-
try. Case studies of Kenya and Tanzania confirm a large amount of under-reporting in the
agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Xia, 2019a; Xia, 2019b). Many of these smaller
firms are private and thus excluded from the scope of this (political science) dissertation,
but some belong to provincial or local governments. These are more akin to state-owned
construction contractors winning bids on their own time: they might bolster China’s image
abroad, but they do so out of concern for their own profits and without much direct input
from Beijing.
On the other hand, larger, better-connected state-owned firms are able to use government
funds to provide a degree of protection from local governance risk, but at the expense of
having to answer more frequently to government priorities. State management of risk via
equity deals is a relatively new topic in the literature on foreign direct investment, which un-
derstandably has treated FDI as the preserve of the private sector. Newer works on the case
of China establish to what degree Chinese state-owned firms look out after their own inter-
ests as opposed to those of the government. Most large Chinese investors are state-owned
but possess a substantial degree of managerial independence. A body of work focusing on
the oil and gas sector treats this as a classic principal-agent problem. S. Chen (2009), Kong
(2010), Erica S. Downs (2011), and Tunsjø (2013) all see firms as profit-oriented organiza-
tions receiving backing from a state with other interests.22 Like other firms, they typically
prefer to enter safer, more profitable markets. However, they also accept low-interest state
credit in order to gain a competitive advantage and in return agree to enter some difficult
22Rithmire (2019) adds that the relative roles of state connections and resources varies substantially from
firm to firm.
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markets in the name of national energy security (not to mention their own learning and
skills upgrading). As was the case for construction contractors, Warner, S. H. Ng, and
X. Xu (2004) find that access to cheap state credit fuels Chinese state-owned firms’ “go-
ing out” strategies; P. J. Buckley et al. (2007), Cheung and Qian (2009), and Kang (2018)
replicate this finding and add that it allows these firms to operate in more corrupt markets
while being steered to countries with high natural resource endowments. Duanmu (2014)
similarly finds that state-owned firms can use their connection to a powerful organization
to ward off host government interference in their operations and as such have a degree of
insulation from local corruption. Shi (2015) finds that larger, predominantly state-owned
firms have better access to cheap credit and are thus disproportionately well represented in
outbound investment flows.23 China’s two-track financial system in which state banks prop
up large, inefficient firms in the name of full employment is now being taken abroad.
Even apart from state support, there are reasons that Chinese equity investors might be
more resistant to dealing with governance risks. As one Chinese development expert put it
to me, Chinese firms have for decades found ways to make money in a home market that
is “a little bit messy” and do not have much difficulty replicating this success elsewhere.24
Empirical studies back up this assertion by drawing on a literature on “institutional dis-
tance,” or the differential between home and host country institutions, as an obstacle to
foreign investment (Eden and S. R. Miller, 2004; D. Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Aleksynska
and Havrylchyk (2013) find that firms from emerging markets such as China and Russia are
less deterred by poor host country governance environments than firms from more devel-
23This is more true in the Global South than the Global North. Many more privatized Chinese firms have
actually been edged out of their own market by state-connected competitors and have fled to safer, more
developed markets, as have those who have used political connections to enrich themselves at the expense of
state goals. See Rithmire (2019).
24Original Chinese: “ πq⇥” Beijing, September 2018.
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oped markets. However, they find that this “institutional distance” effect only works in one
direction. Firms from countries with stronger governance have a hard time acclimating to
countries with weaker governance, but firms from countries with weaker governance have
less difficulty in adjusting to stable legal environments. Kang (2018) applies Aleksynska
and Havrylchyk’s logic to the commodity sector, finding that Chinese firms are more drawn
to natural resource endowments in countries with low institutional distance from China and
higher political risk. W. Chen, Dollar, and H. Tang (2016) and Landry (2019) similarly find
a null relationship between Chinese investment and local governance risk, as opposed to a
predictably negative one for other investor countries. China’s domestic lack of rule of law
is, perhaps oddly, an advantage for its firms in certain overseas markets.
For equity as a whole, we expect the following observable implications. I do not list sepa-
rate predictions for different types of investing firms because publicly available data is not
complete enough to quantitatively test these differences, although I will discuss them in the
case studies.
Table 3.3: Observable Implications for Equity Investment
Hypothesis Independent Variable Predicted Correlation
H1A Territorial claims (recipient is disputant) -
H1B Territorial claims (recipient is not disputant) +
H2 General diplomatic interests +
H3A Geostrategic interests +
H4A Commercial interests +
Legend: “--” = most negative; “-” = negative; “+” = positive; “++” = most positive
3.3.4 Interest-Bearing Loans
State-backed equity investments provide a degree of protection against risk without gener-
ating too much friction between the investing and recipient governments. However, in the
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toughest environments—–and as a latecomer, China is often left with these–—this degree
of risk protection may not be enough. In these cases, China has two further tools at its
disposal: interest-bearing loans and resource-backed loans. Resource-backed loans are a
more stringent subset of interest-bearing loans in which mortgage tags are put on recipient
commodities. These will be discussed in the next section; this section will focus on loans
backed by plain cash. It introduces China’s tied loan structure and explain how this struc-
ture manages governance risk; how it can promote resource security and safeguard specific
assets; and why it is counterproductive for diplomatic and geostrategic concerns. It will
end with a summary of observable implications.
China’s overseas tied loans typically begin with one of two policy banks, the China De-
velopment Bank (CDB) or Export-Import Bank of China (Exim). Exim focuses on more
concessional projects in lower-income countries, while CDB often lends at higher interest
rates in middle-income countries.25 Whichever bank is involved disburses funds directly to
a Chinese contractor tasked with carrying out a project. The host government then repays
the loan to the contractor with interest according to an agreed-upon timetable.
First, and perhaps most obviously, this mechanism serves China’s commercial interests in
generating business for its firms, especially those in sectors suffering from overcapacity at
home. However, tied loans are especially noteworthy for not just promoting these firms, but
also for protecting them from recipient country governance risk. They do so in two ways.
First, the bank serves as a backstop to contractors’ profits in case the borrower fails to repay.
The moral hazard created by a guaranteed bank bailout is not an unintended consequence
25As previously detailed, China’s policy banks were founded in 1994 to make up for the fact that commer-
cial banks were being pushed toward profitability and could no longer fund “patient capital”-type infrastruc-
ture projects which generated more benefits for society than for their financiers. The Export-Import Bank was
founded as an international institution, but CDB started domestically and gradually began to apply its experi-
ence in development finance to overseas projects. The third policy bank, the China Agricultural Development
Bank, remains mostly domestically focused.
98 CHAPTER 3. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND A NEW THEORY
here, but an intended one—–firms need to be incentivized to take gambles, and the lack of
strict adherence to debt contracts again turns into something of an asset. This is similar to
Chinese banks’ domestic use of subsidized credit to incentivize investment to meet growth
targets, including in poorer, rural regions which might otherwise attract less investment.
Second, the fact that no cash ever goes to the recipient government minimizes the risk of
misappropriation (Bräutigam, 2009, pp. 293–94).26
Chinese sources have historically been reluctant to discuss such delicate issues, but this is
changing. Lin and Y. Wang (2017) write that “BRICs, particularly China, view policy con-
ditionality as interfering with recipients’ sovereignty and tend to provide noncash financing
to circumvent corruption, while traditional donors view policy conditionality as a means to
ensure efficient use of aid” (89). The Bretton Woods institutions will route their activi-
ties through recipient Ministries of Finance and use policy conditions to make the sure the
funds are not squandered. (Or, they simply do not lend to countries that do not comply with
conditions, although Lin and Wang do not quite go here.) China, on the other hand, simply
avoids the issue through “noncash financing.” “Noncash financing” could mean grants in
kind (as opposed to the easier-to-steal cash variety), or it could mean using commodities
for debt repayment (the topic of the next section). However, it could also mean using a tied
aid scheme such that Chinese government funds never actually touch local bank accounts.
This is not technically a “noncash arrangement,”—if anything, it is more like the recipient
government is buying a construction project on a cash installment plan—–but it does avoid
the embezzlement risks of cash disbursements to local governments.
Of course, avoiding risk is not a goal in and of itself; there has to be some underlying inter-
est which justifies the risk. Lin and Y. Wang (2017) continue with a long but informative
26See also Kobayashi (2008) and Bräutigam (2011) for details on how tied loans are implemented.
3.3. TOOLS OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 99
passage on tied aid:
The principle of ‘untying aid’ expressed by the OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) does not make economic sense because it separates
aid from trade, isolating aid from market principles, from comparative advan-
tages, and thus from mutual benefit. It also discourages the private sector’s
participation in development financing. Aid in the OECD definition becomes
‘unilateral alms’ after untying aid from trade. By definition, this concept of aid
gives the aid donors a moral high ground as if aid is purely altruistic, placing
developing countries on the receiving end—an unequal and passive position
without ownership. In contrast, African commentators have appreciated the
Chinese approach of cooperation, one that has ‘engendered country ownership
and self-reliance’ (Manji and Naidu 2009, p.7). (91-92)
This brings us back to the previously discussed rhetoric of “win-win” or “mutual gain.” A
donor-recipient relationship is inherently vertical, and as a developing state, China would
rather not position itself as somehow fundamentally different from other developing states.
Receiving only indirect mention in this text are China’s own interests. China’s public opin-
ion constraints require that some economic benefit flow back to China, lest the optics of a
poor state giving away money prove too taxing on Chinese citizens’ views of their govern-
ment. Part of the point of China’s economic push outwards is to maintain demand for its
formidable construction sector after its home market is increasingly saturated. Issuing bank
credit to its firms to do business overseas is certainly one way to accomplish that goal. Lin
and Wang view the promotion of Chinese industry as part of a natural relationship of com-
parative advantage between the Chinese industrial powerhouse and developing countries
rich in commodities and/or cheap labor. At first glance, the idea that untying aid contracts
will do away with this comparative advantage does not seem to hold much water. Say, for
example, that a resource-rich country is hoping to overhaul its main port in order to export
more commodities, many of which will be sold to China. Holding a public auction for
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the contract would clearly not be “isolating aid from market principles”; a traditional free
marketeer would be more likely to advocate an open contest to let the best firm win. After
all, no matter who builds the port, the same types of trade will flow through it, right? A
German-built port could just as easily ship goods to Shenzhen as a Chinese-built one.
There is actually one argument to the contrary. Because policy bank regulations require
a majority of project value to go to Chinese firms, they frequently fund turnkey projects,
or projects which are assembled and ready to operate by a single firm or well-coordinated
consortium. Bräutigam (2011) suggests that tied turnkey projects of this nature might be
more appropriate in Africa, where local governments often lack the capacity to manage
large or high-technology engineering contracts without assistance from a firm with signif-
icant resources and technical know-how. Official Chinese sources make the same point.
The 2011 Foreign Aid White Paper even makes the case that it might be better for Chinese
firms to take an active role in managing projects post-construction, stating:
To consolidate the achievements of existing productive projects, China con-
ducted multi-form technical and managerial cooperation with recipient coun-
tries, such as managing aid projects on behalf of recipient countries, lease
management and joint ventures. After adopting the aforesaid cooperation mod-
els, some already-completed productive projects accomplished more than tra-
ditional technical co-operation in improving enterprise management and pro-
duction level. Through adjustment and consolidation, China’s foreign aid em-
barked on a development road which suits better to China’s actual conditions
and the needs of recipient countries. (State Council of the People’s Republic
of China [-N∫⌘qå˝˝°b], 2011)
It is always possible to read too much into linguistic differences, but the Chinese translation
of the English “turnkey” is chengtao (⇣W), roughly translating to a “complete set.” By
providing “complete” or “package deals,” China addresses shortfalls in implementation
capacity in places with the world’s direst needs. This could be construed as a manifestation
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of China’s comparative advantage in infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading.
Cheng Cheng [↵⁄] (2018) argues that China’s recent experience with industrialization
puts it in a better position to provide this type of advice than developed countries which
have long since refocused on services and allowed their infrastructure and industrial know-
how to atrophy (104-105).
Tied loans can also play a role in building geostrategic transportation routes and securing
access to natural resources. Some loans could go to geostrategic transportation projects or
to commodity production. Others could facilitate the export of commodities. Railroads and
highways to mining sites, for example, are numerous among listings of Chinese projects.
The data on this topic is still too weak to support more than case study evidence, but cases
abound. Since 2009, for example, China has been in negotiations to overhaul Argentina’s
national cargo rail system. Negotiations have moved extraordinarily slowly, and to this date
the only real work completed has been in Argentina’s northern regions, which conveniently
happens to be a major source of soybeans bound for Chinese animal feed troughs (Ellis,
2014, pp. 67–68; Rogers, 2014; Wingo, 2014). As will be discussed in the Peru case study,
PetroChina is currently involved in a dispute with Peru over the environmental impact of a
gas pipeline from an inland production site to the coast. A much more complex story could
be told about a planned series of pipelines, highways, and railways connecting Congolese
minerals and Ugandan oil to the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts.
Tied loans can avoid recipient corruption, facilitate the monitoring of misdeeds by Chinese
firms, and promote knowledge transfer to recipient countries, all of which are more im-
portant in developing countries with weak state capacity and governance. They can also
promote China’s export interests as well as (in some cases) resource security and access
to strategic assets. This raises the question: if tied loans have these benefits, then why not
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use them all the time? The answer is that tied loans do come with costs, especially regard-
ing relations with the recipient country. China may not use policy conditions in the Bretton
Woods sense of the term, but this is not to say that there no strings attached. Indeed, Mattlin
and Nojonen (2015) list the tying of financing packages as a “condition” of Chinese devel-
opment finance, in the “policy conditionality” sense of the term. They also argue that some
of these loans set countries on a path to purchase from Chinese firms for decades, as in the
case of a power plant for which the only available replacement parts are manufactured in
China.27 All else equal, most governments would not like to be told what to do. This holds
for international financial institutions telling them how to organize their budget, and it holds
for a foreign bank telling them that they have to buy from a specific firm for decades. China
can simply sidestep this issue by allowing its construction contractors to find external fi-
nancing wherever possible, or by using equity investment. Some of these diplomatic costs
to debt can counteract the benefits to bilateral relations of Chinese-built projects. For this
reason, I predict no consistent correlation between debt and diplomatic motives, as opposed
to a positive correlation for more concessional financial arrangements.
To make these diplomatic costs worthwhile, the Chinese government will concentrate finite
(if ample) bank lending resources in countries which present high corruption risks and are
important for other reasons, namely geostrategic interests and/or resource security. Better-
governed countries can draw Chinese contractors and/or equity investors without as much
state encouragement. Because these countries have better access to international capital,
they will also be in a position to decline tied loan deals and in many instances have procure-
ment rules making tied packages more difficult to implement. The effects of geostrategic
significance and commercial interests on debt are thus contingent on local governance qual-
27Yun Sun (2017b) makes a similar point regarding railroad projects built to Chinese specifications.
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ity.
This interactive effect takes place against the context of a positive overall relationship be-
tween commercial interests and loans and an indeterminate relationship between geostrate-
gic interests and loans. Loans can be a positive for geostrategic significance by building
transportation corridors but a negative for bilateral relations, at least relative to equity or
freelance contracting. So, I do not make any prediction as to the overall correlation be-
tween debt and geostrategic interests before including the interactive effect. However,
commercial interests in construction-sector exports are embedded in loan contracts, and
some projects also have value to resource security, implying a positive correlation between
debt and commercial interests.
The observable implications of the theory for interest-bearing debt are summarized as fol-
lows.
Table 3.4: Observable Implications for Interest-Bearing Loans (Cash-Based)
Hypothesis Independent Variable PredictedCorrelation
H1A Territorial claims (recipient is disputant) -
H3B Geostrategic interests * recipient governance quality -
H4A Commercial interests +
H4B Commercial interests * recipient governance quality -
Legend: “--” = most negative; “-” = negative; “+” = positive; “++” = most positive
3.3.5 Resource-Backed Loans
Few of China’s arrangements have drawn more attention than resource-backed loans. In
English, they have variously been called resource-backed loans, commodity-backed loans,28
resource financed infrastructure,29 and the “Angola mode”; in Chinese,Dêb7>(“resources
28Bräutigam and K. P. Gallagher (2014).
29Halland et al. (2014).
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for loans”), 7>bDê(“loans for resources”), Dêb˙˙(“loans for infrastructure”),
andâÂ…!✏(“the Angola mode”).30 This work will refer to them as “resource-backed
loans” (RBLs), but readers should be aware of the other names. This section elaborates
how RBLs work, their benefits to governance risk management and commercial motives,
and their shortcomings. It ends with a table of theoretical predictions.
Resource-backed loans are the same as tied loans, but with an extra risk management mech-
anism making use of recipient country resource wealth. They can be repaid in commodi-
ties, repaid in export proceeds of commodities routed through an escrow account, or can be
collateralized with commodities (e.g., Zimbabwe once used a diamond mine as collateral
for a loan).31 These serve a very specific purpose. As one prominent Chinese specialist
put it, “It’s a special type of business. . . it only applies to certain countries”.32 Namely,
resource collateralization serves as additional insurance in countries with high corruption
risk: governments with histories of questionable financial management do not even have to
be counted upon to have money in the coffers to repay the loan (Sanderson and Forsythe,
2013).33 As in the case of regular cash-based tied loans, China’s disbursements go directly
to Chinese contractors and circumvent local government bank accounts. The difference
is that repayment may also be in noncash goods or collateralized with them. Some have
labeled it a “barter deal” trading resources for infrastructure, and while this is an over-
simplification of a multiparty deal with cash involved, one can understand where they are
coming from (Jansson, 2013). For this reason, Cheng Cheng [↵⁄] (2018) writes that
30So called because these types of deals came to prominence in the 2000s during the rush to Angola’s
oilfields following the end of its civil war, although they had been used previously for decades. See Bräutigam
(2009).
31For more details, see Bräutigam and K. P. Gallagher (2014) and Halland et al. (2014).
32Interview, Beijing, September 2018.
33The crisis in Venezuela illustrates that it is actually possible for a government to be in such dire straits as
to default on a resource-backed loan, but the likelihood is lower, anyway. This topic will be discussed in the
conclusion chapter.
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“China has adopted a model of ‘resources-for-infrastructure’ financing in its African in-
frastructure cooperation projects in order to better control the risks of embezzlement and
misappropriation” (105).34
The pros and cons of this model are similar to those of cash-based tied loans but amplified
by the extra risk management mechanisms being put into place. The pros, again, include
even greater avoidance of governance risk as well as the aforementioned benefits of “pack-
age deals” for building management and maintenance capacity in countries without it. If
cash-based tied loans are meant to generate their own repayment capacity through infras-
tructure construction and industrial upgrading, then resource-backed tied loans might make
the process even easier by drawing on a readily available (if untapped) source of repayment.
In a 2007 IMF report, Jian-Ye Wang said as much, stating that:
To finance projects that are expected to generate revenue or export earnings,
through state financial institutions and enterprises China provides trade credit
and commercial loans, often with repayment linked to the output of the projects
(e.g., oil). This approach thus aligns debt financing with evolving repayment
capacity. (J.-Y. Wang, 2007, p. 21)
Wang’s words are to be taken seriously: he later became the Chief Economist of the Export-
Import Bank of China. Sanderson and Forsythe (2013) explicitly connect this strategy to
China’s own industrial development history. Local Chinese officials used the value of land
to repay loans, knowing that the land would appreciate precisely because of the infras-
tructure and industrial projects being funded by the loans, many of which came from the
China Development Bank. Now, CDB—–along with its exclusively foreign-oriented sib-
ling, Exim–—is using the same strategy, only with overseas commodities taking the place
of domestic land. Lin and Y. Wang (2016) make a related point, arguing that this modal-
34Translation by author. Original Chinese: “¯‘K↵ -˝(^2Ñ˙@æΩ˙æ \yÓ-«÷
Ü‘Dêb˙˙’ÑçDæ° É}0ß6ÜD—´*a*(ÑŒi⇥”
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ity allows countries to simultaneously build up natural resource sectors and infrastructure
needs, both of which were being underserved by capital markets.
Low-return infrastructure projects being underserved by capital markets may be news to
few, but the idea of an underserved commodity deposit might seem surprising. Energy and
mining companies do not have a reputation for opting not to exploit economically recov-
erable deposits. This tells us something about the more precise usage of resource-backed
loans: they are designed for resource-rich countries with institutions that are weak enough
to scare off most others. Because Chinese firms are latecomers to the global commodity
business, they are left with the markets that others have declined to enter (S. Chen, 2008).35
Recipient country bargaining power also plays a role. “You have to understand,” one Chi-
nese expert told me about the resource-backed loan model. “This depends on how they [the
government] negotiate with the partners.” He elaborated that some countries like “South
Africa. . . would not accept” such a model. The banks simply have to “adapt to new condi-
tions.”36 In other words, resource producers with better reputations for governance—–on
the African continent, South Africa is a prime example—–are able to draw many sources
of funding and will not accept a deal that places a mortgage tag on their commodity de-
posits. Banks are only able to impose such terms in countries with few other options,
which also happen to be the countries where strict risk management measures are most
necessary. China finds ways to serve its resource security needs in accordance with local
circumstances.
Apart from managing risk, resource-backed loans are used for commercial motives. Par-
ticularly where resource security is concerned, this would seem to be too obvious to bother
35This was point was also brought up by three Chinese energy and development finance specialists in
conversation (Beijing, September 2018).
36Interview, Beijing, September 2018.
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discussing, but it is actually somewhat controversial. Authors such as J. Jiang and Sinton
(2011) and Moyo (2012) point out that Chinese commercial arrangements only result in
direct commodity exports to China in countries with less shipping distance to cover; in
other words, Angola’s oil-backed loans have generated substantial exports to China, but
PetroChina typically opts to ship Ecuador’s and Venezuela’s oil-backed loan production to
markets within the Western Hemisphere. Even so, these loans can still contribute to re-
source security by increasing global supply, keeping prices lower, and allowing Chinese
firms to gain experience on the ground and catch up with more established international
firms.37 Less often noticed is that while Chinese firms do not routinely export resources
from faraway places to China, they could be asked to do so in the event of a global price
spike. The same argument applies to the observation of Gholz, Awan, and Ronn (2017) that
resource-backed loans do nothing to mitigate the risk of U.S Navy interdiction at the Strait
of Malacca. This is true, but history would indicate that oil shocks are much more likely
to come from regional dynamics in the Middle East; resource-backed loans could serve to
divert energy to China and stabilize domestic prices in the event of a Middle Eastern crisis,
or during peacetime via simply expanding global production. They serve the portion of
resource security that happens at the point of the production, not in transit; the transit phase
is better served by Belt and Road-style infrastructure projects.38
The resource-backed model is tailor-made for commodity-producing countries with poor
governance, but its pitfalls prevent it from being used often outside this niche. It is not
applicable to countries with few commodities39 or to those in a position to bargain their way
37See also Erica S. Downs (2011), Evans and Erica S. Downs (2006), Moyo (2012), and X. Tang (2014).
38See also S. Chen (2011). This is not to mention the role of China’s ongoing naval modernization in
securing supply routes.
39There are a few cases of countries using commodities other than hydrocarbons or metals for resource-
backed loans. For example, Ghana has done so with cocoa beans, and Ukraine with wheat. However, these
are the exceptions to a large majority using oil, gas, or metals as collateral.
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to better terms. Then, when it is used, it is asking quite a bit of recipients and is unlikely
to generate the same kind of warm feelings as deals with fewer strings attached. Resource-
backed loans fall at one end of the old tradeoff between making diplomatic friends and
protecting one’s own interests—–in this case, natural resource security and construction-
sector export interests—–against governance risk. Some Chinese experts make the opposite
argument with respect to diplomatic interests. Lin and Y. Wang (2017) and Cheng Cheng
[↵⁄] (2018, p. 105) emphasize the essentially horizontal nature of this deal; a simple
trade of commodities for construction projects based on each side’s obvious comparative
advantage. It is not clear, however, why most resource-producing countries would look
at this as less of an imposition than a deal which brings them the same infrastructural
benefits while maintaining more flexibility in what they can do with their resource reserves.
I maintain that resource-backed loans are in fact the most demanding of China’s major
tools.
The following table lists the observable implications of the theory for resource-backed
loans. The reader should note that because resource-backed loans are an extreme case of
regular (tied) loans, the expected correlations are stronger. These stronger expectations are
denoted as dual positive or negative signs.
Table 3.5: Observable Implications for Resource-Backed Loans
Hypothesis Independent Variable PredictedCorrelation
H1A Territorial claims (recipient is disputant) --
H1B Territorial claims (recipient is not disputant) --
H2 General diplomatic interests (recipient is disputant) --
H3A Geostrategic interests --
H4A Commercial interests ++
H4B Commercial interests * recipient governance quality --
Legend: “--” = most negative; “-” = negative; “+” = positive; “++” = most positive
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3.3.6 Distressed Debt
The debt story does not end with loan disbursement. Most loans are paid back without
much ado, but not all. In these cases, the lender faces a thorny decision. There are four
basic options. First would be to forgive the loan; second, to restructure it, typically into a
series of smaller payments over a longer timeframe and sometimes with new loans to repay
the old; third, to enter into a “debt-equity” swap in which debt is canceled in exchange
for an ownership stake in the project; and fourth, to decline to restructure the debt and
withhold further lending until it is repaid.40 In practice, these strategies may be combined
in any given instance, but it is useful to first think about them in sequence. Debt forgiveness
is clearly the most favorable of the three to borrowers. In some ways, debt forgiveness
resembles grants in that it entails a unidirectional transfer of value, and as such it should
be useful for currying favor toward diplomatic motives or to maintaining friendly relations
with geostrategically important countries. This follows the findings of Alesina and Weder
(2002), who find that from 1989-1997, OECD countries forgave more debt from countries
important to their interests.41
Rescheduling is an intermediate measure. It could conceivably be a positive for lender
diplomatic and geostrategic interests if the terms of rescheduling are well received by the
borrower, or a negative if they are not.42 I make no specific predictions as to the sign of the
coefficient of rescheduling, and this non-prediction puts rescheduling in a middle ground
between debt forgiveness (laxer) and debt-equity swaps (stricter). While rescheduling may
be part of a formal agreement, a country with weak rule of law such as China may also
40This framework was derived from comments made by a Chinese energy expert (Beijing, September
2018).
41Of particular note: binary variables for Egypt and Mexico were very strong predictors of debt relief.
42Chapter 8 will look at specifics of some rescheduling terms where available.
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simply ignore the debt until the debtor is able to repay (Meidan, 2016, p. 10). One former
senior World Bank official saw this ability to “roll with the punches” as a major asset for
China’s operations in risky markets. The Bank, he said, operates in a framework of rule of
law, and any unexpected hurdle that interferes with a project’s implementation means that
contracts must be arduously renegotiated.43 China, on the other hand, can quietly agree
to put construction on hold and/or postpone debt repayments until the period of instability
has passed. This is a de facto but not de jure form of debt rescheduling with deep roots in
China’s own informal, debt-based political economy. This type of informal restructuring
is typically hard to observe—–neither China nor borrowers are apt to announce that the
borrower is behind on payments—–and will not be analyzed quantitatively, although it will
make several appearances in qualitative analyses.
Debt-equity swaps are a step tougher than rescheduling and can be controversial. Pes-
simists in the media such as Abi-Habib (2018) and Pomfret (2018) argue that China is set-
ting “debt traps,” planning to use excessive debt burdens to either browbeat countries into
submission or to actually take possession of strategic assets. Hurley, Morris, and Porte-
lance (2018) already find evidence of high debt distress from Chinese lending in the Belt
and Road Initiative hubs of Djibouti, Laos, and Pakistan. In December 2017, a Chinese
firm actually assumed management of the port it built at Hambantota after Sri Lanka fell
behind on debt payments, and as of this writing, it has recently leaked out that similar terms
were put in place in the event of a default by Kenya on a port project in Mombasa (Mill-
ward, 2018; Mwere, 2018). All of these countries are home to Belt and Road transportation
projects; Djibouti is home to an actual Chinese naval base.
The repossession option seems harsh compared to forgiveness or rescheduling, but is actu-
43Interview, Washington, DC, July 2018.
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ally kinder to recipient interests than demanding repayment in full. Debt-equity swaps only
become a real possibility for projects in distress, in which case asking the recipient to relin-
quish responsibility for the projects blurs the line between imposition and concession. The
Chinese firm might not expect to do much better financially than the previous owners. Such
a deal only happens if there are non-financial reasons to take possession of the property. In
practice, this non-financial reason to date has been geostrategic and navigational concerns,
with Indian Ocean ports playing a leading role in the “debt trap” drama. The logic behind
trading debt for equity is similar to that behind making equity investments to begin with:
assuming a degree of financial risk in exchange for gaining a long-term claim to something
of value. Just as equity investments present a middle option between recipient-friendly
grants and stringent loans, debt-equity swaps are an intermediate between debt write-offs
and demanding repayment in full.
Finally, there is the option to hold out and demand repayment in full. The strictest of the
four options, this will obviously strain relations with the recipient country but is best for
Chinese commercial interests, especially the banks. Examples such as Venezuela suggest
that the commercial interests embodied in resource-backed loans make debt forgiveness
especially unlikely: China will be loath to give up future claims to important commodities
(in Venezuela’s case, oil).
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3.3.7 Summary Statistics
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Table 3.7 lists theoretical predictions for all initial financing mechanisms, excluding the
special cases of distressed debt listed in Table 3.6. Before proceeding to more in-depth
looks at each financing tool in the coming chapters, I introduce some basic summary statis-
tics to assess the hypotheses. Table 3.8 presents the mean annual44 totals and mean project
values for different financing methods using data from American Enterprise Institute (2019)
(equity) and Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018) (all others).45
Table 3.8: Summary Statistics, 2005-2014
Zero-
Interest Debt Debt








9.7 32.1 N/A 376.9 1,328.7
Includes all years for which data is available for all categories. Because the American Enterprise Institute
(2019) equity dataset includes only items over $100M, it cannot be used to estimate the size of a typical
investment.
Financing mechanisms are here arranged in order of increasing strictness from left to right.
Stricter measures are usually used for larger transactions. This supports the prediction
of Hypothesis 4A that commercial interests will lead to tougher terms: the more money is
involved, the tougher China gets. Resource-backed deals in particular tend to be very large;
many are negotiated as multi-billion dollar lines of credit to include a series of projects over
the course of years. This allows China to lock down an important commercial interest in
44For years 2005-2014, which are available for all datasets.
45The division between cash and resource-backed loans is based on the upper-bound estimate of resource
collateralization as calculated by the author. This estimate was found to yield more conservative statistical
results than the lower-bound estimate and so is used consistently throughout this chapter. Details on the
methodology behind these estimates are included in the “Resource-Backed Loan” section of this chapter.
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resource security in one fell swoop, rather than relying on an ad hoc series of smaller deals
as is often done for conventional cash-based debt.
Table 3.8 presents very strong evidence in favor of the construction-sector export and fi-
nancial profitability components of China’s commercial interests, but evidence in favor of
the resource security component is limited to resource-backed loans. Unfortunately, manu-
factured export and financial interests are very difficult to test statistically. Because China’s
official finance is tied to the use of Chinese goods and services, China’s interest in a deal
is perfectly proportional to the size of the deal itself. In a regression, this would mean
that the independent and dependent variables are identical. Resource security, however,
can be statistically tested as an independent variable against various development finance
dependent variables. In the quantitative analysis, I rely more heavily on resource security
as a measure of commercial interests before returning to include export interests in the case
studies.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined a basic of theory of which national interests are likely to lead
to stricter or laxer forms of financing, and which forms of financing are considered laxer
or stricter. At the core of this theory is a tradeoff between using tougher financing terms
to safeguard national interests or laxer ones to win friends. This basic tradeoff is similar
to that at the heart of the existing literature on Bretton Woods policy conditionality but is
manifested in a different series of policy instruments. These policy instruments have roots
in a statist political economy with weak rule of law in which repayment of state-owned bank
loans is flexible, especially for favored projects or well-connected borrowers. Chinese firms
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undertaking projects deemed to be in the national interest are likely to receive this kind of
favorable credit; this holds for projects both domestic and international. If deals go poorly,
they may also be supported by state-owned banks in ways that fall outside the realm of
regularized debt contracts.
This theory will be tested by a series of comparisons controlling for type of project and
government organizations. In many instances, firms adequately promote China’s interests
without much direct encouragement by the state. These typically subsidized freelancers
can serve as effective ambassadors for China without the baggage that comes with Chinese
cross-border bank lending or even equity. Firms wishing to do business in countries that
recognize Taiwan will also use this mode of entry for the simple reason that the government
in Beijing out of principle will not directly back them. However, where firms do not meet
the government’s policy goals by themselves, state capital will be more directly involved.
For smaller-scale social sector projects, this typically means grants (laxer) or zero-interest
loans (stricter). For larger projects, often in the extractive sectors or infrastructure, this
takes place along a continuum of, in order from laxest to strictest: equity investments, tied
loans backed only by cash, and tied loans backed by resources. In the event of debt re-
payment difficulties, a secondary continuum of options emerges. In the order of laxest to
strictest, these are debt forgiveness, debt restructuring, debt-equity swaps, and demand-
ing repayment in full. Table 3.7 on the next page summarizes the predicted observable
implications included in previous tables of this chapter.
The following chapters used a mixed-methods framework to analyze these different types
of financing. Each begins with quantitative analysis before homing in on individual cases.
The chapters are arranged such that less complex cases with fewer relevant Chinese in-
terests come first, with later chapters progressively adding Chinese interests and types of
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financing. Chapter 4 thus begins with the simplest tools, grants and zero-interest loans
for smaller projects. It does so by focusing on African neighbors Burundi and Rwanda.
Both are low-income states where aid is especially salient but have substantially different
political risk profiles. China has few geostrategic or resource interests in either country,
meaning they are useful starting points before adding variables to the equation. Chapter 5
continues with the Burundian and Rwandan cases but pivots toward larger projects carried
out via equity, debt, or freelance contracting arrangements. This chapter adds complexity
with respect to financing methods but shares with its predecessor a simpler set of Chinese
interests. This changes in Chapter 6, which brings in resource security in oil-rich Ecuador
and copper-rich Peru, which (again) exhibit varying levels of political risk. Here, I intro-
duce resource-backed loans as the strictest and most complex of China’s financing tools.
Chapter 7 rounds out the list of independent variables by bringing in geostrategic inter-
ests. Chapter 7’s case studies are Pakistan and Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, oil and other
commercial interests must be weighed against Central Asia’s importance to border security
and Belt and Road transportation routes; in Pakistan, security and transportation concerns
far outpace commercial interests. Lastly, Chapter 8 systematically analyzes all cases of
Chinese debt renegotiation to look at China’s secondary menu of options in the event that
borrowers encounter difficulties repaying loans.
Chapter 4
Diplomacy and Basic Commercial
Interests: Smaller Projects
The previous chapter predicted that the Chinese government would take into account geostrate-
gic interests and resource security in its development finance policy, but for many of the
world’s countries, neither is a major factor. In these states, China is balancing two more
universal interests: diplomatic outreach and commercial goals. China hopes to persuade as
many states as possible of the virtues of its position on territorial disputes (especially Tai-
wan) and a host of other issues.1 At the same time, all states could be markets for China’s
industrial and construction-sector offshoring, albeit some much more than others. The the-
ory predicts that diplomacy requires treatment with kid gloves: the more concessional the
terms the better. Promoting Chinese industry, on the other hand, may be easier accom-
plished via terms and conditions such as tied procurement. This chapter and the following
one analyze this basic trade-off before subsequent chapters progress to more complex cases
1Recently, Xinjiang is an important example.
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in which resource security (Chapter 6) and geostrategic interests (Chapter 7) enter the pic-
ture. This chapter focuses on smaller projects funded by grants and zero-interest loans.
These were hypothesized to be more pertinent for diplomacy, but there are limits to what
they can achieve in terms of scale, and most go to projects in “social sectors” like health and
education. Larger projects such as major infrastructure works will require interest-bearing
debt and/or equity financing to be sustainable; the next chapter (Chapter 5) covers these.
Apart from the fact that they cover similar types of projects at similar scales, grants and
zero-interest loans are also comparable to one another because, as discussed in Chapter 3,
they are both handled by Chinese government agencies led by the Ministry of Commerce.2
Chapter 3 further predicted that they are substitutes for one another, with zero-interest loans
serving as a less diplomatically friendly but more commercially sustainable option short of
reducing or withholding aid.
This chapter and the following one approach small and large projects using a common
mixed-methods framework. Statistical analysis will establish patterns across the develop-
ing world writ large. While more in-depth analysis of geostrategic and resource-related
variables will wait until later chapters, I do discuss them in the quantitative analysis here
simply because excluding them from the models would introduce bias. Then, for more
depth, I include a paired comparison of the cases of Burundi and Rwanda (Tarrow, 2010).
Both are far from any of China’s primary geostrategic concerns and have few significant
natural resources, but they do have their own voices in international diplomacy and are
both markets for Chinese construction firms. While comparable across these and many
other dimensions—size, level of economic development, etc.—Burundi and Rwanda differ
2The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance are also involved. The new China International Develop-
ment Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) is now coordinating these activities, but did not yet exist for the time
period being tested.
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in one critical way: governance. Despite its tragic history—or arguably because of it—
Rwanda has developed an overall more stable legal environment and reliable civil service.
Burundi, on the other hand, has remained mired in domestic strife. Comparison of these
two neighbors shows us how China approaches the basic task of diplomatic outreach in
different governance environments. China’s mixes of grants and zero-interest loans to the
two countries are actually not all that different, but the results have diverged substantially.
This is mostly because of the presence or absence of other major aid donors, many of which
have increased their commitments to Rwanda but have only tepidly remained in Burundi
since an outbreak of political violence there in 2015. Especially since 2015, Burundi has
supported China more often both in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting
and on specific issues involving Chinese policy in the South China Sea, Xinjiang, and Sri
Lanka.
I proceed in three parts. First is statistical analysis; second are the Burundian and Rwandan
cases. Third, I conclude with implications of this chapter’s findings for the theory.
4.1 Quantitative Analysis
4.1.1 Data and Methods
Statistical analysis in this dissertation is based on an author-compiled country-year panel
dataset including 157 countries between 2000 and 2018. This sample is restricted in terms
of both space and time. In space, I exclude all countries which at any point since 2000
have registered a nominal GDP per capita of over US $25,000 as per the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. In practice, Chinese engagement in the developed countries
above this threshold is qualitatively different, seeking safer returns on capital earned within
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China and sometimes access to technology (Kratz, A. Feng, and Wright, 2019). Many
countries just below this threshold—e.g., Greece or Portugal—have received major loan
packages akin to those which are common in more unambiguously “developing” countries.
Despite falling just below the threshold, Taiwan was excluded due to its special political
significance.
In time, the sample excludes years before 2000. Chinese overseas finance prior to 2000
existed only at very low levels and due to budget constraints was qualitatively different
from the type of large infrastructure deals seen today (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015). With the
exception of Chinese government sources, none of the data sources used in this dissertation
contain figures from before 2000.
China’s development finance programs are not transparent, and data quality is a perennial
issue. To ameliorate this problem, I use as many different data sources as possible. Findings
that are confirmed by multiple data sources can be considered more reliable; others can be
taken with a grain of salt or ignored. I introduce data sources for regression dependent
variables (types of Chinese development finance) as they are used in subsequent sections
analyzing the relevant modalities of financing.
Data for all regression dependent variables is adjusted for inflation and currency move-
ments according to the formula In f lationDExchangerate using data on inflation and RMB-USD ex-
change rates from the World Bank (2018c). Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018) use this
methodology for their AidData dataset, and I apply it to other datasets to maximize consis-
tency across models.
This chapter focuses on two countries in which only diplomatic and commercial export
interests are present, but the nature of statistical analysis requires that geostrategic and
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commodity import interests remain in the models regardless. To minimize redundancy
across chapters, I quantitatively analyze the results for these variables alongside the results
tables in this chapter but include more detailed models alongside case studies in Chapters
6 and 7 on resource and geostrategic interests, respectively.3
The following subsection focuses on data for this dissertation’s independent variables be-
fore the subsequent one turns to specific data and methods for small-scale concessional
flows.
4.1.1.1 Independent Variables
Data for independent variables is more widely available than that for dependent variables.
I here introduce data for independent variables and controls for each hypothesis, followed
by general controls. This introduction will apply to all chapters in the dissertation, since
the independent variables used are constant throughout.
Hypothesis 1 on the role of China’s territorial claims is tested using three binary vari-
ables:
• Recipient government recognition of Taiwan. Coded as 1 if the recipient government
has formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and 0 otherwise. Observations for years
in which countries switch recognition were coded as 0 due to the bursts in both
mainland and Taiwanese economic outreach that often accompany these transitional
periods. Data taken from Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018) and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) (2019).
• ASEAN member whose South China Sea claims overlap China’s, binary.
3Chapter 6 also adds another regression dependent variable, resource-backed loans.
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• ASEAN member whose South China Sea claims do not overlap China’s, binary. This
was included both as a control to compare to disputant countries and because these
non-disputant ASEAN members play an important role in China’s regional policy.
China uses economic outreach to non-claimant Cambodia and Laos, for example, to
prevent solidarity with the disputant countries.
In keeping with previous studies, general diplomatic interests per Hypothesis 2 are mea-
sured using United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting alignment per Voeten, Strezh-
nev, and Bailey (2017). This is the percentage of UNGA votes in which a country voted the
same way as China, with abstentions counting as half-agreements. This variable is lagged
by one year due to the fact that many important General Assembly votes take place toward
the end of the calendar year.4
I include three measures of geostrategic interests per Hypothesis 3 as well as one control.
These are:
• Shares land border with China (binary) as a proxy for border security concerns. Data
from CEPII (2017).
• Location at an important maritime chokepoint (binary). In order of least to greatest
distance from China, these are Russia (the Bering Strait); Indonesia and Malaysia
(the Strait of Malacca); Iran and Oman (the Strait of Hormuz); Djibouti, Eritrea, and
Yemen (the Bab-al-Mandeb); Egypt (the Suez Canal); Turkey (the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles); Morocco (the Strait of Gibraltar); and Panama (the Panama Canal).5
• Location along a Belt and Road corridor or Maritime Silk Road route as per the
4I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
5High-income states not included in the sample set include the United States (the Bering Strait); Singapore
(the Strait of Malacca); the United Arab Emirates (the Strait of Hormuz); and Spain and the United Kingdom
(the Strait of Gibraltar).
4.1. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 125
official descriptions at Belt and Road Portal [-˝ & ÔQ] (2018) (binary).6
• Distance from China in thousands of kilometers, weighted for population density as
per the United States International Trade Commission’s (USITC) Dynamic Gravity
Dataset (Gurevich and Herman, 2018). This is included as a control for the fact
that bordering and BRI countries tend to be closer to China, meaning that traditional
gravity models would predict more bilateral commerce regardless of geostrategic
factors.
These geostrategic variables are not independent of one another. Overland connectivity
requires cooperation with neighboring countries, and ten out of the fourteen bordering
countries in the sample set are also along BRI routes. Similarly, seven of twelve coun-
tries at maritime chokepoints are also along BRI routes. The Belt and Road Initiative was
designed such that location at China’s border or at a maritime chokepoint is causally prior
to BRI designation. So, I test the variables separately, with the border and chokepoint vari-
ables in one set of regressions and the BRI binary in another. (Distance is included as a
control in both cases.) These two sets of tests assess somewhat different pathways linking
geostrategic interests to development finance. The geographic variables measure inherent
importance to Chinese interests regardless of state policy, while the BRI variable measures
which of these countries have been prioritized for infrastructural development. In the first
set of countries, China’s incentives are to be as concessional as possible (e.g., grants) to
manage relations with the country; in the second, this need is counteracted by a desire to
6The nature of sea trade is such that inclusion or exclusion of a given port from a Maritime Silk Road
route can be more debatable than for fixed road or rail routes. I include only countries listed on the official
Belt and Road map as a better reflection of Beijing’s thinking, but readers should be aware that in common
discussions in the media, other countries may be casually referred to as along the Maritime Silk Road. The
map used is also included in Chapter 2 as Figure 2.1. The map was published in 2016 and was current as of
June 2018. Future alterations are possible, although these would be less reflective of Chinese strategy during
the time period being tested in this dissertation.
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use less concessional means (equity and debt) to build new projects, including when firms
might not want to do so of their own volition.
Trade flows act as a proxy for commercial interests (Hypothesis 4). Specifically:
• Commodity exports to China measure resource security motives. Perhaps because of
the more direct connection to Chinese interests, these were found to be better predic-
tors of Chinese activity than data on domestic production or resource rents. Data in
thousands of U.S. dollars per United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(2018).7 This variable is lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity where investments
or loans might generate exports to China.8 I also transform this variable according
to the formula ln(x + 1) (henceforth the “log plus one” transformation). This for-
mula corrects for positive skew by approximating the natural logarithmic function
but avoids the loss of observations with an original value of zero.
• Total imports from China (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
2018) operationalize China’s interest in generating business for its firms. It should
be cautioned that the terms of many Chinese deals guarantee that these interests are
accommodated and that any null results mean that these deals did not make a sta-
tistically discernible difference in the larger scheme of global trade. Because of the
essentially tautological nature of comparing funding to purchase Chinese goods to
actual purchase of those goods, I do not rely heavily on this variable to demonstrate
Chinese commercial interests and instead include it more as a control for commodity
exports. Following the treatment of commodity exports, total imports from China are
lagged by one year and transformed according to the formula ln(x + 1).
7I use UNCTAD’s categorization of “primary commodities, precious stones, and non-monetary gold
(SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 68 + 667 + 971).”
8Granted, from China’s perspective, this “reverse causality” might be the point.
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I include one primary measure of governance quality (Hypotheses 3B and 4B) as well as
one control:
• The primary measure of governance quality is the Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors’ Rule of Law index (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2018). The Worldwide Governance
Indicators also include measures of potentially relevant concepts such as control of
corruption and regulatory quality, but these are less immediately indicative of this
dissertation’s conceptualization of governance risk as the risk of arbitrary encroach-
ment on previous agreements by the state.9 This variable is lagged by one year to
avoid endogeneity related to the findings of Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018) that Chi-
nese aid may increase local (if not national) corruption in Africa, implying a potential
effect on overall governance patterns.
• Polity score (21-point scale) per M. Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2018). Governance
quality is correlated with regime type, and China could hypothetically approach au-
tocracies and democracies differently. Lagged by one year to match treatment of
Rule of Law.
I include several general control variables as follows:
• Central government debt-to-GDP ratio per Abbas et al. (2011), as updated by Mbaye,
Moreno Badia, and Chae (2018). Over-indebtedness would be another source of risk
to lenders and investors and could be related to variables of interest including gov-
ernance quality and commodity exports. Lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity
with Chinese loans.
9I have also run tests using Control of Corruption, and the results were essentially the same. Most gover-
nance measures are highly co-correlated with one another, and which one is used matters more in theory than
in practice. Results for Control of Corruption and other measures are available upon request.
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• Gross domestic product per capita (current U.S. dollars) (World Bank, 2018c). This
is an important determinant of both business strategy which also happens to be corre-
lated with any number of variables of interest. Logged to account for positive skew.
• Total population, a traditional predictor of virtually any type of financial flow. Logged
to account for positive skew.
• English as a country’s primary language (binary), per CEPII (2017). Dreher, Fuchs,
Parks, et al. (2018) use this variable because the web-scraping methodology used
to compile their dataset may be more effective at identifying projects in English-
speaking countries.
• A time trend binomial consisting of two variables. The first is a linear series related
to the year; e.g., the year 2000 (the earliest in the dataset) is coded as 1, 2001 as 2,
and so on. The second variable is the square of the first. This accounts for a quadratic
time trend in which Chinese financial outflows rise rapidly during the 2000s but level
in the 2010s following the global financial crisis.
Many of these independent variables are either completely time-invariant (as for the geo-
graphic indicators) or vary only slowly over time (e.g., governance quality). So, clustering
is an obvious issue. I thus include robust clustered standard errors in all models.
4.1.1.2 Grants and Zero-Interest Loans
Data on grants are taken from the AidData project at the College of William & Mary
(Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). Because many grants are made in-kind, there is not
always a reliable estimate for their financial value. To deal with this issue, I include two
models of grants: one of their dollar value, and another of the count of grants in a given
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country-year. The first model (Column 1) better takes into account differentiation in the
size of grants, while the second (Column 2) is more thorough in its inclusion of in-kind
grants. Due to the fact that many country-years have a value of zero, the dollar value of
grants is regressed using a Tobit model left-censored at zero. I use a Poisson model for the
grant count variable.
Data on zero-interest loans is available from two sources: AidData (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks,
et al., 2018) and the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School
of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) (Atkins et al., 2017). The AidData figures are
more comprehensive in that they include web-scraped figures for all developing countries,
but as of this writing are only available for the years 2000-2014. The SAIS-CARI figures
are limited to Africa and thus cannot be used to test several Eurasia-specific variables, but
include a greater number of years (2000-2017) and are subject to greater verification. I
include models of both in Columns 3 and 4.
To better compare grants and zero-interest loans, I include in Column 5 a logistic model
of the dependent variable GrantsGrants+ZIL . Data on both are taken from AidData to maximize
comparability. This model directly reflects the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s decision
between grants and zero-interest loans, but at the cost of losing many country-year obser-
vations for which neither grants nor zero-interest loans were extended.
As for all statistical tests in this dissertation, I include two tables: one for the geography-
based geostrategic variables (the border and chokepoint binaries), and another for the Belt
and Road binary. Because location along a BRI corridor was not found to be a predictor of
aid flows, the BRI specification is located in this chapter’s Appendix (Section 4.4). Only
the geography-based specifications are included in the text of the chapter proper.
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All dollar value dependent variables in the following table are transformed according to the
formula ln(x + 1), with the exception of the fractional logistic model in Column 5.
4.1.2 Results and Analysis
Table 4.1: Grants and Zero-Interest Loans, Commitment Basis, Borders and Chokepoints
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tobit: Poisson: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Grants Grants ZIL ZIL % Grants
(AD) (AD) (AD) (SAIS) (AD)
Taiwan recognition -5.058⇤⇤⇤ -3.476⇤⇤⇤ -23.31⇤⇤⇤ -18.47⇤⇤⇤ 13.62⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-7.50) (-4.24) (-20.79) (-14.74) (15.35)
ASEAN member, SCS -1.349⇤⇤⇤ -1.008⇤⇤⇤ -22.30⇤⇤⇤ 14.15⇤⇤⇤
disputant (binary) (-2.58) (-2.84) (-11.07) (15.61)
ASEAN member, SCS 0.548 0.595⇤⇤ -0.0921 0.862
non-disputant (binary) (1.20) (2.09) (-0.04) (0.99)
UNGA voting similarity 1.895⇤ 1.141⇤ 3.063 -1.731 -0.650
with China (one-year lag) (1.95) (1.81) (0.85) (-0.46) (-0.40)
Border with China -0.231 -0.0969 -7.129⇤⇤⇤ 2.532⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-0.46) (-0.30) (-3.39) (2.68)
Chokepoint (binary) -0.155 -0.326 -4.479⇤⇤⇤ -3.343⇤⇤⇤ 1.680⇤⇤
(-0.39) (-1.61) (-3.79) (-2.96) (2.15)
Distance from China (pop.- -0.000683 -0.0129 -0.0701 -0.394 0.0263
weighted; thousands km) (-0.02) (-0.50) (-0.44) (-1.60) (0.38)
Commodity exports to 0.0735 0.0298 0.424⇤⇤ 0.211 -0.118
China (log; one-year lag) (1.36) (0.90) (2.42) (1.26) (-1.49)
Total imports from 0.667⇤⇤⇤ 0.140 0.358 -0.318 0.0497
China (log; one-year lag) (2.88) (1.10) (0.41) (-0.44) (0.13)
Rule of Law (WGI; -0.255 -0.155 1.674⇤⇤ 0.814 -0.763⇤
one-year lag) (-1.16) (-1.23) (2.04) (1.21) (-1.83)
Polity score 0.0101 0.00960 -0.124⇤ -0.0421 0.0557⇤
(one-year lag) (0.42) (0.72) (-1.71) (-0.65) (1.69)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.0397 -0.0329 0.236 0.288 0.00286
(log; one-year lag) (-0.24) (-0.35) (0.48) (0.70) (0.01)
GDP per capita (log) -1.676⇤⇤⇤ -0.591⇤⇤⇤ -2.442⇤⇤ -0.210 0.247
(-6.74) (-4.32) (-2.41) (-0.30) (0.57)
Population (log) -0.703⇤⇤⇤ -0.142 -0.674 -0.481 0.0427
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1: Grants and Zero-Interest Loans, Commitment Basis, Borders and Chokepoints
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tobit: Poisson: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Grants Grants ZIL ZIL % Grants
(AD) (AD) (AD) (SAIS) (AD)
(-3.47) (-1.23) (-0.89) (-0.78) (0.13)
English language 0.835⇤⇤⇤ 0.600⇤⇤⇤ 1.239 -0.756 0.0210
(binary) (2.83) (4.64) (1.42) (-1.14) (0.06)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 0.328⇤⇤⇤ 0.278⇤⇤⇤ -0.0633 0.484⇤⇤ 0.313⇤⇤
(3.15) (5.53) (-0.20) (2.35) (2.10)
Time2 -0.0135⇤⇤ -0.0112⇤⇤⇤ 0.00646 -0.0291⇤⇤⇤ -0.0141⇤
(-2.48) (-4.43) (0.39) (-3.00) (-1.89)
Constant 9.391⇤⇤⇤ 2.105 10.90 12.87 -1.892
(3.67) (1.35) (1.37) (1.51) (-0.55)
Countries 124 124 124 49 99
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2014 2014 2014 2017 2014
Observations 1499 1499 1499 712 615
Clustered SE? X X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from AidData (AD) and SAIS-CARI (SAIS).
Table 4.1 displays the main results for small-scale concessional flows. The data are very
supportive of a role for grants and zero-interest loans in addressing China’s territorial dis-
putes. The results for Taiwan recognition fit the predicted pattern: countries which recog-
nize Taiwan receive much less financing across the board, but when China decides to make
an exception, grants are much more common than zero-interest loans. China faces strong
incentives to “roll out the red carpet” for countries considering switching relations from
Taipei to Beijing, and given the sensitivity of the issue is likely to extend highly favorable
terms. The model in Column 3 predicts that if all other independent variables are set to their
mean values, a “typical state” which does not recognize Taiwan will receive $78,696 per
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year in zero-interest loans. This figure drops to less than a penny for those who recognize
Taipei. The figures for grants per Column 1 are also drastic—recognition of Taiwan causes
a fall from $1.046 million per year to $4,375—but do not drive projected flows down to
(functionally) zero. So, per Column 5, Beijing’s diplomatic partners can expect grants to
constitute 93.9 percent of total grants and zero-interest loans, but this rises to over 99.9
percent for Taipei’s diplomatic partners. Clearly, China intends to put its best foot forward
when reaching out to Taipei’s diplomatic partners, but this happens only rarely.
A similar pattern is found among South China Sea disputants—China either cuts them off
from all aid or demonstrates to dramatic effect how much they could benefit from back-
ing off of their claims. Non-disputant ASEAN states, on the other hand, may receive
slightly more favorable treatment than other states, but not in any statistically consistent
way: they receive a larger number of grants per Column 2, but not necessarily a larger
dollar value. There are individual instances of non-disputant ASEAN members receiving
favorable treatment in exchange for support of China’s position—Chapter 8 will discuss
China’s debt relief to Cambodia—but these are too few and far between to register in mod-
els of the aggregate data. The effect of territorial disputes, on the other hand, is quite clear.
If all other independent variables are set to the sample mean, ASEAN members with no
territorial disputes with China can expect roughly $1.035M per year in grants, as opposed
to $195,492 for disputants. This is not as stark as the crash to under $5,000 per year for
Taiwan’s diplomatic partners, reflecting the unique sensitivity of Taiwan’s status in PRC
policy. Non-disputant status is, however, associated with a drop from $18,310 per year in
predicted zero-interest loan flows to (again) less than one cent. This is less than the $70,000
shortfall associated with recognition of Taipei, but still not trivial.
There is also moderate support for H2 regarding the UN-related variables. On one hand,
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Figure 4.1: Predicted Total Grant Commitments vs. United Nations General Assembly
Voting Alignment (t-1)
Based on Column 1 of Table 4.1 if all other variables set to mean.
Shaded area is 95 percent confidence interval.
the hypothesized negative relationship between UNGA voting and zero-interest loans does
not exist. Nor is there a relationship between UNGA voting and the proportion of aid com-
mitted in grant form. On the other hand, as expected, grants are positively associated with
UNGA voting alignment. This relationship is statistically inconsistent but substantively
meaningful. Figure 4.1 shows this graphically.
While the model does predict a reasonably strong role for grants in China’s diplomatic
outreach, the rug plot at the bottom of Figure 4.1 illustrates that in practice, most develop-
134 CHAPTER 4. DIPLOMACY AND BASIC COMMERCIAL INTERESTS I
ing countries tend to vote with China fairly often. Indeed, relatively little daylight exists
between the sample’s 25th percentile for UN voting alignment (70.1 percent) and the 75th
percentile (86.4 percent). Per the model in Column 1 of Table 4.1, these two values would
be correlated with $565,693 and $742,151 in grants per year, respectively. This is not a
small difference, but also not enough to be considered consistent given the wide margin of
error. Stronger effects can be observed toward the extremes of the distribution, but rela-
tively few countries inhabit these areas. While these results are somewhat supportive of the
theoretical prediction that grants are useful for general diplomacy, more specific diplomatic
issues surrounding territorial disputes are more directly salient to Chinese policy.
The data support the hypothesis that geostrategically important states will receive better
terms (H3), albeit inconsistently. Table 4.1 demonstrates that given the choice between
grants or zero-interest loans to states bordering China or at maritime chokepoints, the Min-
istry of Commerce more often opts for grants. These results are consistent with the theo-
retical prediction of negative coefficients on zero-interest loans, but not the prediction of
positive coefficients on grants. Given the general predominance of grants over ZILs, this
implies that these strategically important countries are not receiving much less aid than
others but instead that the allocation between grants and ZILs lies more in their favor.
Specifically, the model in Column 5 of Table 4.1 predicts that on average,10 the distribution
will be 99.3 percent grants for bordering countries as opposed to 92.3 percent elsewhere.
Similarly, countries at maritime chokepoints are projected to receive 98.7 percent grants,
as opposed to 93.3 percent for the rest of the sample set. Maintaining free passage through
these countries mandates laxer financing terms.
The results for Belt and Road routes (Table 4.3 in the Appendix), on the other hand, are
10All other independent variables set to mean.
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uniformly null. For small-scale concessional flows, recipient geography matters more than
its positioning in China’s stated policy on connectivity projects. Grants and zero-interest
loans are being used to manage bilateral relations with countries along important trade
routes and in some instances to promote border security, but they are too small to build
connective infrastructure projects of the type likely to appear along the Belt and Road.
As we shall see in later chapters, the task of building up the Belt and Road is left to less
concessional but larger-scale financial arrangements.
Finally, it is worth noting that both grants and zero-interest loans flow to lower-income
countries. This is not particularly surprising, but it is consistent with the idea that small-
concessional flows are best for outreach to countries with the greatest need. We now look
in greater detail at how this has worked in practice in Burundi and Rwanda.
4.2 Small-Scale Concessional Flows to Burundi and Rwanda
China has issued a similar mix of grants11 and zero-interest loans to Burundi and Rwanda
but has generally been more successful in persuading Burundi to support its diplomatic
positions. This is largely because Rwanda is more popular with international donors and is
subject to countervailing pressures, while Burundi (especially since its 2015 constitutional
crisis) is proportionately more dependent on China. A comparison of the two demonstrates
the diplomatic role of aid not just from China but also from elsewhere. This section com-
pares the two in six parts. First is a brief introduction to pertinent information on Burundi
and Rwanda. Second, I place Chinese aid flows in the broader context of aid from around
11This does not include large amounts of debt forgiveness to both countries. Like many other donors,
China has written off much of Burundi’s and Rwanda’s debt which accrued before the violence of 1993-1994
(Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). This is functionally similar to a grant and no doubt relevant to Chinese
diplomacy in the region, but I postpone discussion of it until Chapter 8 on treatment of distressed debt. In any
event, both Burundi and Rwanda benefited from Chinese debt relief, so there is little cross-national variation.
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the world. Third, I analyze the sectoral composition of Chinese aid to confirm that it is
indeed used for smaller projects in the social sectors. Fourth, I look at differences between
grants and zero-interest loans; while the proportion of these two categories did not vary
much between Burundi and Rwanda, there are important qualitative differences in how
they were used. Fifth, I shift to a more micro-level analysis of projects of individual diplo-
matic significance, including some which have occurred after 2014, the latest year in the
primary quantitative dataset from Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018). Sixth, I look at actual
diplomatic outcomes in each country.
4.2.1 Background: Burundi and Rwanda
Landlocked and nestled between larger countries in Africa’s Great Lakes region, Burundi
and Rwanda have quite a bit in common. They have similar populations—10.9 million
in Burundi and 12.2 million in Rwanda—and are both least-developed countries, with per
capita incomes below $1,000.12 They also produce few commodities13 other than coffee
and tea and are not central to Belt and Road navigational interests which play a major role in
Chinese foreign policy.14 Burundi and Rwanda differ substantially, though, in governance.
This difference has roots in their shared tragic history of the 1990s.
Both Burundi and Rwanda are divided between a Tutsi minority and Hutu majority, with the
former historically playing a leading role in government. Ethnic tension between the two
12Figures per World Bank (2018c) as of 2017.
13There is a small exception for tantalum, a mineral used in electronic circuits. Rwanda is a leading
exporter of tantalum, some of it illicitly mined in conflict regions of the eastern Congo and reported as
Rwandan production. However, the value of Rwandan (and laundered DRC) exports put together did not
exceed $40 million in 2017 (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011).
14Both are part of a planned regional network which could more efficiently connect Congolese minerals
to the Indian Ocean coastline. These plans, however, have currently reached the construction phase only in
coastal Kenya and Tanzania, and it remains to be seen what the eventual inland components might look like
and how involved China will be. This topic will be covered in the Conclusion chapter (Chapter 9 along with
other future trends and areas of further research.
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increased under German and Belgian colonialism as the Europeans relied on the Tutsis as
a local ruling class. This fault line has been the subject of periodic outbreaks of violence,
the worst of which happened in the 1990s. At the outset of that decade, Burundi had a
Tutsi-led government, and Rwanda a Hutu-led one. In 1990, the predominantly Tutsi rebel
group Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda. An ethnic civil war
continued for several years and was still ongoing when neighboring Burundi in June 1993
held its first-ever democratic elections, in which Melchior Ndadaye become Burundi’s first
Hutu president. In October, Ndadaye was assassinated, sparking Burundi’s own civil war.
In April 1994, a plane carrying Ndadaye’s successor as well as the Rwandan President was
shot down, triggering the Rwandan genocide which claimed at least half a million lives15
(International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi, 2002).
This is where Burundi’s and Rwanda’s paths began to diverge. In Rwanda, the Tutsi-
led rebels of the RPF took control of the country and put an end to the genocide. Their
leader, Paul Kagame, has been the de facto leader ever since and the de jure President since
2000. The 1990s remained somewhat tumultuous as Rwanda was involved in wars in the
neighboring DRC, but the 2000s saw a remarkable transformation as Rwanda became an
unexpected island of stability in a dangerous neighborhood. This has happened through
both economic capacity- and institution-building and political repression. For the purposes
of this dissertation, this illuminates the distinction between the type of institutional strength
which is relevant to international (and domestic) investors and rules such as freedom of
expression which might be labeled as “good institutions” in their own right but make less
of a difference from a purely economic perspective.
On one hand, Rwanda is not democratic. Kagame’s first formal election to the Presidency in
15The death toll of the Rwandan genocide is still a subject of some debate. See Lemarchand (2018).
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2000 was made by an 83-2 vote in Parliament, not the public. Rwanda’s 2003 Constitution
formally provides for popular elections, but Kagame has “won” all of his popular contests
by margins of over 90 percent. The most recent, in 2017, came after a constitutional change
to allow him to stay beyond the originally planned term limit (Uwiringiyimana, 2017).
Freedom of expression is sharply limited, and the media are heavily censored (Freedom
House, 2019). The state’s heavy hand is accepted to a greater degree because of the memory
of what instability can look like: as the Executive Director of the non-profit Human Rights
Watch put it, the “tragedy is providing the government with a cover for repression” (Roth,
2009).
On the other hand, Rwanda has built a fairly robust legal environment, as of 2018 ranking
fifth in Africa in the Worldwide Governance Indicators’ Rule of Law index (Kaufmann and
Kraay, 2018). Rwanda is one of a minority of African countries with access to international
bond markets and maintains relationships with both the IMF and World Bank (World Bank,
2018c). Granted, the strength of Rwandan rule of law is not equal across all sectors of the
economy. Part of the Rwandan party-state’s strategy for maintaining power has been using
party- or military-owned firms as a mechanism to distribute rents to elites who prove their
loyalty (Gökgür, 2012). These firms enjoy preferential treatment, and those dealing with
them may be exposed to higher levels of political risk than elsewhere in the Rwandan
economy. Party- and military-connected firms have not typically been involved in small
aid projects and will not be discussed in detail in this chapter. They are, however, heavily
involved in infrastructure and public works and will be discussed as a source of within-
country variation in the next chapter.
Despite some subnational inconsistency, Rwanda retains a much stronger reputation for
governance than Burundi, leading to greater inflows of funding from Europe in particu-
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lar (Hackenesch, 2018). Kagame himself has gained some status in international financial
circles. The former guerrilla appeared on a panel on financing to developing countries at
the 2019 Davos World Economic Forum. His co-panelists included IMF Director Christine
Lagarde and the rock star and philanthropist Bono, with former USAID Administrator Ra-
jiv Shah moderating (Kagame, 2019). The Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, a
more critical voice, writes that “Western governments, guilt-ridden at not having stopped
the genocide and impressed by Rwanda’s stability and economic growth, have been all too
willing to close their eyes to [...] repressive sleight of hand” (Roth, 2009). In his estima-
tion, many foreigners are making the same calculation as Rwandan citizens, accepting an
autocrat out of fear of the alternative. There are certainly other interpretations of events. It
is debatable how much international financial circles pay attention to human rights in con-
texts where the West might feel less guilt.16 The point remains, though, that Kagame has
done what has eluded many others in his position: building an economically stable enough
environment to convince outsiders to overlook disagreements over how to manage more
purely political affairs. Kagame’s gambit has made Rwanda disproportionately influential
in African diplomacy as well. He was the 2018-2019 Chair of the African Union (African
Union, 2018). Despite the country’s small size, Rwanda is the world’s third-highest contrib-
utor of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, with Rwandan blue helmets constituting
19.7 percent of the UN’s total strength in South Sudan, 17.8 percent in Darfur, and 13.7
percent in the Central African Republic.17 Rwanda’s ability to turn danger into stability
and outsized influence has drawn comparisons to Singapore, although Kagame himself has
downplayed them (Ultsch, 2018). In any event, Rwanda’s stature in regional affairs makes
it an important diplomatic partner for extra-regional powers, China included.
16The recent scandal following Saudi Arabia’s murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi is a case in
point, as is the rise of China itself.
17As of January 2020. See Peacekeeping (2020).
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Burundi, in contrast, has not fully escaped the cycle of chronic unrest of which the 1993-
1994 bout of violence was the worst instance. Burundi also has a leader who has maintained
power via questionable means, but its economic institutions are not as strong as Rwanda’s.
The Burundian civil war continued through 2005, at which time a peace settlement brought
Pierre Nkurunziza to power as Burundi’s first elected President since Melchior Ndadaye’s
1993 assassination. Like Kagame in Rwanda, Nkurunziza has won repeated elections by
unrealistically high margins, typically with opposition bans or boycotts; also like Kagame,
he in 2015 decided to stay beyond the planned term limit. In Burundi, though, there was
no constitutional change. In April 2015, violent protests began. In May 2015, there was
a failed coup attempt (Thomson, 2016). Nkurunziza’s official argument was that his first
election had been by the Parliament, not voters, and so it did not count toward term limits.
This interpretation was set to expire, though, with the end of his third term in 2020. A 2018
constitutional change passed with suppressed voter turnout did away with this limitation (J.
Moore, 2018). He has currently pledged to step down in May 2020, although many doubt
how much different Nkurunziza’s hand-picked successor will be, or how thoroughly the
previous president will relinquish power (Mwakideu, 2020; Nimubona, 2018). This leads
to a deeper problem for investors: like Kagame’s, the structures of power which Nkurunz-
iza has built may outlast him, but in this case, they are a deterrent to investment. Burundi’s
political economy is essentially patrimonialist, with state benefits flowing to members of
the ruling party at the expense of those less connected (International Crisis Group, 2012).
The letter of the law is secondary to personal connections, and written contracts are subject
to unexpected renegotiation. As of 2018, the Worldwide Governance Indicators ranked
Burundi at the 5.8 percentile for Rule of Law, and the 5.3 percentile for Control of Cor-
ruption (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2018). The impact of corruption and instability on growth
and individual businesses has been heightened since the 2015 protests: the government
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has introduced new mandatory family “contributions” to the national Treasury to address
sovereign debt concerns, and many civil servants have not been regularly paid (Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 2018a; Nantulya, 2019). Nkurunziza is not running in the May 2020
presidential election, but early indications point toward more of the same: Nkurunziza’s
retirement package includes 1 billion Burundian francs (US $530,000) and a luxury home,
and there is legislation currently before Parliament to name him “Supreme Guide of Patri-
otism” (Mwakideu, 2020; Reuters, 2020).
4.2.1.1 Chinese Aid in Broader Context
These developments have affected many donors’ relationships with Burundi and Rwanda,
which in turn affects the environments in which China operates in each country. I here
compare Chinese grants and zero-interest loans to flows from other donors over time. This
is made more difficult by differing rules of accounting. OECD reporting conventions do
not separate loans at zero interest from loans at interest rates low enough to be deemed
concessional by a standardized formula. Both are included alongside grants as “Official
Development Assistance” (ODA). This is obviously different from the Chinese system,
which groups grants and zero-interest loans under one bureaucratic umbrella while a dif-
ferent set of organizations handles interest-bearing loans. Readers should be aware of this
difference when viewing Figure 4.2. This figure compares Chinese grants and zero-interest
loans (bottom) with ODA from all official sources (national governments and multilateral
organizations) which report to the OECD (top), a list that includes all OECD members as
well as several large donors from the Middle East.
Figure 4.2 shows that Chinese aid to Burundi and Rwanda is a fairly small percentage
of the countries’ total official receipts. Part of this is due to differences in accounting—
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Figure 4.2: OECD-Reported Official Development Assistance (All Official Sources) and
Chinese Grants and Zero-Interest Loans, 2000-2018 (Commitment Basis)
Burundi in Red; Rwanda in Blue
ODA data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018). Chinese data from
Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018) (grants) and Atkins et al. (2017) (ZILs).
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the inclusion of concessional loans at interest above zero, the topic of the next section,
would narrow the gap somewhat—but even so, China is one among many countries and
multilateral organizations involved. That being said, the allocation of Chinese aid is more
equitable across the two countries than has been the case for most other donors. The 2015
violence in Burundi led to fears that many donors might cut back, but the reality is that
aid largely flatlined following the end of the civil war in 2005. Donors may never have
been comfortable with Burundi’s domestic political environment, but the need there is too
great to ignore, and so they simply muddle through at existing aid levels without increasing
expenditures. In real terms, this has put serious stress on the Burundian budget. Burundi
fell into a recession after the 2015 protests, and aid receipts have not increased to keep
up with the resulting fiscal deficits. In contrast, Rwanda has high rates of poverty but
an institutional framework in which donors feel more comfortable, and international aid
commitments have continued to rise along with the country’s market reputation.
China has in some years actually given more to Burundi than to Rwanda, a phenomenon
which for other donors happened only during the later phases of the Burundian Civil War.
Its commitments to Rwanda do generally exceed those to Burundi, but not by such a large
margin.
One limitation of this comparison is that AidData’s figures only run through 2014, the
year before Burundi’s renewed violence began (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). While
a more comprehensive analysis of Chinese aid after the crisis would be difficult,18 it is
possible to integrate the more comprehensive data available through 2014 with publicly
available information since then, with the understanding that this may not be the complete
18Larger projects, especially those associated with construction works, are relatively easy to observe. How-
ever, cash grants or donations of equipment or supplies can easily go unrecorded, and this author does not
claim to be able to track them as effectively as large teams at AidData or SAIS-CARI (Atkins et al., 2017;
Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018).
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Table 4.2: Allocation by Sector of Chinese Aid to
Burundi and Rwanda, 2000-2014
Sector Burundi Rwanda
Education 23.1% 7.9%
Government and Civil Society 1.1% 23.7%
Health 13.6% 3.7%
Unallocated / Unspecified 43.7% 43.7%
Other Sectors 18.5% 21.0%
Data from AidData (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.,
2018) and SAIS-CARI (Atkins et al., 2017).
Includes both grants and zero-interest loans.
“Other Sectors” is a residual of other categorized
flows.
picture. The following sections do so by looking at differences across sector; differences
between grants and zero-interest loans; and projects of individual significance.
4.2.1.2 Cross-Sector Comparison
The largest single category of aid to both countries was unallocated, meaning that its use
was either not stated; to be determined; or a simple cash contribution to the state budget. A
literal blank check is highly diplomatically useful, as no conceivable deal has fewer (for-
mal) strings attached. The remainder tends to go to social sectors like health and education
(Burundi) and government administration (Rwanda). Burundi’s needs in health and educa-
tion are generally higher, and Rwanda’s high total for the governmental sector was driven
by two new government buildings. As will be discussed in the project-level analysis, China
also built Burundi’s Presidential Palace after the end of the Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.
(2018) dataset in 2014.19 In general, a focus on social sectors is typical of Chinese (and
19AidData (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018) lists the Presidential Palace project as dating back to 2008,
but at the time of their publication there was not yet a set budget. So, it was included in the dataset without a
dollar value and is thus not reflected in Table 4.2.
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other) aid projects. Larger works such as infrastructure require too much capital to sustain-
ably do on a grant or zero-interest basis, but smaller social-sector projects can be done on
this basis and can be appreciated for taking pressure off of recipients’ state budgets.
4.2.1.3 Grants vs. Zero-Interest Loans
There is no appreciable variation in total allocation between grants and zero-interest loans
between Burundi and Rwanda. Chinese small-scale concessional flows20 to Burundi were
60.1 percent grants; to Rwanda, 65.6 percent. However, there does exist interesting within-
case variation in how grants and zero-interest loans were used. In Rwanda, 75.8 of ZILs in
the AidData database went to the “Unallocated / Unspecified” category, as opposed to 35.0
percent of grants. For Burundi, these numbers were 96.2 and 32.0 percent, respectively.
Zero-interest loans are mostly going to unspecified purposes, leaving quite a bit up to the
recipient government’s discretion. This could reflect the existence of grants in kind. Do-
nation of medical equipment, for example, is automatically slated for the medical sector;
this option does not exist for ZILs. That being said, most grants are made in cash, and the
differential is too large to be explained solely by in-kind grants. Another possibility is that
a blank check for the local government is a kind of consolation prize for having to actually
repay the funds; as in, zero-interest loans would be more stringent in raw financial terms,
but with fewer strings attached as to how to use the money. This distinction does not hold
up as well in the larger-n sample: globally speaking, 43.3 percent of ZILs were unallocated
or vaguely allocated21, as opposed to 36.7 percent of grants. China did deploy both grants
and zero-interest loans in Burundi and Rwanda, but the terms were adjusted to reduce the
20Combined grants per Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018) and zero-interest loans per Atkins et al. (2017).
Years 2000-2014.
21Includes the “General Budget Support,” “Other Multisector,” and “Unallocated / Unspecified” categories,
of which the third was the most important in Burundi and Rwanda.
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negative diplomatic impact of the ZILs in countries where diplomacy is among the Chinese
government’s primary interests.
4.2.1.4 Individual Projects
Much of China’s aid to Burundi and Rwanda fell into categories such as health and edu-
cation which have been focuses of international development and philanthropy since the
1990s. This would have been appreciated but is not particularly distinct from what other
donors have done. A few projects, though, are different. China has donated some items, of-
ten but not exclusively government buildings, which have some prestige value for local gov-
ernments but have limited developmental impact and would be less likely areas of emphasis
for many donors. The impact that these items has can also vary by circumstance. A vote of
confidence is appreciated where most other parties also express confidence (Rwanda), but
goes further in countries where many have serious doubts (Burundi).
In Burundi, China has shown support for the government during both good times and bad.
In 2011, China agreed to donate one Xi’an MA60 aircraft to Air Burundi, the national
carrier, on the condition that Burundi later purchase another. This “buy one, get one free”
deal was not purely aid but was important to Burundi under the circumstances: Burundi Air
had not flown since 2009 after its only airplane reached the end of its useful life. In 2012,
Burundi took delivery of the first plane. Burundi has yet to buy the second, and given its
current unrest this part of the plan will likely remain on hold for the time being. Because of
a lack of certified crew,22 the plane has yet to be cleared to fly, but China’s singlehandedly
restoring the national carrier to operations (if only on paper) had to be appreciated by the
22This has been the official explanation given. The MA60, however, has had numerous safety problems
and is not cleared to fly in many countries. Safety concerns may factor into the plane’s indefinite grounding,
although it is difficult to establish this from the outside. See ch-aviation (2017) and Stacey and C. H. Wong
(2016).
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leadership (ch-aviation, 2017; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018).
Another hybrid deal mixing grants with commercial terms came from another area of com-
parative advantage for China: telecommunications. In 2011, Huawei agreed to build the
capital city of Bujumbura’s first broadband network, the Metropolitan Area Network. The
original plan was to focus on connecting government agencies (Boyle, 2014; Comms Up-
date, 2014). In 2011, only 1.1 percent of Burundi’s population was connected to the Inter-
net, and connections for the civil service were a top priority (International Telecommuni-
cations Union, 2019). China funded the project with a $7.5 million grant from the Ministry
of Commerce and a $7.5 million loan from Exim (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). This
is part of a broader pattern regarding Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunications Equip-
ment (ZTE), its major domestic competitor, in their overseas operations. Construction of
cheap telecommunications networks has become a tool of diplomatic outreach for China,
especially in developing countries which cannot afford more expensive competitors (W. G.
Moore, 2019). Mackinnon (2019), for example, estimates that Huawei by itself has built
around 70 percent of Africa’s 4G mobile networks. Huawei and ZTE’s low cost are par-
tially a function of China’s low costs as a country, but not entirely so. Yap (2019) estimates
that Huawei received up to $75 billion in tax breaks, subsidized credit, and other support
between 1998 and 2018. If one takes into account Huawei’s domestic subsidies, the portion
of the project funded without remuneration was even higher than the publicly announced
50 percent grant financing.
The most important in way in which China supports the Burundian government, however,
has to do with regime legitimacy. China contributed $263,000 to electoral support ahead
of Burundi’s 2010 elections and $800,000 in materials ahead of the ill-fated 2015 polls. In
both instances, though, China was a relatively small contributor in the context of tens of
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millions of mostly European funds routed through organizations like the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; United Nations
Development Programme, 2015). The real difference was in how China has treated the
Burundian regime after the violence surrounding the 2015 polls. Many donors might have
opted to remain in Burundi for fear of what happens if they leave, but China has expressed
more vocal support for the regime through the construction of a new Presidential Palace.
This project dates back to an agreement before the protests, but it came to fruition after
the violence began and was handed over in 2019. The $22 million, 10,000 square me-
ter (108,000 square foot) facility would have been otherwise out of Burundi’s reach even
before the post-2015 recession; as Burundi’s Minister of Foreign Affairs put it at the han-
dover ceremony, “since the independence of Burundi, we have not had such a building”
(Nininahazwe, 2019; People’s Daily⇣∫⌘Â•⌘, 2019; Xinhua, 2013). The Economist
Intelligence Unit (2014) reported that:
The Burundian authorities, who rely on foreign aid for nearly half of the state
budget, will be particularly keen to ensure continued backing from China at a
time when several Western donors, including France and the US, have grown
increasingly critical of its democratic record. Indeed, a number of Burundi’s
traditional donors are increasingly reluctant to extend their support to the gov-
ernment amid an apparent drive to close the democratic space, by arresting or
harassing critics and opponents. Partners, such as India and China, which are
less concerned about Burundi’s political and governance record, are thus likely
to be of increasing importance.
Even if donors did not actually leave following the 2015 unrest, aid did remain flat, and this
as Burundi was already having trouble raising enough taxes to cover expenditures. More
to the point, other donors were mostly not spending on grandiose symbols of presidential
power. The clear message was that China, as a fellow developing (and authoritarian) coun-
try, was in a position to understand Burundi in a way that wealthy Western states would
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not. The rhetoric of non-interference and South-South cooperation discussed in Chapter 2
here finds new life well after the Cold War.
Rwanda had projects of this nature, but they were less audacious and carried less weight
given Rwanda’s more diversified foreign relations. One very early one was Amahoro Sta-
dium, the country’s largest. Originally built by China Civil Engineering Construction Cor-
poration (CCECC) in the 1980s, the $22 million facility already had some symbolic value
well before China’s pockets deepened in subsequent decades. As of 2018, China is funding
the stadium’s renovation at a cost of roughly $2.3 million23—a small gesture, but a sym-
bolically meaningful one (Tashobya, 2018). Like some government buildings, stadiums
often have more prestige value than economic value, meaning China may be more willing
to expend resources here than some more purely development-driven organizations. Sports
venues’ potential as public relations winners has driven China to engage in so-called “sta-
dium diplomacy” in many other countries as well (Vondracek, 2019).
China has also contributed to the government sector in Rwanda. In 2006, China agreed
to a grant to build a new facility for Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Beijing
Construction Engineering Group (BCEG) completed work at a cost of $7.66 million, and
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi personally attended the building’s handover (Dreher,
Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
2009). This type of high-level attention from a major power cannot be taken for granted
in small countries and amplifies the building’s diplomatic impact.24 In 2008, while the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs building was under construction, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) donated $150,000 worth of electronic equipment to the Rwandan Patriotic Front
232.0 billion Rwandan francs, at conversion rate at the date of publication of the cited article. Exchange
rate data per Oanda (2020).
24High-level PRC officials’ willingness to travel to even smaller developing countries can be a selling point
of Chinese engagement. See Eisenman and Heginbotham (2018).
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(RPF), the ruling party (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). The amount is obviously very
small, but there is an important qualitative difference between this type of deal and most
other aid projects. Here, the “one party” in a one-party state is extending assistance to a sim-
ilar organization, despite the (sometimes muted) disapproval of many international donors
of this mode of governance. China’s non-interference policy again finds new life after
the Cold War. Since then, the China Top International Engineering Corporation has built
Rwanda’s new Administrative Office Complex, a gift from China. The building houses,
among several others,25 the office of the Prime Minister—not the most powerful person
in the country (this honor belongs to President Kagame), but not a low-profile one, either.
On the Chinese side, China Daily reports that “Zheng Jianbang, the visiting vice-chairman
of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, was
present to witness the” facility’s handover (Tasamba, 2019). The building used 30 percent
Rwandan and 70 percent Chinese materials, thereby keeping some contract value within
Rwanda without running afoul of China’s tied procurement rules. The facility cost $27
million to complete, putting it in roughly the same league as Burundi’s Presidential Palace
(Lyu, 2019; Tabaro, 2019). However, the circumstances are quite different from Burundi:
whereas one-party (and significantly one-man rule) in Rwanda has gained a degree of in-
ternational acceptance, Burundi’s corruption and instability mean that its leadership does
not enjoy such status. So, Chinese outreach has generated stronger diplomatic results in
Burundi than in Rwanda. We turn next to this topic.
25Per Tabaro (2019), these are the “Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Rwanda Law
Reform Commission.”
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4.2.1.5 Diplomatic Outcomes
As was done for the statistical analysis, diplomatic outcomes can be measured both by
aggregate alignment (United Nations General Assembly voting) or more specific issues of
significance. The status of Taiwan is not an issue in this case. Burundi and Rwanda estab-
lished embassies in Beijing during the 1960s and 1970s. However, Burundi has weighed
in Chinese policy in the South China Sea, Sri Lanka, and Xinjiang; all issues far from its
own interests but close to China’s. On all three of these, Rwanda has stayed silent. I begin
with a general overview of diplomatic alignment with a focus on United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) voting and continue to the specific issues of the South China Sea, Sri
Lanka, and Xinjiang.
Figure 4.3 maps Burundi’s and Rwanda’s UNGA voting alignment with China over time.
Both countries voted with China very often through 2015, albeit Rwanda somewhat less
so. These numbers are not out of the ordinary: the mean voting alignment with China
for sub-Saharan African countries between 2000 and 2015 was 82.7 percent. However,
Rwanda was always somewhat more aloof, averaging 73.5 percent alignment during this
time period to Burundi’s 81.5 percent.
However, this all changed after 2015. Around this time, African alignment with China was
on a slight downhill trajectory, but Burundi stayed the course and voted with China as of-
ten as before. Rwanda, though, began to sharply disagree with China, voting with Beijing
only 33.3 percent of the time in 2016. During his opening address at the 2018 Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a triennial multilateral meeting of leaders from all
African countries and China, Rwandan President Paul Kagame stated that “Africa is not a
zero-sum game. Our growing ties with China do not come at anyone’s expense. Indeed,
the gains are enjoyed by everyone who does business on our continent” (Kagame, 2018).
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Kagame was speaking in his capacity as rotating Chair of the African Union and spoke
about the continent as a whole, but his words worked particularly well for his home coun-
try, which indeed was charting a middle course between an influx of money from major
multilateral organizations and developed-world donors and a steady, productive relation-
ship with China. Burundi was in a very different position, staying with Beijing to a greater
degree than many of its African neighbors.
More concretely speaking, Burundi’s closeness to China has led it to take closer positions
to China’s on controversial issues surrounding the South China Sea, Sri Lanka, and Xin-
jiang.
Burundi began by only weakly supporting China on the South China Sea, mostly keeping
its head down on a controversial issue. As its domestic economic situation deteriorated
and its reliance on China increased, however, a generous aid package later convinced the
Burundian leadership to more overtly support Beijing.
The faraway (from Burundi’s perspective) South China Sea dispute became more salient to
China’s relationship with many otherwise neutral countries in the 2010s as the Philippines
brought the dispute to international arbitration and ultimately won. On July 12, 2016, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an international tribunal based in the The Hague,
ruled that many of the disputed features in the Sea did not meet the minimum criteria
to generate territorial claims, thereby invalidating most of the disputants’ claims. While
this was technically a setback to both sides, the Sea’s de jure neutralization was generally
taken as a victory for the Philippines, which was much less capable of its enforcing its
claims via military power projection. China had years prior committed not to participate
in the arbitration and engaged in a diplomatic offensive to win other countries over to
its perspective. By the day day after the tribunal’s decision, Chinese press articles were
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already citing a Beijing think tank claiming that sixty-six states supported China’s position
(Guanchazhe Wang ⇣¬fl⇧Q⌘, 2016). A later article published by the think tank
authors clarified that this relied on a fairly generous interpretation of China’s position,
including that “China will adhere to peaceful negotiations and settlements of the South
China Sea dispute” (Wang Wen and Chen Xiaochen, 2016). In other words, countries
which made statements indicating hope for peaceful resolution but not actually weighing
in on the dispute were being counted as “supportive.”
Burundi was one of these. On May 10, 2016, before the tribunal had issued its final ruling,
the Burundian Embassy in China released a statement on the South China Sea. The state-
ment was divided into two main sections: one from a Chinese perspective, and a second
from Burundi’s. The first section relies heavily on quotes from Chinese officials:
Chinese islands have been illegally occupied (Emphasis in original)
According to the first counselor of China’s Embassy in Burundi, Sun Jian,
China’s sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea is based on sound
legal and historical foundations. Speaking about the origin of the issue, he
pointed out that beginning in 1970, many Chinese islands were illegally occu-
pied by Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. “It caused a territorial dispute
between these countries and China.”
He also said that his country did not agree with the Philippines’ initiative to go
through international arbitration to find a lasting solution to this dispute. “It is
an action which is totally contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Con-
vention for the Law of the Sea, contrary to their own pledges, contrary to their
agreements with China, and contrary to the preservation of peace and stability
in the South China Sea. " According to him, “the Chinese government will not
accept, recognize or execute the verdict of an illegal arbitration tribunal.” On
the other hand, he stressed that China continues to actively work together with
the concerned parties through constructive measures and negotiation to set-
tle these disputes over territory and maritime demarcation.26 (Nduwamungu,
26Author’s translation from original French:
Les îles de Chines ont été occupées illégalement
Selon le premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Chine au Burundi, Sun Jian, la souveraineté de la Chine sur
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2016)
This part of the Burundian statement does not speak for Burundi so much as it quotes a
Chinese diplomat on China’s official stance. Non-recognition of the tribunal and peaceful
resolution are both mentioned as part of China’s stance, but the only indication that Burundi
is weighing in comes through the section header, “Chinese islands have been illegally oc-
cupied.” The second part of the statement is much clearer on Burundi’s views:
The government of Burundi salutes the courage of the Chinese people (Em-
phasis in original)
On behalf of the Minister of External Relations and International Cooperation,
the Minister’s assistant, Ambassador Thomas Barankitse, said that the question
presented was of current significance and, if not resolved, could provoke the
rending of the fabric of good, peaceful coexistence at the regional, continental,
and international levels.
He thus praised the interest and the courage manifested by the Chinese peo-
ple and their government for their appeal to seek a peaceful settlement of this
dispute while respecting the rights of all sovereign states in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations and with the principle of mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity established by that charter.
While appealing to all the countries concerned to seek a peaceful settlement to
this dispute, he reiterated Burundi’s commitment to strengthening the friendly
relations between Burundi and the Chinese people.27 (Nduwamungu, 2016)
les îles Mer de Chine méridionale est basée sur des fondements juridiques et historiques solides. Parlant
de l’origine de cette question, il a souligné qu’à partir de 1970, beaucoup d’îles de Chine ont été occupées
illégalement par le Vietnam, les Philippines et la Malaisie. « Cela a suscité un différend territorial entre ces
pays et la Chine ».
Il a également indiqué que son pays n’est pas d’accord avec l’initiative des Philippines de passer par
un arbitrage international pour trouver une solution durable à ce différend. « C’est une action qui est tout
à fait contraire aux dispositions de la convention internationale des Nations unies sur les droits de la mer,
contraire à leurs propres engagements, contraire à leurs accords avec la Chine et contraire à la préservation
de la paix et de la stabilité en Mer de Chine méridionale ». Selon lui, le gouvernement chinois n’acceptera,
ne reconnaitra et n’exécutera le verdict d’un tribunal d’arbitrage illégal ». Par contre, il a souligné que la
Chine continue de travailler activement ensemble avec les parties concernées par voie de consolidation et de
négociation pour régler ces différends territoriaux et sur la démarcation maritime.
27Author’s translation from original French:
Le gouvernement du Burundi salue le courage du peuple chinois
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The Burundian Ambassador expresses both respect for the Chinese people’s spirit and hope
that the dispute will be resolved peacefully, but he does not even mention the tribunal or
any of the concrete details of the dispute brought up by the Chinese side. This was a lowest
common denominator attempt to express sympathy for China without actually taking any
firm stance on an issue on which China has been largely diplomatically isolated. Neverthe-
less, by May 20, the Chinese Embassy in Burundi published a statement that Burundi sup-
ported China on the specific issue of its use of Article 298 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, an opt-out mechanism for arbitration for issues of sovereignty (Em-
bassy of the People’s Republic of China in Burundi⇣-N∫⌘qå˝{⇤ÜÍqå˝
'Ü⌘, 2016). It is possible that someone from the Burundian side said this in private,
but it was certainly not in the public statement.
Two months after the Burundian statement’s publication (and immediately after the tri-
bunal’s ruling), China included Burundi as one of the sixty-six countries backing its posi-
tion, the stated reason being that China and Burundi both believed in peaceful resolution
of the dispute. This could easily lead to the mistaken impression that Burundi had un-
ambiguously supported China, which in turn was an unpopular stance in the international
community. Burundi was in a dilemma. On one hand, it could publicly correct China and
reiterate that it had not said anything concrete about the dispute, but this would endan-
Au nom du ministre des Relations extérieures et de la coopération internationale, l’assistant du ministre,
l’ambassadeur Thomas Barankitse, a indiqué que la question présentée est d’actualité intéressante qui, une
fois non résolue, peut provoquer un déchirement du tissu de la bonne cohabitation pacifique au niveau ré-
gional, continental et international.
Il a ainsi salué l’intérêt et le courage manifestés par le peuple chinois et son gouvernement pour l’appel
qu’il lance à rechercher un règlement pacifique de ce différend dans le respect des droits de tous les Etats
souverains conformément à la charte des Nations unies et au principe du respect mutuel de souveraineté et
de l’intégrité territoriale établi par la même charte.
Tout en lançant un appel à tous les pays concernés à chercher un règlement pacifique à ce différend, il a
réitéré l’engagement du Burundi pour le renforcement des relations d’amitié entre le Burundi et le peuple
chinois.
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ger relations with an important supporter. Or, it could decide to take Beijing’s suggestion
and more actively support China’s claims, but this raised its own problems for Burundi’s
relations with other supporters.
Burundi took neither option and did not immediately issue a follow-up to its original May
10 statement. Burundi was not alone in its silence. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initia-
tive (2016) has compiled a list of international stances on the dispute. Thirty-one countries
have actively backed China; twenty-two of these came via a joint declaration from the Arab
League, while nine did so independently. Of the sixty-six countries which China said were
supporting its position, only four actually publicly refuted China’s assertion. These were
European Union members Poland and Slovakia as well as Cambodia28 and Fiji, which has
had traditionally close ties to Australia. Thirty-five took the same path as Burundi and
stayed silent; every one of these was a developing country. Due to its relative reliance on
China, Burundi did not correct the somewhat misleading assertion that it was supporting
China in a faraway territorial dispute, but neither did it actually support Beijing.
By 2018, though, Burundi’s domestic economic and international diplomatic standings had
deteriorated. The post-2015 recession was placing a strain on the national budget that most
international donors were unwilling to address with funding increases. China was one of
the few exceptions. In September 2018, Burundian Second Vice President Joseph Butore
traveled to Beijing for FOCAC, the triannual China-Africa multilateral meeting. Upon his
return, he had two pieces of news for reporters, as here told by Turkey’s official press:
“China is our long-term partner. It has just confirmed it by offering Burundi
a donation of 350 million yuan (more than 52 million dollars) to support our
28Cambodia’s position on the South China Sea has been the subject of a tug-of-war between China and
Japan. At the moment, it is closer to China but at the time of the tribunal ruling was still maintaining a greater
degree of neutrality.
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development projects,” said Butore.
Bujumbura has pledged its unconditional support to China on a number of
international issues, the same source added. “We have promised China our full
support on various international issues, including those relating to the island of
Taiwan or the South China Sea,” said the Burundian official.
According to observers, this donation is crucial when Burundi has been let
go by its main partners, notably the European Union and Belgium, the latter
having suspended their direct aid to the Burundian government amid “recurrent
violations of human rights.”29 (Chahed and Bosco, 2018)
Section 4.2.1.1 already established that the decline in aid to Burundi is here somewhat over-
stated: even after the departure of Belgium, aid inflows were flat rather than decreasing.
Still, though, they were not enough to cover expenditures during a recession, and China’s
new $52 million in grants was badly needed. In return, Burundi offered its support on
Taiwan and the South China Sea. The Taiwan part was not new—since its independence,
Burundi never had an embassy in Taipei—but the South China Sea part was a meaningful
change. The following month, a delegation from the Chinese People’s Political Consulta-
tive Conference visited Burundi. According to the Burundian Senate’s press release from
the event, the Burundian President Senate “expressed the institution of the Burundian Sen-
ate’s support for the People’s Republic of China on on the question of the South China Sea,
which he considers to be an integral part of the People’s Republic of China”30 (Sénat du
29Translation from original French: "La Chine est notre partenaire de langue date, elle vient de le con-
firmer encore en offrant au Burundi un don de 350 millions de yuans (plus de 52 millions de dollars) pour
appuyer nos projets de développement", a déclaré Butore. Bujumbura a de son côté promis d’apporter son
inconditionnel soutien à la Chine sur nombre de questions internationales, a ajouté la même source. « Nous
avons promis à la Chine notre soutien total sur différents sujets d’ordre l’international, notamment celui
portant sur l’île de Taïwan ou la Mer de Chine méridionale », a précisé le responsable burundais. Selon
des observateurs ce don revêt une importance cruciale au moment où pour le Burundi s’est vu lâcher par
ses principaux partenaires notamment l’Union Européenne et la Belgique, ces derniers ayant suspendu leurs
aides directes au gouvernement burundais sur fond de "violations récurrentes des droits de l’homme".
30Translation from original French: Il a également manifesté le soutien de cette Institution sénatoriale à la
République populaire de Chine sur la question de la Mer de Chine Méridionale qu’il considère comme une
partie intégrante de la République populaire de Chine.
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Burundi, 2018). This is a much stronger statement than simply wishing for peace; indeed,
it is stronger than the Chinese diplomatic corps originally claimed Burundi’s position to
be.
Rwanda, on the other hand, publicly avoided the issue altogether and was not even on
Beijing’s 2016 list of countries supporting peaceful resolution.
After Burundi’s change of position on the South China Sea, it supported China on two more
issues: Sri Lanka and Xinjiang. Rwanda took public stances on neither.
The Sri Lankan controversy came first. During the 2000s and 2010s, China had built a
billion-dollar port complex at the Sri Lankan town of Hambantota, the hometown of Pres-
ident Mahinda Rajapaksa. At the middle of Indian Ocean shipping lanes, the project had
clear geostrategic overtones and Beijing may have hoped to gain naval access there, but
these aspirations hit a stumbling block with the authoritarian-leaning Rajapaksa’s surprise
defeat in Sri Lanka’s 2014 elections. In October 2018, less than two months after Burundi
had changed its position on the South China Sea, Rajapaksa attempted to make a comeback
as Prime Minister. He was appointed to the position by the sitting President, but the previ-
ous Prime Minister refused to resign, leading to a constitutional crisis centered on whether
the Prime Minister could be fired.31 Only three countries publicly backed Rajapaksa. The
first was China; the second, Burundi; and the third, Pakistan (Gupta, 2018; Press Trust of
India, 2018a). Arguably China’s closest strategic partner, Pakistan was itself concerned
by the new Sri Lankan government’s better relations with India. Burundi, though, had no
clear interest in the situation apart from China’s support through its own domestic crisis.
Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court later ruled in the existing Prime Minister’s favor, but by this
time Burundi had already aligned itself with an unpopular opinion on China’s behalf.
31This episode involved distressed Chinese loans and as such will be covered in more detail in Chapter 8.
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Burundi has since made a similar calculation regarding Chinese policy in Xinjiang, al-
though it is less alone in this regard. In July 2019, a grouping of twenty-two countries filed
a letter with the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) expressing concern over
“arbitrary detention in large-scale places of detention, as well as widespread surveillance
and restrictions, particularly targeting Uighurs and other minorities in Xinjiang” (United
Nations Human Rights Council, 2019b). The letter tapped into broader international sen-
timent regarding the internment of Uighurs in “reeducation through labor” (≥Y) camps
aimed at the elimination of Islam and forced assimilation into Han Chinese culture (Ramzy
and C. Buckley, 2019). The letter’s signatories, however, were not a particularly repre-
sentative sample: all twenty-two were developed countries, and eighteen were in Europe.
From Beijing’s perspective, the Xinjiang issue is not quite as sensitive as Taiwan—no state
legally contests China’s sovereignty over Xinjiang. Still, the issue could damage China’s
international reputation, and Beijing began to push back. Developing countries, which had
been absent from the initial UNHCR letter, often relied on Chinese development assistance
and might be convinced to see the issue in a certain way. Fifty mostly developing country
governments responded by signing a letter to the UNHRC “[commending] China’s remark-
able achievements in the field of human rights by adhering to the people-centered devel-
opment philosophy and protecting and promoting human rights through development” and
defending Chinese “counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures” in Xinjiang (United
Nations Human Rights Council, 2019a). The language used mimics Beijing’s own mes-
saging on Xinjiang as well as its emphasis on development first (Yellinek and E. Chen,
2019). Burundi signed this letter. Rwanda did not. Having violently repressed protestors
in its own capital, Burundi had a shared interest in China with non-interference in internal
affairs, and Beijing’s continued support through hard times (not to mention the Presidential
Palace) convinced Burundi to take an internationally unpopular position. Rwanda, again,
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remained neutral. In January 2020, China acknowledged this trend by referring to Burundi
as an “all-weather friend,” a title which had previously been bestowed only on Pakistan,
China’s closest strategic partner; and Zimbabwe, which had also lost good standing in
much of the international community due to human rights concerns and economic misman-
agement (Olander, 2020). The announcement was made while Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi was in Burundi—again, a very high-profile visit for a small, frequently isolated
country.
4.3 Conclusion: Small-Scale Concessional Flows
This section has established the diplomatic utility of grants and zero-interest loans. Both
statistical and case study evidence extend previous studies’ findings regarding a correlation
between Chinese aid and voting at the United Nations General Assembly, but only to a
modest degree. The stronger findings had to do with more immediately pertinent issues.
The statistical evidence shows a much larger role for the Taiwan and South China Sea issues
in Chinese aid, albeit mostly in select countries whose stances are more immediately perti-
nent and/or could be changed. Similarly, the largest differential between China-dependent
Burundi and independent Rwanda came not through United Nations voting in the aggregate
but through their public stances on the South China Sea, internment camps in Xinjiang, and
(perhaps less expectedly) Sri Lankan domestic politics. Focusing on an individual donor
(China) allows us to observe a larger diplomatic role for aid than can usually be parsed
through cross-national UN voting patterns.
The differential between grants and zero-interest loans is also confirmed by different types
of evidence. Cross-national statistical evidence shows that grants are better for outreach
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to diplomatic partners as well as states occupying geostrategically important locations,
namely maritime chokepoints or along China’s borders. At the case study level, China did
not issue substantively different proportions of grants and ZILs to Burundi and Rwanda, but
it did attach fewer strings to the usage of money associated with zero-interest loans, thereby
mitigating some of the negative diplomatic impact of asking for remuneration.
The use of grants is found to be similar to that of other major donors. The Burundian Presi-
dential Palace in particular is reminiscent of the type of Cold War-era favor-currying which
inspired many of the founding 20th century works on aid. The role of zero-interest loans,
though, had not been previously explored in the literature and reflects these instruments’
unique role within the Chinese policy apparatus.
The evidence on small-scale concessional flows is generally supportive of the theory. Still,
these are a small percentage32 of total Chinese outflows. Larger projects require more
sustainable financing mechanisms. We next turn to two of these: freelance contracting and
loans.
4.4 Appendix
Table 4.3: Grants and Zero-Interest Loans, Commitment Basis, BRI Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tobit: Poisson: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Grants Grants ZIL ZIL % Grants
(AD) (AD) (AD) (SAIS) (AD)
Taiwan recognition -5.082⇤⇤⇤ -3.491⇤⇤⇤ -24.95⇤⇤⇤ -17.79⇤⇤⇤ 14.81⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-7.59) (-4.27) (-22.15) (-14.91) (16.48)
ASEAN member, SCS -1.312⇤⇤⇤ -0.963⇤⇤⇤ -25.37⇤⇤⇤ 15.83⇤⇤⇤
Continued on next page
32Typically, 2 percent or less.
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Table 4.3: Grants and Zero-Interest Loans, Commitment Basis, BRI Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tobit: Poisson: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Grants Grants ZIL ZIL % Grants
(AD) (AD) (AD) (SAIS) (AD)
disputant (binary) (-2.72) (-2.98) (-12.37) (17.96)
ASEAN member, SCS 0.475 0.588⇤ -0.760 1.009
non-disputant (binary) (1.00) (1.94) (-0.30) (0.97)
UNGA voting similarity 1.512 0.966 0.677 -2.233 0.186
with China (one-year lag) (1.49) (1.45) (0.18) (-0.58) (0.11)
BRI route (binary) 0.290 0.0561 0.881 -1.213 -0.0540
(0.83) (0.24) (0.68) (-0.98) (-0.10)
Distance from China (pop.- 0.0264 -0.00197 0.188 -0.356 -0.0448
weighted; thousands km) (0.61) (-0.06) (1.09) (-1.13) (-0.57)
Commodity exports to 0.0719 0.0313 0.396⇤⇤ 0.337⇤⇤ -0.117
China (log; one-year lag) (1.33) (0.98) (2.04) (2.33) (-1.43)
Total imports from 0.670⇤⇤⇤ 0.147 0.754 -0.585 0.00747
China (log; one-year lag) (2.77) (1.12) (0.80) (-0.83) (0.02)
Rule of Law (WGI; -0.241 -0.155 1.570⇤ 0.789 -0.761⇤
one-year lag) (-1.07) (-1.13) (1.81) (1.08) (-1.76)
Polity score 0.0109 0.0117 -0.104 0.0109 0.0502
(one-year lag) (0.45) (0.82) (-1.35) (0.15) (1.53)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.0683 -0.0580 -0.198 0.238 0.0693
(log; one-year lag) (-0.41) (-0.61) (-0.36) (0.54) (0.30)
GDP per capita (log) -1.708⇤⇤⇤ -0.624⇤⇤⇤ -3.106⇤⇤⇤ -0.125 0.348
(-6.72) (-4.35) (-2.80) (-0.17) (0.71)
Population (log) -0.729⇤⇤⇤ -0.161 -1.186 -0.320 0.116
(-3.38) (-1.26) (-1.45) (-0.50) (0.35)
English language 0.875⇤⇤⇤ 0.609⇤⇤⇤ 1.339 -0.727 -0.0825
(binary) (2.95) (4.50) (1.49) (-1.07) (-0.26)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 0.335⇤⇤⇤ 0.281⇤⇤⇤ -0.0839 0.447⇤⇤ 0.296⇤
(3.26) (5.39) (-0.26) (2.10) (1.95)
Time2 -0.0138⇤⇤ -0.0113⇤⇤⇤ 0.00760 -0.0278⇤⇤⇤ -0.0137⇤
(-2.54) (-4.34) (0.46) (-2.82) (-1.81)
Constant 10.06⇤⇤⇤ 2.583 18.29⇤⇤ 12.43 -3.096
(3.97) (1.61) (2.11) (1.41) (-0.81)
Countries 124 124 124 49 99
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2014 2014 2014 2017 2014
Observations 1499 1499 1499 712 615
Clustered SE? X X X X X
Continued on next page
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Table 4.3: Grants and Zero-Interest Loans, Commitment Basis, BRI Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tobit: Poisson: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Grants Grants ZIL ZIL % Grants
(AD) (AD) (AD) (SAIS) (AD)
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from AidData (AD) and SAIS-CARI (SAIS).
Chapter 5
Diplomacy and Basic Commercial
Interests: Larger Projects
The previous chapter demonstrated that grants are best for diplomatic outreach or for reach-
ing out to countries at geostrategic positions such as maritime chokepoints. Zero-interest
loans are a slightly less friendly alternative. Because these generate negative economic
return1 for the donor/lender, they are generally only used for smaller projects like schools,
hospitals, or government buildings. For major public works, a more financially sustainable
mechanism is necessary.
This chapter covers China’s three basic ways of doing this. (A fourth, the special case of
resource-backed loans, is covered in Chapter 6.) First is freelance construction contracting,
or firms winning bids on overseas projects without any specific support from the Chinese
government. Although often subsidized by the state, Chinese firms are concerned enough
1In the case of zero-interest loans, inflation means that recipients typically pay back less than they initially
borrowed.
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with their own interests that they will prioritize safer, more profitable opportunities. This
may or may not overlap with state foreign policy goals; where it does not, the government
must find ways to steer firm behavior. In China, this frequently means debt.
This leads us to the second modality discussed in this chapter: loans of the interest-bearing
variety. Unlike zero-interest loans, which are handled by the Ministry of Commerce and
other government ministries alongside grants, more conventional interest-bearing loans are
issued by state-owned banks. In the developing world, the Export-Import Bank of China
(Exim) and the China Development Bank (CDB) do much of the heavy lifting. These two
policy banks have a mandate to bet on longer-term projects with less strict profitability re-
quirements, meaning they are well-suited for higher-risk and/or slower-moving projects in
emerging markets. Furthermore, as elaborated in Chapter 3, these banks’ tied loan pack-
ages are designed to enable firms to operate in high-risk countries. So, we expect loans
to fill gaps where firms would not go otherwise and to where the Chinese state perceives
some foreign policy interest of note.
This leaves equity investment as the third option. Most large deals are to some extent lever-
aged with debt, but in this modality, the investor holds the debt (and associated downside
risk) rather than the host country. This is clearly better for the host country (and thus for
bilateral relations), but firms will feel more comfortable with it in environments of lower
risk.
This chapter introduces these three tools of development finance using the same mixed-
methods format as the previous chapter. It focuses how they can be used toward diplomatic
and commercial export interests, which are universal (to varying degrees) to all recipient
countries. So, the qualitative component of the chapter continues with the Burundian and
Rwandan case studies, where geostrategic and resource interests are secondary. Geostrate-
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gic and resource interests are, however, included and discussed in the statistical models for
the simple reason that leaving them out would introduce bias.
I begin with a section on contract revenues comparing those directly funded by Chinese
state-owned banks with those which are not. I then look at equity investments. Each of
these sections opens with statistical analysis before looking at case study evidence from
Burundi and Rwanda. Finally, I add concluding thoughts on implications for the theory
before turning the focus to geostrategic interests and the Kazakhstani and Pakistani cases
in the next chapter.
5.1 Contracts and Loans
This section analyzes systematic differences in when firms’ contract revenues are explic-
itly backed by Chinese state-owned banks and when they are not. In Chapter 3, it was pre-
dicted that freelance contractors—that is, those without project-specific loans from Chinese
banks—would serve a useful purpose for diplomatic and geostrategic purposes. In coun-
tries that recognize Taiwan or are disputants in the South China Sea, Chinese firms acting
on their own can act as an informal bridge without the baggage associated with a recipient
government owing money to the Chinese state or—in the case of the Taiwan issue—PRC
rules against lending to countries in which the Republic of China has an embassy. Be-
cause of China’s generally low costs in the construction sector and many firms’ access to
routine subsidized credit, they also present recipient countries with a discount relative to
most competitors, and this while distancing themselves from the sometimes sensitive poli-
tics of debt. For similar reasons, they can also earn China a good name in geostrategically
important countries, with or without the government in Beijing’s explicit intention.
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The obvious limitation to this strategy is access to financing. Countries with weaker state
institutions are likely to have smaller pools of domestic savings and fewer sources of inter-
national financing. These markets are less attractive to freelancing Chinese firms, unless
loans from their home government incentivize them. The Chinese government may do this
for conventional commercial reasons (promoting its own firms abroad) but will also use
credit to steer firms in directions important to geopolitics or resource security, especially in
higher-risk countries where firms were not doing so on their own.
I test these theoretical predictions in two parts. First is statistical analysis of contracts
and loans to test the hypotheses against broad patterns in the data. This will include basic
analysis of geostrategic and resource security interests, although these will be explored in
more depth in subsequent chapters. Second is evidence from the Burundian and Rwandan
cases. These are used to establish baseline expectations for the use of freelance contracts
and loans before we move to more complex cases where geostrategic interests and resource
security enter the picture.
5.1.1 Quantitative Analysis
Because freelance contracting revenues are to a certain extent “dogs that didn’t bark” next
to dogs that did (state-backed loans), I present the two side-by-side. This section will begin
with the data and methods used to test them against each other before proceeding to results
and analysis.
5.1.1.1 Data and Methods
The independent variables used in this section are identical to those introduced in the pre-
vious chapter (Section 4.1.1.1. As is often the case, however, data availability for the
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outcomes of interest is more of an issue. As for other parts of this dissertation, I respond
by using several imperfect strategies instead of one perfect one. Both contracts and loans
are tracked by multiple databases, each of which has certain strengths and weaknesses. I
here introduce these data sources and how I will use them.
First, Table 5.1 will compare data from National Bureau of Statistics of China (2018) and
Atkins et al. (2017) for contracts and loans, respectively. These two sets of data are unique
in that they measure loan disbursements and not commitments. Most datasets track project
commitments, meaning they contain up-front lump sums in the years in which projects
are officially approved. However, for large projects, disbursement of funds typically takes
place in smaller installments over the course of several years. Tracking these actual cash
flows is relatively difficult, and only the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2018)
and Atkins et al. (2017) do so. Pairing these two data sources allows us to subtract loan
disbursements from contract revenues to estimate the portion of contract revenues earned
on a “freelance” basis without a specific project-level loan contract from the Chinese state.
An OLS regression of this estimate of freelance contract revenues (henceforth “contracts
less loans”) is presented in Column 3, following Tobit regressions of contracts and loans
in Columns 1 and 2, respectively.2 In column 4, I add a Tobit regression of LoansContracts to
directly compare the two modalities of financing, although at the unfortunate cost of losing
country-year observations for which no contract revenues were reported.3 In this table,
I also add an interactive term between commodity exports and rule of law to test for a
2Because of discrepancies in the reported timing of disbursements between the two data sources, some
country-years have negative values for contracts less loans. For example, if loan disbursements per Atkins
et al. (2017) are recognized in 2011, but contract revenues per National Bureau of Statistics of China (2018)
in 2012, then 2011 will have a negative value. I use an OLS regression for contracts less loans to avoid losing
these observations, and because “contracts less loans” are approximately normally distributed.
3Again, because of discrepancies in the data, some years’ loan reported loan total exceeds contract rev-
enues. I use a Tobit model instead of a logistic regression for LoansContracts to keep these observations.
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negative interactive effect as per H4B.
Because the SAIS data is limited to Africa, it cannot be used to effectively test the South
China Sea or geostrategic variables. (Africa is home to only four countries are at maritime
chokepoints, four along designated Belt and Road navigational routes, and (obviously)
none at all which border China.) Indeed, the chokepoint variable was not found to be sig-
nificant in the African context, and I only include models using the Belt and Road binary.
While the geostrategic variables are not a primary focus of this chapter, diplomacy (includ-
ing the South China Sea dispute) is. To make up for this geographic limitation, I also run
the same model as in Table 5.1 on a global sample set in Table 5.2. This does not test for
the hypothesized interactive effect between political risk and geostrategic interests (H3B),
which along with more in-depth analysis of geostrategic interests will wait until Chapter
7.
The global sample set in Table 5.2 uses contract data from American Enterprise Institute
(2019) (Columns 1 and 3) juxtaposed with loan data from Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.
(2018) (Columns 2 and 4). Each dataset is tested using borders and chokepoints as mea-
sures of geostrategic significance (Columns 1 and 2) as well as the BRI corridor binary
(Columns 3 and 4). The global data carry both pros and cons relative to the Africa-only
tests. On one hand, the global data are at a disadvantage in directly comparing loans and
contracts. They use data only on a commitment basis, and comparison across the datasets
leads to many mismatches in timing between contract and loan commitments. Further-
more, the AEI dataset only includes items over $100M. Probably for this reason, it records
smaller volumes of contracts than the aforementioned sources do for loans. Because of
this mismatch in the data, I present these contract and loan figures side-by-side but do not
attempt to extrapolate what portion of contracts per AEI are backed by debt. That being
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said, the more global figures have obvious benefits for testing geographic variables related
to geostrategic interests and the South China Sea.
As a robustness check, I add in the Appendix (Section 5.4) Table 5.5, which compares
the AEI contract figures to loan commitment data from the SAIS (Atkins et al., 2017) and
Inter-American Dialogue datasets (K. P. Gallagher and Myers, 2019), which are limited to
Africa and the Western Hemisphere, respectively. The latter two are calculated on a similar
basis and in many ways are sister initiatives.4 These data face geographic limitations but
nevertheless add to our certainty regarding the findings of the other models.
5.1.1.2 Results and Analysis
Table 5.1: Contracts and Loans, Disbursement Basis, Resource Interactive Term, African
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: OLS: Tobit:
Contracts Loans C - L L/C
(YB) (SAIS)
Taiwan recognition -2.365⇤⇤⇤ -23.38⇤⇤⇤ 157.4 -3.978⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-5.18) (-16.81) (0.57) (-12.32)
UNGA voting similarity 4.364⇤⇤⇤ -1.149 1540.7⇤ -0.266
with China (one-year lag) (5.26) (-0.30) (1.96) (-0.40)
BRI route (binary) 0.847⇤⇤⇤ 2.340⇤ -264.3 0.230
(3.22) (1.77) (-0.70) (1.22)
Distance from China (pop.- 0.0264 -0.0528 -84.33 -0.0111
weighted; thousands km) (0.81) (-0.16) (-1.09) (-0.23)
Commodity exports to 0.122⇤⇤⇤ 0.0156 -64.57 0.00196
China (log; one-year lag) (2.64) (0.10) (-1.51) (0.08)
Total imports from 0.0447 -0.0251 -29.80 0.0635
China (log; one-year lag) (0.27) (-0.03) (-0.15) (0.50)
Rule of Law (WGI; 0.218 6.533⇤⇤⇤ 175.8 0.688⇤⇤
one-year lag) (0.37) (3.31) (0.31) (2.49)
Continued on next page
4One of this work’s sources on resource-backed loans, for example, was co-authored by the director of
SAIS-CARI and the director of the China-Latin America Finance Database.
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Table 5.1: Contracts and Loans, Disbursement Basis, Resource Interactive Term, African
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: OLS: Tobit:
Contracts Loans C - L L/C
(YB) (SAIS)
Rule of Law -0.0578 -0.609⇤⇤⇤ -61.17 -0.0692⇤⇤⇤
⇥ commodity exports (-1.35) (-3.84) (-1.37) (-3.22)
Polity score -0.0424⇤⇤⇤ -0.0500 5.535 -0.00333
(one-year lag) (-2.68) (-0.67) (0.28) (-0.29)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.104 -0.189 -160.5 -0.0170
(log; one-year lag) (-0.73) (-0.49) (-1.14) (-0.25)
GDP per capita (log) 0.0745 -0.633 468.9⇤⇤⇤ -0.165
(0.40) (-0.77) (3.22) (-1.20)
Population (log) 0.486⇤⇤⇤ -0.0532 349.2⇤⇤ -0.145
(3.34) (-0.09) (2.46) (-1.38)
English language 0.996⇤⇤⇤ 0.454 40.71 -0.0311
(binary) (5.18) (0.62) (0.21) (-0.28)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 0.102⇤ 0.614⇤⇤ -72.32 0.0795
(1.85) (1.97) (-1.49) (1.43)
Time2 0.000729 -0.0256 5.424⇤⇤ -0.00436
(0.29) (-1.64) (2.43) (-1.54)
Constant -10.62⇤⇤⇤ 4.443 -7337.9⇤⇤⇤ 2.469⇤
(-5.25) (0.47) (-3.66) (1.73)
Countries 49 49 49 49
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2017 2015 2015 2015
Observations 612 621 612 605
Clustered SE? X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from China Statistical Yearbook (YB) and SAIS-CARI (SAIS).
With respect to China’s territorial claims (H1), the African sample set can only test for
Taiwan (and not the South China Sea), but the results match theoretical expectations. Con-
tractors not backed by state loans (Column 3) display neither aversion nor attraction to
countries which recognize Taiwan. This is unique among China’s development finance
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modalities and shows that freelance contractors can serve a kind of informal outreach mech-
anism to countries which recognize Taiwan without actually violating China’s restrictions
on state finance to these countries. The results are stark: the model in Column 4 predicts
that all else equal, an average country hosting a PRC embassy can expect 27.6 percent of
its Chinese contracts to be backed by state loans, while this number falls to functionally
zero for countries hosting ROC diplomats.
There is also a use for freelance contracting in general diplomacy. The portion of contract
revenues not backed by Chinese state loans (Column 3) is positively associated with UNGA
voting alignment, while revenues backed by state loans (Column 2) are not. The diplomatic
role of freelance contracts is only borderline statistically significant but still substantively
important: a country at the 75th percentile for UNGA voting alignment will on average
source just over double the volume of freelance contract revenues as a country at the 25th
percentile.5
Contrary to theoretical predictions, the results do not show any difference in effects of the
chokepoint binary on freelance contracts versus loans. However, because the African sam-
ple set in Table 5.1 is of limited use in assessing the relevance of geostrategic importance
(H3), I defer more in-depth discussion of geostrategy until after the results of a global sam-
ple set are presented in 7.1. I instead turn to the strength of the African sample set: enough
detail in the data to separate contract revenues backed by Chinese state loans from those
which are earned on a freelance basis. This is useful for testing commercial interests (H4)
at a finer level of granularity.
It was predicted that there would be a negative interactive effect between commercial inter-
ests and governance risk. Table 5.1 confirms this prediction. Loans (Column 2) display the
5Based on Column 3 of Table 5.1, holding all other independent variables to mean.
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Figure 5.1: Effect of Ln(Commodity Exports to China + 1) on Ln(Chinese Loans + 1),
Varying Rule of Law
Based on model of loans per SAIS-CARI (Atkins et al., 2017) in Table 5.1, Column 2. Assuming
non-recognition of Taiwan. All other variables set to mean. Shaded area is 95% confidence interval.
predicted negative interactive effect; freelance contracts (Column 3) do not. Again, China
is using debt to encourage firms to take on higher levels of risk in the name of a broader
national interest. Figure 5.1 displays this relationship as per the model in Column 2 of
Table 5.1.
Commodities are only a clear draw for lenders in countries with weaker rule of law and
have no effect on lenders in better-governed states. The curve pictured in Figure 5.1 shows
a statistically significant (p = .05) positive relationship of commodity exports on resource-
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backed loans above a rule of law score of -0.439 (near Mali, whose strong bureaucracy in
the capital region coexists uneasily with insurgencies in the Saharan north); an effect of
zero at a rule of law score of 0.026 (near Ghana, above the median in the region but around
the middle of the global distribution); and a negative effect above 0.883 (the tax haven and
financial hub of Mauritius). Debt is designed for places with higher political risk.
In practice, this means that debt will constitute a greater share of overall activity in less sta-
ble environments but will take a backseat to freelance contracting (and equity) elsewhere.
The model in Column 4 of Table 5.1 conveys this directly, showing an interactive effect
of resource motives and governance on the share of contracts backed by loans. It projects
that in a country at the 75th percentile in terms of commodity exports to China, a rise from
the 25th to 75th percentile for rule of law is associated with a decrease from 38.0 percent
to 25.5 percent of contracts being backed by Chinese state loans. Tied loan contracts can
push Chinese firms into higher-risk environments but can also be diplomatically tricky, and
bank credit is a finite (if vast) resource. The Chinese government is more likely to use loans
when firms are not addressing some issue of national interest on their own. This interactive
effect is also corroborated using two different data sources in Table 5.5 in the Appendix, al-
though these only show total contracts and loans side-by-side and allow for less fine-tuned
testing of different types of contract revenues than the main results here.
The results for the detailed African data generally support the hypotheses, but with blind
spots for the South China Sea variables and some geostrategic indicators. Table 5.2 turns
to a global sample set. For reasons discussed in the “Data and Methods” section (Section
5.1.1.1), it is difficult to match contract revenue and loan data outside of Africa, and so the
global sample loses some detail, but it is better at assessing the aforementioned (mostly)
non-African issues.
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Table 5.2: Contracts and Loans, Commitment Basis, Resource Interactive Term, Global
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Tobit:
Contracts Loans Contracts Loans
(AEI) (AD) (AEI) (AD)
Taiwan recognition -6.330⇤⇤⇤ -29.63⇤⇤⇤ -6.305⇤⇤⇤ -29.20⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-4.87) (-21.80) (-4.72) (-21.89)
ASEAN member, SCS 1.158 -2.230⇤ 1.507 -1.057
disputant (binary) (0.67) (-1.93) (0.89) (-0.82)
ASEAN member, SCS 1.309 1.702 0.781 0.814
non-disputant (binary) (0.80) (0.87) (0.49) (0.47)
UNGA voting similarity 9.304⇤⇤⇤ 10.50⇤⇤⇤ 8.098⇤⇤ 7.184⇤⇤
with China (one-year lag) (2.61) (2.68) (2.43) (2.14)
Border with China 0.102 1.838
(binary) (0.08) (1.55)
Chokepoint (binary) 1.131 -0.782
(0.93) (-0.76)
BRI route (binary) 2.120⇤⇤ 4.187⇤⇤⇤
(2.09) (4.69)
Distance from China (pop.- -0.0556 0.302⇤⇤ 0.0548 0.504⇤⇤⇤
weighted; thousands km) (-0.42) (2.11) (0.50) (4.79)
Commodity exports to 0.0985 -0.0334 0.102 -0.0805
China (log; one-year lag) (0.55) (-0.20) (0.55) (-0.52)
Total imports from -0.0646 1.978⇤⇤ -0.107 1.671⇤⇤
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.08) (2.39) (-0.15) (2.19)
Rule of Law (WGI; 4.026⇤⇤ 2.516 4.662⇤⇤ 4.270⇤
one-year lag) (2.01) (1.06) (2.31) (1.93)
Rule of Law -0.429⇤⇤⇤ -0.401⇤⇤ -0.466⇤⇤⇤ -0.526⇤⇤⇤
⇥ commodity exports (-2.76) (-2.21) (-2.91) (-3.06)
Polity score -0.112⇤ -0.0586 -0.113⇤ -0.0542
(one-year lag) (-1.68) (-0.85) (-1.76) (-0.85)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.332 -0.808⇤ -0.470 -0.907⇤⇤
(log; one-year lag) (-0.71) (-1.82) (-1.03) (-2.38)
GDP per capita (log) 0.361 -2.366⇤⇤⇤ 0.239 -2.547⇤⇤⇤
(0.48) (-3.03) (0.34) (-3.36)
Population (log) 1.608⇤⇤ -1.023 1.505⇤⇤ -1.043
(2.53) (-1.50) (2.57) (-1.61)
English language 1.498⇤⇤ 1.556⇤⇤ 1.572⇤⇤ 1.849⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (1.97) (2.09) (2.21) (2.76)
Continued on next page
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Table 5.2: Contracts and Loans, Commitment Basis, Resource Interactive Term, Global
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Tobit:
Contracts Loans Contracts Loans
(AEI) (AD) (AEI) (AD)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 1.591⇤⇤⇤ 0.757⇤⇤⇤ 1.604⇤⇤⇤ 0.889⇤⇤⇤
(3.61) (2.89) (3.55) (3.43)
Time2 -0.0431⇤⇤ -0.0317⇤⇤ -0.0438⇤⇤ -0.0366⇤⇤⇤
(-2.47) (-2.28) (-2.45) (-2.69)
Constant -49.68⇤⇤⇤ -10.86 -46.30⇤⇤⇤ -4.168
(-6.80) (-1.51) (-6.81) (-0.64)
Countries 125 124 125 124
Start Year 2005 2000 2005 2000
End Year 2017 2014 2017 2014
Observations 1546 1499 1546 1499
Clustered SE? X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and AidData (AD).
The global sample set provides partial support for the diplomatic hypotheses (H1 and H2).
Taiwan is, again, the strongest predictor: the coefficients for loans are much more negative
than for contracts. Because the global data are less well-suited for comparison between
contracts and loans, this is more limited evidence than for the African sample, where con-
tracts and loans could be compared directly. However, it is consistent with the hypotheses.
The results for the ASEAN variables are weaker. According to the model in Column 2, state
loans do avoid South China Sea disputants, but this finding loses statistical significance in
Column 4, when location along BRI corridors is used as an indicator of geostrategic signif-
icance instead of the border and chokepoint binaries. In all specifications, freelance con-
tractors have no particular prejudice against disputants. Again, the South China Sea factors
in to Chinese decision-making but is simply less important than Taiwan. Most puzzlingly,
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both contracts and loans are highly positively associated with United Nations voting align-
ment. As shown in the previous table, this makes sense for the portion of contracts not
backed by loans, but debt is generally diplomatically contentious. This is probably a quirk6
of the AidData figures for loans: the same model run on SAIS-CARI (Table 5.1) and Inter-
American Dialogue (Table 5.5, in the Appendix) loan data shows a null relationship with
UNGA voting alignment. So, we again find that the Taiwan issue is a strong predictor, the
South China Sea issue a middling one, and UNGA voting the weakest of the three.
The global data also repeat the findings of the African sample (Table 5.1) that Belt and
Road countries receive more of both contracts and loans. To be precise, the models in Col-
umn 3 and Column 4 of Table 5.2 would predict that setting all other variables to mean,
location along a designated Belt and Road route is associated with a 117.9 percent increase
in contract revenues and a 429.2 percent increase in loans. What’s more, neither border
security nor location along a chokepoint is a predictor of contracts or loans. On its surface,
this might seem to run contrary to theoretical predictions. According to the theory, equity,
freelance contracting, and debt can be used to build geostrategic projects, but the former
two are typically preferable for bilateral relations. Equity is able to commit to a long-term
presence, lowers the recipient’s debt burden, and provides actual funding; freelance con-
tracting also avoids debt, albeit with less of a clear long-term commitment and without any
direct funding. This would imply a positive correlation between geostrategic interests and
equity; an ambivalent one for freelance contracting; and a negative one for debt, which can
6One potential explanation for this oddity might have to do with how the data was compiled. AidData’s
figures are mostly based on open-source press releases, meaning they are much more likely to include projects
which host governments see as wins for public relations and choose to disclose than they are to include
controversial or non-performing loans which could be irritants to bilateral relations and which governments
might choose to conceal. Bräutigam (2013) points out that AidData’s figures for some countries tend to be
inflated where local leaders publicly overstate the value of deals in order to claim credit. Credit claiming of
this type is probably positively associated with diplomatic alignment, potentially leading to bias.
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build strategic throughways but in the process may complicate relations with host countries
on whom China will always rely for access.7 The predictions for contracts and loans do
not seem to pan out well, but for one important factor: interactions between geostrategic
variables and governance quality. H3B held that geostrategically important countries with
lower governance quality would receive tougher terms than ones with higher governance
quality, and it is difficult to assess the overall relationship between geostrategic interests and
financing terms without accounting for this interactive effect. Chapter 7 will test this inter-
active term, at which point we can be surer of the results for geostrategic variables.
Finally, before moving on to the next section, the control variables produced one significant
if unanticipated finding. Across this sections’ various models, contractors are typically
more responsive to the gravity controls of GDP per capita and population. The correlation
with GDP per capita is positive for “contracts less loans” as estimated in Tables 5.1, but is
either null or negative for all estimates of loans. Similarly, population is a positive predictor
of contracts but not loans. (Equity responded to population but not income per capita.)
This does not provide direct evidence toward any of the hypotheses, but it does provide
evidence that contractors operate more according to market incentives while lenders can
be convinced to prioritize other factors. This is a causal process observation in favor of
mechanisms underlying the theory (Brady and Collier, 2004).
5.1.2 Contracts and Loans in Burundi and Rwanda
China has few geostrategic or natural resource interests in Burundi and Rwanda, so its
strategy is driven more by diplomatic considerations and a conventional balancing of com-
mercial risk against reward. Chapter 4 demonstrated that China has used aid to crystalize
7See Table 3.7, Chapter 3 for original theoretical predictions.
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shared views on human rights into a close diplomatic relationship with Burundi, but has
had less success doing so in Rwanda, which maintains a more diversified foreign economic
policy. In this section, a similar pattern exists for larger projects. In the absence of major
national interests, Chinese policy banks have not extended all that much credit to either
country. However, Chinese firms have been highly active as contractors in Rwanda, largely
using funding from multilateral organizations like the World Bank. Relatively few Chinese
firms, on the other hand, have found business opportunities in Burundi. Burundi’s higher
political risk has an effect here, both by discouraging Chinese businesses themselves and by
limiting the country’s access to external financing for projects with or without Chinese par-
ticipation. This section starts by looking in turn at freelance contracts and loans in Burundi
and Rwanda. The Rwanda subsection opens with a discussion of road construction, a major
focal point for Rwanda’s development strategy and China’s participation therein.
5.1.2.1 Burundi
Freelance Contracts Atypically for most countries of the world, Burundi has not hosted
very many Chinese-built construction projects since 2000.8 The official documentation of
the Chinese Embassy in Burundi on bilateral relations makes many references to older,
Cold War-era projects such as the 1972 Bujumbura-Nile Road and the 1979 construction of
a textile factory, but references to more recent years are few and far between (Embassy of
the People’s Republic of China in Burundi⇣-N∫⌘qå˝{⇤ÜÍqå˝'Ü⌘,
2014a).9 Exceptions mostly happen where funding is available from the local government,
as in the case of one small government building, or (more often) multilateral organizations,
8I do not here discuss a hydroelectric project built on the Rwandan-Tanzanian border but intended to
supply electricity to Burundi as well and funded partially by a World Bank grant to Burundi. Because this
project is being built partially on Rwandan soil and Rwanda is paying for part of it via borrowing, I discuss it
in Section 5.1.2.2 on freelance contracts in Rwanda.
9See also Flash-Infor (1974, p. 12) and International Economic Cooperation [˝EœN \] (1988).
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which are more interested in social sector projects. In one instance, a Chinese consortium
attempted to build a larger hydroelectric project with Burundian government funding, but
this has stalled, demonstrating the limits of freelance contracting in a country like Burundi.
I cover, in order: 1) the government building; 2) social sector and infrastructure projects
backed by multilateral development banks; and 3) the stalled dam.
In the government sector, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) in
2010 won an $11.0 million World Bank contract to build a new building for the Burundian
Ministry of Finance (World Bank, 2018b). This could be useful for diplomatic outreach,
but less so than the Presidential Palace discussed in Chapter 4. The Palace was 1) funded
by China directly on a grant basis; and 2) went directly to the head of government in a
centralized system; and 3) occurred after the 2015 protests.
Other Chinese-built projects were concentrated in the social sectors and road-building, in
keeping with the priorities of the projects’ World Bank and African Development Bank
funders. A pair of water and sewage projects were also funded by the World Bank but
carried out by Chinese firms. First, between 2011 and 2013, China New Era International
earned $20.2 million expanding the capital city of Bujumbura’s water supply system.10
Then, in 2017, the China Henan International Cooperation Group (Chico) did $21.2 million
of work on a drainage system in Bujumbura (World Bank, 2016, 2018b, 2019a). Chinese
firms did find room to participate, but here within the constraints of the World Bank’s focus
on social sector improvement and only toward Chinese foreign policy goals in that their
presence on the ground could reflect well on Beijing. Unlike for Exim or CDB loans, they
also did not necessarily receive the majority of contract value: Chico’s $21.2 million was
indeed the majority of a $25 million budget, but China New Era’s $20.2 million was a mere
10This was actually two contracts, one for $10.3 million and the other for $9.9 million. See World Bank
(2011, 2018b).
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plurality of a $50 million project.
Three roads tell a similar story, one funded by the World Bank and the other two by the
African Development Bank (AfDB), a regional multilateral organization. In 2013, Chico
earned $9.2 million of a $51.5 million World Bank road construction contract, but in keep-
ing with the World Bank’s frequent use of multi-source procurement, this was again as a
minority participant (World Bank, 2018b). In 2014, Stecol, a Sinohydro subsidiary, was
paid $29 million to build a road running on a north-south axis along the country’s western
edge (Xinhua, 2017a). This enabled trade both with Rwanda to the north and Tanzania
to the south, a point made clear by an official press release from the Chinese Embassy in
Burundi (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Burundi⇣-N∫⌘qå˝{⇤
ÜÍqå˝'Ü⌘, 2014b). Even if China was not actually funding the work, its being
done by a Chinese firm offered an opportunity for public relations, and this without direct
exposure to the risk of friction over debt which was in this instance owed to the African
Development Bank. The same goes for a third road built in 2018 by Hunan Construction
Engineering11 for $11.2 million out of $27.6 million in total AfDB disbursements (African
Development Bank, 2020b).
While the above projects show the opportunities available to Chinese (and other) firms of-
fered by multilateral development bank funding, another shows the limitations posed by its
absence. The idea of a hydroelectric dam at Mpanda had circulated for years—the World
Bank undertook a feasibility study in 1997, and the Nigerian and Indian governments were
in talks about funding it at different points during the 2000s and 2010s (hydro4Africa, 2006;
Direction Générale de l’Énergie et de l’Eau, 2011, p. 133). This did not come to pass, how-
ever, and by 2014 the Burundian government was planning to move forward using funds
11The same firm built Burundi’s Presidential Palace. See Hu Xinsong [··~], Deng Jianying [ì˙Ò]
and He Lijie [Uõp] (2019).
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from its own budget. Under this new arrangement, a consortium of China New Era and the
China Geo-Engineering Corporation (CGC) were slated to build the dam (Economic and
Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Burundi⇣-N
∫⌘qå˝{⇤ÜÍqå˝'ÜœNF°⌅⌘, 2014; World Bank, 2019c, p. 14).
The dam’s budget has fluctuated over time. A 2008 World Bank study put the estimated
cost at $26.5 million, but a more recent (2015) Burundian government document raised
this to $44.5 million (Agence burundaise de Promotion des Investissements, 2015; World
Bank, 2008). Most recently, the Burundian government was looking for an outside investor
to bankroll a $9 million contribution from the 2019-20 budget alone (Kuriyo, 2019). The
project has dragged on for years, but without any reliable external financing, completion re-
mains uncertain. It is no wonder that there are not more instances of Chinese firms building
projects in Burundi without the backing of a multilateral development bank.
Of course, firms could try to secure funding from the home country, but in Burundi, the
Chinese government has only occasionally obliged. I now turn to this topic.
Loans Putting aside the Ministry of Commerce-run zero-interest loans discussed in the
previous chapter, Chinese lending to Burundi has focused on a single hydroelectric project
and telecommunications. Like the stalled dam at Mpanda, the ongoing Ruzibazi hydroelec-
tric project started in 2014, but in this case with the benefit of $49 million in credit from
China Exim (Atkins et al., 2017). Estimates of the project’s total cost have ranged from
$60 million per a 2015 African Development Bank report to $70 million per a 2019 official
Chinese press article (African Development Bank, 2015; J. Omondi, 2019). This leaves
part of the budget to be co-financed by the local government or another source; this part
of the arrangement remains somewhat unclear. In any event, construction is continuing as
planned, demonstrating that China can overcome the high risks of a market like Burundi
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by extending taxpayer-backed credit to a Chinese firm—in this case, Sinohydro is the pri-
mary builder. However, it is less likely to do so in Burundi than in a similarly risky country
in which the government has some other major concern, usually geopolitics or resource
security.
Apart from this small dam, the remainder of Chinese lending to Burundi is concentrated in
the telecommunications sector. Section 4.2.1.4 of the previous chapter discussed the role
of telecoms in Chinese diplomacy in the developing world. “National champions” Huawei
and ZTE are heavily subsidized by the state. This is not done in the name of development
finance so much as to gain leadership in important emerging technologies, but a byproduct
is that Huawei and ZTE can sell to lower-income markets at more palatable prices than
those offered by mostly European12 competitors. In the process, Huawei and ZTE gain
market share in higher-growth countries and likely lock in future sales of parts and main-
tenance for years to come. Section 4.2.1.4 of the previous chapter discussed a 2011 $15
million half-grant, half-loan initiative to build a broadband network in Bujumbura, and this
was not an isolated incident. In 2004, Exim funded 85 percent of a $9.31 million ini-
tiative to expand Burundi’s 2G mobile network; the work was done by Huawei (Atkins
et al., 2017; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). Then, in 2017, Huawei extended a $30
million loan to the Burundian government to upgrade the network using newer technology
(Comms Update, 2017). Press sources indicate that Huawei made the loan itself; this type
of arrangement is uncommon and would indicate that Huawei sees the value in making a
long-term upfront investment in a country where it can secure a high market share for the
indefinite future. In any event, Huawei’s money came either directly from a project-specific
Chinese policy bank loan or indirectly from the Chinese state via its routine subsidization.
12The two main non-Chinese firms in the current 5G race are Sweden’s Ericsson and Finland’s Nokia,
although the field of competition was more crowded for prior generations of telecoms technology.
5.1. CONTRACTS AND LOANS 185
Either way, Huawei had an incentive not just to look out for its own corporate interests but
also the government’s diplomatic concerns which were no doubt boosted by a low-cost,
high-visibility upgrade of this nature.
China lent money to Burundi only on occasion, and often in an area of comparative advan-
tage (telecoms) with implicit subsidies or explicit grants built in. Chinese firms had some
success finding business opportunities there on their own, but within the narrow confines
of projects being funded by multilateral development banks working to alleviate poverty
despite concerns about local governance. Rwanda has not received drastically more loans
from China than has Burundi, but it has hosted many more Chinese contractors.
5.1.2.2 Rwanda
Like Burundi, Rwanda is not home to major geostrategic or resource interests for the gov-
ernment Beijing and has only received a small volume of direct loans. It has, however,
proven to be a more favorable environment for Chinese contractors. A large portion of
China’s activity in Rwanda has been concentrated in road construction, a major priority for
the government’s development strategy. Some road projects have been directly funded by
China Exim, but the majority use financing from third-party organizations like the African
Development Bank. These roads have become a focal point of discourse surrounding
China’s presence in Rwanda for both proponents of Chinese diplomacy and critics thereof,
and much previous analysis of them has been tinted by ideological considerations of one
stripe or another. I instead use hard data on road construction and repair to conduct within-
sector analysis comparing contract revenues earned on a freelance basis to those backed by
tied loan packages. Systematic differences between building one highway and another are
inherently smaller than between a highway and, for example, a dam or a hospital. Isolat-
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ing analysis of Rwanda’s road projects is a natural opportunity to filter out miscellaneous
sector-specific factors. After this, I include two sections on a more diversified assortment
of contract-based and loan-backed projects, respectively, in other sectors. The projects in
these sections are less directly to one another, but they do allow for within-country anal-
ysis based on an internal cleavage in Rwanda’s political economy. Parts of the Rwandan
economy are heavily influenced by firms connected to the ruling party or military, intro-
ducing a greater degree of political risk for projects in which they are involved. I use this
intra-national variation in risk to illustrate how Chinese companies and government orga-
nizations respond.
Roads Road construction and improvement are an important part of Rwanda’s devel-
opment strategy. Africa in general has a relatively low population density spread across
sometimes difficult terrain, meaning better overland connectivity has always been a chal-
lenge for both commerce and exertion of state power.13 As a small, relatively dense state,
Rwanda has it easier than most in terms of domestic connectivity, but as a landlocked state
is more reliant than most on overland international trade. The building (and upgrading)
of roads is thus a focus for the Rwandan government and indeed for many others in the
region. With a low-cost construction sector experienced in building highway networks at
home, China has been heavily involved here. During a 2018 state visit to Rwanda, Chi-
nese President Xi Jinping stated that “China has become Rwanda’s largest trading partner
and largest construction contractor [...] Chinese companies have repaired or built 70 per-
cent of Rwanda’s roads and have become household names” 14 (Xi Jinping [`—s],
2018). The “70 percent” figure is obviously impressively high. Xi stated that Chinese firms
13See Herbst (2014).
14Author’s translation from original Chinese: -˝Ú⇣:b˙æ, '8◆⇡4å, 'Â↵⇧
π⇥[...] -˝l¯Ó˙ÑlÔ`b˙æ˝∂lÔ;Ã↵70% Ú⇣:∂ª7SÑ   ⇢⇥
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had “repaired or built” 70 percent of Rwanda’s roads, but did not say that they were all
Chinese-funded. When asked in an interview about this later that year, Rwandan President
Paul Kagame stated that “China is active in Rwanda, but not in an inappropriate way. The
new roads in Rwanda are largely built with European money. Sometimes there are Chinese
subcontractors.” (Ultsch, 2018) This was a high-enough profile issue that the President
was commenting publicly on it, and he clearly understood the difference between Chinese
contractors and lenders. Indeed, Xi during his visit to Rwanda also mentioned that Chinese
firms were Rwandan market leaders in construction contract revenues. Chinese contractors
without Chinese funding were being mentioned as a selling point during a major diplo-
matic visit, and this to a country whose size would usually preclude attention from leaders
of great powers.
Not all, however, picked up on this distinction. An article the following year in the Atlantic
held that these roads (and other projects) were pushing Rwanda into a “debt trap” in which
it could no longer afford to meet its debt payments (Paduano, 2019). The Rwandan Ministry
of Finance and Economic Planning responded to the article, writing that:
Rwanda enjoys good cooperation with China. However, the size of Chinese
investment in Rwanda cited in the article is inaccurate. It is not true that ‘70%
of Rwandan roads have been financed and built by Chinese’. Rwandan roads
have been financed from diverse sources, the major ones being the World Bank,
the African Development Bank, the Gulf, China, and Japan. Chinese loans to
Rwanda represent less than 5% of Rwanda’s total debt. (Ministry of Economy
and Finance of Rwanda, 2019a)
At this point, it is clear that the Chinese government sees its cheap construction contractors
as a diplomatic asset, even if individual contracts are not being micro-managed by state
authorities in faraway Beijing. The Rwandan leadership and civil service have also made
it clear that they understand this. However, none of the parties involved refuted the claim
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that Chinese contractors had built 70 percent of Rwanda’s roads. The Rwandan Ministry
of Finance did specify that China holds less than 5 percent of total Rwandan debt, but this
was across all sectors and not specific to roads. I here use publicly available data to assess
actual differences between freelance contracts and loans. Table 5.3 lists all known road
construction or rehabilitation projects undertaken by Chinese firms in Rwanda. Readers
should be aware that available data from 2016 onward is of high quality, but earlier years
are spottier.15
15Fortunately, there is no reason to think that earlier years are systematically different. If anything,
Rwanda’s improving market reputation over time would have put more pressure on China firms to loosen
loan conditions in later years, meaning any observed differential between tougher Chinese loans and more
concessional ones from multilateral development banks would have been larger in earlier years than later.
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Available data back the Rwandan government’s assertion that most of Chinese-built projects
use third-party funding. Contract value is not available for all items, but if we use length of
road as a rough proxy—an imperfect one given differences in terrain and road type—only
27.5 percent of the Chinese-built projects in Table 5.3 were directly funded by China. The
Chinese government is not even the leading funder of Chinese-built road projects. This dis-
tinction belongs to the African Development Bank (36.9 percent of road by length), and the
World Bank (16.1 percent) and Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA;
14.3 percent) were not far behind. Because multilateral development organizations such
as these maintain strong presences in Rwanda, it is simply unnecessary for China Exim to
expend major resources to enable Chinese firms to do business there. Instead, they by most
accounts win a majority of multinational lenders’ bids based on their own experience and
subsidization through non-project specific cheap credit at home.
There are, however, systematic ways in which Chinese-funded projects are carried out dif-
ferently from others.16 These are 1) cooperation with local partners; 2) higher costs due
to non-competitive tendering; and 3) differential distribution across urban and rural ar-
eas.
The Rwandan government, like any in its position, would like to maximize its firms’ shares
of contract value, but this can be a difficult struggle when up against better-funded com-
petitors from overseas. There were three instances in which local firms were included as
partners on contracts, and none of the three were Chinese-funded. Exim rules would make
such an arrangement impossible unless the local partners were minority subcontractors.
The identity of these firms also matters. Two of the contracts went to the Horizon Group,
16This does not include potential Chinese interest in better access to Congolese minerals. The data do
include several projects leading to the DRC border, but these were mostly funded by the African Development
Bank. China is not the only party interested in eastern Congo—humanitarian organizations, Western mining
firms, and United Nations peacekeepers all share a desire for better transportation there.
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a subsidiary of the Ministry of Defence. The third went to NPD, a subsidiary of an in-
vestment company owned by the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front. These are both major
construction firms in Rwanda and their participation in major contracts is not unusual, but
China nevertheless missed an opportunity to gain favor with people well-connected to the
ruling regime due to tied procurement rules.17 China in effect sacrificed diplomatic in-
terests because of tough, commercially oriented loan terms. Rwanda, for its part, has an
incentive to opt for multilateral-backed projects over Chinese ones.
There are also more direct financial ramifications of tied procurement for Rwanda. Roads
funded by China Exim cost on average approximately $1,523,000 million per kilometer, as
opposed to $706,000 for all others.18 One Rwandan data source covering the years 2009
and 2010 listed both China Exim-funded projects from that time period as using “single
source” procurement. Of the non-Chinese-funded projects, only one used this modality,
and this was a very small (0.02 km) bridge. The closed procurement process required by
Exim inhibits competition and enables firms to charge higher prices. This is a positive for
Chinese commercial interests in that corporate revenues benefit,19 but it is no wonder that
Rwanda uses this option only sparingly. Indeed, it is largely the same Chinese firms doing
similar20 work for less money when backed by multilateral organizations.
Third, Rwanda appears to have opted for more expensive Chinese debt mostly in and
17Party- and military-connected firms are influential in Rwanda. These firms have a particularly strong
presence in real estate investment and will be discussed in the next section on freelance contracts in Rwandan
sectors other than roads.
18This analysis was inspired by and follows the methodology used by Garzón and D. Castro (2018) and
Villavicencio (2015) comparing tied Chinese projects with others in the Ecuadorian power sector. See also
Namubiru (2018) for a related discussion of roads in Uganda.
19There is an argument to be made that this could be a negative for Chinese business in the long run if the
accrued debt is unsustainable. This issue will be addressed in the conclusion.
20It is possible that the Exim-backed projects are somehow technically more difficult, but this seems un-
likely. Many are more concentrated in and around Kigali, an easier (and more profitable) environment than
rural Africa, whereas as the multilaterals often focus on access to rural areas and/or cross-border trade.
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around Kigali. China Exim has funded two general “Kigali” road projects as well as an
airport highway and the Kigali-area Gininia-Textile Mill project. Given many multilater-
als’ focus on improved access for poor, rural areas, Rwanda may have been using Chinese
credit to fill an urban niche in which other funders were less interested. Tougher terms—in
this case, tied procurement—can be good for Chinese business but bad for relations with the
host country, which in some cases may have better options on the table. Rwanda generally
has more cost-effective options, with the possible exception of urban road upgrading.
This divide between third party-financed deals and Chinese-financed deals exists in other
areas, although no other sector in Rwanda21 has enough of a critical mass of Chinese-built
projects to enable the type of within-sector analysis conducted here for roads. I here turn
to other freelance contracts in Rwanda, and from there move to loans.
Freelance Contracts Most Chinese firms building projects in Rwanda are not directly
backed by state-owned bank loans. However, they have become highly competitive in open
contests, especially when they receive cheap credit from the home country. This could
be construed as both a positive and a negative to Rwanda. On the negative side of the
ledger are local competitors. As one official of the Rwandan Association of Engineers put
it, “How can you compete with a Chinese company bidding with an assurance of a loan
that comes with a 3% interest rate from its home bank when your bank wants an interest
rate ranging between 18-20%?” (Ngabonziza, 2019c). At the same time, subsidization is a
positive to buyers of construction services.
The net diplomatic effect of these savings to Rwandan customers is contingent upon fea-
tures of Rwanda’s domestic political economy which were not directly salient to the smaller
21These types of comparisons are easier to make in larger markets with a higher volume of deals. So, they
will be made for the larger countries featured in Chapters 7 and 6.
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aid projects discussed in Chapter 4 but will be introduced here. Namely, Chinese compa-
nies’ participation in projects sponsored by firms connected to the Rwandan party-state
regime have frequently encountered serious problems in implementation. Projects with
less direct involvement from the host government have, perhaps counterintuitively, gener-
ated more unambiguous benefits for bilateral relations. Rwandan regime-connected firms’
presence or absence in a given deal constitutes an important source of subnational variation
in political risk which can be used to test theoretical predictions. I here introduce the role
of party- and military-connected firms in the Rwandan political economy before analyzing
Chinese contracts in which they were sometimes involved.
Firms owned by the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) or the Rwandan military play
a large role in the Rwandan economy. Gökgür (2012) sees them as running counter to the
common narrative of Rwanda as adhering to Bretton Woods-inspired standards of “good
governance” and rule of law. Privatization of many Rwandan firms in the post-genocide
era, he writes, was carried out in a relatively haphazard away, allowing many elites to cap-
ture privileged positions at bargain prices. Access to these rents is one of the regime’s
levers over party cadres22 and military officers whose loyalty is critical to regime stabil-
ity. Because of their role in maintaining regime stability, Gökgür (2012, p. 16) writes that
party- and military-owned firms “receive and enjoy fully state-granted privileges through
their close fiscal, financial and non-financial ties to the state in procurement contracts, as
well as in their ability to access loans from commercial banks. Furthermore, some of these
banks are majority or minority state-owned.” There is a rough parallel with the role of
well-connected state-owned firms in the Chinese political economy, complete with some
22Analysts of China will immediately note the use of this word. It is sometimes used by analysts of Rwanda
as well. The parallels between the CCP and RPF are not perfect, but they do share a certain centrality to their
respective countries’ regimes.
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of the same unintended consequences. Chapter 2 established the moral hazard intrinsic to
Chinese banks’ subsidized loans to favored firms which the government will prop up indef-
initely. In the Rwandan case, Gökgür (2012, pp. 27–28) similarly finds that “[w]henever
SOEs or party-statals make unwise investments, the Treasury carries the fiscal risks and ul-
timately assumes the fiscal burden.” This lack of credible budget constraints can encourage
excessive gambling which presents a risk to any potential business partners. These firms
are also unlikely to be disciplined for any other bad behavior: Gökgür (2012, p. 24) adds
that “[e]ven if party-statals win contracts through competitive-bidding on their own merits,
they are likely to incur relatively common cost overruns beyond negotiated prices. Their
billing records and their financial statements are unlikely to subject to any full or close
scrutiny on the part of the GoR or any of its public entities.” From the point of view of
a foreign firm, contracts involving companies connected to the Rwandan party or military
apparatus carry heightened risk of cost overruns as well as delays in both construction and
payment.23
State-connected firms are more concentrated in sectors of the economy deemed strategi-
cally important such as industrial goods, construction, and finance. In some instances, a
focus on construction and finance intersects with elites’ private interests by building high-
end housing and commercial areas which most Rwandans cannot afford.24 The net result
is a bifurcated domestic political economy characterized by a closed, sometimes cronyis-
tic system in strategic and/or luxury sectors; and a more laissez-faire approach elsewhere.
23Gökgür (2012) sees greater risk in foreign investors not being connected to Rwandan party-statals be-
cause the rest of the economy is in a disadvantaged position in terms of access to credit and procurement
contracts. I find the opposite to be true: at least in the instances discussed in this dissertation, contracts at
arms’ length from the Rwandan state have generally been implemented with many fewer problems. This find-
ing is based only on contracts involving Chinese firms and should not be taken as definitively generalizable
to all of Rwanda.
24Gökgür (2012) emphasizes private elite interests, while Behuria (2016) focuses more on the strategic
implications of areas such as cement and infrastructure for the maintenance and projection of state power.
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Adherence to the rule of law is generally stronger in the latter category, where core regime
interests are not directly concerned (Behuria, 2015; Behuria and Goodfellow, 2016). For-
eign firms’ exposure to political risk tends to increase where Rwandan regime-affiliated
companies are concerned. Even within the construction and luxury sectors, some projects
are backed by domestic private or international funding. These have generally been marked
by lower political risk.
I identify four categories in which Chinese firms have been involved25 and cover them se-
quentially. First are social sector projects, often funded by major multilateral development
organizations. These are generally low-risk and indeed not drastically different from what
Chinese firms did in Burundi, although because of Rwanda’s better access to capital they
are greater in number. Rwanda, though, presents other types of opportunities not available
in Burundi. The second category consists of projects connected to Rwanda’s national in-
dustrial upgrading drive, especially in manufacturing but at times also in the technology
sector. These are also typically relatively arms-length from the Rwandan government and
in many cases involve Rwandan private firms but have nevertheless become a successful
part of Chinese diplomacy in the region. The third category is government buildings, some
of which have been for military-connected firms with obvious implications for Chinese
relations with the ruling regime. These are usually more limited in scale and not subject
to the same type of political risk as the fourth category, real estate and tourism projects.
Rwanda has made attracting global business travelers and tourists a high economic prior-
ity. For the elites’ own purposes, Rwandan regime-connected and private investors alike
have also sunk large sums into prestige projects such as luxury housing and a $300 mil-
lion convention center. Higher political risk has not deterministically precluded all Chinese
25Apart from roads, which were already covered.
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firms from getting involved with regime-affiliated firms. The minority of cases where Chi-
nese firms have gotten involved in higher-risk deals have left the Chinese government in the
difficult position of deciding whether to directly address the structural problems created by
Rwandan regime-affiliated firms and in the process offend an important diplomatic partner.
Other Chinese-built projects backed by private Rwandan or international money have cre-
ated greater diplomatic benefits than their officially sponsored counterparts. I cover these
four categories in turn.
A. Social Sector Projects and Infrastructure
Chinese firms have built social sector and basic infrastructure projects using third-party
funding in both Rwanda and Burundi, although these make up a smaller proportion of the
more diversified Rwandan landscape. As in Burundi, Chinese firms were typically involved
in Rwandan projects alongside other contractors, demonstrating that no procurement deci-
sions were being imposed on the home government. The one exception proves the rule.
There is one case in which a social sector project is being built by predominantly Chinese
interests. The China Civil Engineering Construction Corp. (CCECC) is as of this writing
building what will be the only hospital in Kigali’s Nyarugenge District. The first phase’s
roughly $7 million26 is funded by the Rwandan and Belgian governments, and a second
phase to expand the hospital is currently planned (New Times, 2018; Ngabonziza, 2019c).
An article in Xinhua proudly mentions CCECC’s participation in the project, indicating
some diplomatic benefits without the Chinese government needing to play any obvious
role in the project’s planning or funding (Xinhua, 2018a).
At the same time, the hospital is a relatively small undertaking and easily done by one firm.
For larger projects, Chinese firms have mostly been part of multinational efforts of the
26Six billion Rwandan francs. Conversion per Xinhua (2018a).
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type disallowed where Exim or CDB are involved. In 2013, the China Geo-Engineering
Corporation (CGC) used $19.9 million in World Bank funds to build a small hydroelec-
tric dam. This made them the primary contractor out of a $34 million budget for the dam
proper, but the dam was part of a much larger ($123.3 million) agricultural and irrigation
program, with the rest of the money coming from Canada, the United States, and a G-20
fund (Global Agriculture & Food Security Program, 2018; World Bank, 2018a, 2020; Xin-
hua, 2018b). Similarly, starting in 2015, three smaller Chinese firms27 received $8.8 million
from the African Development Bank for rural electrification, but this was out of a $34.0 mil-
lion28 budget (African Development Bank, 2020d). By far the largest Chinese-built project,
though, is the ongoing Rusumo hydroelectric dam. Straddling the Rwanda-Tanzania bor-
der, the dam is meant to provide electricity to both countries as well as Burundi, a short
distance away. The World Bank is providing $340 million split an even three ways be-
tween Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania, although on different terms. Reflecting Burundi’s
fiscal position, the Burundian portion is totally grant-based; Rwanda’s, half grants and half
loans; Tanzania’s, all loans. (Because of this financial difference and because only power
lines are actually being built on Burundian soil, I include the project here and not in the
section in Burundi.) (World Bank, 2013a,b) Bidding has not yet taken place for all phases
of the trinational project, but the first phase is divided into two primary contracts. First
is $75.1 million for civil engineering and equipment to a joint venture CGC, which also
built the smaller dam mentioned above, and Jiangxi Water. Second is $46.5 million to the
German-Indian consortium Andritz (World Bank, 2017b). The African Development Bank
is providing another $10.6 million29 to India’s Kalpa Paru for transmission lines to Burundi
27Sieyuan, Ningbo Sanxing, and Rousant (HK).
28This was actually 6.4 million out of a budget of 27.4 million units of account (UA), a currency equivalent
used internally by AfDB. Exchange rates to USD as of December 2015 per African Development Bank
(2020a).
29The actual contract was for 7,526,281.35 euros and 3,580,643,889.41 Burundian francs, which at January
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(African Development Bank, 2019). In all of these cases, funders and host countries used
open procurement rules to maintain competition, and Chinese firms participated on a basis
similar to their peers from other countries.
B. Industrial Upgrading
Industrial upgrading, predominantly in the manufacturing sector but also in the technol-
ogy sector, is a priority for the Rwandan government but is being enacted largely through
industrial zones and favorable tax policies reminiscent of China’s own experience. Some
investors in Rwandan industrial zones are themselves Chinese—this topic will be covered
in much more depth in the following section on equity investments—but most are either
domestic or from neighboring countries (Steenbergen and Javorcik, 2017). In these cases,
Chinese construction firms can still contribute by building factory facilities.
This is part of a longstanding tradition—China Building Materials helped set up Rwanda’s
only cement plant in 1984—but has accelerated substantially over the last decade, and with
generally less state involvement than the government-sponsored 1980s cooperation pro-
gram (Wingo, 2018). Indeed, Cimerwa (the Rwandan cement company that was heir to
the original cooperation project) in 2009 hired China’s Pengfei Group to build the coun-
try’s second cement plant for $50 million (New Times, 2008a). This major (for a small
country) expansion of supply of a critical building material might be the single most sig-
nificant contribution to Rwandan industrialization by a Chinese contractor, but it is not the
only one. Beijing Construction Engineering Group (BCEG)—of the ill-fated Convention
Centre—and China Star Construction both have their Rwandan headquarters in the Kigali
Special Economic Zone (SEZ), an area in which the Rwandan government offers tax in-
centives for manufacturing firms (Chinese Embassy in Rwanda, 2017). Technically, this is
30, 2019 (when the contract was approved) translated to USD 10.6 million USD per Oanda (2020).
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equity investment by Chinese firms, but the real bulk of their activity is as contractors for
local projects. Public relations releases list nine factories apiece built by each firm as of
2018. BCEG built C&H Garments, a Chinese-invested apparel factory and a focus of this
chapter’s section on equity; as well as locally owned producers of water tanks, mattresses,
and foodstuffs. It was also a secondary subcontractor in building the Kigali Logistics Hub,
an inland container terminal operated by Dubai-based shipping giant DP World aimed at
addressing the difficulties of trading in a landlocked state (Hope Magazine, 2018a). China
Star, for its part, has built plastics, printing, and coffee processing plants, among others
(Hope Magazine, 2018d). The values of these contracts are typically unavailable and quite
small—the total value of C&H’s initial investment, for example, was only $10 million, and
only part of this would have to the construction firm. Still, they have an out-sized public
relations impact by contributing to the growth of a manufacturing base on a continent that
has little and in a country whose government is publicly pushing for industrialization. The
Chinese government is aware of this. China’s Ambassador to Rwanda in 2015 visited the
headquarters of BCEG and China Star along with the Chinese-invested C&H Garments
plant, publicly “commend[ing] their important contributions to the socio-economic devel-
opment of Rwanda” (Chinese Embassy in Rwanda, 2017). Construction contractors were
receiving equal treatment here with equity investors, indicating the diplomatic utility of
both. While BCEG is a relatively large, Beijing-based state-owned firm, China Star is a
smaller firm from the southern city of Foshan. China Star by its own account began to fo-
cus on Rwanda because of a slowing domestic market. As they told a local paper in Foshan,
“Rwanda’s government is stable, its demand for infrastructure construction is huge, and its
labor and land are cheap. There’s an enormous business opportunity, and our net profits are
triple what they are in China.”30 (Gao Huichao [ÿgÖ], 2019) Many places are low-cost
30Author’s translation from original Chinese: b˙æ?@3ö ˘˙˙ Bœ' ≥®õå 0˜
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and lack physical infrastructure, but Rwanda is different in its institutional strength. The
government is not only “stable” but also trusted to honor contracts regarding investments
in the SEZ, which in turn presents construction contractors with a major opportunity. This
has not happened in Burundi.
While the above projects focused on manufacturing, another was oriented toward the tech-
nology sector. CCECC received $10.2 million31 to build Rwanda’s Regional Information
and Communication Technologies Centre of Excellence, a training center meant for Rwan-
dan ICT professionals. Another of the government’s priorities is building human capital to
make better use of the arrival of networking and mobile technologies to the region. This
particular project was funded by the African Development Bank (African Development
Bank, 2020b,c). A Chinese firm gained from the convergence of foreign capital and local
government initiative, potentially reaping some of the reputational rewards.
C. Government Buildings
Chapter 4 established that China often uses grants to build facilities for government min-
istries in developing countries. Notably, Burundi’s Presidential Palace was completed and
delivered even after an outbreak of political violence. However, Chinese firms only built
one such facility (the Ministry of Finance building) in Burundi with third-party money,
and this was before the 2015 unrest led most donors to reconsider their priorities there.
This has not been the case in Rwanda, where stronger institutions and a greater accumu-
lation of wealth enables Rwanda to pay Chinese builders directly for their work, albeit
often at low prices. Bilateral Chinese-Rwandan contracts are not nearly as transparent as
those involving major multilateral institutions, and dollar values are not often available, but
<N… X(Ë'F: Ø)ÔÂæ0˝ÖÑ3 ⇥
317.5 million AfDB Units of Account, translated into USD as of December 2015 per African Development
Bank (2020a).
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the buildings themselves are easily observable. An earlier example came in 2007, when
CCECC won a bid to build a new, $10.5 million headquarters for the Rwanda Health In-
surance Fund (RAMA). The company’s announcement, posted in the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce website, speaks to the juxtaposition of out-competing local companies for a
contract but in the process lowering construction costs to the Rwandan government.
Participants in the bid for the RAMA building include Thomas Piron, Roko
Construction Rw. Cor., Seyani Brothers (U) Ltd., Savita Builders Rwanda,
Easter Builders, and five other foreign companies. Amidst fierce competition,
our company rose to the top and at once came away with the bid, undoubtedly
because of our logically sound technical plan. However, this will also benefit
the ever-improving diplomatic relations between China and Rwanda and the
continuing influence of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing.32
(Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic
of China in Rwanda ⇣-N∫⌘qå˝{b˙æqå˝'ÜœNF°
⌅⌘, 2007)
Written in Mandarin, the dramatic tone is best suited for the official Chinese press and is
clearly meant for an audience in the home country. The fact that CCECC out-bid a list of
mostly African33 competitors might have been omitted in an English- or French-language
press release for African consumption. That being said, the Beijing-based conglomerate
did provide cost savings to the Rwandan government by driving down the bidding price.
This could benefit diplomatic relations. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FO-
CAC) refers to the first incarnation of a triannual summit of Chinese and African lead-
32Author’s translation from original Chinese: ¬†b;›-√'¶yÓï⌥Ñÿ THOMAS




33Thomas Piron is Belgian. Roko, Seyani Brothers, and Savita are all Ugandan, although two submitted
bids via local subsidiaries. No information could be found on Easter Builders. Although they were described
as “foreign,” some of the remaining five unnamed bidders could be Rwandan. The term “foreign” (˝ )
in Mandarin can mean “non-Chinese” rather than “outside one’s native country,” and Rwandans living in
Rwanda might still be referred to as “foreign.”
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ers which had taken place in Beijing the year prior. Being a large, centrally state-owned
firm, CCECC almost certainly relies on routine bank financing from state-owned banks;
in some instances, such firms’ executives also face career incentives to undertake projects
reflecting government priorities. CCECC is here virtue-signaling on the Ministry of Com-
merce’s own website, thereby demonstrating the power of the government’s delegating
project decision-making authority to the firms knowing that financial and career incentives
as well as (for some) personal convictions will lead them to act in accordance with the
government’s wishes. High political risk and lack of available capital might stymie this
strategy in Burundi, but it achieves results in Rwanda.
Another government building34 shows a slightly different strategy on the part of a Chi-
nese firm. A subsidiary of China Railway Jianchang35 is building a new, fourteen-story
headquarters for the Rwanda Utility and Regulatory Authority (RURA) (Hope Magazine,
2018c). They are doing so in a joint venture with Rwanda’s Hygerat Construction—
depending on the allocation of contract revenues,36 a potential violation of procurement
rules had it been funded as a grant from the Chinese government, but good for Rwandan
interests in a different way.
New facilities for the national health insurance and utilities agencies are winners for pub-
lic relations, but another Chinese-built project has a more direct connection to the ruling
regime. CCECC, which built the RAMA (health insurance) building, is also building a
$16.0 million headquarters for three groups associated with the Rwandan military. These
34I do not discuss in depth CCECC’s involvement in the Rwandan Social Security Board (RSSB) Towers.
Other than the total value of the contract ($25.3 million), little is known about the construction process.
Contract value per Rwanda Social Security Board (2013, p. 30), converted to USD as of the end of June 2013
per Oanda (2020).
35This is a subsidiary of the China Railway Group, which also owns CCECC, the builder of the RAMA
headquarters discussed in the last paragraph.
36This is unfortunately not publicly known.
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are 1) Zigama, a bank owned by the Ministry of Defence; 2) Rwanda’s Military Medical
Insurance (MMI), an investor in many military-sponsored business ventures; and 3) the
Horizon Group, the leading Ministry of Defence-owned investment company which also
built two road projects in joint venture with a Sinohydro subsidiary (China Civil Engineer-
ing Construction Company⇣-˝ (Â↵∆‚ Pl¯⌘, 2018). President Kagame
took power as a rebel leader, and the military and its associated revenue streams are still
important to the regime. Building a new home for these organizations has particular signif-
icance for Chinese diplomacy.
D. Real Estate and Tourism
Indeed, government buildings in general will be noted more by government officials than
by the general public. This is less true of the fourth type of project discussed here. Several
Chinese-built real estate and tourism projects are highly visible and may reinforce popu-
lar perceptions of growth under the Kagame regime, but are often funded with private or
Rwandan government money and would not have been feasible in a higher-risk market like
Burundi. These projects frequently carry a degree of prestige for the government, particu-
larly in light of Rwanda’s dramatic economic comeback, and will also be noticed by some
(mostly wealthier) citizens outside government. A major international convention center
and luxury housing project funded by the Rwandan government were both seen by many
as too expensive for a low-income country, and few contractors were willing to take on
the associated risk. These represent pockets of more questionable governance in an overall
favorable system, leading to meaningful subnational variation. The publicly funded con-
vention center and housing project both exhibit characteristics paralleling projects backed
by tied loans. While China did not directly fund either, the lack of other interested parties
meant that Rwanda could not dismiss the contractors regardless of how well or how poorly
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the projects went. Privately or internationally funded deals, on the other hand, typically
went relatively smoothly and were paradoxically better for China’s image in the country
than officially sponsored projects. I begin with the publicly funded housing project and
convention center before proceeding to a pair of private real estate projects and an interna-
tionally funded football facility.
By all estimates, Rwanda faces an increasing shortage of housing due to in-migration to
cities. The $150 million Vision City housing project is a flagship part of the government’s
response but has provoked controversy due to its focus on the high-end market. Building
of luxury homes can serve as a symbol of national recovery from the genocide, but there
are serious doubts as to how financially viable they are in a low-income country (Topping,
2014). One government critic pointed out that the opening price for the cheapest units
was $179,000, as compared to the median Rwandan’s annual income of $702 (Himbara,
2018). Most investors might have been leery, and so the project was funded by the Rwanda
Social Security Board (RSSB), the national pension fund. CCECC, which also built sev-
eral Rwandan projects previously mentioned, was brought in as the main contractor (New
Times, 2015b).
Implementation of the project was not smooth. In 2013, the beginning of work was delayed
by a standoff over land, as local resident claimed that they were being under-compensated
by the government for expropriation. Their homes were ultimately bulldozed (Kagire,
2013). Even as construction was underway, the project began to draw criticism from within
the Rwandan government. The Auditor General’s Annual Reports for fiscal year 2016-2017
noted delays and cost overruns in construction, partially due to contractors not being con-
sistently paid on time. The Auditor General also expressed concern that as of September
2017, only 15.5 percent of the houses had been sold, and completion was not far away. This
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problem was being made worse by cost overruns, which were being passed on to buyers
in a country which largely could not afford the houses to begin with (Office of the Auditor
General of State Finances, 2017, pp. 16–17). The first wave of construction was completed
in August 2018, but the vacancy issue largely remained. The government responded by
cutting prices for civil servants and offering mortgages at 11 percent over 20 years—low
by Rwandan standards, but still not enough to attract many buyers. Even at the new level
of pricing, one Rwandan newspaper found that the payments on a two-bedroom unit would
have cost 86 percent of the salary of the Auditor General himself (Ngabonziza, 2018). Even
after the price cuts, 58 percent of units were still vacant as of December 2018. The Auditor
General chalked this up to “inadequate planning” and the fact that the total construction
budget had ballooned from $89.6 million to $131.2 million (Office of the Auditor General
of State Finances, 2018, pp. 42–43). This was a high-risk project that most contractors
without state subsidization might have avoided.
A similar story occurred with respect to a plan to build a world-class convention center in
Kigali, although in this case problems went beyond simple lack of funding or market de-
mand. In this case, the Chinese contractor was found to have done shoddy work. There was
also variation in time here, as Rwanda’s access to international financing both in general
and for the convention center in particular improved over time. This led to increased gov-
ernment leverage over the contractor as the influx of money meant that other firms began
to express interest in continuing the troubled project.
In 2007, a consortium of Prime Holdings (50 percent), the Rwanda Social Security Board
(25 percent), and Rwanda Investment Group (25 percent) set up a company to build a
new convention center in Kigali (COMESA Regional Investment Agency, 2011). Prime
Holdings is a publicly owned corporation, while the Rwanda Investment Group is owned
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by a group of nominally private but mostly unspecified investors known to include orga-
nizations owned by both the state and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (New Times, 2008b;
Gökgür, 2012, pp. 20–21; International Monetary Fund, 2017, p. 24). Crystal Ventures, the
investment wing of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front, later joined (Kimenyi, 2016). In
other words, this was a predominantly public enterprise.
This government-led initiative came with a very high price—$300 million, to be exact—
but also had public policy significance beyond the obvious desire to attract conferences and
tourism. A newspaper exchange involving the project’s (German-born) architect says as
much:
Earlier, critics from Germany and Europe had accused [architect Roland Di-
eterle] of importing an overly luxurious (and expensive) engineering concept
to a country that is only rising from the ashes of political and economic ruin.
But Dieterle believes that the Kigali Convention Complex is a perfect model
for sustainable urban development in Africa:
“In practice it is not realistic for a country to develop itself from the grassroots
level to the high-tech level,” Dieterle retorts, adding:
“It needs landmark projects that demonstrate Rwanda’s success in order to
reach an international level, as well as to show highly educated Rwandans that
they can be optimistic about finding perspectives in their own country.” (New
Times, 2008b)
The project’s budget was raising eyebrows in a country with limited means, but it was
meant as a signal to investors and citizens alike that Rwanda was “rising from the ashes.”
As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the building itself exhibits elements of traditional African
architecture and radiates the Rwandan national colors at night. The monument had political
implications, contributing to a sense of regime legitimacy surrounding Rwanda’s economic
renewal. In 2009, Beijing Construction Engineering Group (BCEG) was recruited as the
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Figure 5.2: Kigali Convention Centre
Source: Taylor (2018, p. 2).
primary builder (New Times, 2009).
Before arriving at the benefits of the convention center for the Rwandan government, there
were two major stumbling blocks: cost and difficulties in the construction process.
As to cost, early project financing was not transparent, but the Rwandan government at-
tempted to maximize its reliance on domestic borrowing via Treasury bonds in order to
avoid the risks associated with fickle international markets and exchange rates (Ngabonz-
iza, 2019b). In a poor country like Rwanda, however, there are limits to this strategy. By
2011, the project was stalling due to lack of funds (Ngarambe and Namata, 2015). (This
issue was not dissimilar from that encountered during the Vision City housing project’s
construction.) In April 2012, the Governor of the National Bank of Rwanda, the central
bank, told the press that “we have talked to almost all the big investment banks and are
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waiting for their decision. Massive projects like the Kigali Convention Centre require a lot
of funding, which our local banks cannot provide.” (Namata, 2012) By April 2013, this
strategy reached fruition with a US $400 million Eurobond issue. The bonds’ yield was
lower than that of debt previously on Rwanda’s books. So, $120 million of the proceeds
were used to retire older, more expensive debt associated with the Convention Centre, and
another $150 million went to actually complete construction.37 As Rwanda’s market rep-
utation was improving, so was its access to international capital; indeed, orders for the
bonds reached $3.5 billion, or over eight times the amount actually available (Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2013; Sulaiman, 2013).
This leads to the project’s second stumbling block: construction quality. Construction had
fallen behind schedule to begin with as money ran low in 2011, but even after it restarted,
it emerged that the Beijing Construction Engineering Group (BCEG) had used substandard
materials which in some instances had already started to degrade before the building was
complete. Auditors spoke to the press about this finding in 2015, after the eurobond is-
sue. In other words, when the Rwandan government did not have the funding to finish the
project, it had no choice but to stay with BCEG.38 With new funding, however, Rwanda had
the leverage to actually ask for an improvement in project outcomes. Ultimately, BCEG
was fired and replaced with a private firm from Turkey (Namata, Kabona, and Ngarambe,
2015). Had this been a tied loan project, Rwanda would have had no choice but to tolerate
the defective work, or else lose funding.39 Paradoxically, firing BCEG was better for Sino-
Rwandan relations than allowing the problem to fester indefinitely, as might have happened
under a closed procurement scheme. In the midst of the controversy, the Chinese Embassy
37The remainder of the issue went to the national airline and a hydroelectric project.
38If the government already knew about the structural problems, which may or may not have been the case.
39As will be covered in Chapter 6, Ecuador found itself in this exact situation with respect to several
hydroelectric projects.
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in Kigali told the Rwandan press that “BCEG and the Rwandan side are currently under-
taking friendly negotiations to resolve the problems arising from their co-operation in the
Kigali Convention Centre project. It’s a commercial issue and will not affect the cordial
relations between China and Rwanda.” (Namata, Kabona, and Ngarambe, 2015) Granted,
diplomats are not in the habit of publicly acknowledging souring relations. With the ben-
efit of hindsight, though, the rest of this chapter demonstrates that Chinese engagement in
Rwanda in fact did not slow down following the episode. Rwanda’s improving domestic
institutional environment and international market reputation decreased Beijing’s ability to
safeguard its commercial interests—in this case, a large construction contract—but in the
process also limited the damage from an irritant to bilateral relations.
Around the same time, two more real estate projects were in the works courtesy of Sekoko
Saïd Hatari,40 a veteran of Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front during the Civil War and
a high-profile real estate investor in Kigali’s post-war economic resurgence (The Indepen-
dent, 2009). These had similar significance for Rwanda’s rebirth, but generally went more
smoothly. First was the Kigali City Tower, a twenty-story commercial building which
Forbes Africa called “the tallest building in Rwanda and a potent symbol of reconstruc-
tion” (Forbes Africa, 2011). Built in 2011, the tower was valued by Ernst & Young at $33
million, some portion of which went to primary construction contractor CCECC (Forbes
Africa, 2011). Hatari’s next project also employed CCECC for construction work, but this
one was much larger. The $200 million “Downtown Ltd.” is a mixed-use development in-
cluding residential space as well as offices, restaurants, and retail (The Downtown Limited,
2020). At its 2010 groundbreaking, Hatari told reporters that “We have gone a long way to
make this day come to true, and the private sector must be the backbone of the development
40Hatari will reappear in the “Equity” section of this chapter since he has invested in other projects along-
side a Hong Kong-based group.
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of the country. We have all the opportunities around us.” (New Times, 2010) First, having
“gone a long way” carries fairly clear subtext for the Civil War veteran. The ability to build
something so mundane as a large shopping center could not be taken for granted in Rwan-
dan history; nor it could be easily done in contemporary Burundi. Second, his mention of
the private sector, apart from promoting his own interests, indirectly speaks to CCECC’s
role. This project (and the Tower before it) were products of Rwanda’s postwar institutional
strengthening and ensuing economic rebound. A homegrown private businessman had the
agency to select a construction firm without taking on debt from an overseas state-owned
bank. Freelance contracting was more suitable to these circumstances than tied loans would
have been, and in the process Chinese firms participated in a pair of projects with broader
symbolism to the Rwandan public.
Finally, Rwanda Football Federation (FERWAFA) has contracted CCECC to build its “FER-
WAFA Village,” a sporting complex which includes a hotel for visiting teams. The $4.8
million41 budget is 65 percent funded by FIFA (FERWAFA, 2016). The hotel may be man-
aged by Century Real Estate, a Hong Kong-invested firm (FERWAFA, 2017). The sporting
complex is nowhere nearly as large as the other projects mentioned here, but it does have
some minor diplomatic significance: FIFA President Gianni Infantino laid the facility’s
cornerstone during a February 2017 visit to Rwanda (Asiimwe, 2017).
The general pattern across all of these projects is that the less involved China is in local
politics or fundraising, the more Sino-Rwandan diplomatic relations can benefit. The two
privately funded real estate projects and FIFA’s sports facility gave a Chinese firm an oppor-
tunity to put its name on high-profile developments; the Kigali City Tower is particularly
symbolic for Rwanda. Local politics complicated the picture, however, for the Vision City
413.85 billion Rwandan francs, converted to U.S. dollars as of the date of CCECC’s selection at November
16, 2016. Exchange rate data per Oanda (2020).
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housing development and the Convention Centre. Both were built more for political rea-
sons than because most expected them to be profitable, and Chinese firms were among the
few willing to take on the risks of non-repayment. The financial establishment in Beijing
was systemically subsidizing firms’ ability to take such risky bets, thereby ensuring Chi-
nese commercial interests in keeping construction-sector capacity at work. However, the
predictable delays and other issues which emerged led to bilateral frictions. In the case
of the Convention Centre, China overlooked the unpaid remainder of a $300 million con-
tract for one of its firms in order to avoid the negative ramifications to diplomatic relations
of problems with the firm’s handiwork. Even within the category of freelance contracts,
we can observe the tradeoff between protecting commercial interests or maintaining diplo-
matic relations, especially where political risk was higher for individual projects than for
the host country as a whole.
Freelance Contracts: Summary
Chinese freelance contracts in Rwanda exhibit substantial variation in terms of diplomatic
impact and political risk. Lower-risk items like multilateral-funded social sector projects or
privately-funded industrial development can be public relations wins without all that much
risk or even much Chinese state involvement. Chinese firms have particularly stood out
for their role in factory construction, the significance of which for the African continent
requires no explanation. Government buildings both for public service provision and for
military organizations close to the regime can also both contribute to China’s reputation
for goodwill. Although these are typically being paid for by the Rwandan government,
Chinese firms’ low cost and routine subsidization generates what amounts to a discount on
the purchase, and the projects’ small size means that the risks of non-payment or political
interference are attenuated. Within the flashier real estate and tourism sectors, however,
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risk sometimes increased. The Kigali Convention Centre and Vision City high-end housing
project both carried price tags in the hundreds of millions in one of the world’s poorest
countries. The Convention Centre in particular left China with a black eye as it opted to
let one of its firms be fired for poor handiwork in the name of the broader relationship.
This tradeoff between commercial and diplomatic interests never came to a head in the
case of privately funded skyscraper and commercial development projects. Political risk
does not deterministically keep all Chinese firms away, but there may be a reason that
the Convention Centre and Vision City are the only two (admittedly large) examples in
Rwanda, and neither of the involved firms has done so well that others would be keen to
follow in their footsteps.
In broader context, Burundi does not offer the same types of opportunities as Rwanda. Its
entire political economy is more similar to the parts of Rwanda dominated by the RPF and
military. As a result, the reduced volume of Chinese construction contract revenues derived
from the country mostly come from external organizations like the African Development
Bank. This also means that in relative terms, aid from the Chinese government is much
more important in Burundi, whereas in Rwanda aid is secondary to what Chinese firms do
on their own accord. This analysis still leaves out two pieces of puzzle: loans from Chinese
banks and equity investments. The next section covers the limited number of loans to
Rwanda, and the chapter concludes with analysis of equity investments.
Loans Chinese contracting firms have been fairly successful in entering Rwanda on their
own, and there is little compelling geostrategic or resource security reason for Chinese
loans to allocate capital there. The only possible exception would have been the Kivu
Belt highway project improving access to the mines of the eastern DRC, and as discussed
previously in this chapter, international interest in this network of roads was such that China
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Exim shared the burden with the African Development Bank and several other multilaterals.
Outside the highway sector, which in any event made more use of non-Chinese capital than
Chinese, banks from China have not been as active in Rwanda. Three loan projects stand
out.
First, a consortium of China Railway (and its subsidiary CCECC), Sinohydro, and China
Geo-Engineering (CGC) between 2014 and 2019 were involved in upgrading water supply
and drainage systems in the Kigali area (African Development Bank, 2018). The Africa
Growing Together Fund, a $2 billion facility contributed by the People’s Bank of China
and intended for collaboration with the African Development Bank, contributed $50 mil-
lion of the budget. This was not a majority of the project budget: another $121 million
came from the African Development Bank itself as well as another $50 million42 from the
European Investment Bank, $41 million from the government of Rwanda, and $20 million
from the OPEC Fund (African Development Bank, 2014, 2017; OPEC Fund, 2018). This
arrangement is qualitatively different many most Chinese loans. Its focus on the social
sector and minority of Chinese funding much more resembles many internationally backed
Chinese freelance contracts. The involvement of the People’s Bank of China, the central
bank, is unusual for an international development project and enabled a different of mode
of financing from the more common closed, tied model. The People’s Bank of China has
generally been a force for liberalization within the Chinese system and is not subject to
the strict China-first procurement rules which often inhibit international collaboration for
Exim and CDB, within whose portfolio international development finance more typically
falls (Bell and H. Feng, 2013).
The other two loan-backed projects stray less from China’s regular practices. China Road
4245 million euros.
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and Bridge (CRBC), a large state-owned firm, is building three stadiums for $9 million
apiece in the Eastern Province, outside the capital. An unspecified Chinese organization is
extending credit which is to be repaid by the districts, the level of Rwandan government
immediately below the province (Mugabe, 2019). Local governments are not likely to
have the same type of access to international capital as the national government or even
provincial ones, meaning that China may have needed to supply its own credit for the
project to happen.
The third and final Chinese loan-backed project is much larger. Exim is lending $214
million toward a hydroelectric project at Nyarabongo, the site of one previously existing
dam. Touted as the largest Sino-Rwandan cooperation projects in history, the size of the
payday for contractor Sinohydro may have been enough to justify the expenditure (F. John,
2020). It also may have been more difficult for Rwanda to find capital for an ambitious
bet.
In summary, the rare occasions on which China has lent money to Rwanda are often prod-
ucts of exceptional or idiosyncratic circumstances: 1) a high degree of cooperation between
the Chinese central bank (not a development-focused organization) with third parties; 2)
projects being implemented at the subnational level; and 3) an exceptionally large item.
The relative dearth of these loans indicates the degree to which they are necessary.
5.1.3 Conclusion: Contracts and Loans
Diplomatically speaking, the best way for Chinese firms to build larger projects is by using
third-party financing. Doing so captures the diplomatic benefits of selling construction
projects at bargain prices while sidestepping potential reputational costs from the politics
of debt; strict procurement procedures associated with Chinese banks; and involvement in
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contentious local fiscal politics. Tied loan contracts do incur these costs, and banks will
typically only incur them when firms require the extra protection from political risk.
This all assumes, though, that Chinese firms’ role is relatively transactional and limited
to construction and engineering. In some cases, Chinese firms have taken on longer-term
roles as investors. The rest of this chapter covers this topic.
5.2 Equity
Equity investment implies a more concrete Chinese financial commitment than freelance
contracting in which financing comes from elsewhere, but asks much less of the recipi-
ent than Chinese loan contracts. Equity investors have fewer procurement requirements
and can buy more local products and/or partner with local firms.43 They are also making
longer-term commitments than are implied by transactional agreements to build projects.
Perhaps most importantly, equity investors hold any project-related debt and downside risk
to the benefit of the local government’s balance sheet. This long-term assumption of risk
is a diplomatic positive but is most tenable in states with stronger rule of law. Following
the format of the previous section on contracts and loans, this section will explore equity
investment as a middle-tier between aid and loans using a mixed methods framework. First
is large-n analysis of the same global sample of developing countries. Second is elabora-
tion of the very limited role for equity investment in the high-risk Burundian environment
and its larger role in Rwanda. I then conclude.
43Unless they are themselves borrowing from Chinese policy banks. This does happen at times and is a
source of variation in financial stringency within the category of equity investment. This type of arrangement
was used in a Burundian television broadcasting investment as well as Peruvian mining projects and will be
discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter 6, respectively.
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5.2.1 Quantitative Analysis
5.2.1.1 Data and Methods
Data on equity investments are taken from three sources. First is the China Global Invest-
ment Tracker maintained by American Enterprise Institute (2019). This dataset includes
independently verified investments from a worldwide sample set, but it only includes items
over $100 million and is not a representative sample. The second is the official data from
the China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). This data
(nominally) includes both large and small deals, but is subject to serious limitations: in this
dissertation’s sample set, it includes less than half of the dollar value of deals included in
the explicitly limited AEI sample. The official data is not more reliable than the admittedly
constrained efforts of independent organizations, but I include it for completeness’ sake.
Third is the China-LAC OFDI Monitor (Monitor de la OFDI China en ALC) produced by
RED ALC (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China) (Dussel Peters,
2019). This dataset includes independently verified deals of all sizes and reaches back to
2000 (as opposed to 2005 and 2003 for the first two, respectively), but is limited to the
Western Hemisphere. Because the regionally limited RED ALC data is less useful for test-
ing geostrategic hypotheses, I include it only in the Appendix (Section 5.4). In the main
body, I instead focus on the two global datasets, running models of each using both sets of
indicators of geostrategic importance.
All values for equity investment are transformed according to the formula ln(x + 1). I use
Tobit models to account for zero-inflation.
5.2.1.2 Results and Analysis
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Table 5.4: Equity Investment, Commitment Basis, Global Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
(AEI) (YB) AEI YB
Taiwan recognition -7.104⇤⇤⇤ -1.925⇤⇤⇤ -6.920⇤⇤⇤ -1.741⇤⇤
(binary) (-3.12) (-2.88) (-3.02) (-2.22)
ASEAN member, SCS -0.152 0.589 0.440 0.662
disputant (binary) (-0.05) (1.12) (0.19) (1.45)
ASEAN member, SCS 5.657⇤⇤⇤ 1.806⇤⇤⇤ 4.162⇤⇤ 1.453⇤⇤⇤
non-disputant (binary) (2.60) (4.14) (2.12) (3.78)
UNGA voting similarity 1.195 1.893⇤ -0.570 1.674
with China (one-year lag) (0.27) (1.83) (-0.14) (1.59)
Border with China 4.072⇤⇤ 1.080⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (2.54) (3.17)
Chokepoint (binary) 1.433 0.559⇤
(1.08) (1.79)
BRI route (binary) 5.405⇤⇤⇤ 1.062⇤⇤⇤
(4.00) (3.79)
Distance from China (pop.- 0.194 0.0208 0.344⇤⇤ 0.0314
weighted; thousands km) (1.31) (0.62) (2.32) (0.87)
Commodity exports to 0.705⇤⇤⇤ 0.183⇤⇤⇤ 0.787⇤⇤⇤ 0.200⇤⇤⇤
China (log; one-year lag) (2.76) (3.65) (3.06) (4.43)
Total imports from 0.401 -0.0185 0.258 -0.0792
China (log; one-year lag) (0.36) (-0.08) (0.26) (-0.37)
Rule of Law (WGI; 0.0201 -0.480⇤⇤ -0.124 -0.446⇤⇤
one-year lag) (0.03) (-2.43) (-0.18) (-2.34)
Polity score -0.0234 0.00370 0.00289 0.00315
(one-year lag) (-0.26) (0.18) (0.03) (0.16)
Debt-to-GDP ratio 1.060 -0.222 0.692 -0.243⇤
(log; one-year lag) (1.43) (-1.53) (1.00) (-1.76)
GDP per capita (log) 0.360 0.174 0.0228 0.171
(0.32) (0.73) (0.02) (0.73)
Population (log) 1.473 0.355⇤ 1.246 0.358⇤
(1.59) (1.84) (1.51) (1.90)
English language 2.000⇤ 0.727⇤⇤⇤ 2.324⇤⇤ 0.729⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (1.80) (2.94) (2.11) (2.98)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 2.865⇤⇤⇤ 0.214⇤⇤⇤ 2.904⇤⇤⇤ 0.223⇤⇤⇤
(3.80) (2.66) (3.87) (2.73)
Time2 -0.100⇤⇤⇤ -0.00339 -0.102⇤⇤⇤ -0.00371
(-3.38) (-0.96) (-3.45) (-1.06)
Continued on next page
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Table 5.4: Equity Investment, Commitment Basis, Global Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
(AEI) (YB) AEI YB
Constant -75.38⇤⇤⇤ -9.651⇤⇤⇤ -67.55⇤⇤⇤ -8.861⇤⇤⇤
(-7.02) (-4.42) (-6.45) (-4.12)
Countries 125 114 125 114
Start Year 2005 2003 2005 2003
End Year 2017 2017 2017 2017
Observations 1546 1354 1546 1354
Clustered SE? X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and China Statistical Yearbook (YB).
As for grants and zero-interest loans, the results for H1 (territorial claims) are stronger than
those for H2 (general diplomacy). Countries which recognize Taiwan receive substantially
less mainland Chinese investment—90.5 percent less, based on the model’s44 prediction
setting all other variables to mean. Interestingly, South China Sea disputants do not receive
less investment, perhaps reflecting the economic dynamism of the Southeast Asian region.
However, non-disputant ASEAN members do receive over triple as much investment as a
“typical” global country.45 While this is not so drastic a differential as exists for the all-
important Taiwan issue, it remains the case that the economic benefits of equity investment
are flowing disproportionately to countries with which China does not have disputes of a
second-order variety. From the Chinese government’s perspective, this could be a reward
to friendly countries as well as a signal to disputants of what could await them were they
to change their stance. Of course, part of this may also reflect nervousness on the part of
44Based on Column 3 of Table 5.4, which uses the more reliable AEI dataset and the BRI indicator, which
was a better predictor of equity than the geographic variables.
45Based on the same model and parameters as the previous prediction regarding Taiwan.
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host governments and firms about the political risk to investing in the midst of a territorial
dispute.
Evidence for the United Nations variables (H2) is somewhat weaker. UNGA voting align-
ment is positively associated with equity investment in the official data but not for the AEI
dataset or the Latin America-only figures (Appendix). UNGA voting and/or underlying
diplomatic alignment appears to be at most a secondary factor. This is similar to the pat-
tern established in the previous chapter on aid: General Assembly voting was a middling
predictor of aid, the South China Sea dispute a stronger one, and the Taiwan issue an over-
whelming one.
Geostrategic factors (H3) are also generally important predictors of equity investment, al-
beit for some measures of geostrategic importance more than others. Of the geographic
variables, border security is a more reliable predictor than the chokepoint binary. Sharing
a border with China was positively correlated with investment for both datasets which in-
clude countries bordering China: according to the model of AEI data, bordering countries
receive just over three times as much investment. In two out of three datasets, the same
could be said of maritime chokepoints. However, this is somewhat more tenuous for the
RED ALC data, the only maritime chokepoint included in which is the Panama Canal.
Chinese firms are heavily invested around the Canal. Depending on one’s perspective, this
is either a data point in support of the idea that China will invest in maritime infrastruc-
ture at important locations, or a single observation not sufficient to yield statistical results.
Belt and Road route countries were also more likely recipients of investment across both
datasets which include them; per estimates of the AEI data, they receive 5.5 times as much
investment, even more than would a bordering country.46 The strong results for Belt and
46The Latin America-only RED ALC data does not.
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Road countries are especially meaningful given this variable’s lack of importance to small-
scale concessional flows. Navigation across these countries is a strategic interest of China’s,
and building railways, highways, and the like is better accomplished via equity investments
which can direct larger volumes of capital committed for the long term. The fact that these
are equity investments also means that Chinese firms are holding any related debt, which
is both a symbol of how highly China values these projects and a welcome move in host
countries.
In keeping with the findings of previous studies, equity investments are strongly corre-
lated with commodity exports to China (H4) in the two global datasets. However, this is
not the case for the Latin America-specific RED ALC figures. This is probably because
Chinese-produced oil in the Western Hemisphere typically goes to the United States or
other hemispheric markets; there is little sense in shipping oil tankers all the way across
the Pacific when other consumers are so close. However, as will be covered in the Peruvian
case study in Chapter 6, China’s dominant position in global metal imports is such that it
does use equity investments to import metals from South America.
One non-result is worth mentioning: there is no consistent correlation between governance
quality and equity investment. The official data show an unexpected negative correlation,
but this does not hold for the two independently verified datasets. The theory did not predict
any such correlation. However, these findings are consistent with the idea that Chinese
equity investment is somewhat protected against political risk, but not to the same degree
as debt. From a more holistic standpoint, equity is thus a smaller share of total activity
in high-risk markets where Chinese banks find reason to issue loans, but a larger share in
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lower-risk markets.
5.2.2 Equity Investments in Burundi and Rwanda
The quantitative results showed that Chinese equity investment responds to more salient
diplomatic issues (Taiwan and the South China Sea) and geostrategic issues (Belt and Road
corridors), but not to the more type of mundane diplomatic concerns operationalized by
United Nations voting and present in countries like Burundi and Rwanda. It also showed
a null relationship with political risk. The largely indeterminate nature of the large-n re-
sults masks a degree of diversity in equity investments. They might be coordinated with
the Chinese state, the host government, both, or neither.47 Some have inherent political
significance, as has been the case for a Chinese firm’s bid for a dominant stake in African
television broadcasts; others, much less so. If aid is generally less stringent and loans more
so, then equity’s middle position on the spectrum actually encompasses a range of possible
outcomes, some of them representing concessions to the host country and some of them
fairly tough.
In this section, I explore this variation through observed investments in Burundi and Rwanda.
Because of its higher risk and smaller market, Burundi has only hosted one Chinese in-
vestment of significance, and and it is part of a broader African initiative which began in
Rwanda. The Chinese government has committed substantial resources into this initia-
tive, in which a (technically) private investor has upgraded television broadcasts in both
countries and in the process strengthened state control over media. This has characteris-
tics of aid in that China is using its own resources to strengthen the position of recipient
elites. I discuss this project first. I then move to the larger number of investments in
47See Rithmire (2019) on different types of Chinese outbound investors.
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Rwanda. These can be sorted the categories of social sector projects; industrial upgrading,
including mining, manufacturing and technology; and real estate and tourism. These are
discussed sequentially and will be introduced in greater detail following the uniquely PRC
government-sponsored case of the television investments.
5.2.2.1 StarTimes Digital Television in Rwanda and Burundi
StarTimes is a Chinese firm, but most of its operations are in the over thirty African coun-
tries in which it now operates television broadcasting businesses. The company’s own web-
site presents it as a pioneer in Chinese influence, referring to itself as “a media company
with global influence surely rising in the East”48 (StarTimes (€æˆ„), 2020). StarTimes
is privately held but frequently coordinates with the Chinese government in Africa (Eco-
nomic Daily [œNÂ•], 2012). In 2012, the firm received a $163 million loan from China
Exim to expand in Africa; another $60 million came in 2014 (Rønning, 2016, p. 67). Exim
has also issued loans to StarTimes to fund its investments in a number of individual coun-
tries, including (as we will see) Burundi (Marsh, 2019). This arrangement is emblematic
of the sometimes uncertain boundary between private business and state policy in China.
Although technically private, StarTimes relies heavily on the state for financing, and the
nature of its activity in Africa reflects many Chinese government priorities. Marsh (2019)
points out that its cheapest television packages only include news from domestic channels,
Al Jazeera, and CGTN, China’s state-owned foreign-language network.49 Pricier packages
might bring in channels from Western countries, but few in Africa are able to afford these.
CGTN has been found to systematically portray the PRC’s policy abroad and even the lives
of its ordinary citizens in a systematically more positive light than other broadcasters, and
48Author’s translation from original Chinese: “ * h⇤qÕõÑ í∆‚≈⌃˙∞( LÑ⌧π”
49As of this writing, channel listings company’s website confirms this. See https://www.startimestv.
com/bouquet.html for channel listings in Kenya.
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its disproportionate representation on African airwaves has obvious implications for pub-
lic diplomacy50 (Madrid-Morales, 2017, 2018; X. Zhang, Wasserman, and Mano, 2016).
Apart from including Chinese content (both news and entertainment) in its channel pack-
ages, StarTimes is also promoting greater inclusion of African content. In an interview
with the official paper China Daily, the CEO of StarTimes’ Rwandan subsidiary “said that
western culture is prevalent in Africa and so the continent needs to ensure that its heritage
is preserved even in the context of globalization.” The article continued, “StarTimes will
soon begin to make African movies so that the continent can showcase its culture to the
rest of the world.” (Ndungi, 2018). Marsh (2019) adds that this leaves StarTimes with a de-
gree of first-mover advantage, as few foreign firms are sponsoring African-created content
which can come across as more relatable or even empowering to many viewers.
Across the African continent, the general pattern is that StarTimes receives state credit to
invest a growth market (digital television) which many African countries might have trouble
affording otherwise. StarTimes usually holds most of the associated debt and risk but has
powerful patrons in Beijing to protect it from losses if investments go poorly. This story has
not unfolded in the exact same way, though, in each of the countries in which StarTimes
has invested. Rwanda and Burundi again present a useful comparison. Burundi’s higher
political risk has not kept China from making a politically useful investment there, but it
has presented roadblocks relative to Rwanda. This sheds some light on the null relationship
between governance risk and equity investment as shown in the statistical analysis. Unrest
in Burundi decelerated Chinese investment relative to neighboring Rwanda but did not
deter it, indicating a degree of resistance to political risk beyond that typically displayed by
purely private investors.
50The immediate impact is limited by the fact that most Africans do not own televisions. However, this
could change over time, and StarTimes has already gained a formidable market share in many countries.
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Rwanda was the first country on the African continent in which StarTimes invested. The
local Rwandan subsidiary was established in 2008. Paul Kagame delivered a speech at the
opening ceremony and cut the ribbon side-by-side with StarTimes’ CEO (StarTimes, 2011).
Little has been said publicly about the terms of StarTimes’ investment in Rwanda, but it is
known that the company started with land-based digital terrestrial transmission (DTT) but
upgraded to satellite transmission in 2014. This move improved access for some remote
rural areas where terrestrial signals were impeded by Rwanda’s hilly topography (Hope
Magazine, 2016b; Ndungi, 2018). By all accounts, StarTimes has been very successful in
Rwanda’s small but growing market. As of 2019, the Rwandan subsidiary’s CEO estimated
that the company had an 81 percent share of the existing market and was planning to sell
inexpensive television sets in a bid to expand its market beyond the 12 percent of Rwandans
who then owned televisions (Sabiiti, 2019).
Beginning the transition to digital television broadcasts in a low-income country was no
mean feat, and replicating it in Burundi has proven to be much more of a challenge. China
over time came to offer a favorable deal to Burundi from a purely financial perspective but
made sure that its own firms were involved in the process. In the end, this tradeoff was
made even more favorable for the Burundian leadership by enabling a greater degree of
state control over the media.
In June 2014, China announced that it would fund Burundi’s transition to digital terrestrial
transmission ahead of the International Telecommunications Union’s June 2015 target for
all of Africa to upgrade from analogue broadcasts. The money consisted of $40 million
divided between grants to the Burundian government and Exim loans to a joint venture
between StarTimes and Radio Télévision Nationale du Burundi (RTNB), the state broad-
caster (Nduwimana, 2014). It is unclear what portion of the deal would have been grants
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and what portion was debt, but the debt was partially held by a Chinese investor and so was
less of an imposition from Burundi’s perspective.
In the near term, the makeup of the original deal became irrelevant as unrest gripped Bu-
rundi beginning in April 2015. The deal was placed on hold as equipment shipments into
Burundi were stalled. (For reference, Rwanda had completed its digital transition by July
2014 and was at this point already planning its upgrade to satellite.) (Kamau, 2015). In
December 2016, President Nkurunziza announced in a speech before Parliament that the
plan was back on. China Exim was supporting the deal (CGTN, 2016).
Under this new arrangement, Exim lent $32.6 million to a joint venture of, again, Star-
Times (60 percent) and RTNB (40 percent). From Burundi’s perspective, there were both
positives and negatives to the loan terms. On the positive side, the repayment structure was
highly concessional: a twenty-five year repayment period at 2 percent interest and a five-
year grace period. Burundi was in the midst of an economic crisis, and anything tougher
might not have been sustainable; the five-year grace period in particular may have been
meant to buy time for Burundi’s economy to recover. These terms essentially sacrificed
some of Exim’s wealth in the name of public diplomacy via television broadcasts and pri-
vate diplomacy with Burundi’s leaders, who were operating on a limited budget. On the
negative side of the ledger, Burundi was not given very much choice in how the project was
implemented. The government went into debt to fund a project being implemented by a
majority foreign-owned company. One anti-corruption NGO questioned whether this was
legal under Burundian law (Manishatse, 2017). By the Burundian Minister of Communi-
cations’ own account, the StarTimes joint venture started the project using its own money
and agreed to be repaid with a future Exim loan. This essentially forced the loan through
Parliament, which had not yet been notified about the deal (Gakiza, 2017). The head of
228 CHAPTER 5. DIPLOMACY AND BASIC COMMERCIAL INTERESTS II
the anti-corruption NGO OLUCOME pointed to the closed nature of the deal: “Instead
of requesting loan on behalf of the Burundian population as it has been done, the govern-
ment should call for an open international competitive bid for the contract whereby RTNB
[the national broadcaster] should have significant shares and the company” would be in
debt (Manishatse, 2017). Furthermore, the promise of grants alongside loans was not what
it seemed. China announced that it was donating $14 million in equipment—not trivial
alongside $32.6 million in highly concessional credit. It emerged, though, that this was
conditioned on acceptance of the loan. The Minister of Communications told Parliament
that this cost was worth bearing in light of the project’s longtime delay and that “the gov-
ernment had no choice because it was negotiating in a position of weakness”51 (Ndamiye,
2017).
This was an atypical arrangement in which a Chinese equity investor was in effect the
beneficiary of a tied loan scheme. This hybrid scheme was tailored to maximize StarTimes’
odds of success in a difficult environment while managing the associated downside risk to
bilateral relations. On one hand, the loan terms were highly concessional. The fact that
StarTimes began work before the loan was approved or Parliament notified indicates that
they were also making use of either credit from their usual bankers or retained profits
from other operations, which in turn were mostly funded by China Exim. Either way,
there was an unrecorded subsidy to the Burundian government via StarTimes independent
of the direct loan from Exim. The lack of choice in equipment and going into (cut-rate)
debt were an acceptable price to pay from Burundi’s perspective. “Negotiating from a
position of weakness,” as the Minister of Communications put it, Burundi could have had
it much worse, and it is indeed unclear that any other companies intended to compete
51Translation from original French: Et d’ajouter que le gouvernement n’avait pas de choix car il négociait
en position de faiblesse.
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against StarTimes.
The real benefit to the Burundian leadership, though, has been control over the media. This
has emerged since the 2016 loan. By August 2017, the general manager of StarTimes in
Burundi stated that the company already had an 85 percent market share (Xinhua, 2017c).
In the grander scheme of things, this is a more modest market presence than the numbers
would seem to suggest. The World Bank (2018c) estimates that in 2017, only 9.3 percent of
Burundians had electricity,52 much less television sets. Still, this represented the wealthiest
sector of the population and an important demographic for regime stability. As Chinese
state media has accurately pointed out, Burundian consumers have benefited from reduced
television costs and higher signal quality following the deal (Xinhua, 2017c). The type
of content being broadcast, however, has been restricted. In 2019, Burundi expelled the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Voice of America (VOA) (Solomon, 2019).
Communications Minister Nestor Bankumukunzi, who had originally announced the deal
with StarTimes, now announced that “all Burundian and foreign journalists who are in
the country are forbidden from reporting or giving information directly or indirectly to the
BBC and VOA.” (Edwin, 2019) Burundi had already been unhappy about the organizations’
coverage of electoral violence, and a BBC story about government interrogation and torture
facilities was reportedly the last straw (Solomon, 2019). StarTimes’ monopoly now means
that Burundian state-produced content dominates the airwaves (Nsengiyumva, 2019). In
Chapter 4, China signaled solidarity with an unpopular Burundian regime by completing
a new presidential palace on a grant basis. Here, a particularistic arrangement of equity
infused with concessional debt went beyond symbolism and actually contributed to state
censorship.
52This number was 34.7 percent in Rwanda.
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In Burundi, Rwanda, and elsewhere on the African continent, StarTimes has enjoyed a high
degree of state support in fulfilling its dual missions of gaining first-mover advantage in the
continent’s nascent television markets and promoting viewpoints favorable to the PRC. In
some instances, pro-PRC broadcasting may overlap with national governments’ own cen-
sorship or propaganda strategies, leading to a coincidence of interests amenable to closer
diplomatic ties. This was true to a certain degree in Rwanda, where Paul Kagame person-
ally attended StarTimes’ precedent-setting entry into what has become a highly censored
media environment, but has become more obvious in countries like Burundi where the
Chinese state incurred losses to its own balance sheet to enable its firms to boost Chinese
discursive power53 without endangering their own financial interests or payrolls in difficult
business climates. Not all investments have such clear diplomatic ramifications. Several
projects in Rwanda exhibit less PRC government involvement and a more balanced mix of
diplomatic and commercial considerations. These are the subject of the next section.
5.2.2.2 Other Equity Investments
Apart from StarTimes, Chinese investments in Rwanda can be grouped into three cate-
gories similar to those observed for freelance construction contracts. For obvious reasons,
no Chinese firm has taken an equity stake in a Rwandan government building, but the other
three groupings do apply. These are, in order presented: 1) social sector projects; 2) in-
dustrial upgrading across the mining, manufacturing, and technology sectors; and 3) real
estate. These generally take place at greater distances from organizations like the policy
banks and Ministry of Commerce, which otherwise play a greater role in overseas devel-
opment finance. Instead, they involve parts of the Chinese establishment which operate on
53“Discursive power” (›ÌC) is a term often used in the PRC in reference to the government’s desire to
gain an international voice in a mostly unsympathetic global media environment.
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more market terms—notably, the sovereign wealth fund is involved in Rwandan affordable
housing—or private capital. Cross-sector comparison shows the strengths of weaknesses
(from China’s perspective) of relying on these organizations to act on their own. On one
hand, they can make investments which build good will, as has been the case for affordable
housing and the manufacturing and technology sectors. On the other hand, these invest-
ments are contingent on the quality of local business opportunities. Affordable housing
has drawn the attention of the United Nations; high-end real estate, of the Rwandan gov-
ernment. Luxury real estate, though, is not necessarily a public relations winner in a poor
country. The manufacturing and technology sectors have the inverse situation: for reasons
to be discussed in this section, they are inherently more difficult for investors hoping to turn
a profit and have drawn much less Chinese capital, but are nevertheless raised more often
in both Rwandan and Chinese official statements hoping to highlight Rwanda’s nascent in-
dustrialization and China’s role therein. The remainder of this section sequentially covers
the social sector, productive industry, and real estate.
A. Social Sector Projects Equity investment in the social sectors is relatively unusual.
Hospitals, schools, and the like in low-income countries are often not very profitable and
are more often the preserve of local government budgets, sometimes supported by foreign
aid. Rwanda is currently home to an exception. CITIC Construction, the construction
subsidiary of China’s sovereign wealth fund (CITIC), has established a joint venture with
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the arm of the World Bank Group charged
with facilitating private investment, to build affordable housing in Africa. The initial in-
vestment totals $300 million spread across Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda, potentially with
more funding and countries to be added later (International Finance Corporation, 2015).
CITIC is reportedly investing $120 million in the Rwandan portion, making it an 80 percent
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shareholder (American Enterprise Institute, 2019). Tiny Rwanda is thus hosting a dispro-
portionate part of a major multinational project that it shares with two of Africa’s largest
countries. On the surface of it, this could be taken as a vote of confidence in Rwanda’s
institutions, but the reality is a somewhat messier product of Rwanda’s bifurcated political
economy. Because Rwanda’s leadership has allocated much of its housing budget to high-
end developments like the aforementioned (and Chinese-built) Vision City, there remains a
growing affordable housing shortage. Rwanda does have the institutions necessary to regu-
late private investment in housing, but the role of the party- and military-owned firms in this
sector of the economy means that insufficient capital is being allocated outside the luxury
sector. This combination of unmet demand and reliable institutions leaves an opening for
foreign capital. As a part of the World Bank Group, IFC is generally more risk-averse than
Chinese firms with state-owned backing would be. The same is actually true for CITIC.
As a sovereign wealth fund, CITIC’s core mission is to earn financial return on China’s
foreign exchange holdings, not to use them as a form of stimulus as Exim and CDB do.
In this respect, CITIC’s cooperation with a major multinational institution is reminiscent
of the People’s Bank of China’s partnership with the African Development Bank to up-
grade Kigali’s water supply and drainage systems. These are more risk-averse parts of the
Chinese establishment operating on broadly similar terms to colleagues from around the
world.
The lower-risk nature of the project allowed for the relatively unusual step of equity invest-
ment in the social sector. It would have been easy enough for the World Bank to issue a
loan for a firm, Chinese or otherwise, to build affordable housing in Africa, but the fact that
both parties opted for equity investment demonstrates a high degree of confidence in the
endeavor’s financial sustainability and long-term prospects in what by all accounts could
5.2. EQUITY 233
be a growth market. IFC’s press release on the topic indicates anticipation of future rev-
enue streams, specifying that the joint venture “will start by developing homes in Kenya,
Rwanda and Nigeria, expanding to other countries as operations ramp up” (International
Finance Corporation, 2015).
B. Industrial Upgrading Rwanda’s Vision 2020 plan for development dates back to the
turn of the millennium, when Paul Kagame had just formally taken office, and lays out a
bold strategy cutting across virtually all sectors of the economy. Parts of it, such as agri-
cultural improvement, are fairly standard in the African context. Others are not. The plan
lists six “pillars,” among them “Good Governance and a Capable State,” “Human Resource
Development and a Knowledge-Based Economy,” and “Private Sector-Led Development,”
with a particular emphasis on new industries that can draw workers away from subsistence
agriculture and contribute to the growth of a middle class (Republic of Rwanda, 2012).
Chinese firms have invested in several such industries, notably mining, manufacturing, and
technology. Across these three sectors, there is an oddly inverse relationship between the
amount of dollars being invested and the amount of publicity they receive. Using private
data from the Rwandan Development Board, Eom (2018, p. 9) reports that at the time of
her publication Rwanda had received $409 million in Chinese investment in construction,
real estate, and tourism; $70.7 million in mining and quarrying; $40.2 million in manu-
facturing; and $4.4 million in services and ICT. The construction, real estate, and tourism
category is driven by one large investor. This sector is not mentioned in the Vision 2020
source document and will be discussed subsequently in its own section. Of the three in-
volving “industry” more traditionally defined, mining and quarrying have drawn the largest
sums of money, but both sides have been relatively quiet about the details. Manufactur-
ing is a smaller destination but due to its centrality to Rwandan economic development
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hopes has received substantial attention in the media and from the leadership of both China
and Rwanda. Information technology is smaller still, but has also played a role in Sino-
Rwandan diplomacy. I cover each of these three in turn.
Of the $70.7 million in the mining sector, $30 million came from Fuxin Jiuxing Science
and Technology, a small firm from China’s Northeast (KT Press, 2017). Another portion of
it may come from a quarry being rehabilitated to supply Chinese road builders with crushed
stone (KT Press, 2018). For Fuxin Jiuxing’s investment, little is available to indicate what
was being mined or whether the project is actually operational. Rwanda’s primary mineral
export is tantalum, which is used for capacitors in many electronic goods. Tantalum ex-
ports, though, do not exceed $40 million per year.54 In an annual report, China’s Ministry
of Natural Resources writes that “following the results of Chairman Xi Jinping’s meeting
with the President of Rwanda, the plan to assess Rwanda’s national mineral resources is
being implemented.”55 (Ministry of Natural Resources, PRC [-N∫⌘qå˝Í6D
êË], 2018, p. 47) The document refers to an agreement during Xi’s July 2018 visit to
Kigali to assist Rwanda in surveying for minerals. The first geologists arrived in Rwanda
in December 2019 (Buningwire, 2019). The project does not overtly focus on any one type
of mineral, although known deposits would imply that the odds are in favor of tantalum,
or perhaps tin or tungsten. The geologists are state-sponsored and could have some diplo-
matic value to China. As the Chinese Ambassador put it, “It is our pleasure if Rwanda
gains from the experienced people in mining. We hope this will contribute to the eco-
nomic development of the country.” (Buningwire, 2019) Pending the results of the survey,
further Chinese investment might be forthcoming. At the same time, though, mining has
54As of 2017, per Simoes and Hidalgo (2011).
55Author’s translation from original Chinese: ÔÅ=û`—s;- b˙æ;fl⇢ ⇣ú ®€b˙
æh˝ˇßDê\õƒ˜yÓƒ«ûΩ⇥
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received much less attention in diplomatic announcements and press articles than other ar-
eas which have received less investment. Mineral extraction’s checkered history in Africa
may limit its value as a tool for publicity. It also tends to be more capital-intensive and
employ fewer people: the Rwanda Development Board estimates jobs created at 1,206
for Chinese-invested mining but 3,498 for manufacturing, despite mining having received
more investment dollars.56
There is more publicity value, then, around a type of activity much less familiar in Africa:
manufacturing. The Rwandan Development Board has stated that through 2016, manufac-
turing is the largest category in terms of the number of Chinese investments (KT Press,
2017). The dollar value of each is relatively small, usually less than $2 million. These
produce a mix of products ranging from building materials to textiles to sanitary napkins
to wooden doors (KT Press, 2017; Kuo, 2016a). Much of this has centered around the
tax-incentivized Kigali Special Economic Zone (SEZ). SEZs themselves draw on China’s
history of opening to global commerce by providing incentives to invest in particular zones
(Steenbergen and Javorcik, 2017, pp. 10–13). The Kigali SEZ has always been a Rwandan-
led initiative, but Chinese firms’ participation in it can nevertheless be symbolically power-
ful. The previous section mentioned that two major Chinese construction contractors57
have their headquarters in the SEZ. Optics aside, the zone is not particularly Chinese.
Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017, p. 22) find that China is second among foreign investors
in the zone with 7 percent of firms, behind India (8 percent) and well behind Rwanda itself
(34 percent). In lieu of uniquely impressive overall statistics, Chinese diplomacy relies on
one central case: C&H Garments.
From the Industrial Revolution in England to parts of South and Southeast Asia today, tex-
56Eom (2018, p. 9). It is unclear if this is a projection or a count of people already employed.
57Beijing Construction Engineering Group (BCEG) and China Star Construction.
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tiles have often been the first rung in the ladder of industrialization. They tend to be highly
labor-intensive, meaning that factories in countries like Rwanda need only modest invest-
ments in physical capital to readily employ many people drawn away from subsistence
agriculture. As a landlocked country with little industrial base, Rwanda thus welcomed the
arrival of C&H Garments. Co-founded by Helen Hai, the former Ethiopia general manager
of Huajian (one of the world’s largest shoe manufacturers) and Candy Ma, the owner of
Future Garments in Kenya, C&H had already been active in Kenya before expanding to
Rwanda. Both co-owners had previously run African manufacturing operations employ-
ing several thousand people apiece (Eom, 2018, pp. 11–12). In 2013, co-founder Helen
Hai visited Kigali alongside Justin Yifu Lin, the former World Bank Chief Economist and
author of many cornerstone works of Chinese development finance strategy discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3. Hai and Ma are both private entrepreneurs and have been careful to
emphasize that they are not funded by the Chinese government, but both the Chinese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and the office of Paul Kagame issued press releases about the visit,
which had clear political overtones (Kagame, 2013; New Times, 2013). Hai is also a Good-
will Ambassador for the United Nations Industrial Development Organization,58 and her
arrival alongside the former World Bank Chief Economist indicates a cachet among major
multilateral institutions which is easier to accomplish for equity investors than for firms
receiving tied loans at the expense of cooperation with non-Chinese.
In 2014, C&H began operations in Rwanda, committing to $10 million in investments over
five years (Agutamba, 2016). Rwanda’s governance environment was a factor in the de-
cision. Hai told reporters that “I have to say Rwanda has amazing leadership, otherwise
I wouldn’t take [Ma] to Rwanda and also she would not make the decision [to set up in
58Agutamba (2016).
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Rwanda]”59 Rwanda’s generous tax treatment within the SEZ is predicated on trust in the
leadership not to roll back the original deal once C&H had invested, and Rwanda’s general
adherence to the rule of law—at least where party or military interests are not concerned—
made this possible. More broadly speaking, rising Chinese labor costs could also dispro-
portionately affect light manufacturing industries like textiles, leading to an opening for
offshoring alongside many construction industries more traditionally affiliated with Belt
and Road (Steenbergen and Javorcik, 2017, p. 18).
By 2016, though, C&H did find itself affected by political developments. In that year, the
East African Community (EAC), of which Rwanda is a member, pledged to stop imports
of used clothing by 2019. Many Africans have historically relied on cheap used clothing
brought in predominantly from developed markets, and the ban was meant to reduce com-
petition for local producers (Kuo, 2016b). In 2018, the United States (a major used cloth-
ing exporter) responded by revoking Rwanda’s privileges under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), a law granting duty-free status to many African goods (Trump,
2018). American tariffs left C&H in a difficult position. EAC rules only allow for favorable
tax treatment in zones like the Kigali SEZ if at least 80 percent of production is exported
outside the EAC, and the loss of a major market made this more difficult to accomplish
(East African Community, 2004, Article 25).
The downside risk that has emerged with Rwanda’s trade spat with the United States took
place within the context of Rwandan rule of law. The decision was made in tandem with
other EAC countries through normal legal channels, although its compliance with World
Trade Organization rules is debatable. It does, though, illustrate the challenges faced by
private investors in pioneering new sectors. As of 2016, co-founder Candy Ma stated pub-
59Manson (2015), quoted in Eom (2018, p. 13).
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licly that C&H was still not yet profitable, and the 2018 loss of the American market could
not have helped (Kuo, 2016b). The 2019 enactment of the African Continental Free Trade
Agreement (AfCFTA) could alleviate the situation by improving access to African mar-
kets outside the EAC, but this cannot fully make up for a major importer like the United
States (Kwemo, 2019). There are also problems with the short-term economic fundamen-
tals of the Rwandan textile industry. It costs more to ship from Kigali to the Kenyan port
of Mombasa than from Mombasa to Guangzhou, where many of C&H’s inputs are sourced
(Kuo, 2016b). Improved infrastructure could reduce landlocked Rwanda’s cost disadvan-
tage over time but can never fully eliminate it. In the meantime, Rwandan manufacturing
is still not cost-competitive with other emerging manufacturing hubs in Asia and Ethiopia.
A common criticism of the used clothing ban is that it has mostly benefited imports of new
clothing from Asia, thereby costing East African consumers more without creating many
jobs locally.60
C&H Garments’ net impact on Sino-Rwandan relations must be assessed differently in the
short and long terms. In the short term, it is symbolically powerful but economically mod-
est. It has already shown its diplomatic value. The Chinese Ambassador visited the factory
in 2017 (Chinese Embassy in Rwanda, 2017). On a separate occasion, Paul Kagame also
made a visit to the Kigali SEZ, including a stop at C&H Garments (C&H Garments LTD,
2017; Republic of Rwanda, 2017). The used clothing ban has made C&H’s contribution
even more politically important as a symbol of Rwandan upgrading from the rich world’s
castoffs.
Any substantive economic benefit to Rwanda, though, is likely to take place only in the
60In the short term, these imports are mostly coming from China, although this is likely to change as the
textile industry continues to migrate to South and Southeast Asia. See Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017, p. 20)
and T. John (2018).
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longer term. Despite the difficulties, C&H is doubling down, adding a second factory and
focusing more on domestic sales and exports to Europe. Even with the second plant, C&H
only employs 1,200 Rwandans (Xinhua, 2018c). One journalist who interviewed Candy
Ma writes that she “anticipates more Chinese production moving to Africa as Southeast
Asia becomes saturated with Chinese factories searching for cheaper locations. She will
still have been the first in Rwanda.” (Kuo, 2016b) Most private entrepreneurs do not operate
with this time horizon and are generally opting for Asian markets which turn profits today.
One report from a UK-based development think tank refers to C&H as an “unusually vi-
sionary foreign [company]” (Booth, Calabrese, and Golooba-Mutebi, 2017, p. 26). The real
question, then, becomes how many will follow in C&H’s footsteps. So far, there have been
some modest results. Pink Mango C&D, another private Chinese firm, in 2019 started a
new Kigali Garment Centre. It currently employs 450 Rwandans, and the Rwandan Devel-
opment Board projects that it could directly or indirectly generate up to 7,500 jobs over five
years (Nkurunziza, 2019; Rwanda Development Board, 2019). This is a major contribution
relative to Rwanda’s current industrial base, but not relative to its population of 12 million.
The type of much deeper economic ties seen in many Asian markets or Ethiopia would
require stronger near-term economic fundamentals. Private investment can contribute to
Chinese diplomacy but is limited by the strength of local business opportunities.
This brings us to the last type of Chinese investment, which is even smaller and more
speculative. Mobile and networking technology could be as transformative in Africa as it
has been elsewhere. Rwanda’s Vision 2020 makes extensive references to technology as a
catalyst for growth. It specifies that:
[...] the government of Rwanda will encourage the use of ICT as a tool for self
employment, innovation and job creation. Policies to encourage development
of smart applications that meet economic needs and develop economic poten-
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tial will be promoted amongst the youth. ICT as a tool for improving service
delivery in both the private and public sector will be emphasized. (Republic of
Rwanda, 2012, p. 18)
The applications of improved network technology in the Rwandan context are numerous,
and Chinese firms are involved in several of note. Shenzhen tech giant Tencent is partnering
with the UK’s Babylon Health to use mobile technology and artificial intelligence to con-
nect rural Rwandans to doctors and predict health problems as they emerge (Ram, 2018;
Sturman, 2018). Huawei in 2017 committed to build a regional data center in Rwanda
and expand the country’s broadband network. The memorandum of understanding also
included collaboration on smart grid and education technology (Huawei [N:] 2017).61
Alibaba, for its part, has expanded its electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP) to Rwanda.
The eWTP is an online service connecting small businesses to global markets, with a par-
ticular focus on emerging markets. Alibaba was already enormously successful in using
network technology to connect small Chinese firms to customers nationwide. This type
of connectivity could be transformative in a country where production is often on a very
small scale or within households. The platform is already being used to market Rwandan
coffee beans, a major export, in China (Karuhanga, 2019; Ministry of Trade and Industry of
Rwanda, 2019). Rwandan government officials hope that other agricultural products could
soon follow (D. Chan, 2019; Ministry of Trade and Industry of Rwanda, 2019, p. 12).
Of course, there is an obvious limitation to technological upgrading in a country like
Rwanda. A shortage of human capital presents a major constraint. As Rwanda’s own
Vision 2020 document puts it,
Rwanda lags behind in professional training, with shortages in the fields of
applied and natural sciences and ICT. Although the country will continue to
61Little has been implemented to date, but this could certainly change.
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rely on imported technology from advanced countries, well-trained special-
ized nationals will be essential to the running and maintenance of technological
systems, ranging from medicine and agriculture to industry and telecommuni-
cations. (Republic of Rwanda, 2012, p. 11)
Huawei and Alibaba are both involved in technical training. Huawei sponsors an annual
competition in which Rwandans submit proposals for new uses of technology in their home
country. Eight per year win scholarships to study in China (Bizimungu, 2018). Alibaba
admits twenty Rwandans per year to study at the Alibaba Business School in the same
Chinese city as corporate headquarters (Karuhanga, 2019). Equity investment here begins
to blend with aid. Huawei is a private firm, but with fairly close ties to the Chinese state.
Alibaba is also private and overall somewhat more aloof from the government but in this
case has collaborated closely with provincial officials. The scholarships for the Alibaba
Business School are funded by the government of Zhejiang Province, where Alibaba is
headquartered. Some are also done in conjunction with the eFounders program, a joint
venture of Alibaba and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD). Alibaba’s memorandum of understanding with Rwanda was signed during a visit by
company chief Jack Ma, a well-known public figure in his own right, and Zhejiang Gover-
nor Yuan Jiajun, a trained engineer who once headed China’s space program (Karuhanga,
2019).
Mining investment employed relatively few Rwandans and has only secondary public rela-
tions or diplomatic value. Industrialization is much more labor-intensive and diplomatically
useful but is constrained by Rwanda’s relative lack of profitability. Technology employs
fewer people and requires less capital expenditure than either mining or manufacturing.
As of 2018, Rwandan Development Board estimates put Chinese investment in ICT at
$600,000, leading to 30 Rwandan jobs (Eom, 2018, p. 10). This number has almost cer-
242 CHAPTER 5. DIPLOMACY AND BASIC COMMERCIAL INTERESTS II
tainly risen since then, but the overall value created for users of the technology may be
much higher than the immediate impact via local employment or investment. With some
government help in dealing with the shortage of human capital, Chinese (and many other)
tech firms have come closer to meeting Rwandan hopes than has happened for manufac-
turing, where immediately profitable investment opportunities are few and far between.
Equity investment is useful for diplomacy, but as moderated by the nature of investment
and the ability of the concerned country and/or sector to draw capital.
C. Real Estate and Tourism As discussed previously in this chapter, Rwandan busi-
nessman Sekoko Hatari contracted Chinese builder CCECC for the Kigali City Tower and
Downtown, Ltd. real estate projects. Hatari has since co-invested with a Hong Kong busi-
nessman Billy Cheung in two more projects with a similar focus on high-end real estate.
Both have a degree of prestige value and fit into the Rwandan government’s plan to attract
high-end tourism and conference travel, but neither have any apparent connection to the
Chinese government. Cheung’s company, Master Assets, does maintain a presence in the
mainland city of Guangzhou, where he was born, but it is otherwise more “multinational”
than “Chinese.” It is privately held, headquartered in Hong Kong, and employs a veteran of
major international firms including Philip Morris and Heineken as CEO (Ltd., 2020a). Mas-
ter Assets’ partnership with Hatari is similar to Hatari’s earlier Kigali City Tower project
in that it might indirectly contribute to China’s image in the region, but based on local
business opportunities rather than coordination with the Chinese state.
The first of the two investments was the Marriott Hotel in Kigali. Co-owned by Cheung
and Hatari but operated by Marriott, the hotel was one of the first high-end establishments
to enter Rwanda and implies a vote of investor confidence (Everitt, 2016). The $60 million
building was Marriott’s first foray into sub-Saharan Africa and Rwanda’s largest hotel.
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The hotel’s opening had both economic and political overtones. In the economic sphere,
it could obviously cater to visiting executives or investors. The owners of the hotel have
added a small apartment building nearby; the company website describes them as “perfect
as a corporate housing option for executives looking for a luxury long stay in Kigali” (Ltd.,
2020b). The timing of the hotel’s opening suggests a minor role in regional diplomacy as
well. The hotel opened just in time for the 2016 African Union Summit in Kigali, and
its grand opening was attended by the CEO of the Rwanda Development Board and the
Rwandan Minister of Trade and Industry (Hope Magazine, 2016a; C. Omondi, 2012). This
was not just a signal of Rwanda’s strength to investors; it was also a signal of Rwanda’s
outsized role in regional politics.
The second of the two investments is much larger. Still under construction as of this writ-
ing, the $200 million Century Park complex will include both high-end housing and two
hotels, one of which is slated to be operated by Sheraton. Located next to Kigali Golf
Course in an upscale neighborhood outside the city center, the project has similar impli-
cations to the Marriott’s for Rwanda’s plan to draw international tourism. (It also happens
to be located between downtown Kigali and the airport.) The groundbreaking ceremony
paralleled the Marriott’s opening in that it was attended by high-profile Rwandan officials,
in this case including the Minister of Infrastructure and the Mayor of Kigali (Gasore, 2014;
New Times, 2015a). Revenues from the construction contract are going to a Chinese firm:
CCECC, which had already built two projects for Hatari, was brought in for this one as well
(Hope Magazine, 2018b). This was not, though, a closed-bid, Chinese-only arrangement.
The funding came from Kenya Commercial Bank,62 and the private Rwandan-Hong Kong
ownership has more obvious ties to Rwanda’s elite than to China’s.
62Bonface (2017).
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5.2.2.3 Summary: Equity Investments
This section has illustrated both qualitative and quantitative variations in equity investment.
In qualitative terms, different types of equity investments can be better suited toward diplo-
matic or commercial investments. Equity in general lies in the middle of the spectrum
between aid, which is more concessional and oriented toward diplomacy, and loans, which
demand more of the recipient but are better for Chinese commercial interests. Some equity
investments may lean toward one of the end of the spectrum or another. StarTimes’ state-
sponsored move into African airwaves may have asked the Burundian government to take
on (highly concessional) debt but was a generally favorable development from the perspec-
tive of a regime hoping to exercise greater control over the media and represented an outlay
of cash from China’s government balance sheet. This contributed to China’s relationship
with the Burundian leadership. The more unambiguously private Hong Kong investors be-
hind the Marriott Hotel and Century Park projects did not require Chinese state financial
support but were also less salient to bilateral relations. These were scarcely mentioned in
official Chinese documents.63
The above cases both involve appreciable commitments of Chinese capital, but this is not
always the case. There is also quantitative variation in equity investment. In any economy,
some sectors are more competitive than others, and some will simply struggle to attract cap-
ital. In Rwanda’s case, the manufacturing sector has difficulty keeping up with lower-cost
competitors. Only particularly committed investors like C&H have chosen to fight this up-
hill battle, although more could follow over time. Nevertheless, the desire for a well-paying
industrial sector is such that the Chinese and Rwandan governments make it a central part
of their diplomatic relationship. A $10 million apparel company has received more atten-
63One Chinese Embassy release does mention the Century Park project in passing. See Embassy of the
People’s Republic of China in Rwanda⇣-N∫⌘qå˝{b˙æqå˝'Ü⌘ (2011).
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tion than $260 million in hotel and luxury housing investments. The technology sector is
even smaller but is still subject to a degree of hype. The Chinese government, though, has
been more directly involved in technology. The costs of training a few Rwandan engineers
are manageable enough. Training tens of thousands of Rwandan factory workers and keep-
ing them employed in loss-making ventures would not be. On a related note, what could be
the early stages of greater Chinese involvement in Rwanda’s modest mineral sector could
generate a greater flow of capital but a smaller increase in employment. This has been only
a secondary talking point for leadership and diplomats.
5.3 Conclusion
Before China was as large a player in global development finance as it is today, it was
already known that donors frequently face trade-offs between less stringent financial terms
which will be well-received in the recipient country or more stringent terms which will
more likely secure repayment. In the context of the Bretton Woods institutions, this usually
meant policy conditionality or something similar. The past two chapters have established
that the same trade-off applies to China but manifests itself very differently as filtered
through different institutions and historical experience. Most Chinese policymakers do not
see “aid” and “business” as necessarily separate. The closest distinction that exists for
China would be between smaller projects implemented via the Ministry of Commerce and
larger ones involving state-owned construction firms and (sometimes) state-owned banks.
In the former category, grants are usually better for diplomatic purposes, while zero-interest
loans are better for China’s state budget.
This chapter has covered larger items. Itself a developing country, China faces popular
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and budgetary pressure not to expend too many resources on projects that do not achieve
at least some financial return. The easiest way to do this is by doing nothing; or, more
specifically, by allowing firms to handle projects on their own, perhaps with an occasional
financial nudge. China’s own developmental history has generated several decades of en-
trenched cronyistic relations between banks and construction firms, and the cheap credit
which many receive as a matter of course allows them to compete internationally at even
lower prices than they would have otherwise. Discount sales of construction projects can
produce diplomatic benefits, as no less a figure than Xi Jinping acknowledged during a state
visit to a small African country. The obvious drawback is that even with their normal diet
of cheap credit, construction contractors will desire at least moderately reliable funding
and will be reluctant to take on very high levels of risk. In the cases where Chinese firms
enter despite political risk—e.g., the Kigali Convention Center—the consequences often
illustrate why more firms do not make similar gambles.
In other cases, a more active approach is necessary. This could mean equity investments.
Equity can be reasonably good for diplomacy in that it does not burden the recipient with
debt and it represents a long-term commitment beyond the completion of construction.
However, long-term commitments are naturally more susceptible to political risk, and eq-
uity investors may also shy away from higher-risk areas. Numerous null coefficients in
the quantitative evidence put equity in a gray area between more diplomatically friendly
modalities and commercially demanding loans. The qualitative evidence illustrates signif-
icant within-category variation. Some projects (notably StarTimes’ television broadcasts)
have obvious political benefits and draw Chinese state resources. Political risk in Burundi
slowed StarTimes’ investment process, but only under extreme circumstances of violent un-
rest, and not indefinitely. The unclear barrier between even private investors like StarTimes
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and China’s state coffers enables a different type of risk-tolerant, potentially politicized
equity investment than is typically covered in the private multinational-focused literature.
However, some Chinese investments are more similar to those from other countries; for
example, the Marriott Hotel in Kigali was a joint venture between a private Hong Kong
firm and a private Rwandan firm and was scarcely mentioned by Chinese diplomats.
Even with state support, though, open-ended equity investments in high-risk markets have
the potential to become a never-ending drain on China’s state budget. An arrangement with
more insurance against risk and less of a firm long-term commitment might be necessary.
This is where tied loans come in. The chummy relations between policy banks and fa-
vored state-owned firms at home is here exported overseas as Exim and CDB maximize
the share of contract value going to Chinese firms; leave the host government with the bill;
and use their resources as an unwritten insurance policy for the Chinese contractors. This
arrangement is less amenable for diplomatic relations than freelance contracting, which
avoids the politics of debt and leaves the host government feeling that it has more choice in
the matter. As seen in Rwanda’s road-building drive, tied procurement also drives up costs
by inhibiting competition—good for Chinese firms, but not for warm feelings between the
two concerned capitals. In some cases, this is unfeasible simply because borrowers with
stronger institutions will have access to many different sources of financing and will feel no
need to take on onerous Chinese conditions. This was certainly true in Rwanda, but does
not explain the similar lack of loans to Burundi.
From China’s perspective, there must be some benefit to offset the diplomatic costs of tied
loans. For particularly large or lucrative contracts, this may be purely commercial. Rwanda
received a loan of over $200 million for its largest-ever dam, but for little else. In many in-
stances, though, we must begin to look beyond the basic trade-off between diplomatic and
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commercial interests to explain where tied loans are deployed. By extension, this means
looking at factors which are typically under-explored in existing academic theory on de-
velopment finance. The next two chapters add two more independent variables in order to
do this. Chapter 6 extends this chapter’s findings of an interactive effect between resource
security and political risk and adds another type of financing: resource-backed loans. Col-
lateralization with natural resources is the toughest arrangement in China’s toolkit and is
used for resource-rich economies where political risk keeps most others away. Here, I com-
pare China’s use of oil-backed loans amid increasing political risk in Ecuador with a series
of equity investments facilitated by the stronger institutions of copper-rich Peru. Chapter
7 then focuses on geostrategic interests. Quantitative evidence and a comparison of lower-
risk, more lucrative Kazakhstan with higher-risk Pakistan demonstrates that loans are more
often used when there are high levels of risk and geostrategically important projects that
(from China’s perspective) simply need to be built. In these instances, China will some-
times mix loans for strategically central projects with more diplomatically friendly equity
investments, cut-rate construction contracts, and/or aid in order to offset the costs to bilat-
eral relations.
5.4 Appendix
Table 5.5: Contracts and Loans, Commitment Basis, Resource Interactive Term, African /
Latin American Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Tobit:
Contracts Loans Contracts Loans
(AEI) (SAIS-IAD) (AEI) (SAIS-IAD)
Taiwan recognition -6.178⇤⇤⇤ -26.24⇤⇤⇤ -6.052⇤⇤⇤ -26.19⇤⇤⇤
Continued on next page
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Table 5.5: Contracts and Loans, Commitment Basis, Resource Interactive Term, African /
Latin American Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Tobit:
Contracts Loans Contracts Loans
(AEI) (SAIS-IAD) (AEI) (SAIS-IAD)
(binary) (-4.77) (-22.05) (-4.16) (-21.26)
UNGA voting similarity 2.705 1.195 2.541 0.980
with China (one-year lag) (0.57) (0.26) (0.54) (0.21)
Chokepoint (binary) 3.110 0.791
(1.55) (0.48)
BRI route (binary) 2.309 2.050
(1.37) (1.52)
Distance from China (pop.- -0.187 -0.288 -0.123 -0.169
-weighted; thousands km) (-0.82) (-1.47) (-0.47) (-0.82)
Commodity exports to 0.254 -0.0353 0.210 -0.0394
China (log; one-year lag) (0.99) (-0.22) (0.83) (-0.26)
Total imports from 0.144 -0.103 0.496 -0.0247
China (log; one-year lag) (0.13) (-0.12) (0.46) (-0.03)
Rule of Law (WGI; 7.913⇤⇤⇤ 6.685⇤⇤⇤ 7.661⇤⇤⇤ 6.958⇤⇤⇤
one-year lag) (2.65) (3.24) (2.66) (3.62)
Rule of Law -0.820⇤⇤⇤ -0.693⇤⇤⇤ -0.777⇤⇤⇤ -0.695⇤⇤⇤
⇥ commodity exports (-3.44) (-4.44) (-3.48) (-4.81)
Polity score 0.00368 -0.0197 -0.0591 -0.0554
(one-year lag) (0.03) (-0.24) (-0.56) (-0.73)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.940⇤ 0.368 -0.949⇤ 0.231
(log; one-year lag) (-1.79) (0.74) (-1.72) (0.48)
GDP per capita (log) -0.0344 -0.0913 -0.259 -0.307
(-0.04) (-0.12) (-0.27) (-0.41)
Population (log) 0.956 0.392 0.719 0.292
(1.12) (0.54) (0.86) (0.41)
English language 1.840⇤⇤ 0.985 1.730⇤⇤ 1.058
(binary) (2.06) (1.31) (1.98) (1.48)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 1.763⇤⇤⇤ 0.621⇤ 1.713⇤⇤⇤ 0.623⇤
(2.71) (1.87) (2.65) (1.87)
Time2 -0.0507⇤ -0.0244 -0.0486⇤ -0.0244
(-1.96) (-1.63) (-1.90) (-1.64)
Constant -33.97⇤⇤⇤ -7.497 -33.29⇤⇤⇤ -6.004
(-3.93) (-0.86) (-4.06) (-0.71)
Countries 72 72 72 72
Start Year 2005 2000 2005 2000
End Year 2017 2018 2017 2018
Continued on next page
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Table 5.5: Contracts and Loans, Commitment Basis, Resource Interactive Term, African /
Latin American Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Tobit:
Contracts Loans Contracts Loans
(AEI) (SAIS-IAD) (AEI) (SAIS-IAD)
Observations 888 1007 888 1007
Clustered SE? X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and SAIS-CARI + Inter-American Dialogue (SAIS-IAD).
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Chokepoint (binary) 7.721⇤⇤⇤
(4.80)
Distance from China (pop.- -0.0835
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Total imports from 0.783
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t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from RED ALC (Dussel Peters, 2019).
Chapter 6
Resource Security
Resource-backed loans are the most stringent of China’s financing methods. Asking coun-
tries to mortgage commodities which in some cases make up a large portion of their
economies is a tough measure and will only be taken where Chinese lenders feel concerned
enough about political risk and borrowers have few other options on the table. The first
section of this chapter uses statistical analysis to establish that resource-backed loans are
targeted at countries rich in mineral wealth and weak in governance, even in comparison
with regular cash-based loans.
The two subsequent sections compare the cases of Ecuador and Peru. Side-by-side and far
from China’s more Eurasian-focused geostrategic concerns,1 Ecuador and Peru are nev-
ertheless important to Chinese interests for their oil and copper, respectively. Following
Rafael Correa’s 2007 election to the Ecuadorian presidency, Ecuador undertook a series of
major policy changes including forcing renegotiation of foreign oil investors’ contracts and
1As will be discussed later in this chapter, they have some geostrategic significance with respect to pro-
posed overland transportation routes which could provide an alternative to the Panama Canal. From China’s
perspective, however, trans-South American connectivity is a much lower priority than Eurasian connectivity.
252
6.1. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 253
electing to default on part of its sovereign debt. These actions undermined global investor
confidence that Ecuador would honor previous contracts, leaving a void for China to fill.
The result was oil-backed loans. Peru, on the other hand, has a stable bureaucracy which
effectively administers foreign investment, albeit with a tangible corruption problem on the
part of elected officials. In Peru’s less isolated and more stable (if imperfect) institutional
environment, China took a very different path, making a series of equity investments in
deposits of copper bound for Chinese factories.
6.1 Quantitative Analysis
6.1.1 Data and Methods
The independent variables used in this section are the same as in previous chapters and
were introduced in Section 4.1.1.1.
Data on resource-backed loans, though, is scarcer and derived some many different sources.
Of the three data sources for loans used in this dissertation, Atkins et al. (2017) provides
information on which loans are backed by resources,2 but Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.
(2018) and K. P. Gallagher and Myers (2019) do not. For the latter two, I use available
lists of resource-backed deals from Foster et al. (2009), Erica S. Downs (2011), Bräutigam
and K. P. Gallagher (2014), Bräutigam and Hwang (2016), K. P. Gallagher, Kamal, et al.
(2016), Meidan (2016), Atkins et al. (2017) and Gholz, Awan, and Ronn (2017) to estab-
lish which loans are collateralized with commodities. These sources all present data on a
commitment basis, so I do the same for this section. For extra certainty, I also performed
2The author thanks Deborah Bräutigam, Jyhjong Hwang, and Jordan Link for providing and assisting with
this data.
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Google searches of each country’s name along with “China” and terms including “loan,”
“commodity-backed,” “resource-backed,” and “oil-backed.”
Most resource-backed deals begin with large lines of credit which are later broken up
into individual projects. This makes matching between the published lists of resource-
backed deals and the Latin American data from K. P. Gallagher and Myers (2019) rela-
tively straightforward, since K. P. Gallagher and Myers (2019) lists lines of credit and not
individual projects. However, AidData often breaks down larger package deals or lines
of credit into constituent projects. In most instances, these projects can be matched to
a cash- or resource-based line of credit using AidData’s project descriptions, AidData’s
listed sources, and Internet searches. However, even after these measures, a few projects’
resource-backed status remained unclear. Because of this issue, I coded two separate sets
of resource-backed loan models: a “low” scenario excluding the questionable cases and a
“high” scenario including them. In practice, these borderline cases are a manageable issue:
the difference is between 29.3 and 31.8 percent of total loans, and the statistical results do
not appreciably change.
In this section, I present the results using the global AidData datset (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks,
et al., 2018). This is done in two tables: one (Table 6.1) using borders and chokepoints to
operationalize geostrategic importance and another (Table 6.2) using the BRI binary. Both
of these tables use the “high” scenario coding borderline cases as resource-backed instead
of cash-based. This scenario was found to yield more moderate results and is employed as
the more conservative measure. Tables 6.9 and 6.10 in this chapter’s Appendix present the
same models for the “low” scenario. Also in the Appendix are Tables 6.11 and 6.12 running
the same models on Africa and Latin America-focused data from SAIS-CARI (Atkins et
al., 2017) and the Inter-American Dialogue (K. P. Gallagher and Myers, 2019). The first of
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these tables uses the chokepoint variable3, and the second uses the BRI binary.
All statistical tables for resource-backed loans follow the same format. Column 1 presents
a Tobit model of total loans; Column 2, a Tobit model of simple cash loans; Column 3, a
Tobit model of resource-backed loans; and Column 4, a logistic model of Resource-backed loansTotal loans .
This fourth model directly compares cash and resource loans, but loses many observations
for country-years in which neither were extended. The dependent variables of the first three
models are all transformed according to the formula ln(x + 1).
6.1.2 Results and Analysis
Table 6.1: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, “High” Scenario
(AidData; Global Sample), Borders and Chokepoints Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
Taiwan recognition -29.63⇤⇤⇤ -29.77⇤⇤⇤ -51.91⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-21.80) (-22.25) (-6.34)
ASEAN member, SCS -2.230⇤ -2.162⇤ -55.02⇤⇤⇤ -13.14⇤⇤⇤
disputant (binary) (-1.93) (-1.79) (-5.78) (-9.77)
ASEAN member, SCS 1.702 2.010 1.864 -2.403⇤
non-disputant (binary) (0.87) (1.04) (0.39) (-1.70)
UNGA voting similarity 10.50⇤⇤⇤ 9.430⇤⇤ 24.47⇤ 6.549⇤⇤
with China (one-year lag) (2.68) (2.35) (1.76) (2.21)
Border with China 1.838 2.130⇤ 2.866 -0.859
(binary) (1.55) (1.73) (0.90) (-1.07)
Chokepoint (binary) -0.782 -0.461 -9.176⇤⇤ -1.336
(-0.76) (-0.47) (-2.26) (-1.64)
Distance from China (pop.- 0.302⇤⇤ 0.285⇤⇤ 1.345⇤⇤⇤ 0.143
weighted; thousands km) (2.11) (1.98) (3.10) (1.36)
Commodity exports to -0.0334 -0.0452 0.317 0.146
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.20) (-0.29) (0.58) (0.91)
Total imports from 1.978⇤⇤ 1.917⇤⇤ 5.959⇤⇤ 1.084⇤
Continued on next page
3The border variable was dropped for the Africa/Latin America sample.
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Table 6.1: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, “High” Scenario
(AidData; Global Sample), Borders and Chokepoints Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
China (log; one-year lag) (2.39) (2.25) (2.55) (1.68)
Rule of Law (WGI; 2.516 1.505 20.89⇤⇤⇤ 3.735⇤⇤
one-year lag) (1.06) (0.65) (3.36) (2.22)
Rule of Law -0.401⇤⇤ -0.258 -2.179⇤⇤⇤ -0.447⇤⇤⇤
⇥ commodity exports (-2.21) (-1.53) (-5.52) (-3.69)
Polity score -0.0586 -0.0592 -0.505⇤⇤ 0.00776
(one-year lag) (-0.85) (-0.82) (-2.34) (0.13)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.808⇤ -0.734 -1.824 -0.651⇤
(log; one-year lag) (-1.82) (-1.64) (-1.33) (-1.77)
GDP per capita (log) -2.366⇤⇤⇤ -2.478⇤⇤⇤ -5.631⇤⇤ -0.756
(-3.03) (-3.17) (-2.35) (-1.21)
Population (log) -1.023 -0.922 -4.050⇤⇤ -0.877⇤
(-1.50) (-1.33) (-2.19) (-1.78)
English language 1.556⇤⇤ 1.573⇤⇤ 3.743 0.130
(binary) (2.09) (2.11) (1.14) (0.17)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 0.757⇤⇤⇤ 0.683⇤⇤⇤ 4.501⇤⇤⇤ 0.495⇤
(2.89) (2.60) (3.97) (1.88)
Time2 -0.0317⇤⇤ -0.0251⇤ -0.251⇤⇤⇤ -0.0348⇤⇤
(-2.28) (-1.81) (-4.41) (-2.36)
Constant -10.86 -9.778 -55.07⇤⇤⇤ -8.981⇤
(-1.51) (-1.36) (-2.61) (-1.78)
Countries 124 124 124 86
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2014 2014 2014 2014
Observations 1499 1499 1499 488
Clustered SE? X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from AidData (AD) with additional resource-backed loan variable coded by author.
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Table 6.2: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, “High” Scenario
(AidData; Global Sample), BRI Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
Taiwan recognition -29.20⇤⇤⇤ -29.23⇤⇤⇤ -51.05⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-21.89) (-22.64) (-6.29)
ASEAN member, SCS -1.057 -0.989 -49.88⇤⇤⇤ -13.06⇤⇤⇤
disputant (binary) (-0.82) (-0.72) (-5.39) (-9.41)
ASEAN member, SCS 0.814 1.071 3.227 -2.284⇤
non-disputant (binary) (0.47) (0.63) (0.62) (-1.79)
UNGA voting similarity 7.184⇤⇤ 6.142⇤ 21.90 6.832⇤⇤
with China (one-year lag) (2.14) (1.78) (1.58) (2.23)
BRI route (binary) 4.187⇤⇤⇤ 4.384⇤⇤⇤ -0.0220 -0.961
(4.69) (4.97) (-0.01) (-1.27)
Distance from China (pop.- 0.504⇤⇤⇤ 0.483⇤⇤⇤ 1.409⇤⇤⇤ 0.157
weighted; thousands km) (4.79) (4.62) (2.90) (1.42)
Commodity exports to -0.0805 -0.0901 0.246 0.0493
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.52) (-0.63) (0.42) (0.29)
Total imports from 1.671⇤⇤ 1.572⇤⇤ 5.428⇤⇤ 0.905
China (log; one-year lag) (2.19) (2.03) (2.25) (1.40)
Rule of Law (WGI; 4.270⇤ 3.316 19.59⇤⇤⇤ 3.937⇤⇤
one-year lag) (1.93) (1.57) (3.03) (2.45)
Rule of Law -0.526⇤⇤⇤ -0.385⇤⇤ -2.139⇤⇤⇤ -0.459⇤⇤⇤
⇥ commodity exports (-3.06) (-2.51) (-5.36) (-3.97)
Polity score -0.0542 -0.0572 -0.491⇤⇤ -0.0439
(one-year lag) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-2.38) (-0.91)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.907⇤⇤ -0.836⇤⇤ -1.693 -0.591
(log; one-year lag) (-2.38) (-2.17) (-1.19) (-1.60)
GDP per capita (log) -2.547⇤⇤⇤ -2.632⇤⇤⇤ -5.226⇤⇤ -0.570
(-3.36) (-3.48) (-2.11) (-0.90)
Population (log) -1.043 -0.913 -3.944⇤⇤ -0.636
(-1.61) (-1.40) (-2.02) (-1.26)
English language 1.849⇤⇤⇤ 1.862⇤⇤⇤ 4.167 0.0490
(binary) (2.76) (2.79) (1.17) (0.06)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 0.889⇤⇤⇤ 0.815⇤⇤⇤ 4.770⇤⇤⇤ 0.566⇤⇤
(3.43) (3.12) (4.14) (2.15)
Time2 -0.0366⇤⇤⇤ -0.0298⇤⇤ -0.261⇤⇤⇤ -0.0371⇤⇤
(-2.69) (-2.19) (-4.59) (-2.53)
Constant -4.168 -3.122 -52.65⇤⇤ -11.17⇤⇤
Continued on next page
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Table 6.2: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, “High” Scenario
(AidData; Global Sample), BRI Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
(-0.64) (-0.49) (-2.37) (-2.09)
Countries 124 124 124 86
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2014 2014 2014 2014
Observations 1499 1499 1499 488
Clustered SE? X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from AidData (AD) with additional resource-backed loan variable coded by author.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show very similar results, the only difference being the operationaliza-
tion of geostrategic interests. I will base my analysis here on whichever of the two models
happened to yield a more conservative estimate in any given instance.
Territorial disputes (H1) were, yet again, very strong predictors. Not a single country which
recognized Taiwan or which has overlapping claims with China’s in the South China Sea
received a resource-backed loan. When China reaches out to these countries, it will want
to do so on more favorable terms to win them over. Borrowers, for their part, would be
unlikely to pledge any important commodities to a party on the opposite side of a territorial
dispute.
Territorial disputes were also negative predictors of cash loans, but not to the same extent.
Some countries have received cash loans from China while hosting embassies from Taiwan,
always in the context of potential shifting loyalties (as happened in Nicaragua and Nauru).
This is not the preferred means of winning these countries over—aid is more concessional
and used more frequently and in higher proportion—but it has been used. It is somewhat
6.1. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 259
unclear whether cash loans avoid South China Sea disputants—there is a negative corre-
lation here when borders and chokepoints are used to measure geostrategic importance,
but this does not hold up when the BRI variable is added. The correlation is negative but
statistically insignificant (p ⇡ 0.141) when no measurement of geostrategic importance is
included.4 With regards to the theoretical prediction that cash-based loans will avoid coun-
tries with territorial disputes with China, this is strong evidence for the Taiwan issue and
lackluster evidence for the South China Sea. However, the evidence is overwhelming for
the specific case of resource-backed loans.
The results for diplomatic alignment (H2) are surprising. While it was hypothesized that
resource-backed loans would lead to cooler bilateral relations, they are actually highly pos-
itively correlated with UNGA voting alignment using AidData’s figures. This may reflect
reverse causality—mortgaging one’s precious commodity deposits may not engender warm
feelings, but it does create a powerful coincidence of cold interests which could spill over
into diplomatic voting. However, this trend does not appear in the SAIS or IAD data (Ta-
bles 6.11 and 6.12 in the Appendix). The same was true of data for total loans (Chapter
7)—these showed a positive correlation with UNGA voting for AidData, but not the other
datasets. So, it is difficult to treat this finding as particularly robust. Overall, these mixed
results are best taken as a null finding for H2: not supportive of the theoretical prediction
that resource-backed loans harm diplomatic alignment, but also not indicative that they
help diplomatic relations. Resource-backed loans’ creation of a high degree of economic
interdependence may counteract the negative diplomatic effects of the demanding nature
of the deals.
The results for geostrategic variables (H3) vary substantially by indicator. Table 6.3 shows
4These results are available from the author upon request.
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Table 6.3: Geostrategic Interests and Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans
Percentage change for: Cash Resource-backed
Shared border 171.0 Null
Maritime chokepoint Null -83.9
Belt and Road 723.4 Null
Assuming non-recognition of Taiwan and all other independent
variables at mean.
Projections per Table 6.1, Columns 2 and 3 (borders and choke-
points); and 6.2, Columns 2 and 3 (BRI).
the percentage changes in cash and resource-backed loans associated with each of the three
indicators. Cash loans are positively associated with both borders and especially location
along the Belt and Road. This runs contrary to the original predictions, but as will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter is due to an interactive effect in which loans are channeled to
projects of high national priority in high-risk countries otherwise avoided by firms. By all
measures, geostrategically important countries draw a higher share of cash loans. China
needs to maintain access through bordering countries, maritime chokepoints, and (after
construction) Belt and Road infrastructure projects; bordering countries may also be home
to sensitivities regarding transnational threats. China will be tough enough in its financ-
ing terms in these countries to make them palatable to firms, but will typically not want
to risk bilateral relations by asking for resource collateralization. This is not an absolute
trend—neighboring Russia and Turkmenistan, for example, have received oil- and gas-
backed loans, respectively—but these are among the highest-risk markets on China’s pe-
riphery, and extra risk insurance may have been necessary here even at a cost to diplomatic
relations.
The interactive effect between rule of law and commodity exports (H4 and H5) displays the
primary purpose of resource-backed loans. Both cash and resource-backed loans display
such an interactive effect, but the effect is much stronger for resource-backed loans. Figure
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6.1 repeats the methodology used to generate 5.1 in the previous chapter, but differentiates
between cash and resource-backed loans.
Resource-backed loans may constitute just under one third of all loans by value, but they
account for a disproportionate share of the observed interactive effect between governance
quality and commodity exports. From looking at these results, it is clear what the Chinese
specialist cited in Chapter 3 meant when he called resource-backed loans a “special type
of business.” Tied cash loans can provide a degree of protection against corruption risk in
resource-producing countries, but resource collateralization adds even more security in the
most difficult markets.
These countries populate the top-left corner of Figure 6.2. There are exceptions. A small
export-backed loan to Uruguay is a clear outlier. Toward the middle of the rule of law dis-
tribution, Brazil and Ghana are also atypical cases.5 Also telling are some of the countries
that did not receive resource-backed loans. Chile, Oman, Malaysia, South Africa are all im-
portant suppliers of commodities to China, but none received resource-backed loans, and
Oman did not receive any loans at all. These countries enjoy better market reputations and
access to international capital and have no need to accept deals which mortgage their min-
eral wealth. China, for its part, does not need the extra insurance against corruption there.6
Resource-backed loans are tailor-made for the higher-risk portions of global commodity
5China’s oil-backed loan to Brazil came before the Petrobras corruption scandal came to light.
6Malaysia’s and South Africa’s reputations have taken a hit since 2014, the last year in this dataset, but
even today are in better positions than, say, the DRC or Venezuela.
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Figure 6.1: Effect of Ln(Commodity Exports to China + 1) on Ln(Chinese Loans + 1),
Varying Rule of Law
Cash in Green; Resources in Black
Based on models of loans per AidData (2000-2014) in Table 6.2, Columns 2 and 3. Assuming
non-recognition of Taiwan. All other variables set to mean. Shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 6.2: Total Loan Commitments vs. Mean Rule of Law, 2000-2014
Countries receiving RBLs in Large print;
Countries exporting above the mean amount of commodities to China in Red
Based on “high” resource-backed loan scenario of AidData dataset (2000-2014).
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markets.
6.1.3 Summary
Quantitative evidence strongly backs the original theoretical intuition for resource-backed
loans: they manage local governance risk by channeling cash funding via Chinese con-
tractors and separating repayment from local government finances. At the same time, they
also allow Chinese commodity firms to expand their footprints in the highest-risk markets,
where the extra risk insurance is most necessary and local governments are likely to have
few other options. This can raise firms’ technical capacity and expand global commodity
supply.
6.2 China’s Resource Security in Andean South America
Both Ecuador and Peru present significant draws to Chinese capital, but via very different
mechanisms. Next-door neighbors along South America’s Pacific coastline, both are home
to important commodities—large amounts of oil with small amounts of mineral ores in
Ecuador, and vice versa in Peru. In 2017, Peru supplied 21.07 percent of the world’s
international copper trade and 30.02 percent of China’s imports, making it the leading
supplier of China’s enormous electronics industry. Ecuador, on the other hand, exported an
underwhelming $496 million in crude oil to China in 2017, a sum constituting only 6.72
percent of its crude exports and an even less significant 0.32 percent of purchases by China,
the world’s largest importer.7
Based on these statistics alone, one would expect China to be much more deeply involved in
7Statistics on “copper ore” (HS 2603) and “petroleum oils, crude” (HS 2709) per United Nations (2018).
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the Peruvian copper industry than in Ecuadorian8 oil. In fact, this is not totally true. China
is now the top country of origin for investors in Peruvian minerals—not just copper, but
also two major iron mining projects—but is one of several major players amid continued
interest from competitors both domestic and from a range of other countries. China did,
however, gain a more dominant status in Ecuador, where a series of populist political and
economic decisions kept many others away. At one point, over 90 percent of Ecuadorian
crude production was pledged to Chinese firms as part of resource-backed loan deals or
related purchase agreements, and this despite the fact that the Chinese firms typically sold
the oil to commodities traders who transported it not to China but to nearer markets in the
Western Hemisphere (Schneyer and Medina Mora Pérez, 2013b).
The real distinction between Chinese engagement in Ecuador and Peru has been more qual-
itative than quantitative. In Peru, China has made a series of equity investments in copper
and iron mines, with only a limited presence in the infrastructure sector; in Ecuador, oil-
backed loans have brought Chinese firms en masse into infrastructure construction and
oil extraction alike. This distinction is the product of recipient domestic institutional dy-
namics. In Ecuador, the administration of President Rafael Correa voluntarily defaulted
on a portion of the country’s sovereign debt and pledged to withdraw from the IMF and
World Bank, but needed large sums of money for an electrification push intended to drive a
poverty-reducing “revolution.” Expenditures on the infrastructure led to both serial deficit
financing and an uptick in cronyism in a country which already had a reputation for cor-
ruption. Enabled by the risk reduction function of oil-backed loans, China entered where
few others would, and the Ecuadorian government had few options but to accept its terms.
Ecuador came to mortgage most of its oil deposits, especially as a fall in oil prices strained
8The English-language demonym for the people of Ecuador varies between “Ecuadoran,” “Ecuadorean,”
and “Ecuadorian.” I use “Ecuadorian” due to its proximity to the Spanish ecuatoriano.
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its ability to service Chinese loans. Without any additional oil to serve as risk insurance,
Sino-Ecuadorian lending began to shrink in scope. Since 2017, the new administration
of Lenín Moreno has pragmatically reestablished ties with the Bretton Woods institutions
and international capital markets, and Chinese activity has further moderated in the face of
more substantive international competition.
Peru had its own period of instability in the 1980s, but has since trended toward liberal,
private sector-oriented policies and enjoys strong relationships with multilateral develop-
ment banks and multinational firms. In a crowded marketplace, Chinese firms had little
ability to impose terms and concentrated on recipient-friendly equity investments; in any
event, in Peru, they had less need for the risk-management function of tied debt. This has
begun to change since 2016, as several Peruvian presidents and party leaders have been
implicated in the Odebrecht corruption scandal that has to some degree involved most of
Latin America. Many elected politicians are engaging in corruption, but under the con-
straints of an entrenched liberal bureaucracy which only leaves a few select avenues for
graft. Peru’s internal dichotomy provides a source of within-case variation. Odebrecht, the
Brazilian construction giant, at the center of the scandal, has been ejected from Peru. This
left several infrastructure projects unfinished. China here entered the void, using debt to
manage the risks inherent to taking on works previously tainted by bribery.
The Ecuador-Peru comparison provides some degree of evidence for all of the hypotheses
but is especially suited to testing the interaction between resource security and domestic in-
stitutions. Large-n tests revealed that debt and especially resource-backed debt is targeted at
countries in which China has commodity security interests but whose domestic institutions
are not favorable for foreign firms. Studies of Ecuador and Peru allow us to make relevant
comparisons over both space and time. In space, Ecuador better fits the unfortunate profile
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of a commodity exporter whose domestic institutions have constrained investment; Peru,
with its stronger institutions, less so. This comparison is made more potent by the fact that
it compares shades of gray rather than black and white: especially following the Odebrecht
scandal, Peru’s perceived corruption risk is appreciably high in its own right. Even this lim-
ited differential in governance risk has led to a pronounced difference in Chinese strategy.
The Odebrecht scandal is also part of a pattern of useful variation over time. Peru began
to clean up a chaotic domestic environment in the 1990s, enjoyed a subsequent period of
stability, and is currently in a period of uncertainty. Ecuador experienced even more drastic
fluctuations: first with the rise of Correa, and currently with Moreno’s efforts to investigate
and address Correa-era graft. China responded to these variations in time, toughening its
approach in times of danger and taking a more recipient-friendly line otherwise.
I begin with the Ecuadorian case.
6.2.1 Ecuador
China’s involvement in Ecuador has ebbed and flowed with the country’s domestic politics.
I accordingly divide the Ecuadorian case study into four temporal segments. First is the
era before Rafael Correa’s 2007 inauguration. China was only peripherally involved in
Ecuador at this point, but events before Correa’s rise to power played an important role in
setting the stage for China’s entry. Second is the period between Correa’s inauguration and
the mid-2014 oil price crash. Falling oil prices severely strained the national budget and
saw the beginning of a slowdown in Ecuadorian borrowing, and this before the fact that
there was little oil left to mortgage to China. Third is Correa’s remaining time in office,
until the beginning of the fourth period with the inauguration of current President Lenín
Moreno in 2017.
268 CHAPTER 6. RESOURCE SECURITY
6.2.1.1 Ecuador Before Moreno
Ecuador has long been characterized by a high degree of socioeconomic inequality which
has often led to political polarization and drastic policy swings. The country has suffered
from two types of instability: one between left and right policy positions between suc-
cessive presidential administrations, and another related to global commodity price cycles.
This long history does not need to be spelled out in its entirety in this work. I will instead
begin with the period of instability that created the political status quo extant as China be-
gan to enter the region in the mid-2000s. Namely, Ecuador’s 1998-2000 financial crisis
and coup d’etat led to a series of institutional changes aimed at protecting international
investors and preventing a recurrence of the crisis. These domestic rules reflected the risk
management preferences of predominantly Western-based private creditors and the IMF.
As such, they maintained a degree of stability in global market interest in Ecuador, and
their eventual decline opened the door to China’s entry.
Coming on the heels of similar problems in Mexico and Southeast Asia, Ecuador’s financial
crisis of 1998-2000 put serious pressure on its currency, the sucre. On January 9, 2000,
President Jamil Mahuad announced that Ecuador would abandon the greatly devalued sucre
and begin using the U.S. dollar (Rohter, 2000). Only twelve days later, on January 21, he
was ousted in a coup and after a brief period of uncertainty replaced with his Vice President,
Gustavo Noboa. Noboa then reached a series of understandings with creditors and the IMF
that set Ecuador’s status quo for some time. In April 2000, the IMF agreed to a $304
million bailout line of credit, at the expense of privatization of several state utilities and
measures to control deficit spending (International Monetary Fund, 2000a,b).
Noboa’s government further negotiated with creditors to restructure future bond repay-
ments. Ecuador agreed to swap out dollar-denominated Brady Bonds—themselves a prod-
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uct of previous debt restructuring negotiations with the U.S. government—and Eurobonds
for a new series of Global Bonds to be traded on both sides of the Atlantic (Conaghan,
2012, p. 669). In 2002, they added a significant domestic measure to ensure that the cri-
sis did not recur. The “Fiscal Transparency Law” contained a series of quantitative fiscal
policy requirements, most notably a 3.5 percent cap on annual expenditure growth (Mejía
Acosta and Albornoz, 2020, p. 241). This was in keeping with the IMF’s policy conditions
as well as concern in the domestic and international business communities about a return
to unsustainable indebtedness. Ecuador would also proceed with the construction of a new
Heavy Crude Pipeline (Oleoducto Crudo Pesado, or “OCP”) and per the new law would
use the additional revenues to contribute to a new stabilization fund. This stabilization
fund was known as “Feirep,” a Spanish-language acronym Feirep for “Fund for Stabiliza-
tion, Social and Productive Investment, and Reduction of Public Debt”9 This lengthy name
indicates its three distinct purposes. The fund took a portion of oil revenues and devoted
70 percent of its expenditures to servicing and buying back public debt, 20 percent to a
natural disaster emergency fund—Ecuador is vulnerable to earthquakes, floods, landslides,
and El Niño events—and the remaining 10 percent to social spending, especially to the
health and education sectors. This system reduced the national debt and provided a modest
countercyclical cushion against oil price cycles. It was also popular among international
financiers for these reasons and, more directly, because it bolstered the IMF’s efforts to
limit a return to serial major deficit spending and thus lowered the risk of default (Gallardo,
2012; López-Cálix et al., 2005, pp. 26–27).
These changes were not, however, universally popular in Ecuador. Former President León
Febres-Cordero accused Noboa of misusing $9 billion of the proceeds of the debt swap to
9Spanish: Fondo de Estabilizaciòn, Inversiòn Social y Productiva y Reducciòn del Endeudamiento
Pùblico.
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Figure 6.3: Average Monthly Price of Ecuadorian Crude Oil Exports (USD), January 1996
– February 2018
Based on basket of different types of crude exported by Ecuador.
Source: CEIC (2018), using data from the Central Bank of Ecuador.
bail out two banks to which he was connected (News, 2003; Conaghan, 2012, pp. 669–70).
More generally speaking, there was a sense (especially but not exclusively on the left of the
political spectrum) that Noboa had caved to creditors’ demands and given up too much at
the negotiating table. Feirep also drew criticism for its designation of 70 percent of pipeline
revenues to debt buybacks, despite high levels of poverty made worse by the crisis.10
This arrangement remained in place as Ecuador climbed out of its recession in the early
and mid-2000s. As shown in Figure 6.3, oil prices were on the rebound in what was to
become an extended expansion.
The oil market was on the precipice of a boom, partially due to growth in Chinese demand.
Both China and Ecuador saw this boom coming when they began negotiating for a greater
Chinese role in the Ecuadorian oil industry. In August 2003, Ecuadorian President Lu-
cio Gutiérrez visited Beijing. That year saw several oil deals worth at least $170 million
10For example, see (Suárez Buitrón, 2003, pp. 18–23).
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in equity investments, but typically as a minority partner alongside larger players (Guo,
2018, p. 21). Changqing Petroleum Exploration Bureau, a subsidiary of China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC; one of the “Big Three” state-owned oil firms), agreed to
invest $70M in new drilling in Block 57 (Bnamericas, 2003). CNPC also took a stake
in the Amazon region’s Block 11; the size of the stake is unclear, but at the time, Block
11 was only producing 1,000 barrels per day, many of which were produced by Romania’s
Rompetrol (Rigzone, 2003; Palacios, 2008, p. 178). Sinochem paid $100 million for Cono-
coPhillips’ 14 percent stake in Block 16. In an industry worth billions per year in exports,
these small investments did not make China more than a minor player.
China’s larger entry into the Ecuadorian market had roots in events that had little to do
with it. An Ecuadorian macroeconomic policy change and a dispute with an American firm
both paved the way for a Chinese entry. First, in April 2005, Ecuador canceled Feirep, the
post-crisis oil-based stabilization fund, and replaced it with a new fund known as Cereps.11
(Reuters, 2005). Whereas Feirep had set aside 70 percent of its revenues for debt repay-
ment and buyback, Cereps devoted only 20 percent to economic stabilization, leaving the
remaining 80 percent to go to discretionary budget items (Schenone, 2005, p. 81). This
opened the door to deficit spending during a period of high oil prices—sustainable as long
as prices stayed high, but highly risky thereafter (Gallardo, 2012). Also gone was the par-
allel legal requirement of a 3.5 percent per annum cap on spending increases (Mejía Acosta
and Albornoz, 2020, p. 241). On the day that the official announcement of Feirep’s can-
cellation was made, the market price of Ecuadorian government bonds due in 2012 had
already fallen by 2.2 percent of face value on anticipation of this policy change (among
others) (Reuters, 2005). While it is unclear how many in Beijing were paying attention
11An acronym for Cuenta Especial de Reactivación e Inversión, or “Special Account for Productive and
Social Reactivation.”
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at this point, the removal of an institutional safeguard against fiscal mismanagement and
ensuing jitters in the bond market were the beginning of an opening for a new market en-
trant. The personnel involved were also a sign of things to come. Minister of Economy and
Finance Rafael Correa, not yet a household name in Ecuador, told reporters that “We are
the only country in the world where petroleum revenues are promised ahead of time to buy
debt. What effect does this have? It triples the price of our debt and makes millionaires out
of a few creditors.”12 (Reuters, 2005)
A second shock in the pre-Correa era came not from the management of oil revenues but
from the oil industry itself. The American firm Occidental Petroleum (“Oxy”) was engaged
in a dispute with the Ecuadorian government regarding its 2000 sale of a 40 percent stake in
its operations in Ecuador’s Block 15 to Canada’s EnCana. The Ecuadorian government said
that it had not approved the deal and that Occidental was thus in violation of its contract to
take sole responsibility for production in the block; Oxy claimed that it had received gov-
ernment approval (Ebner, 2004; Reuters, 2007a). EnCana, realizing what it had stumbled
into, in September 2005 sold its Ecuadorian operations to Andes Petroleum, a consortium
of CNPC (55 percent) and Sinopec (45 percent). The deal was valued at 1.42 billion, a
striking vote of confidence given the circumstances. Chinese firms were aware of the risks
involved: China Daily quoted an oil company official as saying that “The joint venture by
the Chinese oil companies in buying EnCana’s Ecuador assets means considerably fewer
risks, compared with CNOOC’s individual deal for Unocal” (Wang Ying, 2005). While the
executive’s immediate point was that CNPC and Sinopec meant to divide the deal’s risk by
co-investing, the subtext is striking. In that year, the United States’ Congress blocked a bid
12Translation by author. Original Spanish: “Nosotros somos el único país del mundo que los ingresos
petroleros los comprometió anticipadamente para comprar deuda ¿qué efecto tiene eso? Se nos triplica el
precio de la deuda y estamos haciendo millonarios a unos cuantos acreedores.”
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by the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) to buy California’s Unocal. This
served as a wake-up call to new Chinese investors that political risk needed to be heeded.
The anonymous executive’s reference to the failed Unocal deal that such a fate could just as
easily befall CNPC in Ecuador. Even in the more liberal Chinese press environment of the
2000s, this admission of downside risk and reference to a sensitive diplomatic issue with
the United States was atypical for Chinese state media outlets and indicated strongly held
concerns.
The executive was right to be concerned: Ecuador allowed the Chinese joint venture to
stay, but in 2006 nationalized Occidental’s assets at Block 16, leading to a lengthy legal
battle (F. Marshall, 2011). The nationalization had a much larger effect than just granting
a foothold to Chinese state-owned firms with a greater ability to use public funds from
the home country to tolerate risk abroad. Occidental had been Ecuador’s largest foreign
producer, and its expulsion sent a message to others that no one was really immune from
political interference (Valencia and Ulmer, 2016). In September 2006, Rafael Correa, now
out of government and running for President, stated on the campaign trail that accepting
Occidental’s request for international arbitration would be “an act of betrayal of the coun-
try” (El Universo, 2006).13
Despite an atmosphere of rising risk, some Chinese firms began making plans for major
projects in Ecuador. Many clustered around the coastal city of Manta. Most of Ecuador’s
maritime trade passes through the port of the largest city of Guayaquil, in the south. Chi-
nese actors and local authorities both hoped that this left room to grow in Manta, along the
central coastline.
13Translation by author. Original Spanish: “un acto de traición a la Patria.” Villavicencio (2013) sees the
Occidental dispute as a launching point for Correa’s career, although Correa talked about it relatively little on
the campaign trail.
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Plans for the area included a seaport, airport, oil refinery, and perhaps a transit corridor to
inland cities. The seaport came first. In 2006, Hong Kong-based private firm Hutchison
Port Holdings led a consortium to invest $423 million into expanding the existing small
port, including dredging the shipping channel to allow for larger ships and enlarging the
fishing pier (Ellis, 2009, p. 132). China was interested in diversifying its imports of fish-
meal, which is frequently used as animal feed in a country which has outsourced animal
feed to foreign producers in order to focus its limited domestic farmland on grain crops
more central to food security. As of 2005, China bought 85.9 percent of its fishmeal im-
ports from Peru and Chile but recorded none at all from Ecuador, leaving obvious room for
growth (United Nations, 2018). Of course, expanding the port would also mean more room
for Chinese manufactured exports to Ecuador, and Ecuador (and especially the surrounding
province of Manabí) hoped to expand its exports as well. Ellis (2009) writes that the port
also factored into plans for the oil industry:
Hutchison’s development of the port should be understood in the context of
the increasing Chinese commerce with Ecuador—–a context that includes the
construction of a new refinery in Manabí and the possibility that petroleum
output from newly opened ITT oil fields would be sent to Manta for refining
and subsequent export. (133)
At the time, Ecuador was considering exploiting the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT)
oilfields which were protected from drilling as part of the Yasuní National Park. The oil-
fields lay underneath an Amazonian biodiversity hotspot, meaning that their fate was highly
controversial, but China was hoping that they could be opened to drilling. Ecuador’s main
oil refinery at Esmeraldas, along the northern coast, was inefficient and unable to keep up
with domestic demand for refined fuel, much less an influx of new oil from Yasuní, and a
new one would be necessary to reduce Ecuadorian dependence on foreign refining.
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A refinery and port would also require some degree of transportation to interior cities.
Manta was home to a small airport, which itself housed the United States Air Force’s
only operating base in South America, used primarily for anti-narcotics operations. The
American lease was set to expire in 2009, and if the lease were not renewed, there would
be an opportunity to find a new use for the infrastructure.
Overland transit, however, would be more fundamentally necessary for the port’s success.
In the case of the refinery, this would likely mean either an oil pipeline or highway to oil
fields in the Amazon; for the port, more likely connectivity to the cities of the Andean
highlands, especially the capital of Quito.
The project here took on a more strategic flavor. Inland connectivity could conceivably
connect all the way to the Brazilian border and from there to the Atlantic. This would
mostly benefit Brazil: Ellis (2009, p. 133) estimated that Brazil accounted for 36 percent of
Latin American exports to China, but the imposing voyage from the Southern Atlantic to the
Western Pacific took over forty days. Ecuadorians in adjacent inland areas would also hope
to benefit from better access to regional and global markets. However, the elephant in the
room was neither in Brazil nor in Ecuador but in Panama. China, fairly or not, perceived the
Panama Canal to be American-controlled. An alternate route connecting the Atlantic and
Pacific would provide China with a way around this issue, (possibly) maintaining access
to Brazilian soybeans, iron, and export markets in the event of a crisis (Amazon Watch,
2014, p. 7). This is essentially a South American iteration of the Belt and Road’s aim to
circumvent maritime chokepoints by moving across the Eurasian mainland, albeit years
before the Belt and Road was announced. Especially given the U.S. Air Force’s uncertain
future at Manta, there was a possibility for a geostrategic opening for China.
That being said, this opening was far from certain. When Ecuador went to the polls to
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elect a new president in 2006, the only deal in Manta for which ink had dried was for
the seaport; the rest remained hypothetical. In the oil industry as well, China had made
inroads following the departures of Occidental and EnCana but remained one of several
players; notably, Spain’s Repsol was heavily invested. More to the point, China’s entry
into Ecuador was limited to equity investments. The oil block investments were part of
Ecuador’s system of “participation contracts”; essentially, purchases of the right to exploit
and sell oil, while paying some taxes and royalties to the government. The Hutchison port
deal was done on a public-private partnership (PPP) basis, meaning by putting forward the
money to build the new project, Hutchison “bought” the right to operate and profit from
it for thirty years (Kueffner, 2009). While not exactly the same as an equity investment
in perpetuity, this is a much longer-term commitment than a debt contract, and Hutchison
held much more financial risk than the Ecuadorian government. The expulsion of Oxy sent
enough jitters through the international business community that China gained a foothold,
but the damage to Ecuador’s institutional environment was not yet such that China was in
a position to dictate terms. Notably, there were no major debt packages to Ecuador.
What happened with China’s involvement in Ecuador was contingent on the general future
trajectory of Ecuadorian governance patterns. These changed drastically in 2007.
6.2.1.2 The Rise of Correa
The seven years between Rafael Correa’s 2007 inauguration and the 2014 fall in global oil
prices saw enormous expansion in Chinese commercial activity in Ecuador. Because of
the sheer volume of activity, I divide this section into three parts. First, I discuss general
changes in policy and governance during the first two years of Correa’s first term. Many of
these drastically limited foreign interest in Ecuador’s economy, paving the way for China’s
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entry. Second, I detail China’s primary mode of entry: a series of oil-backed loans. Third, I
continue to how Ecuador used the money. Namely, much of it went to hydroelectric dams,
alongside a few miscellaneous other infrastructure projects.
2007-2008: The Transition Period Rafael Correa won the November 2006 presidential
vote on a leftist populist platform tapping into popular discontent with domestic and in-
ternational economic elites. When he took office in January 2007, he wasted little time in
pushing an ambitious agenda. Correa’s changes affected a large swath of the Ecuadorian
political and economic landscape, but I will focus on several changes which affected its
international financial position. These are: 1) a freezing of ties with the IMF and World
Bank; 2) changes to the legal structure of its dealings with foreign oil companies; 3) the
elimination of the oil stabilization fund and limits on deficit spending; 4) a new constitu-
tion; and 5) a strategic default on part of its sovereign debt.
The above changes were all being negotiated simultaneously, but the rupturing of ties with
the Bretton Woods institutions happened particularly quickly. A pledge not to sign any
further letters of intent (an early step in the process of borrowing from the IMF) was an-
nounced in the days leading up to Correa’s inauguration (El Universo, 2007). The Ecuado-
rian government went a step further with the World Bank, actually expelling the Bank’s
Country Manager in April 2007 (BBC News, 2007a). Between January 2008 and June
2013, the Ecuador borrowed only $2.2 million from the World Bank, and none at all from
the IMF.14 This left a gap in Ecuador’s financing options that bore filling. In the case of the
IMF, this shortfall was multiplied by private lenders’ realization that they could not count
on an IMF backstop in the case of another crisis. Correa was willing to pay this price both
14The World Bank project was actually funded by Japan, but housed within the Bank. International Mon-
etary Fund (2020b) and World Bank (2020).
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for the immediate political gains of catering to his base and, more fundamentally, to gain
a free hand to reshape Ecuador’s political economy in ways that would cause even deeper
ruptures with international investors.
One such change was to the oil sector. As in most countries of the world, Ecuador’s subsur-
face minerals are property of the state. Under the old system of “participation contracts,” in-
vestors bought the rights to extract and sell these minerals within a defined geographic area
but then paid income taxes to the state. These contracts amounted to equity investments
in the right to extract. In 2008, Correa commuted these into “service provider contracts.”
Now, foreign oil firms no longer owned the rights to extract; instead, they were simply
contractors hired to drill by the oilfields’ ultimate owner, the Ecuadorian state. Oilfield
contractors also had to pay more in taxes and fees to the government (González-Vicente,
2013, p. 56). Oil companies were not being directly forced out a là the nationalizations of
a prior era, but they did lose legal title, and their profits were arbitrarily reduced contrary
to a prior agreement.
Changes to the oil production scheme were met by arguably larger changes in how oil
money was spent. Readers may recall that in 2005, then-Minister of Economy and Finance
Correa had overseen the replacement of Feirep, an oil-based stabilization fund which slated
70 percent of its expenditures to external debt, with Cereps, a successor which instead
devoted 80 percent of its resources to discretionary spending. Feirep had been created by
a 2002 “Fiscal Transparency Law” limiting deficit spending. In his inauguration speech,
Correa made it clear that these arrangements’ days might be numbered:
Is it not corruption that there exist absurd laws like the Fiscal Transparency
Law, which limits any expenditure except debt servicing?
Was it not corruption, the barbarity called the Fund for Stabilization, Social
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and Productive Investment, and Reduction of Public Debt—the sadly famous
FEIREP—that with the resources brought by new petroleum extraction guar-
anteed the payment of debt and its repurchase ahead of schedule? In this way,
they have robbed us of our money, our natural resources, our sovereignty...
although the majority of these deeds, for having been sanctioned by corrupt
laws, will remain unpunished, on the 26th of November of 2006 the Ecuado-
rian people condemned their authors and executors to the dustbin of history.15
(Correa, 2007)
In May 2008, Correa scrapped Cereps entirely.16 The institutional barriers to a return to
large-scale deficit financing were coming down.
The end of the stabilization funds was an important legal change, but not the most impor-
tant one of Correa’s first two years in office. In September 2008, a new Constitution was
approved. The document’s 444 articles do not bear systematic explanation here, but I will
isolate several of interest from an international business perspective.17 One had to do with
the roots of the previous crisis: the new Constitution established that monetary policy was
formulated by the executive branch and implemented through the Central Bank (Govern-
ment of Ecuador, 2008, Article 302). This raised the possibility that the president could
order an inflationary monetary policy to generate a short-term boom, potentially leading to
a longer-term bust, as had happened in the late 1990s. Another article of the 2008 Constitu-
15Translation by author from original Spanish. Original:
¿Acaso no es corrupción la existencia de leyes absurdas como la Ley de Transparencia Fiscal, que
limita cualquier gasto, menos el servicio de la deuda?
¿Acaso no fue corrupción esa barbaridad llamada Fondo de Estabilización, Inversión y Reducción
del Endeudamiento Público –el tristemente célebre FEIREP- que con los recursos de la nueva extracción
petrolera garantizaba el pago de deuda y recompraba ésta en forma anticipada y pre anunciada? De esta
forma, nos han robado nuestro dinero, nuestros recursos naturales, nuestra soberanía. . . Pese a que la
mayoría de estos hechos, por haber estado amparados en leyes corruptas, quedarán en la impunidad, el 26
de Noviembre del 2006 el pueblo ecuatoriano ya condenó a sus autores y actores al basurero de la historia.
16Technically, Cereps funds were transferred to the Savings and Contingency Fund (Fondo de Ahorro y
Contingencia), which carried few restrictions. See legal guidance at (Correa, 2008).
17See text of constitution at Government of Ecuador (2008).
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tion held that Ecuador could no longer participate in international arbitration outside Latin
America (Government of Ecuador, 2008, Article 422). On one hand, this preserved the
possibility of transnational arrangements with other regional states, especially Venezuela.
On the other, Occidental could not expect much from its ongoing lawsuit, and any would-
be investors would have to take notice as well. On a related note, another article allows
for state expropriation of private assets “for reasons of public utility or social and national
interest.”18 Future investors could not reasonably expect secure tenure.
Garzón and D. Castro (2018, p. 32) note that in the same year, Ecuador altered its procure-
ment law to allow non-competitive bids if an outside party were to put up at least 75 percent
of a project’s financing. While not actually part of the Constitution, the new procurement
law reinforced some of its changes. As the World Bank and many private actors were either
exiting or developing jitters, there would be a need to find replacements. Several countries
would offer tied, non-competitive financing packages—Russia and Venezuela were part of
the picture—but China dwarfed the competition in raw financial terms.
Before moving forward to China’s large-scale entry, however, there is one last major change
to cover: Ecuador’s December 2008 default on part of its sovereign debt. The previous sec-
tion discussed how following the 1998-2000 financial crisis, President Gustavo Noboa had
entered a debt swap trading bonds in default for a new set of Global Bonds offered in the
United States and Europe. His political rivals accused of him using the funds toward his
own financial interests, or simply of giving up too much to international creditors in order
to maintain access to markets. Correa opened an investigation into Ecuador’s debt, leading
to a September 2008 report which found evidence of “illegality” and ”irregularities.” The
report alleged that Ecuador received too little for its bonds in default; was asked to put
18Author’s translation from Spanish: por razones de utilidad pública o interés social y nacional. Govern-
ment of Ecuador (2008, Article 323).
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up an excessive amount of collateral for the deal; that the investment bank Salomon Smith
Barney had acted without a legal contract and had improperly used $724 million in Ecuado-
rian funds put up as collateral; and that the bonds were not legally callable before most had
reached their maturity date and thus could not be forceably traded for new ones (Comisión
de Auditoría Integral del Crédito Público, 2008, pp. 39–41, 180–82). The crux of the ar-
gument was not that the previous government had not agreed to the creditors’ terms but
that the whole arrangement—hiring a foreign investment bank and taking a loss and pledg-
ing collateral as part of a default settlement—was part of a military government’s plan to
raid the coffers of a country in turmoil and was thus inherently illegitimate. From the per-
spective of the investors, this was an unwarranted attack on a plan that had already been
negotiated and put into place eight years prior; from Correa’s perspective, it was righting
the wrongs of his country’s past leadership.19 In December 2008, Ecuador formally entered
into default on $3.2 billion of debt related to the 2000 swap, despite having an abundance
of money in the state coffers to make payments.
Whatever the merits of Correa’s case, the message received by investors was that no legal
contract was safe in Ecuador (Ray and Chimienti, 2015, pp. 12–13). All of these changes
generally raised investor perceptions of political risk. As the Bretton Woods institutions and
many private firms withdrew, Ecuador was now going to turn to a country whose methods
of doing business were better suited for environments in which expropriation or misappro-
priation were major concerns and the rule of law was anything but stable.
China Enters: Presales and Resource-Backed Loans Correa had painted himself into a
corner: he needed money to pursue his electoral mandate for a “citizen’s revolution” (rev-
olución ciudadana) dismantling Ecuador’s structures of systemic poverty and inequality,
19A financial sector perspective on this can be found in Zeledon (2009).
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but this came with a steep price tag, and many sources of finance had disappeared (D. Cas-
tro Salgado, 2019, p. 313). In June 2009, Ecuador took tepid steps toward reestablishing
relations with private creditors by buying back most of the bonds in default. However, the
purchase was made at only 35 percent of the bonds’ face value after markets had largely
given up on them (Economist, 2009). Leaked video of a former Correa official also suggests
that the administration may have intended to use default to push bond prices downward to
facilitate an easier buyback, and bondholders could hardly trust them not to do the same
again (Economist, 2007).
Notable goals of the Correa administration included addressing electricity shortages by
harnessing the hydroelectric potential of rivers flowing from the Andes; boosting domestic
oil refining capacity; and generally spending more in social sectors. Limited amounts of
money also came from Brazil,20 Venezuela, and Russia, but only China had both the ability
to deal with Ecuador’s elevated political risk and deep enough pockets to fund Correa’s
initiatives.
China’s financing to Ecuador was not only to change quantitatively, but also qualitatively.
China’s limited outreach to Ecuador pre-Correa had mostly been through equity invest-
ments. Under the new political environment, these were increasingly untenable. PetroChina
and Sinopec’s investments were commuted into service contracts along with those of other
foreign oil companies. Hutchison’s thirty-year investment in the Manta port also fell
through. Correa, frustrated with lower levels of shipping traffic than anticipated, attempted
to renegotiate the contract to remove tourism and industrial zones that Hutchison hoped to
use as cash cows. Hutchison delayed planned investments in response to Ecuadorian de-
mands, and in January 2009, Correa told the press that he was issuing Hutchison a “yellow
20Relations with Brazil were complicated by Ecuador’s default on a loan to BNDES, Brazil’s national
development bank, on similar grounds to those used to justify the sovereign bond default.
6.2. CHINA’S RESOURCE SECURITY IN ANDEAN SOUTH AMERICA 283
card,” referring to football officials’ warnings to players short of expelling them. In Febu-
rary 2009, Hutchison left (Kueffner, 2009; Leung and Chiu, 2009; El Universo, 2009b;
Ellis, 2014, pp. 173–74). In July 2009, Correa opted not to renew the American military’s
lease at the Manta airbase, and there was some discussion of using to boost trans-Pacific
travel, but this also never came to pass (Ellis, 2014, p. 132). Discussion of an inland corri-
dor from Manta also fizzled.
In the meantime, however, Manta did attract one major new equity investment commitment.
In July 2008, Ecuador and Venezuela signed a deal to build the mammoth Refinery of the
Pacific in the area, the idea for which had been circulating for some time. Ecuador was to
own 51 percent of the project, with the Venezuelan national oil firm Petróleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA) owning the remainder. The expected price tag was US $6 billion, or 9.7 percent
of Ecuador’s GDP (Reuters, 2008b).21 The deal’s geostrategic implications were not hid-
den. Rafael Correa made the announcement standing alongside Venezuelan President Hugo
Chávez and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega at Manta Air Base, where American air-
men and women were at that point still stationed. Villavicencio (2013, pp. 176–77) points
out that the Pacific Coast refinery could allow for processed fuel export to Asia without the
use of the Panama Canal. This confirms the theory’s predictions for the impact of geostrate-
gic importance on development finance for both Venezuela and, in a different way, China.
China may care about energy transit through the Panama Canal but at the end of the day
has much more direct interest in Eurasia. The opposite is true for Venezuela, which was
willing to risk large sums via equity. Venezuela later backed out due to lack of funding, and
China agreed to buy part of PDVSA’s stake, but even this fell through (Comercio, 2014).
The project was ultimately scrapped.
21The World Bank (2018c) estimated 2008 Ecuadorian GDP at $61.76 billion.
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China’s move away from equity was the beginning of its oil-backed loans to Ecuador.
These came in two types. First was the “pre-sale,”22 or a simple purchase order trading
cash up front for oil deliveries later according to a predetermined schedule. An interest rate
connects the value of the oil deliveries to the value of the upfront payment; in effect, the
buyer receives a discount for paying ahead of time. Pre-sale payments are also untied to any
specific use. Pre-sales are technically not loans but advanced payment for exports, meaning
that they are not included in any of the databases of loans used for quantitative analysis
earlier in this chapter, but I include them here due to their relevance for true “loans” which
followed. The second type is the more familiar resource-backed loan in which there is an
actual loan contract labeled as such with funds destined (at least partially) for Chinese-built
construction projects. In the Ecuadorian case (as in many others), smaller oil-backed loan
agreements were signed alongside larger oil purchase orders, meaning that only a minority
of purchase orders would be slated for loan repayment (K. P. Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski,
2012, pp. 5–6; Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, p. 26).
Table 6.4 lists China’s oil-backed financing packages to Ecuador.
22Spanish: preventa or venta anticipada.
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The first pre-sale came in July 2009, several months after the Manta port deal had fallen
through. China agreed to forward $1 billion to Ecuador, repayable over two years at 7.25
percent interest. These terms could be viewed as very favorable or very unfavorable, de-
pending on one’s perspective. On one hand, the annual interest rate was to be the second-
highest of all of the oil deals, and its two-year repayment period without an initial grace
would be tied with the other pre-sale as the toughest. On the other, unlike tied loans, the
funds were not directed to any particular project, a fact much appreciated by a govern-
ment in the process of increasing social sector spending. The funds went directly from
PetroChina to Petroecuador, the state-owned oil firm; at the beginning of 2011, as Ecuador
was repaying the loan, the Ecuadorian press reported that Petroecuador planned to invest
$549.7 million in exploration and production but transfer $2.4 billion to the state budget
(El Universo, 2011e). It is difficult to know what these numbers would have been absent
China’s cash injection, but the oil sector and state budget both benefited to some extent.
The pricing of the oil within the deal is of ambiguous benefit to Ecuador. The deal (along
with the rest of China’s deals) gave Ecuador less for its oil than other purchases around the
same time. Villavicencio (2013) sees this as a sign of predatory strong-arming, but it could
also be construed as PetroChina receiving a discount for ordering larger volumes smaller
competitors. I take no position on how to compare prices paid by China with those paid by
others, but will instead compare successive Chinese deals.
The next Chinese deal was the first oil-backed loan proper. Its interest rate was lower—at
6.00 percent, the lowest that was to be offered—although the price paid was also lower.
K. P. Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski (2012, p. 9) see oil collateralization as driving down in-
terest rates by managing risk. Indeed, we can see that of the deals in the early (2009-2011)
period—that is to say, while Ecuador’s financial position was still somewhat stronger—the
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oil-backed loans tended to carry lower rates and longer payback periods. This is because
they are at least partially expressly directed to Chinese projects, meaning the risk of mis-
appropriation or non-repayment is attenuated.
However, this loan came with a much larger string attached: opening an Amazonian na-
tional park for drilling. The Correa administration’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative, named after
Yasuní National Park and the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) oilfields beneath it,
sought to raise $3.6 billion to compensate Ecuador for not drilling in the park. Yasuní
was important both in its location at a rainforest biodiversity hotspot and as the location
of much of Ecuador’s remaining untapped oil. Villavicencio (2013) estimated that as of
2007, Ecuador’s existing oilfields had roughly ten years of left at current production levels,
meaning the park would be critical to future oil exports. The conservation initiative cer-
tainly catered to Correa’s base and may have been meant to prove a point about the actual
depth of the rich world’s commitment to conservation, and it never actually raised even
$1 billion (Vidal, 2012). Documents from the 2009 negotiations leaked to the Guardian
state that “the Ecuadorian party has said it will do all it can to help PetroChina and An-
des Petroleum explore ITT and Block 31.”23 This was while the Yasuní-ITT Initiative was
(publicly) alive and actively raising funds. Correa might have ultimately decided to drill in
the park anyway, but it was politically costly, especially with respect to indigenous rights
groups and environmentalists in his political base. China was taking a tough position to
promote its commercial goals in a way that created a cold coincidence of economic inter-
ests but probably not many feelings of diplomatic warmth.
In exchange for pledging what China wanted most, Ecuador was able to secure what was
otherwise a fairly favorable bargain. The leaked documents from Ecuador’s Ministry
23D. Hill (2014). Original document at Ministerio de Coordinación de la Política Económica (2014).
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of Economic Policy Coordination provide an unusual level of detail about negotiators’
closed-door experiences. One chart lists China’s and Ecuador’s interests. China’s goals
were:
Chinese objectives:
1. To secure the provision of crude to PetroChina in the medium term
2. To specify the nature of CDB’s financial operations
3. To secure the participation of Chinese firms and contractors in the execution
of projects
4. To strengthen bilateral relations under the spirit of cooperation
Ecuadorian objectives:
1. To access a line of credit on favorable conditions for the financing of
priority projects
2. To strengthen relations with a strategic ally24
Source: Ministerio de Coordinación de la Política Económica (2014, p. 5).
Text coloring and emphasis in original.
The listing of objectives is highly consistent with the predictions of Chapter 3. Ecuador
anticipated that China would drive the hardest bargain on oil, placing it at the top of the
list and in boldface and different text coloring. Next were China Development Bank’s and
the firms’ interests; a realistic fourth were diplomatic relations. Ecuador did not even list
oil exports among its interests. Drilling in Yasuní was being done for a greater good, but
24Translation by author. Original Spanish:
Objetivo chino
1. Asegurarse la provisión de crudo en el mediano plazo para Petrochina
2. Concretar operación financiera para BDC
3. Asegurar la participación de empresas y contratistas chinos en ejecución de proyectos
4. Fortalecer relaciones bilaterales bajo espíritu de cooperación
Objetivos Ecuador
1. Acceder a una línea de crédito en condiciones favorables para financiamiento de proyectos
prioritarios
2. Fortalecer las relaciones con un aliado estratégico
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Ecuador did not relish doing it. The point was, to use their own words, “financing of priority
projects,” which as will be covered in the next section refer mostly to large power sector
and other infrastructure works. Ecuador also more highly rated geostrategic priorities,
leaving them in boldface and using fairly strong language—the PRC as a matter of course
never uses the word “ally,” for example. Ecuador was aware of its strategic vulnerability
as it distanced itself from the United States, but also understood that this was a peripheral
concern to China.
This accurate understanding of China’s interests led Ecuador to get much of what it wanted.
China’s original proposal called for an eight-year guarantee provision in the loan; this
was bartered down to two years (Ministerio de Coordinación de la Política Económica,
2014, p. 7). China also asked for the loan to be split between $500 million toward in-
frastructure and energy projects and another $500 million tied to Chinese-built projects;
Ecuador bargained their way to $800 million completely untied and “$200 million to pri-
ority projects defined by the Government of Ecuador and that can be executed by Chinese
firms if they win the bidding processes” (emphasis in original) (Ministerio de Coordi-
nación de la Política Económica, 2014, p. 8).25 The boldface again tells an important story:
Ecuador was concerned about China’s tying of contracts and wanted to avoid them. It also
says quite a bit about China’s priorities, as the open-procurement stipulation in this deal
was against China Development Bank’s normal operating procedures. Writing such a large
blank check to Correa’s government was highly risky and shows how far China was willing
to go for a chance at the ITT oilfields.
In practice, as will be discussed in the following section, very few non-Chinese firms were
25Translation by author from Spanish: “$200 millones destinados a proyectos prioritarios definido por
Gobierno Ecuatoriano y que podrían ser ejecutados por empresas chinas en proceso de ganar procesos de
licitación.
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to win bids on any of the projects, although it is hard to ascertain how much of this was
due to Chinese government pressure, Chinese firms’ inherent cost competitiveness, or other
countries’ firms’ apprehensions about the Ecuadorian market. Still, the fact that Ecuador
saw it fit to specify open bidding demonstrates that they saw the tying of loans as an im-
position. One Ecuadorian press article cited oil sector veteran and journalist Fernando
Villavicencio in an article on the credit line:
For the petroleum expert Fernando Villavicencio, these negotiations with China
generate not just an economic dependency but also a technological dependency
on that country.
He also mentioned that this technology has been questioned. Villavicencio
further criticized the fact that there had been no open bids to guarantee quality
and price and that the loan contract indicating that $200 million should go to
the state-owned firm Petroecuador had been violated.26 (El Universo, 2011a)
Tied loans take away borrower choice of project technology, potentially for decades, and
remove incentives to control costs and build high quality works. A report by El Universo
(2011a) also mentions some controversy about the destination of the funds. The final ver-
sion of the plan had apparently specified that of Ecuador’s “priority projects,” $400 million
in funds would flow through Petroecuador. Given the fluid financial boundary between
Petroecuador and the Ecuadorian state coffers, there is no guarantee that all of this money
would go to oil-sector investment to repay China’s loans, but at least some of it would. The
article continues to specify that Correa diverted $100 million of this amount to a public
26Translation by author. Original Spanish:
Para el experto petrolero Fernando Villavicencio, estas negociaciones con China generan, además de
la dependencia económica, una dependencia tecnológica frente a ese país.
También mencionó que esta tecnología ha sido cuestionada. Villavicencio critica además que no se
realicen licitaciones para garantizar la calidad y el precio y que se haya violentado el contrato de crédito
que indicaba que los $ 200 millones debían ir a la empresa pública Petroecuador.
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security initiative. This was not China’s decision, but it does indicate their priorities. They
were willing to entertain Correa’s diversion of funds from a sector that could help repay
the loan to one that could not at least partially because China National Electronics Import
& Export received the $100 million contract for an emergency call system (El Tiempo,
2011). What’s more, the another $100 million to the oil sector went to fund a PetroChina
subsidiary’s participation in pipeline development (El Universo, 2011a).
One more bone of contention emerged between China and Ecuador: to whom the oil was
sold. As for many oil exporters, Ecuador had long sold much of its oil to trading firms
specializing in “midstream” delivery of oil from producing countries to refineries. These
firms naturally demand a cut of the value chain. Many of them, and especially large firms
such as Glencore and Trafigura, exercise significant influence over global commodity mar-
kets. Correa had pledged on the campaign trail to broker deals directly with refineries so
as to avoid these extra costs and indeed made arrangements with buyers in Uruguay and
Venezuela. However, he ultimately struggled to find enough refiners with the interest or fi-
nancial muscle to arrange for transportation by themselves. For the first pre-sale agreement
(July 2009), PetroChina had agreed to go along with this demand. However, for the first
oil-backed loan (June 2010), China scrapped the commitment not to sell to traders, who
were taking the oil mostly to neighboring Latin American markets or the United States.
Allowing the traders to handle transportation to nearby markets was more efficient from
PetroChina’s perspective and was also consistent with the Chinese government’s desire to
use the deal toward energy security (Schneyer and Medina Mora Pérez, 2013a; Villavicen-
cio, 2013, Chapter 2). As Schneyer and Medina Mora Pérez (2013b) put it:
The new oil flows allow China to hedge its exposure to oil prices or disruptions
from suppliers closer to home, including top OPEC producers Saudi Arabia,
Iran and Iraq. [. . . ]
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Less than 2 percent of Ecuador’s oil was shipped to China during the second
quarter, according to Ecuadorean Central Bank data. Instead, at least 214,000
bpd of it wound up in the United States, where many refineries are configured
to process heavy-sour Latin American crude.
Chinese firms serve as middleman in most of the Ecuadorean oil sales, while
keeping a strategic option to divert barrels to China if needed. As China’s trade
grows in the region, U.S. relations have soured with Venezuela and Ecuador,
whose leaders are outspoken U.S. critics.
China could send more oil to the home country in the event of a price shock, but doing so
would cost more in terms of transportation and pose challenges to refining. PetroChina and
Sinopec struck an effective balance between their own profit interests and their government
and largest shareholder’s interest in commodity security. This being a more commercial
than diplomatic endeavor, Ecuador’s preferences were not heeded.
In June 2011, it was reported that Block 14, which had originally been purchased by
PetroChina and Sinopec from EnCana in 2005, had been expanded to include part of Yasuní
National Park (Acosta, 2011). The official policy of waiting for international donations in
lieu of oil revenues was functionally over. Within ten days, another oil-backed line of credit
was agreed to (Amazon Watch, 2014, p. 5). Ecuador had stalled on the informal agreement
to open the new oilfields in exchange for the previous loan, but the promise of further credit
apparently changed this. At $2 billion, the second loan almost doubled the previous $1.2
billion deal. In exchange for opening the park, Ecuador received a degree of discretion
on how to use the funds, although not as much as previously. The $2 billion was divided
between two tranches. The first, of $1.4 billion, carried a higher (7.16 percent) interest rate
but could be used at the Ecuadorian government’s discretion. Notably, it was not collat-
eralized with oil. The remaining $600 million was oil-backed and designated for use in
the oil sector, but carried a lower (6.25 percent) interest rate (D. Castro Salgado, 2019).
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A comparison within a single loan deal illustrates the power of resource collateralization:
borrowing toward oil production and repaying in oil led Ecuador to be charged a lower risk
premium via the interest rate.
The second credit line also illustrates greater concern over governance risk on the part
of China Development Bank. The national budget deficit planned for that year reached
$3.7 billion, including major pay raises for public employees (Ecuador Inmediato, 2011).
The elimination of institutional barriers to unsustainable deficit spending was beginning to
show. Ecuador was also heavily reliant on higher-risk oil production from new deposits,
notably in Yasuní. According to one member of the National Assembly, 75 percent of
Ecuador’s oil already went to Chinese firms (El Universo, 2011c). CDB had uncharac-
teristically allowed 80 percent of the first credit line to be lent with no real conditions on
how it was used, but this time exercised more caution, cutting the discretionary portion of
the loan 70 percent and specifying that it be used for infrastructure. This way, CDB could
at least ensure that the funds would go toward something that generated income and not
social benefits or public sector pay which, regardless of their other merits, would not cre-
ate enough short-term return to service high-interest loans. Designation for infrastructure
could also compensate for increasing risk by channeling money toward Chinese firms in
need of overseas contracts. China was also tougher about enforcing its interest in commit-
ting more—30 percent, versus 20 previously—of the funds toward oil production, both for
its national energy security purposes and to make sure enough oil was being drilled to meet
payments to CDB.
By the end of June 2011, China’s concerns were to a certain extent balanced out by a
second $1 billion pre-sale agreement, which by its nature did not slate funding toward any
particular end. The second pre-sale was generally similar to the first, albeit with a slightly
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lower price premium. However, even this relatively no-strings-attached deal demonstrated
greater caution than came previously. It was a smaller portion of overall lending: its $1
billion came next to a more demanding $2 billion deal, while the first $1 billion had come
almost a year before a smaller ($1.2 billion) and less demanding oil-backed loan.
By 2012, Ecuador’s budget situation had not improved. In the first nine months of that
year, Ecuador ran a $1.2 billion deficit even after accounting for new borrowing; without the
proceeds of new borrowing, that number rose to $3.3 billion (Subsecretaria de Contabilidad
Gubernamental, Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas del Ecuador, 2012b). In contrast,
the Ecuadorian government had $2.4 billion in liquid assets on hand (Subsecretaria de
Contabilidad Gubernamental, Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas del Ecuador, 2012a).
Ecuador approached China for more money, but China held out until December 2012, when
the third credit line was approved. As far as the oil sector was concerned, China drove a
hard bargain: the associated purchase orders led to Chinese firms’ control of 90 percent of
crude exports (Schneyer and Medina Mora Pérez, 2013b). This was particularly damaging
from Ecuador’s perspective because it meant there was little oil left over to sell on the
“spot market,” as the marketplace for short-term sales of commodities outside of contract
is known. Buyers of commodities under large contracts typically receive a discount for
buying in bulk and committing to years of future purchases. So, Ecuador missed out on the
opportunity to sell much of its oil at a higher price, further complicating its fiscal situation
(Argus Media, 2017; Villavicencio, 2013).
In exchange, though, China offered Ecuador a favorable deal in other ways. Of the $2
billion lent, $1.4 billion was for budgetary support. This was not oil-backed and was essen-
tially discretionary (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; Garzón and D. Castro, 2018). The
remainder was split between two tranches of $300 million each. The first of these went
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toward sectors unrelated to oil, especially health but also security. The health and security
projects were carried out by Chinese firms, although it is unclear whether that was a de jure
requirement of the loan or a less formal arrangement. The second $300M tranche was oil-
backed and slated for the energy sector (Ecuavisa, 2013; Villavicencio, 2013, pp. 118–19;
Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, p. 27). As in the previous cases, the oil-backed component
carried a lower interest rate (6.87 percent) than the other parts (7.19 percent), but the gap
shrank. This 0.32 percentage point differential stands in contrast to the 0.91 percentage
point gap between the oil-backed (6.25 percent) and non-oil-backed (7.16 percent) parts of
the second credit line (June 2011). As Ecuador ran out of oil production to mortgage, the
risk management value of oil collateralization was dwindling as well.
At this point, China had secured as much oil output as it feasibly could, and only 15 percent
of the financing package was backed by crude. Indeed, the $1.4 billion in discretionary
funding matched up well with the $1.2 billion in remaining financing needs as of the third
quarter of 2012. At this point, China’s actions fell in something of a gray area between
the theory’s predictions for loans and for treatment of distressed debt. The theory predicts
tougher treatment where resource security is involved. If we look at the third (2012) credit
line as a loan, then this prediction is borne out: China got as much oil as it could. The
directly oil-related part of the package was only $300 million, however, and it is best to
look at the $1.4 billion in discretionary spending in particular as a de facto refinancing of
Ecuador’s debt. Because of its oil interests, China could not allow Ecuador to default, and it
certainly could not allow a situation in which Petroecuador began cutting production due to
lack of funding.27 So, China lent just enough to keep Ecuador solvent, but did not actually
demand any less in the way of commodities.
27This is what happened in Venezuela. See Kaplan and Penfold (2019).
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The oil-backed loans had, at least for the time being, run their course. China refocused
on using the existing credit lines to generate business for its firms, as well as to ensure
that funds were being spent on projects that could generate return. No further oil-backed
loans would be issued until 2016; these will be covered in Section 6.2.1.3. No further pre-
sales have been made to this date. However, before we move forward to events after the
credit boom, we should first cover what was done with the money and how it also reflects
a delicate dance between Chinese and Ecuadorian interests.
Where Did the Money Go? This section will cover all Chinese-built projects until the oil
price crash of mid-2014. I begin with two sections on loans: first to the energy sector, which
played a central role in the Correa administration’s development strategy, and then to other
projects. These loans include both those withdrawn under the oil-backed China Develop-
ment Bank lines of credit as well as others receiving individual project-based financing.
It is usually possible to establish whether any given project was part of an oil-backed line
of credit, and I will make this distinction on a case-by-case basis. However, Ecuador fre-
quently drew from several oil-backed lines of credit at once, and is difficult to know which
line of credit backed a given project.28 Because the previous section already outlined the
differences between lines of credit, I will not dwell on them here. After the loans, I proceed
to China’s handful of equity investments in Ecuador during this time period before moving
on to freelance contracts.
Loans for Energy: Hydroelectric and Oil Power, and particularly hydroelectric power,
was part of Correa’s plan for Ecuador from the beginning. Rivers and streams flowing down
the slopes of the Andes provide ample potential for extra electrical output, and lower elec-
28D. Castro Salgado (2019) helpfully narrows down these possibilities (e.g., “The dam was funded by
either Line of Credit II or III”), but further available information remains fairly limited.
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tricity prices could contribute to both further industrialization and an improved standard
of living. Correa’s original energy plan was to double electrical capacity and increase hy-
dropower’s share of the total from 53 percent when he took office to an eventual 90 percent.
He also ran for office on an environmentalist platform and despite the events surrounding
the Yasuní-ITT Initiative took zero-carbon energy fairly seriously in Ecuador’s domestic
electricity generation. A move to hydropower would carry obvious positives for pollution,
a common concern for many city dwellers (Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, pp. 32–33). On
a less positive note, these projects were on some level trophies to bolster Correa’s image
among the electorate. Technical experts have expressed doubt that a small country such as
Ecuador could use all of the electrical capacity being built (Lozano, 2019). One critical
journalist refers to them as “Pharaoh-esque works” (obras faraónicas) built as quickly as
possible without much foresight (Villavicencio, 2013, Prologue). Fast-paced construction
of large projects with uncertain economic prospects is a risky endeavor, meaning that China
took extra care to protect its interests. Apart from oil collateralization, this also meant mea-
sures such as non-competitive tied bids and sovereign guarantees. I begin with the dams,
followed by a smaller number of fossil fuel projects.
During Correa’s term, Ecuador began work on eight new dams, seven of which were built
by Chinese firms and six of which were funded by China (Garzón and D. Castro, 2018,
p. 34; Lozano, 2019). The non-Chinese exceptions include one Brazilian-financed and
Brazilian-built project as well as another financed by Russia but built by a Chinese firm.
All of these are BRICS members whose governments are less averse to using public funds
to protect their firms in high-risk markets29; however, as is generally the case globally,
China’s deeper pockets propel it into a dominant position. I summarize the dams here in
29Sierra (2017) and Stuenkel (2015).
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sequence, including the lone non-Chinese project as a comparison case.
The first and largest project was the Coca Codo Sinclair dam. Accounting for 30 percent
of national electricity demand by itself, the dam was the centerpiece of Ecuador’s mod-
ernization drive. At the project’s signing ceremony, Correa stated that “The signing of
the contract is the largest foreign investment in the country’s history, without having to
kneel in front of anyone [...] and during a full international economic crisis.”30 (El Uni-
verso, 2009a; Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, pp. 39–41) Rhetoric aside, though, the reality
of the deal was not particularly lopsided in Ecuador’s favor. The dam had originally been
agreed to in February 2008 as a joint venture between Ecuadorian state-owned power firm
Termopichincha (70 percent ownership) and the Argentine state-owned firm Energías de
Argentina (ENARSA; 30 percent ownership), which was also expected to provide 30 per-
cent of financing. In September 2009, only a year and a half later, Ecuador bought out
Argentina’s share for only $5.5 million. Argentina’s departure was variously attributed to
a lack of resources, concerns about the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, and Ecuador’s
constitutional changes establishing state control over the energy sector (Power Technology,
2019b; Yao Yang, 2018, p. 1; Vallejo et al., 2018, p. 4). The implications were that the
project was too risky for Argentina’s tastes; that Argentina (and most others) did not have
the resources to build the project; and that equity investments continued to be difficult in
Ecuador.
Whatever actually happened, a delegation from China Exim arrived in Quito to negotiate a
new deal only a week after Argentina’s departure, and newspapers were already reporting
that Exim was considering bankrolling 85 percent of the project (El Comercio, 2009b).
In a context of high risk, equity was being replaced with debt. Soon after, a new bid for
30Translation by author. Original Spanish: La firma del contrato es la mayor inversión extranjera en la
historia del país, sin tener que arrodillarnos ante nadie (...) y en plena crisis económica internacional.
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the construction contract was conducted under Ecuador’s new semi-competitive bidding
system. As was discussed in Section 6.2.1.2, this new system allowed bidders to jump to
the head of the queue by providing 75 percent or more of project financing. D. C. Castro
Salgado (2014) elaborates:
The contracting was conditioned on financing, which was a great limitation
to many bidders. As expected, the only firms capable of meeting the require-
ments were Chinese. Over the course of the auctioning process, there were
presented only two bids. One met under the preestablished requirements: the
Sinohydro-Andes Consortium (later only the Sinohydro Corporation of China,
after Constructora Andes left the consortium and the Chinese firm decided to
continue negotiations on its own [...]31 (62)
Another of Correa’s institutional changes, the new bidding system, de facto did away with
market competition, removing the majority of private firms without immediate access to
millions in loans for a high-risk project and leaving only Sinohydro. At the project’s signing
ceremony, the Chinese Ambassador nodded to the risk issue, stating that “where others see
risk, we see opportunities, and this country has many opportunities to grow” (El Tiempo,
2009).32
The lack of competition opened the door to cost inflation or cutting corners on quality
with impunity, but it also meant that Correa could move quickly and show visible results
without relying on private multinationals. The contract with Sinohydro was signed in Oc-
tober 2009, leading to a period of wrangling over loan terms. China Exim wanted a series
31Translation by author. Original Spanish: La contratación estaba condicionada al financiamiento, lo cual
implicaba un gran limitante para muchos de los oferentes. Tal como se esperaba, las únicas capaces de
cumplir con los requisitos serían las empresas chinas. En el transcurso de la convocatoria, se presentaron
solo dos oferentes; uno fue calificado y cumplió con los requisitos preestablecidos: el Consorcio Sinohydro-
Andes (posteriormente sólo Sinohydro Corporation de China, ya que la Constructora Andes se retiró del
consorcio y la empresa china decidió continuar las negociaciones por su propia cuenta) [...]
32Translation by author. Original Spanish: Donde otros ven riesgo, nosotros vemos oportunidades y este
país tiene muchas oportunidades de crecer.
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of stipulations to manage risk, and these did not sit well with the Correa administration.
China asked for a sovereign guarantee using assets of the Central Bank of Ecuador as
collateral. Ecuador balked, at least partially because this may have violated parts of the
new constitution (Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, p. 39). As Correa himself put it, “All of
a sudden, negotiating with China is worse than with the IMF. They’re asking for incred-
ible guarantees.” These guarantees were “really attacks on sovereignty,” he continued,
and expressed his concern that the trajectory of relations with China were on the line (El
Comercio, 2009a).33 This dissertation’s theory treats both collateralization and IMF condi-
tionality as unwelcome impositions on borrowers. President Correa apparently concurred,
and unsuccessfully attempted to shop the Coca Codo deal with groups in Korea, Russia,
and possibly others (Ellis, 2014, p. 143).34
The deal proceeded, and in June 2010, China Exim agreed to fund 85 percent of the project
with a $1.68 billion credit (Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, pp. 38–39). It is unclear whether
the central bank guarantee remained part of the deal, but either way, a more familiar type
of risk management tool was used: repayment in oil. China Exim funded its share on a
traditional cash basis, but the 15 percent for which Ecuador was responsible was funded
via an agreement to sell oil to China (Harris, 2014a; Hydro Review, 2009). This is not
technically an oil-backed loan, since the “oil-backed” and “loan” parts of the deal were
separate, but it did provide a degree of extra security for Sinohydro, and indirectly for
Exim as well. Apart from guarantees of commodity security, there was also an implicit
guarantee of Chinese export interests: Garzón and D. Castro (2018, pp. 42–43) report that
75 percent of project components were imported from China. This has implications not just
33Translation by author. Original Spanish: De repente negociar con China es peor que con el FMI, nos
estaban pidiendo unas garantías increíbles [...]
34El Comercio (2010) says groups from the United Kingdom, Spain, and Iran were also consulted.
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for short-term trade statistics but also for trade in spare parts well into the future (Mattlin
and Nojonen, 2015).
The Sopladora project also had its origins before the Correa administration but was enacted
around the same time as Coca Codo. Sopladora had been planned since 2006 and was
unique in that it was not actually a dam but an underground hydroelectric facility making
use of the runoff from an existing dam (Harris, 2016). Ecuador held a (technically) open
bid in 2009 but, again, asked bidders to provide at least 75 percent of project financing.
The tendering process went similarly to that for Coca Codo: twelve companies bid, but
only China’s Gezhouba, in partnership with Ecuador’s Fopeca, had the financial backing
to meet the Ecuadorian government’s request (D. Castro Salgado, 2019, p. 65). In October
2011, after a period of negotiation, China Exim agreed to a $571.3 million loan. One
interview-based report states that the loan was conditioned on Ecuador’s acceptance of
a new oil pre-sale agreement, the proceeds of which would flow into an Exim collateral
account (Lucci, 2017, p. 9). This has not been confirmed elsewhere, but if true, it would
mean that Exim has also used commodities as collateral in Ecuador. Exim has done this in
many other countries, especially in Africa, but Ecuador’s major oil-backed credit lines were
all handled by CDB. Exim later continued its backing of Coca Codo and Sopladora in 2013
with a $509.2 million loan to Harbin Electric to build the transmission lines connecting the
hydropower plants to the national grid (Bnamericas, 2013; Garzón and D. Castro, 2018,
p. 27).
A group of three dams and a wind farm, on the other hand, were backed by the known
oil-backed CDB credit lines. In late 2011 and early 2012, a total of roughly $680 million
in financing from the credit lines went to the Delsitanisagua dam, built by Power Construc-
tion Corporation subsidiary HydroChina; the Mazar Dudas dam, built by China National
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Electric Engineering Company (CNEEC); the Quijos dam, also built by CNEEC; and the
Villonaco wind farm, built by Xinjiang Goldwind (REVE, 2011; PennWell, 2012; Ellis,
2014, p. 62). All of these put together sum to less money than the Coca Codo project by
itself, and scarcely exceed the value of Sopladora. For the two larger dams, China negoti-
ated project-level terms with more defined budgets and risk-management tools. For these
smaller projects, however, the pre-negotiated line of credit was sufficient. This is consistent
with the idea that China will drive a harder bargain where greater commercial interests are
at stake.
The last of the six Chinese-funded hydroelectric projects was Minas San Francisco. Its
history is somewhat similar to Coca Codo’s in that it previously belonged to another firm
as part of a deal that went bad. In a deal that predated Correa, it was originally built by
Brazil’s Odebrecht and funded by $302 million in credits from the Brazilian Development
Bank (BNDES). The loan also received $150 million in guarantees from the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, the World Bank’s risk insurance wing. The project’s im-
plementation did not go smoothly, however, and a series of technical failures emerged.
Ecuador sought reimbursement and threatened to expel Odebrecht not just from Minas
San Francisco, but also from several other unrelated projects. In September 2008, Correa
sent the military to take control of $800 million in construction project sites and expelled
Odebrecht from the country; two months later, Ecuador filed a lawsuit to stop paying the
BNDES loan which funded the dam (Hydro Review, 2008b; International Rivers, 2008;
Riveras, 2008; Valencia, 2008). After the extreme circumstances under which the project
fell through, few were interested in taking it on, and it sat vacant for several years. Eventu-
ally, in January 2012, Harbin Electric35 was invited without a bidding process to participate
35Per Kirchherr and Matthews (2018), Sinohydro may have been involved as well.
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(Wangyi Caijing⇣Q◆"œ⌘, 2012; D. C. Castro Salgado, 2014, pp. 67–68). In April
2013, Harbin Electric received a $312.5 million loan from China Exim, which yet again was
entering spaces in which others were not interested (America Economía, 2013; Garzón and
D. Castro, 2018, p. 27).
This was the last of the Chinese-funded dams, but there was one more Chinese-built one.
Odebrecht’s expulsion also left a vacancy at its Toachi-Pilatón hydroelectric project, a
grouping of two dams. Its $452 million million was partially backed by $170 million
from BNDES, with the rest coming a government fund containing oil revenues from as-
sets seized from Occidental after its expulsion (Hydro Review, 2007, 2008a). After the
Brazilian departure, the Export-Import Bank of Russia took BNDES’s place with $123.2
million in credit to facilitate the purchase of equipment from Russia. The rest, a sum of
$250 million, came from Ecuador’s own Social Security Institute Bank (Banco del Instituto
Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social, or “Biess”) (Plan V, 2018). Biess is a state organization
founded in 2009 as part of the 2008 constitutional changes and holds a mandate to admin-
ister Ecuador’s social security funds (Biess, 2012). The new contract went to the Russian
state-owned firm, Inter RAO, which supplied much of the equipment, and the Three Gorges
subsidiary China International Water & Electric (CWE) (Plan V, 2018). Russia used a
fairly similar strategy to China’s to finance the export of equipment toward a project with
a checkered recent history; China made an appearance here not as a funder, but as a free-
lancer making use of money from the Ecuadorian central government and (indirectly) the
risk guarantee provided by Russian state funding to its business partner.36
This leads us to the lone totally non-Chinese dam at Manduriacu. In 2012, Odebrecht was
allowed to reenter the country and won the smaller ($126 million) contract using $90.2
36By 2011 and 2012, the project was beginning to encounter problems with delays and cost overruns.
These will be covered along its more substantial problems post-oil price crash in Section 6.2.1.3.
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million in credits from BNDES (Odebrecht, 2012). This appears to have been a de facto
closed bid: BNDES had agreed to back Odebrecht’s bid six months prior to the actual ten-
der. Odebrecht was already hiring personnel for the project when Ecuadorian government
announced a bid for “invited” firms only (Ecuador Review, 2015). The project was substan-
tially smaller than many others. This could be taken as a sign of some continuing wariness
between Odebrecht and the Ecuadorian government, but may also simply reflect that Coca
Codo in particular had already saturated the market for enormous electricity projects. BN-
DES also backed a much larger share of project value this time: roughly 71.5 percent, as
opposed to 61.4 percent and 37.6 percent of the failed Minas San Francisco and Toachi-
Pilatón deals, respectively.37 Brazil may have been making greater demands on Ecuador
in the way of debt repayment in order to protect Odebrecht against a repeat of previous
events.
Apart from the dams, China was also involved in two fossil fuel projects: an oil-fueled
power plant and an oil refinery. The power plant, named Termoesmeraldas II, was located
in Esmeraldas, the site of Ecuador’s primary existing oil refinery. This allowed for a ready
source of fuel oil, implying a smaller bill for refined imports. In 2011, Harbin Electric
was contracted to build the plant for $101.4 million; 70 percent of this came from the
China Development Bank (Corporación Eléctrica del Ecuador, 2020; Secretaría General
de Comunicación de la Presidencia, 2008). This represented a small step toward energy
independence, but Ecuador hoped to make much larger cuts to its imports of refined fuels.
This would have come from the refinery, which as discussed in Section 6.2.1.2 was highly
ambitious for the size of Ecuador’s market and was ultimately canceled.
37Estimates based on loan and contract values in Garzón and D. Castro (2018, p. 36) for Minas San Fran-
cisco and Manduriacu and Hydro Review (2008a) for Toachi-Pilatón, the original Brazilian loan for which
was replaced by the later Russian one in Garzón and Castro’s figures.
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Loans for Other Infrastructure The 2010-2011 rush of activity in the hydroelectric
sector tapered off as the government’s plans moved off the drawing boards and into im-
plementation. However, many of these dams—especially the larger ones—were financed
on a project-specific basis, leaving the oil-backed lines of credit available for other use.
Especially after the dam projects were underway, a stream of non-energy items began to
draw Chinese financing.
One early such loan came in 2009, when Exim pledged $50 million toward the purchase
of two Chinese-built transport planes for the Ecuadorian Air Force. This deal fell through
due to Ecuador’s request that engine and other components be manufactured in Ecuador
(El Universo, 2011d). This is weak evidence in favor of the tradeoff between commercial
and geostrategic interests: for a country with major geostrategic significance for China, the
Chinese government might have nudged Exim and Xi’an Aircraft (the manufacturer) into
taking a financial hit on the deal, but not in faraway South America.
The rest of the deals are a hodgepodge of assorted items. In the period before the mid-
2014 oil price drop, the China Development Bank oil-backed loans went toward a flood
control project at Chone ($52 million; 2011); the ECU 911 emergency response and po-
lice surveillance system ($240 million; 2012); a related Transporte Seguro (“safe transit”)
system installing cameras and help buttons on public transit ($107.6 million; 2013); and
five hospitals ($325.9 million; 2013) (Fox, 2012; Ellis, 2014, pp. 62–63; Xinhua, 2015;
El Universo, 2017a; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; D. Castro Salgado, 2019, p. 310).
Per D. Castro Salgado (2019, p. 310), these were all part of Credit Lines I-III and as such
carried interest rates between 6.00 and 7.19 percent.
In the interim, in 2013, Exim added one more project: an $80 million loan to expand the
roadway leading to Quito’s airport. This loan charged only 2 percent interest and was
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payable over twenty years with a five-year grace period (Ministerio de Relaciones Ex-
teriores y Movilidad Humana, 2012; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; Garzón and D.
Castro, 2018, p. 28). These terms are obviously quite different from the higher-interest,
oil-collateralized CDB loans previously mentioned. Another outlier also came in 2013, in
the form of a $298.9 million loan from the Bank of China, a Big Four commercial bank, and
the Hong Kong branch of Deutsche Bank.38 This loan, which went toward the large Cañar
y Naranjal flood control project, was repayable over fourteen years with four years grace
and a variable interest rate of the six-month LIBOR rate plus 3.5 percent (Dreher, Fuchs,
Parks, et al., 2018; Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, p. 28). Since LIBOR rates were below 1
percent at that point, this was also more favorable than the CDB terms, not to mention the
lack of oil collateralization (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2020). A smaller ($55 mil-
lion) flood control project at nearby Bulubulu was funded with CDB credit, but the trend
was toward more concessional, non-oil-backed loans by other banks (Empresa Pública del
Agua, 2013; Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, p. 310). By 2013, when these more concessional
loans were made, the CDB’s terms were already locked in place per the credit line agree-
ments, and any flexibility in Chinese policy was likely to come from other banks which
had not already poured large sums into Ecuador. Exim and Bank of China’s laxer terms
might be due to a desire to manage bilateral relations—this would be consistent with the
theory, although actual evidence of this would be difficult to observe. A more observable
explanation, though, has to do with Ecuador’s fiscal situation. China’s “budgetary support”
oil-backed credit line of December 2012 essentially kept Ecuador’s government solvent
for another year, and based on their negotiating tactics—holding out for the best possible
deal—Beijing was aware of Quito’s situation. Ecuador was clearly a riskier bet in 2013
than in the previous years, leading to greater doubt about its ability to service the more
38It is not clear how much of the loan came from each bank.
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important oil-backed loans. Credit to Ecuador on cheap terms would keep it afloat and
able to continue drilling for oil. China also used this strategy—using concessional terms
on less important projects to maximize the odds of repayment on more important ones—in
situations of more serious debt distress in Niger and Venezuela, among others (8).
Equity in Mining Equity was not a major part of Chinese market entry strategy during
this time period. Apart from the aforementioned refinery, two more examples took place,
both in the mining sector. The first was relatively early on, in 2010, when a consortium of
Tongling Nonferrous, which is owned by the province of Anhui, and central-government
owned China Railway purchased Canada’s Corriente Resources for $652 million. Corriente
owned several copper deposits in Ecuador, most notably the major Mirador site (Ellis, 2014,
p. 18; Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, p. 31). The use of equity investment makes this deal
stand out, but there are good reasons for it. First, the deal happened not only via Ecuador’s
institutions, but also Canada’s. The actual transaction took place in Canada, where Cor-
riente had been listed on the stock market (Corriente Resources, 2010). This would have
obviously complicated any bilateral loan deal between China and Ecuador. Second, there
was important cross-sector variation in political risk. Following the 2008 Constitution, oil
production and electricity generation were off limits to majority foreign investment. Mi-
nority foreign shareholding was still legal, but investors were nervous enough to avoid it.
Ecuador’s small mining sector, in contrast, was a less lucrative target and was subject to
much less political interference. The Mirador investment was not without political prob-
lems: after Tongling officially gained a license to mine at Mirador in March 2012, indige-
nous protests put the project on hold for a month and at one point took over the Chinese
Embassy in Quito. The issue was ultimately sorted out, but only after Tongling threatened
to withhold its first $40 million royalty payment to the government (Ellis, 2014, pp. 149–
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50). Project risk due to local community relations presents an interesting counterpoint to
political risk from higher levels of government. Problems such as weak judiciaries and in-
consistent contract enforcement present risk at the financing level and are more damaging
to equity than to debt, but community protests are an operational-level risk and will affect a
project the same way regardless of variation in financing arrangements. China would have
had similar problems if they had issued a copper-backed loan to run the mine. Tongling
and China Railway were not deterred: in March 2012, they agreed to invest another $1.44
billion over time to develop the mine (Llangarí, 2015).
A similar deal was made in 2013, when Hong Kong-based private firm Junefield and the
provincial SOE Hunan Gold bought the Rio Blanco gold and silver mine from Canada’s
International Minerals. Again, the Canadian dimension of the deal made equity a more
logical course of action. The main difference is that this deal involves smaller firms, one
of them private and domiciled outside the mainland, with less clear connections to policy-
making apparatus in Beijing (Ning Hui, 2019).
Other Contracts Chinese firms engaged won a handful of freelance contracts during
this time period. In addition to China Water & Electric’s hydroelectric partnership with the
Export-Import Bank of Russia, other contracts came from the telecommunications, trans-
portation, healthcare, and oil sectors. China’s two major telecoms firms, Huawei and ZTE,
have both been involved in building and upgrading Ecuador’s cellular networks. Ecuadors
telecoms authorities are opaque, and details in this area are sketchy, but it is known that
Huawei and France’s Alcatel were paid $72.2 million for work on Ecuador’s 3G network
and earned an undisclosed amount on the later 4G system as well (El Universo, 2011b;
Comms Update, 2013; Ellis, 2014, p. 109). This is probably a minority of total activity: one
of Ecuador’s major newspapers found that Huawei and ZTE together earned $150 million
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in Ecuador in 2011 and 2012 (Araujo, 2014). As discussed in Section 4.2.1.4 on Burundi
and Rwanda, China’s subsidization of its telecommunications industry has allowed the con-
struction of bargain-priced networks to become a tool of diplomatic outreach, especially in
developing countries which cannot afford more expensive competitors (Mackinnon, 2019).
This is a concrete example of the counterintuitive finding of Chapter 5 that freelance con-
tracting can be better for bilateral relations than actual provision of credit—the Chinese
government subsidizes projects through indirect financing at home such that lower-income
governments can buy at a discount.
Other Chinese firms entered less because of any particular state backing and more because
other funding was available. In 2008, Guangxi Road and Bridge received credits from
the from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Western Hemisphere’s largest
regional multilateral development bank, to build a $100 million dollar, 1.25-mile bridge
over the Babahoyo River (Uechi et al., 2009; Ellis, 2018, p. 89). In 2012, China Railway
No. 14 built a small hospital in Ecuador’s Amazonian region using $25 million from the
national social security fund, which in turn drew on oil revenues (El Telégrafo, 2012; El
Universo, 2017b). These deals reflect differentiation with China’s credit-based domestic
political economy. Major national champions such as Sinohydro and Gezhouba received
massive, project-specific state support to create business opportunities in a high-risk mar-
ket, with the Ecuadorian government taking on debt and acceding to Chinese conditions
in the process. Huawei, also a major firm, received generalized state support at home and
passed this on to the Ecuadorian government in the form of low prices; this is better for
relations with the recipient government, but does not provide quite as explicit a guarantee
to the firm. Lesser-known firms like Guangxi Road and Bridge are more likely to rely on
funding through more conventional channels. This is hard to come by in a country like
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Ecuador, but the Inter-American Development Bank and domestic oil-sector savings did
provide some limited opportunities.
The last type of Chinese contracts during Correa’s early years in office were not fully
China’s decision. Ecuador’s 2008 decision to begin converting foreign oil investments into
service contracts went into effect in 2010 (Ley Reformatoria 2010). Blocks 14 and 17,
which CNPC and Sinopec had purchased from EnCana in 2006, were affected alongside
the rest (El Diario, 2008). This process also resulted in a $610 million contract to Andes
Petroleum (a CNPC-Sinopec joint venture) to service Block 43, which had also passed
to them as part of the EnCana deal (Secretaria de Hidrocarburos del Ecuador, 2010). This
block was later expanded to include parts of Yasuní National Park, so its financial value has
since increased. The oil firms had lost tenure despite legal contracts, and the risk of equity
purchases in a weak institutional environment was on full display. That being said, CNPC
and Sinopec did not leave. In 2011, Ecuador began publishing data on private investment
in the oil sector, with the caveat made clear that “investment” meant funding put toward
production capacity but not actual legal title. With that caveat in mind, CNPC and Sinopec
accounted for 36.1 percent of private investment in 2011, 45.8 percent in 2012, and 56.9
percent in 2013.39 Others might have begun to dial back, but financial backing from the
home government and participation in an oil-backed loan scheme gave the two Chinese
firms the cover they needed to stay.
6.2.1.3 Correa in Crisis
With major projects already underway and all oil production already mortgaged, the nature
of the Sino-Ecuadorian relationship shifted from creating new arrangements to maintaining
39Calculated by author using data from Agencia de Regulación y Control Hidrocarburífero (2017) and
Agencia de Regulación y Control Hidrocarburífero (2018b).
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the old. The fall in oil prices stretched Ecuador’s already fraying ability to service the
existing loans. The period from mid-2014 to Correa’s departure from office in January
2017 saw two major trends. First, China remained involved, but mostly by making use
of oil-backed credit already pledged but not yet drawn upon, with some additional deals
on the margins. Second, Ecuador began to attempt to diversify away from overreliance on
China, with mixed results. I address these two trends sequentially before moving forward
to events under the administration of Lenín Moreno.
Chinese Financing, Continued Lower oil prices were taking a toll on Ecuador’s public
finances. Government revenues were falling, but many capital expenditures had already
been agreed upon as part of infrastructure packages, and the government was reluctant
to significantly cut social spending. The result was major annual deficits which hit their
trough at 7.67 percent of potential output in 2016, Correa’s last full year in office.
Late 2014 and 2015 saw slower growth in Chinese credit to Ecuador. Further oil-backed
deals were no longer a feasible option, and CDB’s presence was limited to the use of ex-
isting credit facilities. Exim and the commercial banks, however, continued to expand in
a more limited capacity using tied cash loans. A few freelance contractors found room to
operate as well, although this grew difficult under Ecuador’s increasingly tenuous finan-
cial situation. With the markets for electricity generation already saturated, these newer
projects were more diverse in sectoral terms, including more social-sector projects, often
on favorable terms. This is consistent with two theoretical predictions. First, bilateral rela-
tions were suffering. China had demanded stronger risk protection measures than Ecuador
had anticipated, and Ecuador was having greater trouble repaying than either side had an-
ticipated. Easier terms could help mend some of the damage. Second, the theory predicts
that where commercial interests at stake in distressed debt negotiations, China will attempt
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Figure 6.4: Ecuadorian Budget Government Surplus/Deficit, 2001-2019
Source: Graph generated by IMF Data Mapper using data from International Monetary Fund (2020a).
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to recoup as much of its losses as possible. The risk of default had become more pal-
pable than China anticipated, and sending cheap credit toward social sectors could ease
Ecuador’s budgetary burden in these areas and allow more resources to be diverted toward
servicing the oil-backed loans, all without the Ecuadorian government having to cut back
on generous social spending programs.
One earlier such social sector project occurred in the healthcare sector. Hospitals built
with oil-backed CDB credit under a series of 2013 agreements had a multiplier effect for
Sino-Ecuadorian business even after oil prices fell. In 2014 and 2016, Sinopharm was
awarded a pair of contracts worth $60.1 million and $59.4 million, respectively, to build
a new pharmaceutical factory and to supply medical equipment and medicine to hospitals
(Ecuavisa, 2016; El Universo, 2017b). At least one of the hospitals being supplied had
been built in Esmeraldas under the CDB credit line beginning in 2013 (Sinopharm, 2017).
The second of the two contracts was also funded under one of the CDB credit lines; the
first’s source of funding remains unclear (Dirección Nacional de Infraestructura Sanitaria,
Equipamiento y Mantenimiento, 2017, p. 59).
The Bank of China–Deutsche Bank (Hong Kong) consortium that had supported the 2013
Cañar y Naranjal flood control project returned in November 2014 with $312.0 million
for ten road projects; they added another $85.7 million for three roads in March 2015.
Like the consortium’s previous loan to Ecuador, these carried variable interest rates of 3.50
percentage above the six-month LIBOR rate. Again, since LIBOR rates remained below
one percent at this point, this was still more favorable than the CDB credit lines with both
6 to 7 percent interest and oil backing, albeit with some risk related to the likelihood that
interest rates would rise during the fourteen-year payback period. The loan also came
with a four-year grace period, leaving Ecuador with some time to deal with the fallout of
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low oil prices before payments came due (-˝{Ñ‹⇢œF¬⌅⇣Economic and
Commercial Office of the Chinese Embassy in Ecuador⌘, 2014; D. Castro Salgado, 2019,
p. 304; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2020). In January 2015, China Exim also
added $250 million to export induction kitchens manufactured by privately held national
champions Haier and Midea. Less polluting, more energy-efficient kitchens were part of
the Ecuadorian government’s Human Development Grant (Bono del Desarrollo Humano)
conditional cash transfer and social benefit program (El Universo, 2015; K. P. Gallagher
and Myers, 2019; Vasconez, 2015). The terms of the loan are regrettably unavailable, but
as in the case of the highways, China was backing one of Correa’s social initiatives. This
would certainly be good for bilateral relations and would also free up resources to service
the oil-backed loans.
The last oil-backed loan had been issued in November 2012; by the end of 2015, both
pre-sales and the first credit line had already matured (D. Castro Salgado, 2019). A pair
of January 2016 agreements broke this streak. On January 22, the Industrial and Commer-
cial Bank of China (ICBC) committed $970 million in further credits to the Ecuadorian
government via Petroecuador (Valencia, 2016). This loan was backed by an oil purchase
agreement, a first in Ecuador for any Chinese lender other than the policy banks (CDB and
Exim). Four days later, the CNPC-Sinopec joint venture Andes Petroleum signed contracts
to explore for four years and drill for twenty in Blocks 79 and 83, two new oil blocks in
the Amazon (Agencia de Regulación y Control de las Telecomunicaciones, 2016). These
were adjacent to the Yasuní National Park production blocks which had been opened in ex-
change for CDB oil-backed credit and were by some accounts even more biodiverse (Ray
and Chimienti, 2015, pp. 24–25). History appeared to be repeating itself as new oil explo-
ration funded new loans, although there was no official statement linking the two. Without
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additional exploration, Ecuador had no more oil left to pledge as collateral, and the dire
budgetary situation spurred Correa to drill in areas with unpopular ramifications for indige-
nous groups and the environment. The loan was totally discretionary, meaning it could
be used to make up at least part of Ecuador’s budget shortfall, but ICBC demanded tough
terms in return. The interest rate was variable, a first for an oil-backed loan in Ecuador,
and indexed to the three-month LIBOR rate plus 6.5 percent (Dirección Nacional de Con-
sistencia Presupuestaria, 2016; Ellis, 2018; D. Castro Salgado, 2019, p. 304). At the date
of the loan’s signature, the LIBOR rate was roughly 0.62 percent, meaning a 7.12 percent
initial interest rate Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2020). This was comparable to the
pre-sale interest rates of 7.16 and 7.25 percent, but for the fact that rates were climbing at
that time. The loan also had no grace period, which had been true of the pre-sales but never
of the oil-backed credits. China was willing to bear the risk of supporting Ecuador’s high
deficits, but only at a steep cost.
Ecuador still needed cash and was courting other sources—the official announcement of the
new Andes Petroleum exploration deal was headlined “Private investors trust Ecuador”40—
but found it hard to come by. In April 2016, three months after the ICBC and exploration
deals, a larger, partially oil-backed loan package was announced. CDB was to add $2
billion in new credit lines. This included $1.5 billion at 7.25 percent tied to infrastructure
projects and another $500 million backed by oil at 6.87 percent. Notably, the oil-backed
component was slated “to pay contractors from approved projects” (D. Castro Salgado,
2019, p. 304). China was using the potential for new oil production to secure payment for
its firms, which were nervous about their Ecuadorian client’s fiscal position. In effect, $500
million in potentially or actually distressed debt was being restructured to be collateralized
40Translation by author from original Spanish: Inversionistas privados confían en el Ecuador. See Agencia
de Regulación y Control de las Telecomunicaciones (2016).
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with oil; or, at least, this change was being made for firms not already contracted under oil-
backed lines of credit. This is consistent with theoretical predictions that where commercial
interests predominate over diplomatic or geostrategic, China will be less forgiving toward
debtors.
Tied to infrastructure projects, the remaining $1.5 billion was more demanding on the
Ecuadorian government than the discretionary ICBC loan, but it did give them some room
to continue investing in public works projects. Trends in Chinese financing during Correa’s
last year in office generally paralleled trends from before the new oil-backed credit infusion
in that they combined some projects under the CDB umbrella with some negotiated case-
by-case from sources. They also maintained the 2014-2015 focus on social sector spending
and public services.
CDB backed the construction of a $198 million government building,41 two universities for
$58 million,42 and $45 million in sports facilities. The terms of these were already set by
the CDB credit arrangements, so there was little to negotiate here.
We can gather more from the terms of Exim’s deals, which were negotiated independently.
The $198 million “City of Knowledge” university and innovation complex and $102.5
million Santa Elena aqueduct were both funded at 3 percent interest with twenty years’
payback and five years’ grace. Again, low interest rates and generous grace periods gave
Ecuador the ability to maintain levels of social sector investment while still paying back the
oil loans (Empresa Pública del Agua, 2017; D. Castro Salgado, 2019, p. 304). The terms
for the Exim-backed Guayasamín toll road project were less generous—7 percent interest
41Servicio de Contratación de Obras (2015).
42There may have also been a third. CAMC, which was contracted to build the two universities known to
be backed by CDB, also built a third $30 million campus for which details of funding are unavailable. See
China CAMC Engineering Co. (2017) and El Universo (2017a).
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and 15 years’ repayment—but still more favorable than the shorter-term oil-backed loans.
In the case of the toll road, Exim was using tougher terms in other areas to compensate.
A tunnel connecting central Quito with a nearby valley, the project was backed by toll
revenues—common in this sector—and came with a less common stipulation that Ecuador
not build any competing throughways for thirty years (Auditoría Gobiernos Seccionales,
2017; Deniz and Borja, 2017; Pacheco, 2017). Exim was finding ways to lock down its
interests in a country under increasing financial duress.
As the theory would have predicted, the above projects all involved debt to the Ecuadorian
government. However, there were exceptions. First, in April 2016, an earthquake hit Man-
abí province, killing 668 people and damaging 35,000 homes (International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2016). China responded with $150 million in grant
aid to rebuild a hospital and 400 homes (DPA, 2016). Another $167 million came as a loan
from the Bank of China to rebuild schools; this was made at low interest (six-month LIBOR
plus 3.5 percent) and over twelve years (Garzón and D. Castro, 2018). It is difficult to gen-
eralize much from these extraordinary circumstances, though, as China might have given
the aid to a disaster-stricken country regardless of any other financial arrangements.
Other deals were more mundane. In 2016, China Road and Bridge purchased the Hotel
Quito for $30.8M. The proceeds of the sale went to Ecuador’s social security fund, which
was spinning off assets to cover its debts. So, to the degree that the deal was state-directed,
it could have been done toward the greater good of maximizing Ecuador’s ability to repay
the larger loan packages (El Telégrafo, 2016a; Quiroz and Orozco, 2016). In any event,
the deal was much smaller than any of the major loan packages. Similarly, the provincial
mining firm Shandong Zhaojin has invested $1 million in a local affiliate to explore for
gold (T. Daly, 2018b).
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Ecuador Attempts to Diversify By 2016, the Ecuadorian newspaper El Comercio esti-
mated that China held around 8 percent of Ecuadorian GDP in debt, and the Correa admin-
istration was beginning to realize that China’s oil-heavy financing model was approaching
its natural limits (DPA, 2016). Ecuador attempted to branch out to other partners, both to
gain leverage vis-à-vis China and for the more immediate task of paying its bills. These
efforts had only modest success, but they are theoretically important in that they provide
interesting contrast cases with Chinese policy. First, I discuss oil deals with Thailand and
Oman. Second, a pair of port projects contrasted sharply with Hong Kong-based Hutchi-
son’s failed investment at Manta.
In July 2015, Ecuador secured a $2.5 billion oil pre-sale not from China, but from PTT,
Thailand’s state oil firm. This pre-sale charged interest of the 30-day LIBOR plus 6.97 per-
cent, which put the interest rate above either of China’s with the potential to rise. However,
it does not appear to be have been tied to any particular purpose, although the Ecuadorian
Ministry of Finance vaguely said that it would go toward “public investment in infrastruc-
ture” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). Thailand’s construction sector, while not small,
cannot so easily handle $2.5 billion in new contracts as China’s; similarly, the backing of a
smaller state did not allow PTT to grant the slightly lower interest rates afforded by CDB.
In December 2016, $600 million more in oil pre-payments came from PTT, plus another
$300 million from Oman Trading International (Parraga and Valencia, 2016). These were
smaller deals with smaller countries, but they did at least take some pressure off of the
Sino-Ecuadorian relationship.
While the Thai and Omani arrangements were more similar to China’s loan-for-oil or pre-
purchase deals, two sets of port investors took a very different tack. The port complex
at Manta, where a planned investment by Hutchison had fallen victim to an early dispute
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with the Correa administration, was as of December 2016 to go to the Chilean private firm
Agencias Universales (AGUNSA). AGUNSA downsized Hutchison’s $423 million plan
to a more modest $177.3 million for a forty-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement.
This meant nixing planned expansion of fishing facilities. These had been a priority for
a firm based in food-insecure China, but not for a competitor looking only at profits and
coming itself from a major seafood-exporting country (AGUNSA, 2017; Port Strategy,
2016).
Another 2016 deal saw a consortium of Dubai’s DP World (78 percent) and local conglom-
erate Nobis (22 percent) agree to build a major $1.2 billion complex under a fifty-year
leasehold at Posorja. This was near the largest city of Guayaquil but located near deeper
waters, better for large post-Panamax vessels. While China’s plans for a large complex
at Manta were of questionable market logic, location both near Guayaquil and Ecuador’s
banana belt—the second major export after oil—meant more players were willing to sign
up for the Posorja plan (El Telégrafo, 2016b; Proparco, 2018a). The first wave of financ-
ing consisted of $147 million from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); $50M
from the China Co-Financing Fund for the Americas (a cooperative project between the
China Development Bank and IDB); $130M from the German Development Bank (DEG);
and $50M from Proparco, France’s international development finance agency (DP World
Posorja, 2018; IDB Invest, 2018; Patrini, 2018; Proparco, 2018a,b). Subcontracting for
construction work is still underway but has so far included $140 million to China Harbour
Engineering (CHEC), $100 million to Belgium’s Flanders Dredging, and $29 million to an
Ecuadorian-Costa Rican group (El Universo, 2018). China is involved, but only as one of
many parties in a much more open setting. This multinational equity investment also holds
more of its own risk, rather than using debt to transfer it to the recipient. As the manager
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of the Guayaquil Port Authority put it:
Today in Posorja there is no dock, no port, no cargo. So this is an important
investment where the risk is assumed 100 percent by the investor. The State
won’t put up a single cent [...] (After the concession ends), as for all of these
concessions, all that infrastructure will pass into the hands of the State without
any type of expenditure.43 (El Telégrafo, 2016b)
Outreach to Thailand and Oman and two port investments did begin to strengthen Ecuador’s
position, but not enough to change a fundamental pattern of isolation from international
markets and over-reliance on debt. The institutional changes at the beginning of Correa’s
term scared off most other than China, and the pendulum was now swinging in the opposite
direction. A more important change came in May 2017, when Lenín Moreno took office as
President.
6.2.1.4 Lenín Moreno and Future Trends
Facing flagging support, a weak economy, and rumors of corruption, Correa did not seek
reelection in Ecuador’s February 2017 voting, instead nominating his former Vice President
Lenín Moreno. A leftist by nature but pragmatist by circumstance, Moreno has backtracked
on many but not all of his predecessor’s institutional changes (Ellis, 2018). As of this
writing, Moreno is still in his office, and his track record is not yet set in stone. However,
he has so far charted a middle ground between Correa’s weakening of the rule of law and the
relatively rigid legal protection of investors of the early 2000s. The results have also been
something of an intermediate—modest interest from private investors, a contentious return
to the Bretton Woods institutions, and continuing engagement with China on somewhat
43Author’s translation from original Spanish: Hoy en Posorja no hay muelle, no hay puerto, no hay carga,
entonces es una inversión importante donde el riesgo es asumido 100% por el inversionista. El Estado
no pondrá un solo centavo (...) (Luego de que termine la concesión), como en todas las delegaciones de
concesiones, toda esa infraestructura pasará a manos del Estado sin ningún tipo de desembolso.
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more favorable terms. I discuss, in turn, 1) greater scrutiny of the corruption and quality
control issues which can result from tied procurement; 2) renegotiation of oil deals and
smaller arrangements with China; and 3) Ecuador’s return to the IMF.
The Levee Breaks: Problems in Implementation The tied nature of Chinese projects
has led to serious problems in implementation. There is clear theoretical logic behind why
tying contracts would be an imposition on the borrower, but this section will add empirical
evidence of how these arrangements can shield contracting firms from risk at the recipient
country’s expense. The point of tied arrangements—or, at least part of the point—is that
contracting firms can count on banks to prop them up in the event that a high-risk project
encounters difficulties. The intention may have been to shield firms from events in the
recipient country, but the moral hazard created by easy access to bank credit with weak
budget constraints is just as likely to allow for wrongdoing by the contractor (Russel and
Berger, 2019). In Ecuador, the lack of competition in the bidding process has allowed
firms to cut corners on quality, inflate costs, and sometimes engage in corruption with no
real consequences. After all, if they are expelled, they take the project’s funding with them,
and Ecuador has few other places to which to turn . Cases of poorly executed tied projects
provide causal process observations for the moral hazard intentionally built into the tied
procurement system.
The eight hydroelectric projects provide a natural avenue for comparison. Lozano (2019)
points out that of the eight, only one (the Brazilian-built Manduriacu dam) was completed
on time. Many have also suffered from substantial cost overruns. Table 6.5 lists estimates
of cost overruns alongside how much of the project was financed by foreign loans.
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Several important trends stand out. The table is ordered such that projects receiving a lower
percentage of development bank financing are listed first. In general, the more money
a project receives from foreign policy banks, the more cost overruns it is likely to have.
Projects reliant on domestic savings or tax revenues face stricter budget constraints than
those backed by banks whose mandate includes propping up their firms even when com-
mercial banks might not. This is admittedly a small sample, but the Pearson correlation
coefficient between the percentage of a project backed by an external loan and the percent-
age budget overrun is 0.549 percent overall, and 0.783 percent for the six Chinese-funded
projects. For the Chinese-funded cases, the distinction between Exim and CDB projects
is also useful. The Exim loans were negotiated individually and independently from large
lines of credit. So, it is more difficult for them to overrun their budgets without having to
renegotiate with the bank. The CDB loans, on the other hand, were part of large oil-backed
lines of credit which were only partially tapped. Contractors using CDB loans knew that
there was already a pre-approved source of additional financing and were in a better po-
sition to allow costs to rise. Villavicencio (2015) further notes that these eight publicly
funded dams cost an average of $2,741 per installed kilowatt of capacity, or 41 percent
more than the $1,608 per kilowatt associated with a comparison set of six privately funded
dams.44
Within-case qualitative observations from the largest dam support the intuition as to why
this is the case. Despite not drastically exceeding its budget, the Coca Codo dam is a poster
child for these problems. There were serious questions from the outset about such a large
project in a small electricity market, and Sinohydro entered with the backing of tax rev-
enues funneled through Exim. The tied modality which pushed Sinohydro into the project
44See also Garzón and D. Castro (2018, p. 37).
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may also have prevented its successful implementation. Technical problems emerged rel-
atively early in the construction process and continued to mount over time (Villavicencio,
2013). In December 2014, a part of the construction collapsed, killing thirteen workers.
Sinohydro continued construction, and the work was declared complete during President
Xi Jinping’s November 2016 visit to Quito, but as of December 2018 engineers had only
once attempted to push the dam to its full generation capacity, and this led to an electri-
cal grid outage. No fewer than 7,648 cracks in the works have been observed (Casey and
Krauss, 2018; Garzón and D. Castro, 2018, pp. 38–44). There were attempts to correct
course. A Mexican government organization wrote a report questioning whether thirty-
year-old projections for water flow could still be counted upon given the drying effects of
climate change, but the report was ignored by government officials determined to move
quickly toward a visible achievement. The New York Times reports that “a senior engineer
sent records to Mr. Correa, the president, asking to brief him on the problems, according
to documents viewed by the Times. The engineer was fired days later” (Casey and Krauss,
2018). Correa was primarily interested in building a political trophy, and Sinohydro was in
a financial position to oblige without putting any degree of effort into quality control. There
may have also been corruption involved. Vice President Jorge Glas is already in prison for
taking bribes from Odebrecht, and he and several associates are currently under investi-
gation for the Coca Codo project based on leaked audiotapes and bank statements (Casey
and Krauss, 2018). Corruption has always been a problem in the infrastructure sector and
is much easier to achieve in closed-door deals without competitive bids. Coca Codo may
have had a tougher budget constraint than the CDB-backed projects, but in the absence of
competition, this led Sinohydro not to act more efficiently but to cut corners.
Apart from delays and cost overruns, several of the other projects also developed quality
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problems. Delsitanisagua was finished two years behind schedule and suspended even after
its formal “opening” due to problems with the turbines (Primicias, 2019). China National
Electric Engineering Company (CNEEC) has been kicked out of both the Quijos and Mazar
Dudas projects for breach of contract (essentially, failure to complete works) (Deniz and
Borja, 2017).
Lastly, but by no means least, a January 2019 audit found that of $4.9 billion in audited
oil-related infrastructure funds, $2.5 billion had gone missing, including from the canceled
Refinery of the Pacific project at one point backed by China (Pipoli, 2019). Correa’s in-
stitutional change to allow closed bidding opened the door for very bad behavior, and the
Moreno administration has begun to take steps to address the issue. Better management of
these problems could allow Ecuador to bargain its way to more favorable financing terms
as more international actors regained interest. The Moreno administration was certainly
hoping for this as they pushed to restructure Ecuador’s relationship with China.
Renegotiations From the outset, Moreno made no secret of his desire to revisit Ecuador’s
oil-backed loans (Shullman, 2019, p. 34). Still, Ecuador was hardly out of the financial
woods—its 2016 budget deficit was still at 7.67 percent of GDP (International Monetary
Fund, 2020a). Moreno had both an electoral mandate and a practical necessity to turn
around the country’s fiscal situation, but further short-term cash infusions would be nec-
essary to do so. In October 2017, he agreed to borrow $200 million more from China
Development Bank at 6.5 percent interest over eight years. Of this, $120 million was
payable after two years’ grace, and the remainder after three. These terms are not exactly
concessional, but they did provide a two- to three-year window for Ecuador to get its house
in order. Perhaps more tellingly, they were more favorable than CDB’s most previous
non-oil-backed loan, which was made at 7.25 percent interest loan due over eight years
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(D. Castro Salgado, 2019, p. 305). China may have been regaining some confidence in
Ecuador’s institutional strength.
The fact that the loans were not backed by oil also gave rise to another major shift in
Ecuador’s public finances. In November 2017, after a four-year absence, Ecuador made
its first sale of oil on the short-term spot market, which typically provides higher prices
than oil bought under long-term contract. This had been impossible with all oil produc-
tion locked up by pre-sales and oil-backed loans, but greater fiscal restraint under the new
administration was beginning to have a positive multiplier effect on government revenues.
A week later, Minister of Hydrocarbons Carlos Pérez was sent to Beijing to renegotiate
purchase orders with an eye to free up more oil output (Argus Media, 2017).
This effort met with only limited success. China is at its toughest where resource security
is concerned, and with almost all of its oil already mortgaged, Ecuador had little leverage
over Beijing.45 The existence of the arrangement with Thailand’s PTT, though, may have
helped Ecuador’s case. In May 2018, it was announced that PTT and the concerned Chinese
oil firms agreed to readjust the pricing and timing of planned oil shipments to Ecuador’s
benefit. The overall level of debt, however, was not changed (Agencia de Regulación y
Control Hidrocarburífero, 2018a). The theory held that restructuring short of forgiveness
is the a tougher treatment of distressed debt than writing it off but is still more favorable
than non-renegotiation. China gave some ground due to some combination of the role of
PTT—an admittedly much smaller debtholder—and fear of the impact on Ecuadorian crude
production that tougher treatment and a prolonged crisis could have.
Per the announced initial projections, the restructuring would reduce Ecuador’s budgetary
shortfall by $3.5 billion, but this was spread across many years and only partially addressed
45Conversation with China-Latin America specialist, Washington, DC, July 2018.
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the immediate crunch. As the government cracked down on corruption, it attempted to find
more bidders on new oil contracts. In October 2018, six contracts worth a total of $1.6 bil-
lion in investment in capacity were signed by firms from Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, the
United States, and Venezuela (González, 2018). These mostly private firms were regain-
ing confidence in Ecuador’s business climate as the memory of Correa’s nationalization of
equity contracts began to recede. In that same month, $210 million in loans for budgetary
support came from the Latin American Development Bank (CAF) (Corporación Andina
de Fomento, 2020). In December 2018, China Exim committed $69.3 million for further
earthquake reconstruction. Being humanitarian, the loan charged only 2 percent interest
over twenty years (D. Castro Salgado, 2019, p. 305).
The IMF Despite all of the above, Ecuador’s budget remained in the red. Ecuador wanted
greater concessions on debt to China, $6.5 billion of which was still on the official books
at the end of 2018, but found Beijing unwilling to move any further. In need of leverage,
Moreno began to publicly consider going to the IMF for bailout assistance if China did
not come through (Valencia and Cohen, 2018). Funding from the IMF would strengthen
Ecuador’s hand in demanding renegotiation of the oil loans, although this “threat” may
have also been a way for Moreno to deflect blame for impending IMF conditions on China.
In any event, China (partially) obliged only two days later with $969 million in new loans.
Again, these took some immediate pressure off of Ecuador such that repayment of the oil
loans would be less tenuous. Toward this end, the loans were on more favorable terms
than the oil loans: $900 million was at 6.5 percent interest, and $69 million slated for
earthquake relief was at 2 percent interest. China also committed $30 million in grants
toward Ecuador’s defense budget—not much in the grand scheme of things, but probably
well appreciated, and as much as can be expected from non-reimbursable expenditures
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(Pipoli, 2018).
The following month, however, saw a return to bad news. First came the release of the
aforementioned audit report finding that billions had gone missing. Then, Ecuador man-
aged to raise $1 billion on the bond markets—a difficult proposition, given its history of
bond defaults—but at 10.75 percent interest (Maidenberg and Dube, 2019).
Clearly in need of better options, Ecuador in February 2019 made good on the threat to
go to the IMF, which itself came through with a $4.2 billion line of credit at a much more
favorable 3 percent interest due over 10 years. This also came with $6 billion in credits
from other organizations including the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank,
and Latin American Development Bank. This was enough to plug Ecuador’s fiscal hole and
begin to actually reverse the accumulation of debt to China. However, there were strings at-
tached. The Fund attached conditions including layoffs at state-owned enterprises, greater
central bank independence—a reversal of one of Correa’s institutional changes—and tax
“rationalization”—again, indirectly countering Correa’s scrapping of safeguards against
deficit spending (International Monetary Fund, 2019b; Valencia and Cohen, 2019). Most
notably, the Fund asked Ecuador to do away with its decades-old subsidies on fuel, which
were estimated to cost 3 percent of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2019a). This last
point led to major demonstrations, including by politically important constituencies such as
teamsters and indigenous groups. Stuck between international bureaucrats and his own cit-
izens, Moreno sided with his political base and withdrew the plan to cut fuel subsidies from
the National Assembly (Brown, 2019; Ecuavisa, 2019; Valencia and Kinosian, 2019). The
IMF essentially gave way, so long as Ecuador continued to abide by the other conditions
and negotiate a new tax plan (Campos, 2019; International Monetary Fund, 2019c). This is
clear evidence of a mechanism linking governance quality to financial stringency via access
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to multiple sources of financing. The Mahuad government in 2000 had exclusively relied
on the IMF and private bondholders and had been forced to accede to most of their de-
mands; Correa had relied exclusively on China and mortgaged virtually all of the country’s
oil. Moreno charted a middle path. He strengthened institutional safeguards against cor-
ruption, serial deficit spending, and other mismanagement enough for the IMF and others
to make a comeback, but without totally alienating China. So, neither the IMF nor China
were at their most stringent—the Fund decided to live with Ecuador’s fuel subsidies, and
China renegotiated oil pricing and extended some more concessional credits.
6.2.1.5 Conclusions: Ecuador
Ecuador’s institutions have seen substantial variation over time with correspondingly dra-
matic implications for Chinese (and other) development finance. Institutional changes were
linked to financial outcomes via two mechanisms—lender demand for greater protection,
and borrower leverage (or lack thereof) to resist these demands via access to other financ-
ing. These two factors ebbed and flowed over the course of Ecuador’s tumultuous decade.
The post-crisis settlement of 2000 was made largely on the terms of the IMF and the mostly
Western private banks which held much of Ecuador’s debt, and Ecuador’s political econ-
omy of the early 2000s was characterized by strong legal investor protections. Rafael Cor-
rea’s 2007 election changed all this as he forced renegotiation of arrangements across much
of society, including the foreign-invested financial and energy sectors. The expulsion of the
Bretton Woods institutions and jitters among most private firms opened space for firms with
greater state backing to manage what was becoming a highly risky market. These included
Brazilian and Russian organizations, but Chinese interests were by a large margin the ma-
jority. However, Correa’s gamble on major infrastructure investment was uncertain enough
for China to demand extra protection; having directly or indirectly lost access to most fund-
330 CHAPTER 6. RESOURCE SECURITY
ing, Correa had little choice to accept collateralization of oil, even as he compared requests
for central bank asset collateralization to negotiating with the IMF.
Correa’s gamble was ultimately unsuccessful, and a second major source of variation in
time came with the election of Lenín Moreno in 2017. The non-competitive bids inherent
to China’s tied loan model were effective at preserving Chinese firms’ balance sheets, but
unfortunately might have been too effective for their own good, enabling firms to engage in
corruption and corner-cutting in construction without any ramifications. Moreno began to
take serious steps toward dealing with corruption and quality control and more limited steps
toward altering some of Correa’s institutional changes. This was enough to regain funding
from the IMF and associated international development banks, but also to restructure some
Chinese oil-backed loans.
Not all cases have as much variation over time as Ecuador’s; nor do most involve as much
investor risk. The Peruvian case contains some moderate variation over time but mostly
serves to illustrate how China approaches quieter markets with less risk and more inter-
national investor interest. To be specific, China mostly used equity investments, with the
exceptions of a few projects of elevated risk in which most other international actors were
not interested. We turn next to Ecuador’s neighbor to the south.
6.2.2 Peru
Because Peru’s domestic political economy since the 1990s has been subject to less dra-
matic swings than Ecuador’s, I organize this section not by time period but by type of
economic activity. Some sectors such as fishing and mining are internationally competitive
and have drawn major Chinese equity investment on a scale not seen in Ecuador. Much of
Peru’s infrastructure sector is also subject to competitive international bidding, but certain
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types of projects are less lucrative and higher-risk and have drawn Chinese tied loan pack-
ages more typical of the Ecuadorian case. This between-sector and even between-project
variation is a within-country microcosm of the much larger variation observed between
countries. I begin with a section on Peru’s background, with a particular focus on the
early 1990s, when the policies of President Alberto Fujimori laid the groundwork for what
has become Peru’s long-term political economy to this day. This period also saw China’s
first major entry into the Peruvian market. I then do the bulk of the analysis of economic
activity broken down by sector, namely 1) fishmeal; 2) mining; 3) banking; and 4) infras-
tructure.
6.2.2.1 Background: The “Fujishock” and Early Chinese Investments
Like Ecuador’s, Peru’s 20th century was at times tumultuous, marked by high inequality,
social unrest, economic instability, and military interventions in politics. The 1980s were
a particularly difficult time as Peru battled the effects of that decade’s Latin American
debt crisis—Peru defaulted on sovereign debt in 1980 and 1984—as well as the Maoist
Shining Path insurgency. The early tenure of President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) was
a crucial turning point in Peru’s history. Fujimori managed to bring the Shining Path under
control and pursued a series of policies known as the “Fujishock” characterized by a general
emphasis on liberal marketization and fiscal tightening. As the initial recessionary impact
of budget cuts faded, international markets began to regain confidence in Peru.
Liberalization involved privatizing many state-owned assets, including in Peru’s significant
mining sector. Firms from around the world were interested, and the winner of one pri-
vatization bid came from China. In 1992, Beijing-based Shougang—or “Capital Steel,”
literally translated—purchased the Marcona iron mine from the Peruvian state. This was a
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very early instance of China’s deployment of state capital to supply its growing industrial
needs. As one press report of the time put it:
The growth of the Chinese economy is so rapid, and its industrial base so un-
derdeveloped, that buying steel mills, iron mines and other Western businesses
is far easier than waiting until such industries can be developed within China,
say investment bankers and executives of the Capital Steel Corporation of Bei-
jing, which concluded the deal here. (Nash, 1992)
There is also good reason to believe that state credit helped guide Shougang in a direction
amenable to the Chinese government’s interests. Shougang’s chairman had served with
Chairman Deng Xiaoping during the Chinese Civil War, and the firm had been early par-
ticipant in the profit responsibility scheme which had begun to allow state-owned firms
to manage and reinvest their own profits during the early 1980s reform period. This was
a generally well-connected firm with personal and financial connections to elites in Bei-
jing and as such was in a position to be guided to meet state priorities (González-Vicente,
2013, pp. 50–51). The state’s deep pockets helped Shougang beat out a Chilean-Japanese-
Mexican group for the bid. González-Vicente (2013) writes that:
The bidding process was opaque, and in November 1992, after both parties had
already agreed to Shougang’s total offer of US$311.8 million, the Peruvian
government decided to bail out Hierro Peru, assuming debts for a total of S
800 million (Peruvian nuevo soles), equivalent to US$493 million at the time.
(51)
This follows the findings of Landry (2019) and Chapter 5 of this dissertation that Chi-
nese equity investment has an indeterminate and variable relationship with political risk, as
opposed to a more predictable risk aversion on the part of most private investors. Chinese
investors were in a position to deal with a high degree of project-level debt distress, and had
good reason to do so given China’s rising need for iron from abroad. Gónzalez-Vicente’s
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point also raises questions about whether the Shougang deal should be treated as a pure
equity investment. The Peruvian government took on a great deal of debt, albeit debt that
had previously belonged to a state-owned enterprise and was debatably separate from the
liabilities of the government proper. This debt was not issued by China, but it nevertheless
placed risk on the Peruvian government’s shoulders, and not on China’s. The Peruvian
institutional environment was changing such that equity investors were beginning to feel
more comfortable there, but this change was still uncertain enough that Shougang wanted
extra protection from financial downside risk.
A second major Chinese investment came in 1993, this time in the oil and gas sector. In
that year, the IMF extended credit to Peru, the first such loan since Peru’s 1984 default
and slide into hyperinflation (Rossini and Santos, 2015). Peru’s macroeconomic situation
was improving, and later in 1993, the Peruvian government issued a new Organic Law of
Hydrocarbons (Ley Orgánica de Hidrocarburos) establishing a new legal framework for
the oil and gas sector. The law provided for two types of contracts. Under license contracts
(contratos de licencia), Petroperu (the national energy company) grants investors licenses
to exploit and gain the profits from oil and/or gas deposits, although Petroperu remains
the ultimate owner. Under service contracts (contratos de servicios), on the other hand,
firms do not own licenses to deposits but are instead paid to work on wells as contractors
(Government of Peru, 1993). Readers will note that this is essentially the opposite of the
change made by the Rafael Correa administration in Ecuador. Correa commuted all “par-
ticipation contracts”—leaseholds similar to Peru’s license contracts—to service contracts,
in the process reducing global energy firms’ interest in Ecuador. The Fujimori adminis-
tration’s provision of a more solid legal basis for equity-like investment had the opposite
effect, attracting interest from many multinationals which had shied away from Peru during
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the tumultuous 1980s. Among these was PetroChina (CNPC), which in 1993 bought the
rights to operate the established oilfields of Blocks 6 and 7, near the border with Ecuador
(China National Petroleum Corporation, 2020). These deals were relatively small, cost-
ing CNPC $63 million between the two oilfields, but were nevertheless significant as the
Chinese oil industry’s first ever investment in Latin America. Like their colleagues in iron
mining, China’s oil majors were expanding overseas to gain greater experience and know-
how (Kong, 2010, pp. 81–82). Peru’s trend toward increasing legal protection for investors
provided an opportunity to do so in a region where China had no previous footprint.
While the Shougang deal was important to Peru’s iron industry, both iron and oil are sec-
ondary to copper in Peru, and CNPC’s $63 million in oil investments did not make it a
leading player in the country. In any event, China was a much smaller player in the global
economy in the early 1990s. This period was important for Sino-Peruvian relations not just
for these two investments, then, but also in that established what was to become a stable
set of policies under which foreign firms, Chinese included, must operate.46 The liberal
arrangement established by Fujimori remains largely in place today. This affects Peru’s
engagement with China both on a more domestic level via the legal structure in which for-
eign firms invest and on an international level by successfully attracting capital from many
sources.
Domestically speaking, the Fujimori period left Peru with a system bifurcated between a
very strong, stable bureaucracy and a relatively unstable elected leadership. Heirs to Fuji-
mori’s liberal adjustment policies and engagement with the IMF, the bureaucracy tends to
favor market-based approaches and does not much vary its activities regardless of who oc-
cupies the Presidency or Congress. The elected officials, on the other hand, are only incon-
46Two Peruvian economists independently brought up the Fujishock as the basis for Sino-Peruvian rela-
tions today. Interviews, Lima, September-October 2019.
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sistently concerned with pro-market policies and rarely at all with stable adherence of any
governance model. Fujimori himself was a controversial figure—after Peru’s turnaround
of the early 1990s, he was in the latter half of the decade exiled on corruption and hu-
man rights charges. He was later convicted of ordering a break-in of a government offi-
cial’s apartment; embezzlement; and human rights violations including murder dating to
the fight against the Shining Path (BBC News, 2007b, 2009; Sullivan, 2010). Peru’s post-
Fujimori history has been less extreme, but the duality between a diligent, at times rigid
bureaucracy; and volatile, often corrupt elected politics has endured.47 Of Peru’s six post-
Fujimori presidents, three have been arrested on corruption charges, largely connected to
the Odebrecht corruption scandal which rocked many Latin American governments (Burn-
son, 2019; Fowkes, 2019; Taj, 2019b). A fourth committed suicide with police at the door
(Quigley and Guzman, 2019). The current president, himself a one-term caretaker who
took office after his predecessor’s implication in the scandal, in October 2019 dissolved
Congress and called for new elections after several party leaders were implicated in the
Odebrecht scandal (BBC News, 2019).
The degree of political risk posed by Peru’s elected executive and legislative branches is
thus much higher than that posed by the civil service. So, China engages with these two
parts of the Peruvian government on very different terms, and the relative weight of the
bureaucrats and politicians can vary by project. For most sectors of interest to foreign
investors—mining, energy, and most public works fall into this category—the Peruvian
state bureaucracy creates rules for market competition but only plans projects where there
are clear social benefits but private firms are not interested.48 For most major projects,
47One Peruvian economist interviewed for this dissertation began by saying that Peru is “very stable,” and
a few minutes later said that Peru was “a little unstable.” He clarified that he meant that the bureaucracy in
the first instance and Congress in the second.
48Interview with Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finance official, Lima, September 2019.
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the bureaucracy requires a battery of assessments of concerns such as financial sustain-
ability and environmental and social impacts. These typically involve the input of many
stakeholders; relations with local communities for mining projects, for example, are of-
ten particularly fraught. Sanborn and Yong (2014) write that the amount of paperwork
involved in the Peruvian system and the need to engage with many stakeholders have been
off-putting to Chinese investors, especially when they first arrived. Chinese firms are used
to an environment in which many laws and regulations are not strictly followed and the
immediate views of the central leadership are generally more important. This suited them
well in Ecuador, at least under Correa, but much less so with the Peruvian bureaucracy.
Furthermore, as established in Chapters 3 and 5, China uses tied loan contracts as a form of
insurance in environments with inconsistent rule of law. This is often not well-received by
the bureaucracy, which as a legacy of the disaster of the 1980s and subsequent close con-
nections with fiscally conservative IMF and World Bank counterparts are deeply skeptical
of debt.49 As one Peruvian economist put it to me, “In Peru, we believe that the loan is
an inefficient mechanism.”50 Then, when the government does decide to borrow, it usually
holds project-level competitive bids precluding tied financing packages. (Contrast this with
Ecuadorian President Correa’s decision to explicitly allow tied packages.) Peru’s liberal
apparatus thus steers China (and others) toward equity investments, which given the sta-
ble legal environment surrounding these deals is generally acceptable to China. However,
there are pockets of the Peruvian political economy where the politicians outpace the bu-
reaucrats. Some patronage or prestige projects might be promoted by leaders or legislators
hoping to boost their electoral prospects; in one instance, a series of trans-South American
navigational projects was also explicitly put forth as an area of Sino-Peruvian cooperation,
49“We learned through disaster.” Interview with Peruvian economist, Lima, September 2019.
50Original Spanish: En Perú, creemos que el préstamo es un mecanismo ineficiente. Interview, Lima,
October 2019.
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without much input from Lima’s technocrats. In these exceptional cases, China has made
inroads into Peru using its more familiar debt-centric model.
The distinction between elected officials and technocrats also has an international compo-
nent. The Peruvian scholars Novak Talavera and Namihas (2016) write that:
Definitively, Peru’s decision to engage in an open and diversified foreign and
commercial policy toward the world has been highly positive for the country in
that it allows the country to obtain greater benefits and lowers the risks of de-
pending on one partner or bloc. Such is our relationship with China. However,
it is also necessary to recognize our differences (democracy and human rights)
and maintain a relationship that does not distance ourselves from our natural
partners, like the United States and Europe.51 (57)
No government would want to over-rely on any one outside power, and Peru is no excep-
tion. Peru’s success in courting the engagement of many outside groups—not just China,
but also multilateral financial institutions, the United States, Europe, Japan, other Latin
American countries, and global bond markets—is largely the result of its “open and di-
versified foreign and commercial policy.” In keeping with the Bretton Woods institutions’
preference for international openness, the Peruvian bureaucracy enforces competitive and
open bidding procedures at the early stages of projects and stable property rights for in-
vestors once they have won bids. Novak and Namihas even bring up normative concerns
regarding which provide common ground with other democracies and potentially multilat-
eral organizations. The unstated issue is that Peru’s investor protections, stable adherence
to law, and even adherence to democratic process is highly uneven across different parts
51Translation by author from original Spanish: Definitivamente, la opción tomada por el Perú de tener una
política exterior y comercial abierta al mundo y diversificada resulta altamente positiva para el país, en tanto
le permite obtener mayores beneficios y reducir los riesgos de depender de un solo socio o bloque. En esta
línea se inscribe nuestra relación con la China. Sin embargo, es también preciso reconocer las diferencias
(democracia y derechos humanos) y mantener un relacionamiento que no nos distancie de nuestros socios
naturales, como lo son Estados Unidos de América y Europa.
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of its political system. The technocrats who engage with international investors fit this de-
scription, but many high-ranking politicians do not. Where bureaucrats and the rule of law
prevail, Novak and Namihas correctly predict that many outside parties will be interested,
and Peru will likely be able to play them against each other to extract a better deal for
itself. However, there are occasions when political patronage or behind-the-scenes corrup-
tion erodes confidence in the rule of law surrounding individual projects. This was made
abundantly clear by the Odebrecht scandal: after Odebrecht was found to have bribed mul-
tiple Peruvian heads of state, it was forced to leave the country, and its’ former projects’
checkered pasts deterred most other firms from getting involved. China has filled the void
for several of them, often using debt-based modalities more typical of its engagement in
countries like Ecuador. This type of subnational variation in political risk, including but
not limited to the Odebrecht scandal, will form the basis of the rest of this chapter.
I proceed to analysis of projects as broken down by sector. First is fishmeal, which plays
a contributing role in Chinese food security. Chinese investment here was mostly private
without any apparent government involvement; this case of strong market logic presents
a control case opposite those in which government funding was necessary to push firms
in a desired direction. Second, the oil and mining sectors have drawn exclusively equity
investments. Third is the banking sector. Reflecting Peru’s lower financial risk, China has
here made a mix of loans and equity investments on more favorable terms than typically
observed of Chinese bank loans to developing countries. Lastly is infrastructure. China has
been involved in projects including ports, overland transportation, telecommunications, and
electricity generation, but has done so on very different terms based on perceived project-
level risk. In some instances, exogenous shocks like the Odebrecht scandal left openings
for Beijing to fill, sometimes using different financial terms from the norm in Peru. With
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respect to a proposed transcontinental railway, Chinese geostrategic concerns make a rare
appearance in South America, leading to a much less market-driven approach on the part
of China.
6.2.2.2 Fishmeal
As discussed in the Ecuadorian context in Section 6.2.1.1 of this chapter, China uses im-
ported fishmeal to address the food security concerns of a billion-strong population living
on limited arable land. China’s 2008 Outline of the Medium- and Long-term Plan for Na-
tional Food Security established that China did not want to import more than 5 percent of
its consumption of staple grains (e.g., rice and wheat) (Central People’s Government of the
People’s Republic of China⇣-N∫⌘qå˝-.∫⌘?ú⌘, 2008). This meant
using China’s limited farmland for crops like rice, which produce large amounts of food
on modestly sized plots, and outsourcing more land-intensive crops of secondary impor-
tance to trading partners. Animal feed to back the rising Chinese middle class’s increasing
meat consumption has been highlighted as an area in which China can afford to buy from
overseas without compromising its core food security interests. Rich in protein and highly
land-intensive, imported soybeans for use as animal feed have drawn significant attention,
and for good reason: China bought $35.6 billion worth of them in 2017 (D. Ma and Adams,
2014; United Nations, 2018). The lion’s share of soybeans, however, come of one of three
countries—the United States, Brazil, and Argentina—and the politicization of the soy trade
during the Sino-US trade war has highlighted China’s vulnerabilities here (United Nations,
2018). Ground fish is also rich in protein and allows China to diversify away from reliance
on soy. At just over $2 billion per year, China’s fishmeal trade is modest relative to its $30
billion per year in soybean imports. Figure 6.5 shows that it is also concentrated among a
few exporters.
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Figure 6.5: Chinese Imports of Fishmeal as Animal Feed, 1995-2017
Graphic generated by Observatory of Economic Complexity (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011).
In every year since 1995, Peru has provided at least 44 percent of China’s fishmeal imports.
Runner-up Vietnam provided only 6.7 percent as of 2017. China has obvious resource
security interests here but has not needed to put forth all that much effort to secure them.
At least in the context of rising demand in the 2000s and early 2010s, the Peruvian fishmeal
trade was profitable enough to draw Chinese investment from private organizations. In
particular, China Fishery Group has purchased numerous assets in Peru. A private family
business based in Hong Kong, China Fishery is listed on the Singapore stock exchange,
and its management team are mostly Hong Kong nationals or overseas Chinese. It would
be difficult to observe direct state support from Beijing to such a firm, but the company
does not fit the profile of a mainland Chinese national champion. Nevertheless, beginning
in 2006, China Fishery went on an extended shopping spree in Peru. Table 6.6 details the
results.
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2006 Alexandria Fishing Co. 103 Ellis (2009, p. 159); Dussel Pe-ters (2019)
2006 Pesquería Isla Blanca (fishingfleet) N/A Ellis (2009, p. 159)
2007 Pesquería Maru (fishmeal pro-ducer) N/A Ellis (2009, p. 159)
2007 Pesquería El Pilar (fishmeal pro-ducer) N/A Ellis (2009, p. 159)
2007 La Candelaria SA and AltorealSA 11 Dussel Peters (2019)
2007 Chimbote fishmeal plant 18 Ellis (2009, p. 159); Dussel Pe-ters (2019)
2010 Pesquería Alejandría 95 Dussel Peters (2019)
2010
Deep Sea Fishing SAC, Pes-
quera Islaya SAC, Pesquera
Mistral SAC, Epesca Pisco SAC,
and Pesquera Pocoma SAC
56 Dussel Peters (2019)
2011 Negocios Rafmar and ConsorcioVollmatch 26
Ellis (2014, p. 38); Dussel Peters
(2019)
2013 Copeinca (controlling interest) 809
Ellis (2014, p. 38); Novak Talav-
era and Namihas (2016, p. 56);
Dussel Peters (2019)
2014 Copeinca (100% stake) 556 Dussel Peters (2019)
Total 1,674
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Not counting several transactions for which no amount is available, China Fishery spent
at least $1.6 billion building up its Peruvian operations. Available information would sug-
gest that this was a more traditionally entrepreneurial venture whose contribution toward
Chinese national interests was more incidental than intentional. First, the 2013 purchase
of Copeinca—by itself roughly half of the total—was backed by a loan from HSBC, a
UK-based bank with its origins in Hong Kong during the British colonial era (Novak Ta-
lavera and Namihas, 2016, p. 56). HSBC has better access to the mainland Chinese market
than most multinational private banks but remains an essentially private organization and
is legally still a foreign entity in China. It seems unlikely that the government in Beijing
would channel tax funds through HSBC when it has its own state-owned banks to do so.
Second, Singapore-listed China Fishery and its Hong Kong parent, Andes Pacific, filed
for bankruptcy in 2016. The bankruptcy was filed in, of all places, New York. American
bankruptcy law shielded them from the claims of HSBC, its loan to which was jeopardized
by some combination of “political troubles in Russia,” where the firm had also made in-
vestments, and declining yields due to El Niño and climate change in the Pacific (White,
2018; Woo, 2016). The Chinese government did not bail them out; instead, the company
used legal bankruptcy protections more typical of their home environments of Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Peru. As of this writing, China Fishery is still in bankruptcy protection and
looking for a buyer: again, not a likely move for a firm with a blank check underwritten by
Chinese taxpayers (White, 2018).
The Chinese government is willing to use state funds toward resource security interests,
but only in high-risk markets which firms are nervous to enter otherwise. Ecuadorian oil
was a high-risk area; Peruvian fishmeal was not perceived as such, although investors may
have underestimated non-political risks posed by climate change and declining fish stocks.
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Figure 6.6: Chinese Imports of Copper Ore, 1995-2017
Graphic generated by Observatory of Economic Complexity (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011).
Peru’s fisheries, though, are of much less importance to its economy than are its miner-
als.
6.2.2.3 Mineral Extraction: Oil, Gas, and Metals
Peru is a minor producer of iron ore, oil, and gas, and the world’s second-largest producer of
copper ore (U.S. Geological Survey, 2019). The U.S. Geological Survey (2019) estimates
that roughly 10 percent of the world’s copper reserves are in Peru. As seen in Figure 6.6,
China’s trade statistics reflect this fact.
So, it comes as no surprise that China is deeply involved in the Peruvian mining sector,
including not just copper but also smaller deposits of iron and hydrocarbons. Table 6.7 lists
these investments.
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Table 6.7 comprehensively lists all Chinese investments in mineral production, although the
amounts should be taken with a grain of salt. Most investments involve smaller amounts
up front to buy the concession and much larger planned expenditures over time. Plans for
longer-term expenditures often fluctuate significantly over time as investors negotiate with
host governments and subcontractors (Ellis, 2014). The above figures are best estimates
as of this writing but in some cases may not be final. With that caveat in mind, there re-
mains one overwhelming trend: China only used equity investment to enter Peru’s mineral
sector. This reflects China’s latecomer status in global development finance, which Chap-
ter 3 posited as a driver of China’s need to use strict risk management tools. By the time
China emerged as a global economic power, many of the safest markets were already fairly
saturated, leaving China with the toughest ones. Peru falls more into the former category,
meaning that China competes with a range of multinationals there. Generally speaking,
Peru is thus in the position to demand more favorable deals, which given many Peruvian
officials’ aforementioned aversion to borrowing means asking for equity investment and
leaving any debt with the investing company. The contrast with debt-heavy Ecuador is
stark.
These equity investments, though, are not a monolith. In some cases, Chinese firms have
bought out other foreign firms; in others, projects are started new or bought from the host
government. This distinction tells us something about the degree of extant market com-
petition, which in turn is a product of Peru’s domestic institutional framework. In most
instances, China has bought mines from other firms, as opposed to buying concessions
from the Peruvian government and/or opening new mines. This reflect’s Peru’s institu-
tional framework: a strong reputation among international investors has attracted many
major multinational firms to Peru, meaning its market was already fairly crowded by the
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time China emerged a major player in global mineral extraction. This was true for two oil
and gas deals, and several metals deals. To start, the 2003 purchase of oil Blocks 1A-B and
8 involved taking a 45 percent stake in the Peruvian affiliate of Argentinian firm PlusPetrol
(Ellis, 2009, p. 150; China National Petroleum Corporation, 2020). Something similar
happened in 2013, when CNPC purchased the Peruvian operations of Brazilian national oil
company Petrobras.55 CNPC bought 100 percent of two of the three blocks purchased from
Petrobras, but only 46.2 percent of a third, which was shared with Spain’s Repsol (Slav,
2017). Here, China was trusting Peruvian state institutions to regulate and adjudicate own-
ership contracts. In four other cases, China was effectively trusting third-party institutions
as well. The Rio Blanco mine was acquired by purchasing UK-based Monterrico Metals,
which was listed on the London Stock Exchange (Reuters, 2007d). Chinalco acquired the
Toromocho mine by buying a Canadian firm listed in Toronto and Lima (Reuters, 2007c).
Minmetals and Jiangxi Copper bought out a privately held Canadian firm to gain owner-
ship of the Galeno project (Reuters, 2007b; SEDAR, 2008). Lastly, Nanjinzhao bought the
Pampa de Pongo iron concession from Canada’s Cardero Resource Corporation (Cardero
Resource Corp., 2009). This fourth instance is unique in that Cardero had other assets and
the Chinese firm bought only the Peruvian subdivision, not the entire company.
One way of looking at the obvious pattern above is that Chinese investors trusted British
and Canadian institutions to regulate major transactions. This is accurate, but only pertains
to the immediate purchase transactions and not to actual operations in Peru once the com-
panies had been bought out and taken private. China would then still have to trust Peru’s
institutions. The real message was that Peru’s institutions were strong enough for compa-
55This deal was already being discussed before Petrobras’ corruption scandal broke in 2014. While it might
appear that China was moving into the void left by the Lava Jato scandal—and this has happened for other
formerly Brazilian-backed projects—the sale of Petrobras’ Peruvian assets might have happened anyway.
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nies with operations predominantly based there to meet the numerous hurdles to listing on
major global exchanges like London and Toronto. This, in turn, means that to have a chance
at acquiring the relevant mining projects, China had to work within the constraints of the
target companies being listed on the stock market, which in turn meant having to do rela-
tively transparent equity deals. Because Peruvian mining had strong access to capital from
third countries, Chinese firms were forced to take equity stakes and hold for themselves
any pertinent debt financing, a desirable outcome from Peru’s perspective.
There were two exceptional cases. First was China’s first mining investment in Peru, the
1993 purchase of the Marcona iron mine by Shougang. Shougang bought the Marcona iron
mine directly from the Peruvian state.56 This arrangement was a product of the politics of
the time—the Fujimori government was in the process of privatizing state assets. These
assets could only be sold off once. By the 2000s, China’s demand for minerals had grown
immensely, leading to a greater interest in investment abroad, but so had most international
investors’ interest in a now-stable Peru. Most subsequent deals, then, saw China buy from
these firms.
A second exception was the mammoth (almost $7 billion) Las Bambas copper mining deal.
This had originally belonged to global commodities giant Glencore but was purchased by
a Chinese consortium on less-than-arms-length terms. Swiss-headquartered Glencore was
planning to buy out its major rival Xstrata, raising antitrust concerns. These being global
firms, they needed approval from the regulators of all major markets, China included. As
one report at the time put it, “Glencore had to sell the Las Bambas project or other assets by
September 2014 in order to win China’s approval for its takeover of miner Xstrata last year,
as Beijing feared the merged group would hold too much sway over global copper supply”
56More specifically, the seller was Hierro Perú, a state-owned firm.
6.2. CHINA’S RESOURCE SECURITY IN ANDEAN SOUTH AMERICA 349
(Paul, 2014). Glencore acceded to Beijing’s request.57 As in the previous cases, equity was
the natural mode of entry to buy an existing project from another firm, but the surrounding
circumstances were quite different. In this case, China was able to use political means to
outdo market competition.
6.2.2.4 Banking
Chinese banks are also involved in the Peruvian financial sector. They have used a mix of
equity investments and loans to enter, but where loans are used, they are typically less tied
to specific projects than in Ecuador (or most other places). Table 6.8 lists these loans and
investments.
Of the four loans listed in Table 6.8, only one might have been tied. Little information is
available on the 2011 loan for electronic infrastructure, and we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that it came with the stipulation that a Chinese contractor do the work. The other
three, however, were more open-ended. In a rare direct deal with a foreign entity, Chinese
trade insurance group Sinosure provided COFIDE, Peru’s national development bank, with
$200 million for trade finance. This would obviously help Chinese exporters but was not
connected to any particular project or favored firm. So, this would not directly feed China’s
tendency to grant loans to firms based on political connections. Nor would it carry the risk
reduction measures of avoiding foreign bank accounts; to the contrary, it lent directly to a
foreign government institution. Another $150 million for trade and investment promotion
went to Banco de Crédito del Perú, the nation’s largest private bank. Clearly, decision-
makers in China had many fewer qualms about trusting Peruvian banks to repay than they
did in Ecuador.
57The original deal was that Glencore sell the mine, but not to any particular buyer. A Chinese consortium
later won the bid. See Ferreira-Marques (2013); Ellis (2014, p. 21); and Sanborn and Chonn Ching (2017a).
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Chinese banks were also willing to make equity investments in Peru. Novak Talavera and
Namihas (2016, p. 56) write that only 35 percent of the Peruvian economy receives any
kind of funding from the financial sector, presenting a serious constraint to growth. Foreign
bank loans for a fixed amount can somewhat address this shortfall, but making an actual
equity bet creates a framework for more credit to flow through the economy indefinitely.
Creutzfeldt (2016, pp. 607–608) writes that all twelve of ICBC’s first loans in Peru went to
non-Chinese firms. A commercial bank, ICBC is there to earn profits, not to replicate Exim
and CDB’s functions of assisting Chinese firms. Hong Kong-based private conglomerate
Fosun has also put $211 million into the Peruvian insurance industry. These firms are
entering Peru of their own accord, meaning that the Chinese state can save its resources for
efforts that are important to national interests but less lucrative.
6.2.2.5 Infrastructure
China has been much less involved in Peru’s infrastructure than in its mining sector. Indeed,
China’s relative dearth of infrastructure deals in Peru is relatively unusual given China’s
strength in this area. The underlying reason is Peru’s institutional framework, which both
favors competitive bids and draws many competitors. I begin with a few exceptional cases
where Chinese organizations have been involved either as lenders or by winning construc-
tion bids. These are relatively few, though, and the real story lies in “dogs that didn’t
bark”—in this case, a major transcontinental overland corridor which resembled Chinese-
built mega-projects in higher-risk environments but was ultimately nixed in the planning
stages by the Peruvian government. I conclude with how Chinese firms did manage to re-
main involved in Peruvian infrastructure—mostly through public-private partnerships and
equity investments, which are favored by the Peruvian government. These include some
more leveraged investments where the departure of Brazilian and American firms left a
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higher-risk void in need of filling.
Peru’s procurement laws for development contracts are fairly strict and do not leave much
room for tied packages. In one case, China did actually issue a loan to Peru, but as part of a
mostly non-Chinese project. The expansion of Lima’s metro, a major undertaking projected
to eventually cost a total of $5.66 billion, was initially supported by $750 million from the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Of this $750 million, $50 million came from
a special IDB fund contributed by the China Development Bank to support public-private
partnerships (PPPs). China was also not a major presence in the construction process:
a consortium of Spanish, Italian, and Peruvian interests won the concession to operate
the Metro expansion, and the rolling stock was purchased from Italian-based, Japanese-
owned Hitachi Rail Italy (Inter-American Development Bank, 2014a,b). The new trains
are driverless, meaning that Peru has committed to using Hitachi’s leading-edge technology
for many years to come (Hitachi Rail Italy, 2016). This is essentially the opposite of the
technological “conditionality” embodied in many Chinese loan contracts requiring the use
of Chinese equipment—and, by extension, Chinese replacement parts and technicians in
years to come. This is a very different kind of loan from what was seen in Ecuador—instead
of working bilaterally and maximizing the share of project value going to the Chinese
economy, CDB this time worked through a multilateral organization on an open basis.
Neither the Peruvian government nor the IDB would often allow otherwise.
Since tied loan packages are difficult to implement, Chinese firms must compete in open
bids, meaning going head-to-head against a number of major global construction firms
which were well-established in the Peruvian market before China’s arrival. This is a dif-
ficult task, but they have had a few successes. In 2018, China Railway (70 percent) and
China Railway 20th (30 percent) won a $375 million contract to build a highway between
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Huánuco and Huallanca, in the Andean highlands (China Railway Construction Corpora-
tion, 2018). A minority of the project was backed by the Inter-American Development
Bank, with the rest coming from the Peruvian government (Inter-American Development
Bank, 2016). In that same year, a consortium of Gezhouba (80 percent) and the Peruvian
firm EIVI (20 percent) outbid twelve others to win a $131 million58 contract to build an-
other highway between Oyón and Ambo, not far from the first project. This project came
out of the Peruvian government budget (Ahora, 2018, 2019).
Two highway projects are a relatively modest contribution compared to what Chinese firms
were doing in the smaller market of Ecuador. One area in which China has gained a more
significant market share is in telecommunications. In 2009, the United States’ Nextel used
Huawei equipment for its 3G network in Peru (NII Holdings, 2011). In 2011, Vietnam’s
Viettel (locally known as Bitel) set up 2G and 3G networks in Peru using ZTE equipment
(Comms Update, 2012). ZTE hardware was also used for a 4G network built by Velatel
(Marketwire, 2011). This trend has accelerated for the fifth generation of wireless technol-
ogy: of Peru’s four largest carriers, two are opting to use Huawei equipment for their 5G
networks, and a third (Bitel) stayed with ZTE (Comms Update, 2019; Karlosperu, 2019).
Because these networks are built by private firms, the source of funding is less likely to
be the Chinese state, although ZTE’s 4G deal was reportedly 85 percent financed by the
company59 (Marketwire, 2011). China is a genuine market leader in lower-cost telecom-
munications technology and in a fast-moving sector faced less entrenched competition than
in other infrastructure sectors.
The above projects have gone relatively smoothly, although there is one exception that
58444 million soles. Conversion to dollars at November 28, 2018 (date of press article) per Oanda (2020).
59The article cited states that “ZTE has agreed to finance 85% of the approximately $41 million total
projected cost,” but leaves it open as to whether this is the company’s own money or a loan from elsewhere.
Loans from the Export-Import Bank of China routinely cover 85 percent of project cost.
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proves the rule. A drainage project in the Amazon basin city of Iquitos has displayed some
of the symptoms of flawed incentives in Chinese development finance seen more often in,
for example, the Ecuadorian hydroelectric sector. This reflects a weaker institutional envi-
ronment in Iquitos than in the national government. The Iquitos project began with a $58
million loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2008, and China
International Water & Electric (CWE) was chosen to build sewers for a city that mostly
lacked them (Global Construction Review, 2018). The $125 million contract was subject
to a number of cost overruns, and actual expenditures reached $220 million. Despite this,
subcontractors at one point went on strike claiming that the company had not paid them
(Ellis, 2014, pp. 66–67, 162). Most parts of the sewer system never actually worked. Pros-
ecutors later charged the governor of Loreto, the department in which Iquitos is located,
and CWE officials with graft. The governor was also under investigation for several other
corruption schemes and later served jail time (Carbajal, 2019). CWE was disbarred by
JICA and is currently being sued by the Peruvian government (Global Construction Re-
view, 2018). While not encouraging, this was a relatively isolated event in the Peruvian
context. CWE was expelled from two hydroelectric projects in Ecuador alone, not to speak
of misconduct by other firms. This was an example of subnational variation in institutional
strength: the governor apparently had an extensive track record of corruption, opening the
door to bad behavior far from the prying eyes of the Lima bureaucracy. It may also re-
flect Peru’s dichotomy between legalistic civil servants and unscrupulous elected officals,
as the governor played a larger role in this project than elected officials typically do in most
instances.
In one very notable instance, China did attempt to reach out through Peru’s elected officials
at the national level. The Bi-Oceanic Corridor was an enormously ambitious initiative to
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link Peru’s Pacific coast to the Brazilian Atlantic. This was similar to the proposed corridor
from Manta, Ecuador to the Brazilian border, but received more serious consideration in
Peru before ultimately being scrapped as well. The Corridor provides an excellent exam-
ple of why the debt-heavy, non-competitive model favored by China in many higher-risk
markets struggled to succeed in Peru, despite Beijing’s best efforts.
The idea of better connectivity across the imposing barrier of the Amazon Basin had existed
for centuries, and some progress had been made in 2006 and 2007 with the construction
of two east-west highways connecting Peru’s coast to the Brazilian border. The first went
through Piura, in the north; the second through Ilo, in the southern-central coastline (Ellis,
2009, p. 154). These highways would have inherently less capacity than a train, though. A
Chinese firm, Shandong Luneng, had in 2006 attempted to build a $10 billion series of in-
vestments including port infrastructure in the far southern city of Tacna and a railway inland
to Bolivian mines, but the railway ultimately fell through after the port project was given to
an Indian firm (Ellis, 2009, pp. 153–54; K. Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010). The Peruvian
government decided to give the idea a second go, but this time further north. In 2008, Pres-
ident Alan García formally announced the Transcontinental Brazil-Peru Atlantic-Pacific
Railway, usually known by its Spanish acronym, FETAB60 (Government of Peru, 2008).
Unlike the Shandong Luneng-proposed route, this one ran through Piura, in the north, and
ran directly into Brazil without passing through Bolivia. This was a favored project of
President García, who reportedly referred to it as “the most important public work that is
currently being realized in South America” (Ellis, 2009, p. 153).
As happened for Ecuador’s highly ambitious hydropower projects, though, finding a finan-
cial backer was difficult, and none emerged for years. That formally changed in July 2014,
60In Spanish, Ferrovía Transcontinental “Brasil-Perú” Atlántico-Pacífico.
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when Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff formally invited Chinese involvement in FETAB
at a BRICS summit in Brasilia. In November, Peru joined while García’s successor, Ollanta
Humala, was visiting Beijing for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit
(Novak Talavera and Namihas, 2016, p. 50; Adins, 2016, p. 74). At this point, all relevant
parties had formally signed on. A feasibility study began after Chinese Premier Li Keqiang
visited Brazil in May 2015 (Niu, 2018, p. 186). Diplomatic summits did not rank among
major factors in most of the projects listed above, but this was no ordinary project. First
was the sheer scale—China’s own early estimates of the total cost (across both Brazil and
Peru) would be $60 billion. This would be enough to warrant some Chinese involvement
in that this could be an enormous payday for Chinese firms. This could happen both in the
short term with construction and the long term: an article from China’s nationalist-leaning
Global Times following Brazil’s invitation of Chinese participation states that “China hopes
to export railway technological standards, such as gauge”61 (Global Times⇣Ø⇤ˆ•⌘,
2014). Continued dependence on China for replacement parts and maintenance of criti-
cal infrastructure is an unwritten but very real type of condition attached to development
finance (Mattlin and Nojonen, 2015).
This might have been enough to push some Chinese involvement, but there were other com-
mercial and geostrategic drivers as well. Commercially speaking, the railway could shorten
the transit time from the soy fields and iron mines of Brazil to Chinese ports (Grey, 2018).
This arguably could benefit Chinese resource security by lowering transportation costs, al-
though this would be contingent on rail freight actually costing less than maritime transit.
The more immediate value of the project from China’s perspective is more geostrategic.
According to Chinese scholar Sun Zhang:
61Translation by author from original Chinese: -˝  ì˙¡ÔÄ/ƒ< ÇhΩ⇥
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From China’s perspective, the Bi-Oceanic Railway’s strategic use is greater
than its transportation use. From a cost perspective, rail transportation costs
roughly twice as much as sea transportation, and the goods that China could
use the railway to buy from Brazil would not be worth it. But, from a longer-
term strategic perspective, the Bi-Oceanic Railway would help China break
America’s monopoly on international trade flows via control of the Panama
Canal.62 (Sun Lichao⇣Y= ⌘, 2014)
In other words, even if the railway loses money, it might be worthwhile simply to create an
alternative to Panama. Bai Ming, a scholar with a research institute affiliated with China’s
Ministry of Commerce, explicitly connects this issue to resource security.
“Trade between China and South America can take three routes, including
crossing the Caribbean to pass through the Panama Canal and on to the Pacific;
from the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America to the Pacific;
and across the Atlantic and through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal
before passing through the Indian Ocean,” says Bai Ming, Assistant Director
of Global Market Research at the Ministry of Commerce’s Chinese Academy
of International Trade and Economic Cooperation. The second route through
the Strait of Magellan comes close to the Antarctic and is quite dangerous;
the third route is very far and expensive. So, in the long-term China heavily
depends on the Panama Canal.
Data from the Panama Canal show that China is its second-largest user, with
53 million tons of goods moving through the canal either to or from China in
2011. “For China to be a great trading power, for a large quantity of goods to
be blocked by another great power is very dangerous, especially since much
of what China imports from South America is goods important to fundamental
security like energy and food.63 (Sun Lichao⇣Y= ⌘, 2014)
62Author’s translation from original Chinese: $↵¡Ô˘é-˝eÙ ⇠e\(ÿé–ì\( Œ⇣
,⌦≤ ¡Ô–ì/w–Ñ$ ÊÛ -˝ŒÙ(¡Ô–ì'iv ✓ó FŒ‹⇠e⇤@e
↵ $↵¡Ô⌃ ©é-˝S4ÓMé˝ß6↵ÑÙˇl–≥˘˝EiAÑÑ≠0M⇥
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This logic is highly similar to the Eurasian transportation routes discussed in Chapter 7, but
instead of the nearby Strait of Malacca, the Bi-Oceanic Corridor is designed to bypass the
faraway Panama Canal.64 This is of secondary importance from China’s perspective, but
is nevertheless a major global chokepoint. There is reason to doubt how well this would
work from China’s perspective. On one hand, the 1977 Torrijos-Carter Treaties returning
sovereignty over the canal to Panama did reserve an American right to intervene against
any threats to free passage through the canal (Treaty of Pan. Canal 1977). In sheer hard
power terms, in the event of a Sino-American conflict, China would be unable to stop
American forces from blockading a small target so close to the United States. On the other
hand, it is doubtful whether China could do much to guard the Pacific terminus of a trans-
South American railroad which would, again, be geographically in the United States’ home
region. Interestingly, Adins (2016, p. 89) writes that “if above all in a symbolic way, China
would achieve a logistical alternative to the Panama Canal.”65 Even if at least some in
Beijing recognize the dubious value of bringing goods safely to the Pacific Coast where
they will again become vulnerable to American interdiction, there can be an optical or soft
power component to the project demonstrating that China can compete with the United
States. If this interpretation is correct, China’s interest in the project could be as much
diplomatic as geostrategic.
Even if China is willing to spend resources, the question remains of whether Peru is. As the
central link between Brazil and China, Peru’s participation is indispensable. This is where
the project fell short. Doubts about economic viability were pervasive among interviewees
i⇥”} ⇥
64Adins (2016, pp. 66–68) and Castro Obando (2018) both explicitly connect the Bi-Oceanic Railway to
the Belt and Road.
65Author’s translation from original Spanish: ... si bien sobre todo de manera simbólica, China contaría
con una alternativa logística frente al Canal de Panamá.
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in Lima. Two interviewees raised concerns that the railway would slowly sink into the
soft jungle floor, leading to a state of “perpetual maintenance,” to borrow the phrasing of
one of them.66 Before reaching the Amazon Basin, the Andes would also present a major
obstacle. Of the project’s total $60 billion budget, $35 billion was slated for Peru, despite
most of the railway’s length passing through Brazil’s vast interior. This was largely because
of the costs of crossing the world’s second-highest mountain range (Taj, 2019a). What’s
more, while Peru would have paid over half the costs, many Peruvians doubted that they
would reap many of the benefits. Many interviewees expressed concern that Peru would
simply become a pass-through country for Sino-Brazilian trade. Others worried about the
environmental and social costs of building through the pristine rainforests of northeastern
Peru, not to mention similar concerns in Brazil.67 Then there was the issue of financing.
Equity investment never appears to have been publicly discussed, but the former Peruvian
Ambassador to China said in a post-retirement interview that “China through its banks
was offering possibilities for loans”68 (Castro Obando, 2018). A Chinese scholar at the
Shanghai Institutes of International Studies adds that “if China contributes most of the
loans to the project, the model of concession or arrangements of payment must be adapted
to attract Chinese investors” (Niu, 2018, p. 186). To compensate for putting tens of billions
into a project which was unlikely to turn a profit, Chinese companies would need some
extra risk insurance in the form of tied loans.
Hypothesis 3B held that China uses debt to push geostrategic projects in areas of high risk,
but is more willing to use equity elsewhere. At the project level, the Bi-Oceanic Corridor
was indeed high risk, and China did attempt to use debt there. At the national level, though,
66Interviews, Lima, September 2019. See also Adins (2016).
67See also Adins (2016).
68Author’s translation from original Spanish: China a través de sus bancos estaba ofreciendo posibilidades
para préstamos.
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Peru’s institutional environment was much less receptive to debt. In 2016, Peru backed out
of the project. During a trip to China, President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski told reporters that
“without getting confrontational, I told [the Chinese side] that this trans-Amazonic train
has very high costs and environmental impacts, and that we would have to look at that
carefully”69 (Fowkes, 2016). One Peruvian economist interviewed for this project stated
that the railway had “died of cost, basically.”70 Kuczynski instead proposed a train running
north-south along the coast, connecting Lima to a series of smaller cities (Fowkes, 2016).
Interviewees unanimously saw this route as more financially sustainable than the trans-
Amazonian route to Brazil—the route runs through more populated areas while avoiding
the engineering issues of crossing the Andes and Amazon basin—but without any geopo-
litical significance for China. The price tag was also lower: as of 2019, the government
estimated that $3.26 billion in investment would be necessary. The Peruvian is also seek-
ing bidders for a public-private partnership, as opposed to a loan (Barrow, 2019; Negocios
Perú, 2019). China Railway bid for the project but did not get it, and as of this writing the
bidding process is still ongoing (Reyes, 2019).
In the meantime, two trans-continental alternatives have emerged. First, a rail route further
to the south connecting the Peruvian port of Ilo to Brazil via Bolivia is being discussed, but
with a different set of actors. This time, a German-Swiss consortium including Siemens has
signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Bolivia, a landlocked state
with a more direct interest in access to the ocean than Brazil or Peru either one. Bolivia
has leveraged German interest in its deposits of lithium, an important component for some
types of batteries, to maintain their support (Dannemann, 2017; Taj and Nienaber, 2019).
69Author’s translation from original Spanish: ...sin entrar en nada confrontacional, les dije que el tren
transamazónico [Transoceánico entre Perú y Brasil] podría tener costos muy altos e impactos ambientales,
y tendríamos que mirar eso con cuidado.
70Original Spanish: muerto de costo, básicamente.
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It remains to be seen whether the project comes to fruition, but it is certainly more viable
than the northern route: it avoids the ecological and engineering difficulties of the Amazon
Basin, and 66 percent of the planned route actually already exists (Adins, 2016, pp. 75–
87). This leaves roughly $10 billion of work left to do—not a small amount, but still much
smaller than the $60 billion associated with the northern route (Niu, 2018, p. 187).
Second, more along the northern route of the Chinese-backed railway, Peru has renewed
interest in the Amazon Waterway (Hidrovía Amazónica) project dredging Amazon tribu-
taries leading to an inland port, which is connected to the coast by highway. This project
was originally put on ice in 2014 when contracting firm China Communications Construc-
tion Company (CCCC) failed to consult local communities as required by law (Sanborn
and Chonn Ching, 2017b). In 2017, after the railway had fallen through, a new concession
was granted to a 50-50 consortium of Sinohydro and Peru’s own Construcción y Admin-
istración, SA (CASA) (Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones del Perú, 2020). The
language used by national investment promotion agency Proinversión in its documentation
about the project is strikingly similar to China’s advocacy of the Bi-Oceanic Railway: the
waterway is meant as “a corridor from Brazil to the great markets of Asia and Australia”71”
(Proinversión, 2013). However, an enormous difference exists with respect to the cost: the
waterway is budgeted at only $94.7 million. It is also being done on a PPP basis over a
twenty-year term, meaning debt is being held by the responsible joint venture.
China’s use of debt to push capital into higher-risk but geostrategically significant projects
has succeeded in some places, but not Peru. Part of this may have been due to a less di-
rect Chinese interest than in, say, Kazakhstan or Pakistan (the topics of the next chapter),
but China has nevertheless remained interested. Vice President Fu Mengzi of the China
71Author’s translation from original Spanish: un corredor hacia desde Brasil hacia el gran mercado
asiático y Australia.
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Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, a think tank housed within China’s pri-
mary intelligence agency, stated that he hoped Peru would reconsider the project, although
he acknowledged it was “difficult.”72 It may be that China might have offered more fa-
vorable terms to a project in its more immediate interests—indeed, the following chapter
will discuss major sacrifices of wealth for strategic navigational projects in Asia. The real
constraint was Peru’s willingness to undertake related costs. Instead, Peru downsized to a
more modest investment in rail through areas of higher population density and a dredging
project costing a fraction of the railway, but along a similar route. It may yet also sign on
to a railway to Bolivia for lower cost, although this is still uncertain. These projects were
better aligned to incentives provided by Peru’s relatively small consumer market and were
thus able to draw capital from places other than China: a Peruvian firm for the waterway,
and European backing for the Bolivian railway. They were also done more often as equity
stakes in public-private partnerships, at least in the case of the Peru-only waterway and
coastal rail. Indeed, a Chinese firm is a partner in the concession for the waterway, and this
could happen for the coastal rail.
Unlike in Ecuador, Peru’s institutional framework made it difficult to splash enormous sums
into politically motivated projects via debt, but this does not mean that there is no room for
Chinese involvement. The waterway is only one of several public-private partnerships in
which Chinese firms have invested. A major port expansion project is being planned at
Chancay, to the south of Lima, in a bid to alleviate congestion at the existing primary port
of Callao, to the immediate north of Lima. China Ocean Shipping (COSCO) has already
paid $225 million for a 60 percent stake in the concession (World Maritime News, 2019).
Planned investments in the port’s expansion are eventually expected to reach $3 billion
72Original Chinese: àæ⇥At Congreso Nacional ALADAA-Perú, September 25, 2019, Pontificia Uni-
versidad Católica del Perú, Lima.
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(Yilei Sun and T. Daly, 2019).
Other PPP or equity deals include several in the power sector. In 2015, Hydro Global, a
joint venture of Three Gorges and Energias de Portugal, filed a declaration of interest with
Peru’s investment authority to build a new hydroelectric dam (Gestión, 2015; Proinversión,
2015). This would give any other interested parties ninety days to file their own paperwork
preceding a competitive bid, but the concession for the new San Gaban III dam—there
were already two others nearby—did indeed stay with Hydro Global. Construction is being
done by China Water & Electric (CWE), a Three Gorges subsidiary, and the joint venture
will manage the completed product for a thirty-year term. During this time, 5 percent of
generated power will go to Empresa Generación Eléctrica San Gabán (EGESG), a state-
owned firm which already manages the San Gaban II dam and has a concession to build
another. The other 95 percent of revenues will stay with the concession-holders, who out
of a planned budget of $560 million have borrowed $438 million from China Development
Bank on a nineteen-year term (Gestión, 2018; Harris, 2017; Proinversión, 2016). This
“self-financed” (autofinanciado) project puts no obligation on the Peruvian state budget
and even pays out a small amount to a Peruvian state-owned firm. This was effectively a
compromise between China’s debt-backed model and Peru’s preferred equity investment.
Few other bidders were interested in the Hydro Global-proposed project, and and the Pe-
ruvian government mostly entertained the idea because Hydro Global offered to provide
all necessary financing. However, Peru hosted enough other investment projects, including
in hydroelectricity, that they were in a position to ask the investor to take on most project
risk—the San Gabán III project was expendable from their perspective. So, Three Gorges
did take an ownership stake, but at least partially due to others’ lack of interest managed to
handle all of the construction work internally using financing from a policy bank in Beijing.
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China Development Bank is functionally assuming much of the risk that the project turns a
loss, but unlike in the cases of loans directly to the recipient government cannot share that
risk with the local authorities.
Whereas the San Gabán III dam never attracted much investor interest to begin with, an-
other Chinese-invested hydroelectric plant at Chaglla was more the product of a prior in-
vestor’s departure. The Chaglla plant had already been built by Odebrecht, which spent
$1.5 billion to develop it, including $774 million lent by Brazil’s national development
bank, BNDES, and $150 million from the Inter-American Development Bank (Aquino,
2018; Inter-American Development Bank, 2011; N. Stone, 2013). The project was near
completion when the Odebrecht scandal spread from Brazil to Peru, leading to the firm’s
expulsion from most ongoing contracts in the country. The Chaglla dam was too far along
to simply abandon, but many other engineering firms were put off by the whiff of corrup-
tion surrounding it. China’s Three Gorges filled the void, purchasing the project in 2019
(Ven, 2019). The Bank of China, ICBC, and Spain’s BBVA, issued an $850 million, two-
year bridge loan for the project and covered the rest of the $1.4 billion purchase price by
purchasing an equity stake (Inframation, 2019). Of this $1.4 billion price, $600 million
went toward paying Odebrecht’s creditors; $100 million toward a settlement with Cofide,
Peru’s national development bank; and $319 million toward settling a civil suit over bribery
(Gestión, 2019). In other words, less than a third of the purchase price actually went to-
ward construction; most went toward cleaning up after a scandal that Three Gorges did not
create. The panoply of creditors and injured parties which could possibly sue Odebrecht’s
heirs presented a high degree of political risk, especially since they might be sympathetic
figures in the court of public opinion, not to mention the actual judicial system. These risks
were multiplied by the fact that Three Gorges committed to operate the project for fifteen
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years. The company only did so with implicit backing from (mostly) Chinese banks, in-
cluding the unusual measure of banks taking equity stakes. Three Gorges’ use of funding
from Chinese commercial banks and one European private firm also reflects a quirk of this
case: because the construction was already mostly done and in the legal ownership of part
of the Peruvian government, the policy banks could not fulfill their usual function of en-
suring that funds go to Chinese construction firms. As one report on the dam put it, “The
Export–Import Bank of China looked at the deal initially, but since the borrower is a Peru-
vian SPV [special purpose vehicle], they could not participate due to internal regulations
[...]” (Inframation, 2019).
Lastly, and much less dramatically, China Yangtze has as of October 2019 agreed to buy the
Peruvian assets of the American firm Sempra, which manages a large part of Peru’s electri-
cal grid. The deal is very large, valued at $3.59 billion, and unlike the hydroelectric projects
does not come with an expiration date on the relevant concession. The deal is similar to
Chaglla, though, in that a Chinese firm is moving in where another was forced to retreat.
Based in San Diego, Sempra was significantly affected by 2019’s California wildfires and
opted to sell off its two South American divisions to deal with issues at home. (Sempra
also plans to sell its Chilean assets to China’s State Grid for $2.23 billion.) (Sarkar, 2019;
Sarkar and Shariq Khan, 2019). China is again moving in to voids left by other market
actors, although the Peruvian (and Chilean) grid assets were lower-risk opportunities and
merited multi-billion dollar equity investments.73
73As of this writing, these deals are being reviewed for antitrust considerations and are not yet final.
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6.2.3 Conclusion: Peru
Peru’s general stability presents a useful contrast to Ecuador. While Ecuador’s fragile post-
crisis compromise did not last long, the basic structures created by the Fujimori adminis-
tration following Peru’s turbulent 1980s have largely endured. As a result, Peru exhibits
little variation over time, but much more variation across sectors, as Peru’s bureaucracy
exercises effective oversight over much of the economy but leaves some pockets less cov-
ered. In the fishmeal and mineral extraction sectors, the inherent commercial promise of
exports to China combined with a reliable Peruvian institutional framework meant that
firms were comfortable making equity investments, sometimes without any apparent direct
support from Beijing. This underscores the interactive nature of the relationship between
political risk, resource interests, and development finance stringency. China did not use
commodity-backed loans in Ecuador because Ecuador had oil; it did so because Ecuador
had oil and its track record toward international investors deterred most firms from enter-
ing without encouragement from the home government. Within Peru, the failure of the
Bi-Oceanic Corridor reveals the limits of this risk-management strategy. The Corridor it-
self was not profitable and highly politicized, negotiated more by diplomatic summit than
by the more reliable rules and regulations of Peru’s bureaucracy. China tried to use debt
to push firms into a geostrategic project here, but cognizant of having better options, Peru
backed out and opted for competitive bids on smaller-scale projects. A mismatch between
high project-level risk and lower national-level risk was the project’s undoing. Other excep-
tions existed where subnational institutions were weaker than national (the Iquitos sewer)
and to a limited degree where the departure of Brazil left a void. Overall, the Peruvian
case illustrates how China approaches development finance where important commercial
interests are involved, but stronger local institutions and international competition present
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constraints.
6.3 Conclusion: Resource-Backed Loans
Large-n and case study evidence both demonstrate that resource-backed loans are designed
for markets in which China has commodity interests but local institutions are less favorable
to foreign loans or investment. This covers one extreme of this dissertation’s spectrum
of stringency in financing terms. The most stringent terms (resource collateralization) are
reserved for the toughest cases with the understanding that bilateral relations could suffer.
This was certainly the case in Ecuador, where the optics of a close commercial relationship
clashed with sharp rhetoric by the Ecuadorian leadership and the reality was probably not
receiving the best possible deal for its oil wealth.
These findings extend a pattern begun by Chapters 4 and 5. These showed that aid and
equity are better for bilateral relations but (in the case of equity) are susceptible to political
risk. This chapter added resource-backed loans as an even stronger reaction to political
risk.
The next chapter introduces the last of the main independent variables not yet discussed in-
depth: geostrategic interests. Where political risk is an issue, the risk management value of
tied loans can propel capital into areas of strategic interest, potentially leading to a delicate
balancing act between the need to stay on good terms with countries at geostrategically im-
portant junctures and the potentially onerous terms used by banks to protect firms. Chapter
7 will move toward the geostrategically central74 Eurasian context. Here, where political
risk is high, resource-backed loans only seldom enter the picture; after all, China has much
74From China’s perspective.
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more to lose here from a tense bilateral relationship. Instead, we observe a mix of grants,
equity, and loans depending on the risk profile and geostrategic nature of the project in
question.
6.4 Appendix
Table 6.9: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, “Low” Scenario
(AidData; Global Sample), Borders and Chokepoints Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
Taiwan recognition -29.63⇤⇤⇤ -29.76⇤⇤⇤ -54.74⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-21.80) (-22.19) (-5.74)
ASEAN member, SCS -2.230⇤ -2.233⇤ -51.03⇤⇤⇤ -13.97⇤⇤⇤
disputant (binary) (-1.93) (-1.88) (-5.05) (-9.06)
ASEAN member, SCS 1.702 1.932 3.870 -3.358⇤⇤
non-disputant (binary) (0.87) (1.00) (0.73) (-2.06)
UNGA voting similarity 10.50⇤⇤⇤ 9.290⇤⇤ 23.26 8.414⇤⇤
with China (one-year lag) (2.68) (2.34) (1.37) (2.26)
Border with China 1.838 2.082⇤ 2.789 -1.407
(binary) (1.55) (1.70) (0.63) (-1.40)
Chokepoint (binary) -0.782 -0.529 -7.569⇤ -0.954
(-0.76) (-0.53) (-1.78) (-1.24)
Distance from China (pop.- 0.302⇤⇤ 0.292⇤⇤ 1.336⇤⇤ 0.0633
weighted; thousands km) (2.11) (2.01) (2.57) (0.55)
Commodity exports to -0.0334 -0.00770 0.0587 -0.0458
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.20) (-0.05) (0.10) (-0.25)
Total imports from 1.978⇤⇤ 2.008⇤⇤ 4.272 0.665
China (log; one-year lag) (2.39) (2.40) (1.51) (0.92)
Rule of Law (WGI; 2.516 1.772 23.22⇤⇤⇤ 3.337⇤⇤
one-year lag) (1.06) (0.77) (2.84) (2.06)
Rule of Law -0.401⇤⇤ -0.292⇤ -2.478⇤⇤⇤ -0.439⇤⇤⇤
⇥ commodity exports (-2.21) (-1.73) (-4.95) (-4.19)
Polity score -0.0586 -0.0679 -0.242 0.0825
(one-year lag) (-0.85) (-0.95) (-1.09) (1.43)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.808⇤ -0.803⇤ -1.408 -0.370
Continued on next page
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Table 6.9: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, “Low” Scenario
(AidData; Global Sample), Borders and Chokepoints Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
(log; one-year lag) (-1.82) (-1.80) (-0.86) (-1.08)
GDP per capita (log) -2.366⇤⇤⇤ -2.575⇤⇤⇤ -3.939 -0.0879
(-3.03) (-3.31) (-1.39) (-0.12)
Population (log) -1.023 -1.084 -2.382 -0.215
(-1.50) (-1.59) (-1.02) (-0.36)
English language 1.556⇤⇤ 1.602⇤⇤ 5.177 -0.110
(binary) (2.09) (2.15) (1.41) (-0.11)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 0.757⇤⇤⇤ 0.722⇤⇤⇤ 3.977⇤⇤⇤ 0.207
(2.89) (2.80) (3.30) (1.09)
Time2 -0.0317⇤⇤ -0.0283⇤⇤ -0.219⇤⇤⇤ -0.0179⇤
(-2.28) (-2.07) (-3.70) (-1.92)
Constant -10.86 -7.919 -69.34⇤⇤⇤ -17.27⇤⇤⇤
(-1.51) (-1.09) (-2.74) (-2.76)
Countries 124 124 124 86
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2014 2014 2014 2014
Observations 1499 1499 1499 488
Clustered SE? X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from AidData (AD) with additional resource-backed loan variable coded by author.
Table 6.10: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, “Low” Scenario
(AidData; Global Sample), BRI Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
Taiwan recognition -29.20⇤⇤⇤ -29.26⇤⇤⇤ -50.48⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-21.89) (-22.56) (-5.60)
ASEAN member, SCS -1.057 -1.087 -45.44⇤⇤⇤ -12.75⇤⇤⇤
disputant (binary) (-0.82) (-0.80) (-4.76) (-8.53)
ASEAN member, SCS 0.814 1.013 4.458 -2.946⇤⇤
non-disputant (binary) (0.47) (0.59) (0.73) (-2.20)
Continued on next page
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UNGA voting similarity 7.184⇤⇤ 6.055⇤ 19.40 8.547⇤⇤
with China (one-year lag) (2.14) (1.80) (1.12) (2.12)
BRI route (binary) 4.187⇤⇤⇤ 4.279⇤⇤⇤ 2.036 -0.193
(4.69) (4.79) (0.57) (-0.26)
Distance from China (pop.- 0.504⇤⇤⇤ 0.485⇤⇤⇤ 1.552⇤⇤⇤ 0.157
weighted; thousands km) (4.79) (4.66) (2.75) (1.38)
Commodity exports to -0.0805 -0.0498 -0.0292 -0.128
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.52) (-0.35) (-0.05) (-0.62)
Total imports from 1.671⇤⇤ 1.672⇤⇤ 3.663 0.482
China (log; one-year lag) (2.19) (2.19) (1.26) (0.67)
Rule of Law (WGI; 4.270⇤ 3.539⇤ 23.00⇤⇤⇤ 3.927⇤⇤⇤
one-year lag) (1.93) (1.68) (2.85) (2.64)
Rule of Law -0.526⇤⇤⇤ -0.416⇤⇤⇤ -2.506⇤⇤⇤ -0.476⇤⇤⇤
⇥ commodity exports (-3.06) (-2.68) (-5.29) (-4.80)
Polity score -0.0542 -0.0657 -0.248 0.0259
(one-year lag) (-0.85) (-1.00) (-1.15) (0.60)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.907⇤⇤ -0.901⇤⇤ -1.297 -0.349
(log; one-year lag) (-2.38) (-2.30) (-0.75) (-0.96)
GDP per capita (log) -2.547⇤⇤⇤ -2.731⇤⇤⇤ -3.659 -0.0707
(-3.36) (-3.65) (-1.28) (-0.10)
Population (log) -1.043 -1.081⇤ -2.217 -0.0391
(-1.61) (-1.68) (-0.93) (-0.06)
English language 1.849⇤⇤⇤ 1.885⇤⇤⇤ 5.924 0.0278
(binary) (2.76) (2.83) (1.54) (0.03)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 0.889⇤⇤⇤ 0.853⇤⇤⇤ 4.251⇤⇤⇤ 0.276
(3.43) (3.33) (3.44) (1.39)
Time2 -0.0366⇤⇤⇤ -0.0331⇤⇤ -0.228⇤⇤⇤ -0.0198⇤⇤
(-2.69) (-2.47) (-3.81) (-2.03)
Constant -4.168 -1.341 -66.27⇤⇤ -18.02⇤⇤⇤
(-0.64) (-0.21) (-2.52) (-2.72)
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from AidData (AD) with additional resource-backed loan variable coded by author.
Table 6.11: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, African/Latin
American Sample, Chokepoints Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
Continued on next page
6.4. APPENDIX 371
Table 6.11: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, African/Latin
American Sample, Chokepoints Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
Taiwan recognition -26.24⇤⇤⇤ -29.02⇤⇤⇤ -31.47⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-22.05) (-22.50) (-5.38)
UNGA voting 1.195 1.403 10.83 0.568
similarity with China (one-
year lag) (0.26) (0.24) (0.89) (0.20)
Chokepoint (binary) 0.791 1.310 -29.77⇤⇤⇤ -12.40⇤⇤⇤
(0.48) (0.80) (-4.18) (-8.45)
Distance from China -0.288 -0.103 1.127⇤ 0.176
(population-weighted; thou-
sands km) (-1.47) (-0.45) (1.80) (1.02)
Commodity exports to -0.0353 -0.257 1.506 0.390
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.22) (-1.15) (1.46) (1.19)
Total imports from -0.103 0.838 1.266 -0.123
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.12) (0.79) (0.41) (-0.13)
Rule of Law (WGI; 6.685⇤⇤⇤ 6.177⇤⇤⇤ 18.21 1.332
one-year lag) (3.24) (2.58) (1.49) (0.31)
Rule of Law -0.693⇤⇤⇤ -0.630⇤⇤⇤ -1.944⇤⇤ -0.256
⇥ commodity exports (-4.44) (-3.40) (-2.49) (-1.02)
Polity score -0.0197 -0.0605 -0.351 0.0103
(one-year lag) (-0.24) (-0.55) (-1.62) (0.15)
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.368 -0.0124 0.0945 0.0519
(log; one-year lag) (0.74) (-0.02) (0.06) (0.13)
GDP per capita (log) -0.0913 -1.240 -1.823 0.414
(-0.12) (-1.20) (-0.66) (0.51)
Population (log) 0.392 0.206 -0.835 0.0407
(0.54) (0.22) (-0.33) (0.06)
English language 0.985 2.276⇤⇤⇤ 3.676 -0.0459
(binary) (1.31) (2.62) (1.01) (-0.04)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 0.621⇤ 1.124⇤⇤ -0.0973 -0.139
(1.87) (2.53) (-0.10) (-0.42)
Time2 -0.0244 -0.0370⇤ -0.00102 0.00368
(-1.63) (-1.88) (-0.02) (0.25)
Constant -7.497 -14.78 -53.65⇤⇤ -13.03⇤
(-0.86) (-1.43) (-2.38) (-1.66)
Countries 72 72 72 53
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2018 2018 2018 2018
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Table 6.11: Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis, African/Latin
American Sample, Chokepoints Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
Observations 1007 916 916 332
Clustered SE? X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from SAIS-CARI and Inter-American Dialogue.
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Table 6.12:
Cash vs. Resource-Backed Loans, Commitment Basis
African/Latin American Sample
BRI Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Logit:
Loans Cash Resource % Resource
Taiwan recognition -26.19⇤⇤⇤ -29.04⇤⇤⇤ -32.00⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-21.26) (-21.44) (-5.60)
UNGA voting 0.980 1.104 11.34 0.976
similarity with China (one-year lag) (0.21) (0.19) (0.97) (0.35)
BRI route (binary) 2.050 3.141⇤⇤ -2.669 -0.855
(1.52) (2.49) (-0.87) (-1.17)
Distance from China -0.169 0.0869 1.018 0.124
(population-weighted; thousands km) (-0.82) (0.36) (1.39) (0.67)
Commodity exports to -0.0394 -0.279 1.567 0.367
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.26) (-1.28) (1.60) (1.32)
Total imports from -0.0247 0.989 1.043 -0.0942
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.03) (0.97) (0.34) (-0.10)
Rule of Law 6.958⇤⇤⇤ 6.470⇤⇤⇤ 17.89 1.392
one-year lag) (3.62) (2.94) (1.45) (0.35)
Rule of Law -0.695⇤⇤⇤ -0.624⇤⇤⇤ -1.932⇤⇤ -0.263
⇥ commodity exports (-4.81) (-3.80) (-2.45) (-1.17)
Polity score -0.0554 -0.123 -0.325 0.00595
(one-year lag) (-0.73) (-1.24) (-1.62) (0.09)
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.231 -0.235 0.294 0.140
(log; one-year lag) (0.48) (-0.39) (0.17) (0.32)
GDP per capita (log) -0.307 -1.568 -1.591 0.472
(-0.41) (-1.48) (-0.55) (0.56)
Population (log) 0.292 0.0445 -0.660 0.0885
(0.41) (0.05) (-0.25) (0.12)
English language 1.058 2.421⇤⇤⇤ 3.509 -0.198
(binary) (1.48) (2.90) (0.97) (-0.17)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 0.623⇤ 1.135⇤⇤ -0.147 -0.161
(1.87) (2.53) (-0.15) (-0.48)
Time2 -0.0244 -0.0375⇤ 0.00116 0.00462
(-1.64) (-1.90) (0.02) (0.31)
Constant -6.004 -12.75 -55.17⇤⇤ -14.25⇤
(-0.71) (-1.22) (-2.40) (-1.76)
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from SAIS-CARI and Inter-American Dialogue.
Chapter 7
Geostrategic Interests
Apart from some minor concerns regarding the Panama Canal, the previous three chap-
ters’ focus on cases far from significant Chinese geostrategic interests did not lend itself to
testing such considerations. Statistical testing in these chapters did assess the direct rela-
tionship between geostrategic factors and development finance stringency (H3A), but not
for an interaction between geostrategic importance and political risk (H3B). The results for
H3A were mostly supportive of the theory. Geostrategically important states on average
receive a higher proportion of grants over zero-interest loans; more equity investments;
and more freelance construction projects. However, they also receive much more debt,
which would seem to contradict the theory’s prediction of laxer terms for geostrategically
important countries.
In this chapter, I find that this unexpected result for debt is the product of an interactive
relationship between geostrategic importance and political risk. Loans are targeted specif-
ically at countries which are both along Belt and Road routes and present higher levels of
political risk. BRI countries with stronger rule of law can draw capital without an active
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Chinese government intervention. Chapter 5 already established that freelance contract rev-
enue and equity investment are correlated with geostrategic indicators. I here find that for
some indicators, there is actually a positive interaction between rule of law and geostrategic
importance for freelance contract revenues. Firms can be trusted to build geostrategically
important projects on their own where the risk is manageably low. Only elsewhere does the
government incur the diplomatic and financial costs of issuing debt.
Following the format of the previous chapters, I use a mixed-methods approach to demon-
strate these findings. First is a large-n section using similar statistical models to those in the
previous chapters, but with additional interactive terms for geostrategic interests. Second
are case studies of Pakistan and Kazakhstan. Both are indispensable to their respective por-
tions of the Belt and Road. The “New Eurasian Land Bridge” cannot reach Europe without
passing through Kazakhstan. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is meant to
connect western China to the Indian Ocean and only passes through the two countries in its
title. At the same, both Kazakhstan and Pakistan border China and are home to concerns
regarding transnational insurgencies and border security.
There are differences between the two, though. One is domestic governance. Both are rel-
atively high-risk by global standards but have reversed places over time. Pakistan tended
to score higher for rule of law through 2007, but Kazakhstan has since pulled ahead. This
variation over time allows us to test the implications of political risk. There is a more
unambiguous difference between the two with respect to the relative weight of Chinese
geostrategic and economic interests. Despite its smaller size, Kazakhstan is more commer-
cially significant, with a steady stream of oil revenues to fund new construction contracts
and a steady stream of oil to alleviate China’s energy security concerns. Pakistan, on the
other hand, is more important to regional (or even global) geopolitics and is home to more
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serious border security concerns. A comparison of the two allows us to see what happens
when geostrategic concerns are front and center versus when they compete with resource
security and other commercial interests.
As for the previous chapters, I begin with large-n analysis and then proceed to the case
studies.
7.1 Quantitative Analysis
Table 7.1 uses the same data sources and methodology as Table 5.2 in the previous chapter
but uses interactive terms for geostrategic variables instead of natural resources. These data
and methods are detailed in Section 5.1.1.1 of the previous chapter.
Table 7.1: Contracts and Loans, Commitment Basis, Geostrategic Interactive Terms,
Global Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Tobit:
Contracts Loans Contracts Loans
(AEI) (AD) (AEI) (AD)
Taiwan recognition -6.813⇤⇤⇤ -30.37⇤⇤⇤ -6.745⇤⇤⇤ -29.21⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (-5.46) (-22.84) (-5.01) (-22.84)
ASEAN member, SCS -0.406 -2.392⇤⇤ 0.330 -1.295
disputant (binary) (-0.33) (-2.07) (0.25) (-0.90)
ASEAN member, SCS 1.257 1.182 0.863 0.144
non-disputant (binary) (0.81) (0.57) (0.57) (0.08)
UNGA voting 8.448⇤⇤ 10.63⇤⇤⇤ 8.565⇤⇤ 7.122⇤⇤
similarity with China (one-year lag) (2.35) (2.68) (2.55) (1.96)
Border with China 0.892 0.851
(binary) (0.54) (0.44)
Chokepoint (binary) 2.547⇤⇤ -1.910
(1.99) (-1.41)
BRI route (binary) 2.700⇤⇤ 2.150
(1.97) (1.32)
Continued on next page
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Table 7.1: Contracts and Loans, Commitment Basis, Geostrategic Interactive Terms,
Global Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Tobit:
Contracts Loans Contracts Loans
(AEI) (AD) (AEI) (AD)
Distance from China -0.0924 0.256⇤ -0.0135 0.418⇤⇤⇤
(population-weighted; thousands km) (-0.69) (1.73) (-0.12) (3.74)
Commodity exports to 0.273 0.190 0.310⇤ 0.234⇤
China (log; one-year lag) (1.59) (1.22) (1.86) (1.71)
Total imports from -0.295 1.916⇤⇤ -0.249 1.563⇤⇤
China (log; one-year lag) (-0.38) (2.36) (-0.34) (2.15)
Rule of Law (WGI; -1.927⇤⇤ -2.169⇤⇤⇤ -1.706⇤⇤ -1.719⇤⇤
one-year lag) (-2.54) (-2.94) (-2.41) (-2.47)
Border with China 0.880 -1.041
⇥ Rule of Law (0.56) (-0.54)
Chokepoint 3.963⇤⇤⇤ -1.354
⇥ Rule of Law (2.68) (-0.97)
BRI route 1.712 -2.089
⇥ Rule of Law (1.29) (-1.39)
Polity score -0.0961 -0.0591 -0.117⇤ -0.0314
(one-year lag) (-1.45) (-0.87) (-1.83) (-0.50)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.195 -0.746 -0.465 -0.649⇤
(log; one-year lag) (-0.40) (-1.64) (-1.01) (-1.68)
GDP per capita (log) 0.793 -2.107⇤⇤⇤ 0.593 -2.140⇤⇤⇤
(1.05) (-2.61) (0.84) (-2.79)
Population (log) 1.797⇤⇤⇤ -1.005 1.554⇤⇤⇤ -0.953
(2.79) (-1.47) (2.61) (-1.55)
English language 1.576⇤⇤ 1.562⇤⇤ 1.561⇤⇤ 1.813⇤⇤⇤
(binary) (1.97) (2.01) (2.08) (2.61)
Time (Y2000 = 1) 1.707⇤⇤⇤ 0.708⇤⇤⇤ 1.641⇤⇤⇤ 0.833⇤⇤⇤
(3.81) (2.67) (3.65) (3.07)
Time2 -0.0478⇤⇤⇤ -0.0292⇤⇤ -0.0450⇤⇤ -0.0339⇤⇤
(-2.72) (-2.09) (-2.54) (-2.42)
Constant -55.05⇤⇤⇤ -14.30⇤⇤ -50.27⇤⇤⇤ -10.27
(-7.61) (-1.97) (-7.44) (-1.65)
Countries 125 124 125 124
Start Year 2005 2000 2005 2000
End Year 2017 2014 2017 2014
Observations 1546 1499 1546 1499
Clustered SE? X X X X
Continued on next page
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Table 7.1: Contracts and Loans, Commitment Basis, Geostrategic Interactive Terms,
Global Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit: Tobit: Tobit: Tobit:
Contracts Loans Contracts Loans
(AEI) (AD) (AEI) (AD)
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Data from American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and AidData (AD).
The results are mostly, if not perfectly, supportive of the theory. On one hand, only one in-
teractive term (the chokepoint interaction for contracts in Column 1) reaches conventional
statistical significance. Both BRI interactive terms come reasonably close—p ⇡ 0.196 and
p ⇡ 0.164 for contracts and loans, respectively. More importantly, though, the predic-
tions of the models for contracts and loans do indicate substantial differences between the
two outcomes of interest at certain levels of governance quality. This is best conveyed
graphically. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the distinction between contract revenues in the
aggregate and those backed by tied loans in particular. The first figure illustrates the inter-
active relationship between rule of law and chokepoints; the second, between rule of law
and BRI routes.
Contracts are derived from geostrategically important locations with higher rule of law
scores, while loans go to those with weaker scores. However, the observed interactive
relationship between rule of law and chokepoints is much stronger for contracts; indeed,
the point estimate of the relationship between the chokepoint binary and loans never reaches
statistical significance for any rule of law score. The opposite is true for BRI routes, which
matter much more for loans than for contracts.
The reason for this is the subtle distinction between pure geography as measured by the
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Figure 7.1: Effect of Location at Chokepoint on Ln(Chinese Contracts + 1) and
Ln(Chinese Loans + 1), Varying Control of Corruption
Contracts in Blue; Loans in Red
Based on models of contracts per AEI (2005-2017) and loans per AidData (2000-2014) in Table 7.1,
Columns 1 and 2. Assuming non-recognition of Taiwan. All other variables set to mean. Shaded areas are
95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 7.2: Effect of Location on BRI Route on Ln(Chinese Contracts + 1) and
Ln(Chinese Loans + 1), Varying Control of Corruption
Contracts in Blue; Loans in Red
Based on models of contracts per AEI (2005-2017) and loans per AidData (2000-2014) in Table 7.1,
Columns 3 and 4. Assuming non-recognition of Taiwan. All other variables set to mean. Shaded areas are
95% confidence intervals.
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chokepoint binary and geostrategic intent as measured by China’s Belt and Road policy.
Readers may recall the finding of Chapter 4 that China gave more grants than zero-interest
loans to bordering states and those at maritime chokepoints, but that this did not hold for
BRI countries. The implication was that China needed to be as friendly as possible to
countries at inherently important locations so as to maintain access, but that once a country
was designated as an actual target for Chinese infrastructure projects under the Belt and
Road, less concessional means would be necessary to build major throughways. Some-
thing similar is happening here. Maritime chokepoints have inherent commercial signifi-
cance regardless of any articulation of official Chinese policy. So, Chinese contractors seek
business there of their own accord, but only in countries with strong rule of law where they
can be confident that they will be paid for their services. Oman, the chokepoint country
with the highest average Rule of Law score (0.47) over the sample set,1 hosted contracts
but received no loans. Runner-up Malaysia, with a mean Rule of Law score of 0.46, was
the source of $10.99 in Chinese contract revenues for every $1 disbursed in loans.2
This, however, leaves chokepoints with weaker governance patterns uncovered. In some
cases, this does not matter much to Chinese interests, but certain chokepoints (especially
those in Eurasia) are integral parts of the Belt and Road and have been officially desig-
nated as such. For example, the Panama Canal is undoubtedly a major chokepoint but
was not part of the original Belt and Road blueprint; the same could not be said for the
Straits of Malacca or Hormuz. Even at individual chokepoints, China may designate some
neighboring countries as part of the Belt and Road but not others. For instance, at the
Bab-al-Mandeb, Djibouti (which hosts a Chinese naval base) is noted on the official map
1This includes the years 2005 through 2014, when both contract and loan data is available.
2This keeping in mind that because of theAmerican Enterprise Institute (2019) database’s exclusion of
items under $100M, the contract figures are understated, and the real ratio of contracts to loans is probably
even higher.
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of the Belt and Road; neighboring Eritrea and Yemen are not. Loans show no correlation
with chokepoints at any level of rule of law, but they do correlate with official Chinese state
priorities as articulated by plans for the Belt and Road. State-owned bank loans can incen-
tivize firms to enter markets deemed important to national interests but with institutional
environments which would otherwise deter many of them.
Figure 7.2 illustrates this dynamic for Belt and Road countries. The relationship between
the BRI binary and contract revenues is statistically significant at a p = 0.10 level above
a Rule of Law score of -0.64. Of the states along Belt and Road routes, this is closest to
Indonesia’s mean value of -0.66. While contract revenues are drawn more from the high
end of the rule of law distribution, loans go more toward the low end. Specifically, there is
a statistically significant (p = 0.10) relationship between loans and the BRI binary for all
rule of law scores below -0.13, near Thailand’s mean score of -0.11. In a middle part of the
distribution (roughly, between -0.66 and -0.13), we observe a more even mix of freelance
and state loan-funded contracts, but outside this transitional zone, lenders are picking up
where more risk-averse freelance contractors leave off. The Chinese state is using bank
credit to push its firms in a desired direction, but only where governance risk necessitates
the accompanying financial and diplomatic costs.
Overall, Table 7.1 presents relatively weak evidence for H3A, which predicted an overall
relationship between geostrategic importance and financing terms. H3A overall held up
better for aid and equity investment, which as concessional tools of financing are well-
suited for outreach. New evidence in this chapter does, though, more strongly support
H3B’s prediction of an interaction between geostrategic importance and governance quality
for construction contracts, backed by Chinese loans or otherwise. If anything, the observed
interactive relationships are probably understated by the fact that globally available contract
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data includes both contracts backed by loans and those which are not. If we were able to
separate freelance contracts from loan-backed contracts (as could be done for the African
data), the observed difference the two would almost certainly grow.
7.2 Chinese Development Finance in Pakistan and Kaza-
khstan
Pakistan and Kazakhstan are useful test cases for these findings at a greater level of depth.
China has a series of common interests in its relationships with both countries, but there is
enough within-country and cross-country variation in risk and commercial factors to make
useful comparisons. Several commonalities revolve around shared borders with Xinjiang
and attendant concerns regarding cross-border flows of extremist activity, narcotics, and
human trafficking. At times, these concerns begin to blend with China’s more general
aim to reduce domestic inequality by using cross-border trade to promote growth in the
less-developed western provinces. While much of the inland West is being targeted for
growth, the initiative takes on a particularly security-tinged character in Xinjiang. Then,
both Pakistan and Kazakhstan are indispensable first stops on their respective Belt and
Road corridors; Pakistan is even the only country to have its own designated corridor.
This introductory section provides overviews of 1) the trajectory of events in Xinjiang
and how they affect China’s overseas development finance; 2) Kazakhstan’s and Pakistan’s
locational advantages in the context of the Belt and Road; and 3) differences in commercial
interests and governance patterns across the two countries and over time.
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7.2.0.1 Xinjiang
Xinjiang was a back-burner issue for many years, but diplomacy surrounding support for
Chinese policy in Xinjiang and the security of the province have bothbecome larger issues
over time. This section outlines the trajectory of events in Xinjiang and how they ultimately
matter for development finance.
The historically Turkic-speaking, Muslim territory now known as Xinjiang (literally trans-
lated, a “new frontier”) has faded in and out of Chinese control over time dating back
to imperial dynasties. The PRC inherited it from the Qing empire, leading to an uneasy
coexistence of a newly anti-imperialist, atheist Chinese state with a colonized, Muslim mi-
nority group. Notwithstanding some unrest in 1990, the contradiction simmered for much
of the twentieth century, as Beijing tended to take a relatively hands-off approach to the
province.
Two shocks upset this balance: 1) the September 11 attacks; 2) and the westward ripple
effects of growth in China’s more populated East during the boom years of the 2000s.
First, the 2001 emergence of terrorism as a primary driver of American foreign policy and
a more prominent issue in global affairs created an opening for China to gain foreign (and
especially American) assent for harsher policies in Xinjiang. Xinjiang was at this point a
lower-profile issue than Tibet but nevertheless a source of bad press for China. After 9/11,
framing the issue in terms of terrorism proved relatively effective at reducing international
pressure regarding treatment of the Uyghurs. Human rights groups remained skeptical,
but the United States government in particular changed its tune. As the American mili-
tary prepared for an invasion of Afghanistan, China offered to contribute. They probably
did not expect the offer to be accepted, but it still conveyed a certain commonality of in-
terests (Small, 2015, pp. 131–32). Xinjiang shares a short border with Afghanistan, and
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China’s nervousness about the Taliban was genuine. The American State Department, for
its part, acceded to Beijing’s request to designate the East Turkistan3 Islamic Movement as
a terrorist organization (Kan, 2010, pp. 4–7). There remains some doubt as to the group’s
strength: Small (2015, pp. 89–91) estimated that as of his writing, perhaps tens of fighters
remained in Pakistan’s Waziristan region, a historical home base for insurgencies.4 Kan
(2010, pp. 7–8) questions some of the evidence of supposed ties to al-Qaeda and points
out that the ETIM’s leader has denied any such fealty, an unlikely move if he had been
expecting any support from bin Laden. Regardless, the War on Terror became a relatively
successful pretext for Beijing to move more aggressively in Xinjiang.
This took time to unfold. High-speed growth in Han-majority provinces generated enor-
mous dislocation and inequality as rural and inland areas fell behind the factory-powered
cities and coasts. One safety valve for those left behind has been migration to Xinjiang
(and Tibet). Shortly after the PRC’s founding, the 1953 census found Xinjiang to be 75
percent Uyghur and 6 percent Han; the 2010 census, 46 percent Uyghur and 41 percent
Han (Toops, 2004, p. 1; Toops, 2016). Uyghurs are already a minority in the provincial
capital of Urumqi and may well not be the largest group forever. Han settlement is being
actively subsidized in some areas (Hoja, 2020). There is also a perception that much of
Xinjiang’s natural wealth (especially oil) is being appropriated by the central government
and Han settlers without benefiting Uyghurs. Economic studies show that Uyghurs have
benefited economically from the influx of cash, but the cultural clash and sense of loss of
control remain (A. H. Liu and Peters, 2017; T. Miller, 2017, Chapter 2). In 2009, Xinjiang
experienced its worst outbreak of violence in some time, with an official death toll of 197.
3This name is used by Uyghur activists instead of the Han-centric “Xinjiang.”
4Located along the Afghan border, Waziristan’s significance to insurgent groups dates back to the groups’
war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. See also Cooley (2012, pp. 76–77) and T. Miller (2017, Chapter
2).
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Two knife attacks at train stations and an explosion at Tiananmen Square have since fol-
lowed (Handley, 2019). The Tiananmen attack was perpetrated by Uyghurs from near the
border with Pakistan (Small, 2015, pp. 177–80). Beijing’s claims of extremism in Xinjiang
ring truer today than in the immediate post-9/11 era.5
China’s reaction has been a campaign of repression. An unknown number of Uyghurs are
in “reeducation” camps—one United Nations organization believes the figure to be around
one million (BBC News, 2018). These are aimed at converting Uyghurs to secular Han cul-
ture, eliminating Islam from public life, and enforcing cultural homogeneity (Zenz, 2018).
Even outside the camps, a network of cameras with facial recognition; checkpoints at the
entrances to buildings; and surveillance of mobile communications exceeds that found in
the rest of China (Byler, 2019; Rajagopalan, 2017). Some Uyghurs are also being used as
forced factory labor (V. X. Xu et al., 2020). Uyghur desperation has increased along with
Han exertion of control over time, and the threat from extremism is at a high point.
In international development finance, this means two things. First, the imperative of safe-
guarding the western border has strengthened as the extremist threat has turned from imag-
inary to real. This means being as understanding as possible with the financial situations of
neighboring countries like Kazakhstan and Pakistan and perhaps sending counter-terrorism
aid. Second, on a more global scale, there has been a predictable backlash against the
internment camps. This made an appearance in Chapter 4 with Burundi’s vocal support
for China, but the issue takes on greater urgency in majority-Muslim countries next to
China. The attempt to persuade others to see eye-to-eye on Xinjiang has gained a spot
below the Taiwan issue in the pantheon of major Chinese diplomatic concerns. As we shall
see, China’s diplomatic efforts have succeeded in Pakistan but have fallen flat in Kaza-
5For a fuller discussion of the issues surrounding the settler colonization of Xinjiang, see Bovingdon
(2010).
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khstan.
7.2.0.2 Overland Connectivity
The government in Beijing prioritizes stability in Xinjiang largely because of its implica-
tions for territorial integrity and citizens’ security, but it does touch on a more international
issue: overland connectivity via Belt and Road routes. Both the New Eurasian Land Bridge
via Kazakhstan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) pass through Xinjiang.
Some projects generate wealth for Xinjiang-based companies, and there is a generalized
hope among many Beijing elites that cross-border trade could contribute to prosperity and
stability in the province. The commercial dimension of domestic stability leaves elites in
a dilemma at the international level. On one hand, safe access across corridors built by
China will require friendly relations with transit countries like Kazakhstan and Pakistan.
On the other, being tougher on recipient countries can lock down economic resources for
firms doing business in Xinjiang, which could thereby (at least hypothetically) contribute
to stability. This tension is at the heart of the findings of this chapter’s quantitative analy-
sis. Beijing faces incentives to be as hands-off as possible with geostrategically important
countries unless there is some compelling reason to do otherwise. This could be because
firms are unwilling to build risky but strategically important projects and require extra state
protection to do so; or it could be because of the presence of oil or other lucrative com-
mercial interests. Looking across countries, the quantitative analysis showed that terms
get tougher for countries with high political risk and natural resources or geostrategic sig-
nificance. Within the Kazakhstani and Pakistani cases, we observe a similar pattern be-
tween sectors or even projects. The Chinese government will use tough terms to push firms
into strategically important areas—e.g., highways from the Chinese border to the Pakistani
coast—but may be exceptionally forgiving elsewhere to blunt the potential damage to bi-
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lateral relations—for example, favorable deals on electricity generation in power-scarce
Pakistan.
7.2.0.3 Commerce and Political Risk
Kazakhstan’s and Pakistan’s common importance to geostrategic interests masks some im-
portant variation. Notably, Kazakhstan is a major exporter of hydrocarbons and uranium.
These minerals by themselves must change China’s calculus, as do their implications for a
Kazakh state budget more flush with revenues to spend on Chinese construction projects.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has few resources and tends to run current account and fiscal
deficits which often lead to debt crises. Pakistan’s relative weakness as a commercial des-
tination is often outshined by its enormous implications for regional security. Parts of the
country are hubs for extremist groups like the Taliban which present obvious concerns to
Beijing. Many Pakistani (and Indian) elites also see China as a counterweight against In-
dia, although it is not clear to what extent China, the strongest of the three parties involved,
shares this view of Pakistan. China must be as understanding as possible with Pakistan’s
state budget both because of strategic ties and more specifically because of the potential
implications of a Pakistani economic downturn for China’s own domestic security.6 In
Kazakhstan, security concerns are somewhat more muted, and there enough commercial
interests to lead to moderately strict financing terms.
Political risk is relatively evenly matched between the two countries in the aggregate, but
not necessarily at any given point in time. The exact patterns of governance in each coun-
try will be discussed in their respective sections, but Figure 7.3 presents a basic graphical
snapshot. Kazakhstan’s score noticeably rises over time. As in other former Soviet states,
6This is similar to the dynamic observed by former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Robert M. Hathaway
(2017), who sees Pakistani as using its own internal fragility as an asset at the bargaining table.
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Figure 7.3: Rule of Law (Worldwide Governance Indicators), 1996-2018 (Commitment
Basis)
Kazakhstan in Blue; Pakistan in Green
Data from Kaufmann and Kraay (2018).
the privatization era of the 1990s was fairly chaotic, but this did not last forever. Power was
later consolidated under the presidency of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was in office from
Kazakhstani independence in 1991 through 2019. Nazarbayev’s rule brought a degree of
stability, if not necessarily rule of law: the word of he, his family, and their associates is ul-
timately more decisive than the letter of the law. Still, rule by clique provides more stability
from a business perspective than the free-for-all of the post-communism 1990s.
The score of Pakistan, on the other hand, has fluctuated within a fairly consistent bandwidth
390 CHAPTER 7. GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS
over time. Risks to stability from terrorism and domestic conflict have waxed and waned
but never fully disappeared. In none of the years in question has the Pakistani government
fully controlled all of its own territory. Indeed, Pakistan’s internal divisions between elected
civilians, the military, and the intelligence community raise questions of how much civilian
law even matters for parts of Pakistan’s own establishment. Deals with one part of the
Pakistani establishment are thus prone to interference from other parts or from non-state
actors, especially extremist groups.7 Further complicating the matter is the fact that some
extremist groups receive tacit or direct support from parts of the Pakistani establishment,
in particular Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the influential military intelligence agency.
China must tiptoe around non-state parties in Kashmir and elsewhere which are aligned
with elements of the Pakistani state but can be more overt in its concerns with anti-state
separatist groups like those in Balochistan. Even where militant groups are not concerned,
Pakistan’s perennial tensions between wealthy, populous Punjab and the less developed
provinces can present headaches for investors in projects perceived to benefit some parts of
the country more than others.
The remainder of this chapter analyzes these two cases. Because China’s policy in Pakistan
is more purely oriented toward the geostrategic interests on which this chapter focuses, it is
discussed first. The Kazakhstani case then adds a layer of complexity with greater mineral
and other commercial interests.
7In other words, Pakistan’s primary political risk comes from leaders having little power, while Kaza-
khstan’s comes from concentrated power. Studies such as (W. Henisz, 2000, 2002) have operationalized
political risk in terms of constraints on the executive, the underlying assumption being that the main source
of danger to investors is arbitrary impingement on their interests by host country leaders. Under this frame-
work, Pakistan’s weak executive would be placed on the opposite end of a spectrum from Kazakhstan’s
strong. However, the remainder of this chapter will demonstrate that China reacts similarly when rule of law
is undermined by weak and strong leaders alike. This provides a confirmation of the validity of the use of
rule of law as an indicator of political risk.
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7.2.1 Pakistan
Because geostrategic interests are central to the Pakistani case, this section arranges sec-
tors of Chinese activity by level of geostrategic importance. Some sectors are inherently
more geostrategically important than others—overland linkages from China to the Indian
Ocean, for example, take precedence over the factory sector. Even within sectors, there
may be variation in project-level risk or geostrategic significance. Following 1) a brief
introduction to relevant Chinese interests and political risks, I begin with 2) items such
as aid to refugees or law enforcement, which are openly aimed at security or geostrategic
motives; before continuing to 3) overland transportation; 4) maritime transportation; and
5) telecommunications. The latter three categories can all be geostrategically significant
in some instances but not all. For example, a highway connecting the Chinese border to
the coast has clear geostrategic value to China, but Karachi city streets may not. These
economic sectors allow us to compare the relationship between geostrategic interests and
development finance stringency within the Pakistani case. After these, I turn to 6) elec-
tricity generation, which is not geostrategically important to China per se but is a major
political issue in Pakistan and as such is a focus of Sino-Pakistani economic cooperation.
Within the power sector, we can observe differences in levels of political risk based on the
project-level details—e.g., a dam in territory disputed with India carries higher risk—and
the type of power plant—for example, nuclear power is more geopolitically charged than
hydropower. After electricity come 7) mineral extraction and 8) other projects. Neither of
these are typically directly related to Chinese interests and either rely on third-party funding
or (very occasionally) Chinese debt.
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7.2.1.1 Background
The Sino-Pakistani relationship is generally deeper and dates back further into history than
most relationships with many further-away developing states. The politics of India’s par-
tition put Pakistan in a position of chronic vulnerability vis-à-vis its larger perennial rival;
the 1971 loss of East Pakistan to an India-friendly secession movement hammered the
point home. China, for its part, had its own issues with India. The spirit of post-World
War II, postcolonial solidarity between the two Asian giants faded fairly quickly with the
1962 Sino-Indian War. China’s falling out with the Soviet Union over the course of the
1960s and subsequent rapprochement with the United States left it on the same side of the
later Cold War as Pakistan, and China even contributed to Pakistani- and American-backed
mujahideen fighters against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.8
The “all-weather friendship,” to use a favorite Sino-Pakistani term, has survived the end of
the Cold War and expanded to focus on new areas. The India issue is still there, although the
distribution of military power is such that Pakistan takes it much more seriously than does
China. From China’s perspective, the drivers of the relationship are now the stability of
Xinjiang, geostrategic navigational projects, and commerce. Home to a number of militant
groups, Pakistan has as much bearing on stability in Xinjiang as does any other country.
The sixty billion-dollar9 series of projects collectively referred to as the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a flagship for the Belt and Road in general. As the crow flies,
Pakistan represents the shortest possible route from the Persian Gulf to Chinese territory10
and avoids the Strait of Malacca, where the U.S. Navy maintains a presence.
8Small (2015). See especially Chapter 1.
9This number is based on original plans for CPEC, many of which are experiencing delays and a few of
which have been canceled. So, the final number is likely to be lower. See CPEC Authority (2020) and Prasso
(2020).
10A. J. Siddiqui (2020).
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Despite this significance, though, Pakistan remains a high-risk market. Chinese authorities
are painfully and unusually publicly aware of this. A guide for Chinese investors issued by
the State Taxation Administration of China [˝∂ °;@] (2018) cautions that:
Pakistan’s domestic infrastructure is making great strides, its market is growing
wealthier, and its investment opportunities are many. At the same time, it
faces strained state finances; shortages of energy resources; monetary inflation;
political instability; and other problems. In the short term, these problems will
be difficult to resolve. Responding to the Belt and Road’s call and actively
investing in Pakistan may earn firms a high return, but firms will also face
many risks including but not limited to those related to taxes.11 (3)
The reference to taxes at the end is a nod to the issuing agency’s core job description, but is
not necessarily indicative of the main sources of risk in Pakistan. These come earlier in the
passage and have to do with Pakistan’s serial debt and financial woes as well as a series of
internal political divisions ranging from mundane (inter-agency rivalry) to dangerous (mil-
itant extremism). Both present risks to investors. I begin with the more directly economic
aspects of Pakistan’s governance before looking at more political divisions which indirectly
affect economic outcomes.
Pakistan’s economic institutions lead to chronic fiscal and current account deficits which
lead it to frequent debt crises. As of March 2020, the IMF estimated that tax collection
remained 62 percent below its potential were the law fully enforced (Haider, 2020). Some
of this is simply due to limited state capacity, a problem that affects most governments
in Pakistan’s region and at its income level. At the same time, studies have found that
corruption and political instability both suppress government revenue collection (Amin et
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al., 2014; Chaudhry and Munir, 2010). Low tax revenues are at times met by inflated
government spending, especially in the power sector. Electricity shortages are a chronic
problem in Pakistan, and the government heavily subsidizes consumption and maintains
electricity prices at low rates. While this is meant to improve consumer access to electricity,
it comes at the expense of power company revenues, and many producers struggle to afford
fuel. Many borrow money just to cover fuel costs, and if they later cannot repay, they
might borrow even more. Some periodically shut down production to avoid incurring any
further costs, leading to rolling blackouts. This “circular debt” has ripple effects across
the economy, especially in electricity-consuming industrial sectors, which have not done
as well in Pakistan as in many other labor-rich Asian countries. A 2019 World Bank study
found that electricity subsidies cost Pakistan’s economy a startling 6.5 percent of GDP
per year; more of this came through indirect effects on other sectors of the economy than
through the cost of the subsidies themselves (F. Zhang, 2019).
Low tax collection and reduced industrial output spell problems not just for the domestic
fiscal balance, but also for the international balance of payments. Pakistan’s electricity
sector has historically relied heavily on imported fuel, especially fuel oil from the Persian
Gulf. This is not a problem in and of itself—industrial powers like Japan and South Korea
also import fuels for power plants—but for the fact that inefficiencies in its use prevent
Pakistan from generating enough exports to pay for it. In 2017, oil, coal, and gas were
equivalent to approximately 23 percent of Pakistan’s imports and 41 percent of its trade
deficit (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011). The actual effect on the trade deficit is even higher,
since a more efficient power sector could reduce reliance on imported manufactures and
increase exports.
In the narrowest sense, this affects China in that Chinese firms have become heavily in-
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volved in Pakistani power generation. More broadly speaking, Pakistan’s chronic debt
problems pose risks of non-repayment across the board. Pakistan drew on IMF funds in
fourteen of the twenty-one years between 2000 and 2020 (International Monetary Fund,
2020c). There may be a degree of moral hazard here: many of the IMF’s major contributors
share China’s concerns about what would happen were Pakistan to enter a sharp economic
downturn, and the Pakistani leadership is aware that most Western countries are unwilling
to totally leave them on their own (Hathaway, 2017). With Pakistan’s track record, Chinese
lenders do not necessarily have a reasonable expectation of being repaid. One Chinese spe-
cialist interviewed by scholar Yun Sun has stated that China expects to lose eighty percent
of its money in Pakistan (T. Miller, 2017, Chapter 3). This is obviously a very high esti-
mate and might not be universally shared in all corners of the establishment, but pessimism
(if of a lesser degree) is generally well-founded. China’s own guide to its investors did
not express confidence that Pakistan could repay loans (State Taxation Administration of
China [˝∂ °;@], 2018, p. 11). In an echo of China’s domestic political economy as
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this situation is much more troubling for the banks than for
the firms. As Markey (2020) puts it:
Chinese loans to neighbors like Pakistan quickly cycle back into Chinese pock-
ets when Chinese firms win construction contract bids. In the best-case sce-
nario, Chinese companies are kept afloat by doing business in China’s neigh-
bors. Even if loans are slowly or incompletely repaid, the entire effort amounts
to China subsidizing its own firms. This is hardly unusual in China’s state-
dominated (and still nominally communist) system. (2)
The question thus becomes under what conditions the banks are willing to sacrifice them-
selves for the firms. Risk is avoidable—there are lower-risk destinations than Pakistan, and
lower-risk projects within the country than some selected by Chinese firms—but China’s
banks, and especially the policy-focused Export-Import Bank and China Development
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Bank, sometimes see it fit to lose money regardless. This typically reflects some kind
of strategic priority, whether it be a strategically oriented project or an item meant to curry
favor with the leadership. Incompletely repaid loans appear in the quantitative data, but in
practice they may begin to resemble unwritten partial grants, potentially with some of the
attendant benefits for bilateral relations.
Pakistan is also home to domestic divisions12 which present difficulties to investors with-
out directly affecting macroeconomic policy. Regional rivalries are a perennial issue. The
province of Punjab is home to roughly half of Pakistan’s population and as such is the
economic center of gravity. It is inherently easier to build profitable infrastructure in areas
with more wealth and more users, meaning investors are naturally drawn to Punjab, but this
can generate resentment in other provinces, where there is a sense that some presidential
administrations in particular have favored Punjabis (Ebrahim, Kugelman, and Small, 2016;
Rafiq, 2017, pp. 31–34). At the very least, this can spur the government to reallocate some
investment funds to less privileged areas, which in turn forces private sector partners into
lower-return markets. In some provinces, the risks are much more dramatic. Pakistan is
home to a number of militant groups, some of them with separatist ideologies. China’s ma-
jor cluster of construction activity at Gwadar, for example, lies in Balochistan, where many
locals see it as a stalking horse for encroachment from other parts of Pakistan. Militant
groups have repeatedly attacked Chinese workers. The dispute in Kashmir affects China in
a different way: while Pakistani Kashmiri groups have less reason to target China, projects
in this disputed territory will typically draw the ire of India, potentially leaving firms in the
lurch if funding organizations back out.
12Civil-military relations are a major issue in Pakistan but will not be discussed here. The military and
civilian authorities both generally favor cooperation with China and have avoided the internal divisions which
characterize Pakistan’s relations with many other countries.
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In short, Pakistan’s domestic economic institutions tend to favor low government revenues,
high expenditures, and costly infrastructural inefficiencies. Put together, these lead to re-
peated debt crises which concerned international parties feel little choice but to address.
Divisions between the provinces and the central government mean that foreign investors
must in some cases simultaneously walk on multiple tightropes. These risks are gener-
ally well-understood in China and are seen as worth incurring for some projects more than
others.
7.2.1.2 Aid, Diplomacy, and Geostrategic Interests
Many projects have an indirect impact on border security and/or geostrategic interests
by contributing to Pakistan’s economy (and thus its domestic stability) and making it
more likely that Pakistan allows China strategic access. A few Chinese-backed initiatives,
though, fall more directly into the security sphere. In keeping with theoretical predictions
for geostrategic factors, these are exclusively done by grants or very low-interest loans. I
discuss in turn: 1) aid to deal with refugee inflows; 2) development assistance to Pakistani
law enforcement, including but not limited to counterterror; and 3) a communications satel-
lite with implications for Pakistan’s space competition with India.
Afghanistan’s civil war already created shared challenges for China and Pakistan even be-
fore the attacks of September 11 and the American invasion. During the height of the war,
China contributed substantial sums toward supplies for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This
included a donation of 2 million RMB in August 2000; 2 million in April 2001; 10 million
to Peshawar and 4 million to Lahore in October 2001; and 12 million in November 2001
(Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; People’s Daily, 2001). Readers will note the signifi-
cant uptick following the American invasion of October 2001. Shortly after the invasion, a
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PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman told reporters that “[a]s a friendly neighbor of Pakistan,
we closely watch the domestic development in Pakistan. We hope to see a stable situation
there. It is of vital importance to the Pakistani people and to the international fight against
terrorism. Recently, we provided to Pakistan 10 million RMB yuan worth of commodity
assistance” (United Nations, 2001). The commodity assistance was partially humanitarian
in nature but also aimed at bolstering stability in a volatile situation on China’s western
flank. The aid departed for Pakistan from Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, thereby remind-
ing other parties of China’s stake in the situation (People’s Daily, 2001). In 2007, as the
war continued, China reportedly offered a $400 million grant to help repatriate Afghan
refugees in Pakistan (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). All mention of this thereafter dis-
appeared from the press, and it is not clear whether the funds actually went through. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was pushing Pakistan to allow
Afghan refugees to stay unless they volunteered to return, meaning that there was a fairly
defined ceiling in how many repatriations would actually occur.13 Still, the sheer intent to
use up $400 million demonstrates the depth of Chinese concern with the situation. Indeed,
the exclusive use of grants for refugee-related aid speaks to China’s willingness to sacrifice
resources to address the issue.
Attention to the refugee issue began to wane over time, and China’s efforts shifted toward
Pakistan’s general domestic stability. In 2006, China helped set up Pakistan’s first DNA
testing lab. According to the Pakistani Minister of the Interior, the “establishment of DNA
lab is a major step in the on-going efforts of the ministry of interior to better equip the police
and law enforcement agencies in their fight against crime, terrorism and public disorder”
(Dawn, 2006). This trend toward a focus on law enforcement and counterterror outside the
13Afghan refugees’ status in Pakistan has changed substantially since then. See Jamal (2016).
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Afghan refugee communities was accelerated by the July 2007 attack at Islamabad’s Lal
Masjid (Red Mosque). Fifteen Uyghur PRC nationals were killed in the attack, and other
Chinese citizens were taken hostage. China pushed for a military resolution to the hostage
standoff, which did indeed happen and led to an end to a truce between the Pakistani gov-
ernment and the Pakistani Taliban. Small (2015, Prologue) sees this as a turning point in
Sino-Pakistani relations. An attack in the heart of Islamabad hammered home the point
that Afghan refugees were not the only source of instability in Pakistan. The attack may
also be a reason that Chinese economic engagement in Pakistan remained at relatively low
levels until the early- to mid-2010s.14 It also affected the content of development finance.
In 2008, China provided drug-sniffing dogs (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). (Nar-
cotic smuggling and terrorism are closely linked in the region.) In the same year, China
Exim funded $6 million in vehicle X-ray equipment. At 2.5 percent due over 20 years, this
modest loan was not a grant but was also affordable even for a low-income state (Dawn,
2010).
The most prominent Chinese-backed law enforcement initiative in Pakistan, though, has
been the Safe Cities projects, a series of networked security cameras in Pakistani cities.
The first Safe City project began in Islamabad in 2010. The $234 million contract was
partially ($124 million) backed by Exim at 2 percent interest over 20 years, with a five-
year grace period (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). Pakistan only owed debt on just
over half of the project, and this part at friendly terms. This came at the cost, though,
of competitive procurement. The Chairman of the implementing Pakistani agency told a
Senate committee that the “major share of repayment of interest on the loan was to be borne
by the Chinese government” but that “Huawei was the sole company supported by them”
14Kugelman (2017, p. 20) writes that a 2014 Pakistani military offensive improved the security situation
enough for some investors to return.
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and “Exim Bank had linked funds for other projects with award of contract to the Chinese
firm.” With little choice, the Chairman waived the usual bidding requirements, leading to
the deal’s temporary halting by the Supreme Court (I. A. Khan, 2013). At the same time,
China clearly had interests other than generating business for Huawei and was willing to
reduce the effective interest rate even below the two percent being nominally charged.
The first and most obvious is counterterror. The pilot of the Islamabad project included
four cameras, one of which was near the Lal Masjid. An official of the implementing
agency stated that the site of the attack in which Chinese had been killed “might be a
serious trouble spot” (Ali, 2014). The expansion from 4 to 2,200 cameras has continued
apace with implications for both routine law enforcement and government surveillance,
with the latter in a bureaucratic position of strength. Despite being a law enforcement
project, the Safe Cities are administered by the National Database & Registration Agency
(NADRA), which manages the national identification system and citizen databases. Police
can request access to records but do not actually own them (Ali, 2014; Chaudhary, 2018).
Government monitoring of citizens is being prioritized over more traditional police work.
This is part of a global pattern of export of the type of surveillance technology used in
China proper, increasingly with the use of facial recognition and artificial intelligence (E. C.
Economy, 2020; Hillman and McCalpin, 2019). In the Pakistani case, the provision of these
tools at near-zero interest constitutes a form of diplomatic outreach that most of Pakistan’s
democratic partners probably would not match.
The Safe Cities program has since been expanded to include eight cities, and events since
then have suggested a third motivation beyond counterterrorism and diplomatic outreach
(Hillman and McCalpin, 2019). In 2016, Huawei won an $84.7 million contract to build
a similar system in Lahore after terror attacks there. Pakistani technicians later discovered
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unexplained Wi-Fi transmitters in the equipment and had Huawei remove them. This does
not necessarily prove that anyone outside Pakistan was watching—companies sometimes
add excess components to inflate costs—but it does raise the possibility that Chinese access
to Pakistani surveillance data could have contributed to the highly generous financial terms
(Kelion and Iqbal, 2019; Moss, 2019).15
Lastly, a 2008 satellite also straddles the line between development finance and security
cooperation. Built by China’s Great Wall, the satellite’s construction and launch were
funded by $199 million in credits from Exim, as well as another $12.8 million for ground
control (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). The terms were the same as those for the
Islamabad Safe City: 2 percent interest over 20 years with 5 years’ grace. The satellite
is being used to transmit television and Internet signals across all of Pakistan and may be
profitable, but Exim is not claiming any appreciable share of the profits, and commercial
interests are not necessarily the primary motivation (Pakistan Space & Upper Atmosphere
Research Commission, 2011). Pakistan has been engaged in a space competition with India
and at no point has come close to narrowing the gap between them. The country’s first
commercial satellite at least gave Pakistan the optics of having a presence in space, even if
the satellite was built with very little local content (Manjoor, 2018; S. Siddiqui, 2012; Xilu
[F], 2011). Great Wall may stand to profit in the future from maintenance contracts,
but the real purpose of Exim’s financial sacrifice was to cater to Pakistani strategic interests
and signal China’s enduring friendship.
15This is not an isolated incident. Huawei was found to be transmitting data from the Chinese-built African
Union headquarters to Shanghai (Tilouine and Kadiri, 2018).
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7.2.1.3 Overland Transportation: The Karakoram Highway, et al.
Transportation from western China to the Indian Ocean is a core Chinese concern in its
relationship with Pakistan. This section will begin with the marquee cross-border Karako-
ram Highway and then will discuss more recent highway construction branching off from
Karakoram and sometimes extending southwards to the coast. In general, China has used
debt to cover higher-risk portions of projects central to its strategic interests but has allowed
others to carry the financial weight elsewhere, sometimes with Chinese firms on board as
contractors.
One of the centerpieces of Chinese policy in Pakistan has long been the Karakoram High-
way from Kashgar in western Xinjiang to Abbottabad in northern Pakistan. Originally
built in the 1960s and 1970s, construction across treacherous mountainous terrain cost
over 1,000 Chinese and Pakistani workers’ lives. From its inception, this was more of
a strategic project than an economically viable one. Trade along the highway was never
cost-competitive with maritime shipping except for perhaps some less-populated areas on
either side of the border. At its peak, the highway never carried more than 10 percent of
Sino-Pakistani trade (Small, 2015, pp. 99–100; T. Miller, 2017, Chapter 3). Small (2015)
says of the road that:
[...] no logistical planner could expect to count on a reliably landslide-free sup-
ply route. But [the Karakoram Highway] “altered the balance of geographical
politics on the subcontinent”, expanding the reach of the Pakistani government
into previously inaccessible frontier regions, and consolidating Sino-Pakistani
control over territory that India claims as its own. As the roadbuilding initia-
tive was launched, [Pakistani President] Ayub Khan “was pleased to remark
that in order of priority the first urgency was strategic and one of the immedi-
ate significance”. The “economic and commercial importance of the highway”
was only “the second objective” for Pakistan. The same was true for China.
The principal construction phase for the road closely paralleled the Cultural
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Revolution, a period that was distinguished by very little normal economic
planning. The largest centrally directed Chinese economic project at the time
was the vast “Third Front” programme to develop an industrial base in the west
of the country that could act as a strategic reserve in the event of war with the
United States or the Soviet Union. The route, especially the development of
the border-crossing at Khunjerab rather than the more obvious Mintaka Pass,
was carefully devised to keep it further from the Soviet border. China’s sense
of encirclement, vulnerability and isolation was acute, and Pakistan in the mid-
1960s was one of the few countries that mitigated it. (106-107)
China’s “sense of isolation” takes on a different character today and is perhaps less acute,
but it still exists. North Korea is still China’s only treaty ally, and Pakistan is a more reliable
security partner. The threat of Soviet troops approaching from Central Asia has receded,
but the threat of the American Navy at the Strait of Malacca has not. The Karakoram
Highway’s utility as an emergency door for critical supplies still merits the expenditure
from Beijing’s perspective. Pakistan still understands this: as recently as March 2020,
the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington pointed out in a speech that from Kashgar, the
distance to the Pakistani coast is roughly half that to the southern Chinese mega-port of
Shenzhen (A. J. Siddiqui, 2020).
While the original highway project had long been complete by the time China was a more
globally consequential player in development finance, it has reentered China’s contempo-
rary agenda in three different ways: repair, improvement of existing roadway, and extension
to new places. First, Small’s comment about the lack of a “reliably landslide-free supply
route” reflects actual events. A January 2010 landslide rendered a section of the road in
far northern Pakistan impassable, even creating a small lake. The China Road & Bridge
Corporation (CRBC) was brought in to do the repair work, receiving $223.5 million from
the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim) against a $275.1 million budget (Dreher, Fuchs,
Parks, et al., 2018; Pamir Times, 2015). Even with most financing arranged from the home
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country, it still took until September 2015 to finish repairs, which involved five tunnels
and eighty bridges (Pamir Times, 2015; T. Miller, 2017, Chapter 3). Bank financing was
necessary to push CRBC into a painstaking and potentially dangerous project.16
Independently of the repair work, China has been funding the overhaul and widening of the
original roadway. This has been done in phases, all of which have been done by Chinese
firms with some degree of state financial backing. The first stretch of highway represented
$490 million in revenues for CRBC, $327 million of which came from Exim. The sec-
ond, larger phase is supported by a $1.315 billion loan and built again by CRBC. The third
brought $150 million to a consortium of China Railway and China Energy Engineering;
this one was backed by an undisclosed mix of grants and loans (Pamir Times, 2015; Rafiq,
2017, pp. 10–11; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; CPEC Authority, 2020). The unusual
use of grants for an infrastructure project is telling: keenly aware of Pakistan’s fiscal limita-
tions and the potential damage to bilateral relations therein, China makes an atypical overt
sacrifice of wealth, albeit for the smallest section of road which it could most afford. The
quantitative results suggested that grants would flow to geostrategically important coun-
tries, and loans to geostrategically important countries with high political risk. Pakistan
meets both descriptions.
The third way in which the Karakoram Highway continues to have an impact on China’s
current development finance is via newer projects connecting its southern terminus to new
destinations. The original highway reached Pakistan’s populated northern areas but relied
on domestic infrastructure to reach the coast. Contemporary Chinese efforts have focused
on improving access from the Karakoram Highway to the coast. This includes a “western
16The main sources of risk here were as much ecological as political. This is different from the political
risk included in the theory and quantitative testing and is less generalizable across many cases, but it has a
similar net impact.
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corridor” to a new Chinese-built port at Gwadar17 as well as an “eastern corridor” to the
major coastal city of Karachi.
Along the western corridor, there is a clear division of labor based on project risk. It is
telling that the southernmost stretch of the road leading to the port at Gwadar was done
by the Pakistani military’s Frontier Works Organization (FWO) with Pakistani government
funding (CPEC Authority, 2020; Reconnecting Asia, 2020). This passes through Balochis-
tan, where separatist insurgent groups have carried out attacks on Chinese workers (and
others). China had an interest in leaving this part of the project to the Pakistani military,
which is much better equipped to handle local dangers than civilian engineering firms could
be. For Pakistan, the highway could represent better projection of power into a province
which, if not in actual danger of breaking away, does pose resistance. Details on segments
of road further north are somewhat scarce, but at least two segments totaling $597 mil-
lion18 are being funded by Chinese loans (CPEC Authority, 2020). Further north, closer
to the Karakoram Highway, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and UK Department for
International Development (DFID) have contributed $161 million to a $190 million19 road
from Havelian to Burhan to be built by a joint venture including Gezhouba (Pamir Times,
2015; Rafiq, 2017, p. 13). This is significant in that China is currently planning a logistical
“dry port” at Havelian for transshipment of goods traveling along the Karakoram Highway.
Early plans are reportedly for $65 million in debt financing from Chinese banks (CPEC
Authority, 2020; Reconnecting Asia, 2020). DFID and the ADB are also exploring fur-
ther collaborations in Pakistani infrastructure but have put greater emphasis on economic
viability and feasibility studies (Asian Development Bank, 2018). The division of labor
17Maritime infrastructure is the subject of this chapter’s next section.
1896.036 billion Pakistani rupees.
1925,920.028 and 30,494.150 million rupees, respectively.
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along the western corridor reflects incentives which face China in other contexts as well.
The Pakistani government can be trusted to handle parts of the project, and others might be
built by established development organizations. China judiciously uses debt to fill in the
gaps—the Karakoram-connected dry port is a notable area with more significance to China
than to others’—but no more than necessary.
This mix of actors exists in the eastern corridor as well, but is skewed more toward local
firms. Only one segment of the Karachi-Lahore Motorway has been Chinese-funded. The
Multan-Sukkur segment is funded with a $1.3 billion loan from China and built by China
State Construction Engineering. Another segment (Lahore to Abdul Hakeem) is being built
by China Railway but with local funding. The rest is either locally funded or has not yet
been tendered. The Karachi-Hyderabad section is being built by the Frontier Works Organi-
zation (Rafiq, 2017, p. 13; CPEC Authority, 2020; Reconnecting Asia, 2020). Connecting
Pakistan’s two largest cities is economically an easy enough sell that local actors saw it fit
to use their scarce resources there. Chinese firms were involved, but as often as not without
funding from their home government.
Finally, a smaller, lesser-known road highlights the inverse case: China using more debt in
cases of higher risk. In 2012, the Pakistani National Highway Authority (NHA) canceled
a contract under which Gezhouba would have used a loan from Exim to build a road from
Juglat to Skardu. Juglat is along the Karakoram Highway in the mountainous north; Skardu
lies to the east of Juglat and is not far from the Line of Control, the de facto boundary sep-
arating the Indian-administered and Pakistani-administered portions of disputed Kashmir.
The stated reason was lack of transparency in the bidding process, indicating that this had
been a non-competitive bid (Road Traffic Technology, 2012). Gezhouba later returned to
bid on the project and signed a new contract in 2014 (Nagri, 2015). There has been sub-
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stantially less press around this project. Unlike the western and eastern corridor highways,
it is not listed on CPEC’s official portal, but it is included in a spreadsheet of CPEC-related
finances away from the more immediately accessible part of the website. The spreadsheet
indicates a $138 million budget for “improvement and widening,” of which $124 million is
listed as foreign-funded (CPEC Authority, 2020).20. The amounts listed to the nearest ru-
pee come out to exactly 90 percent foreign financing, which is consistent with the project-
specific involvement of a foreign lender. While the project is not publicly confirmed, it
appears likely that China is funding Gezhouba’s contract to build a road to Skardu; it is
unclear what other foreign power would be willing to step into the fraught politics of the
Line of Control. The geopolitics of a road improving Pakistan’s access to the Line of
Control would scare away many companies, but guaranteed credit may at least ease their
nerves.
Across the board, China mostly used its funds toward projects which were significant to
its own geostrategic interests, and even then only where others like the Pakistani military,
Asian Development Bank, and British government were not fulfilling these ends on their
own. This was mostly done through tied loans in order to push firms into what were often
high-risk projects but on one occasion partially deployed grants for the last stage of an
increasingly expensive series of highway renovations. The next section finds a similar
pattern for the maritime infrastructure being built up at the southern termini of the eastern
and western corridors.
2022,154.037 and 19,938.633 million rupees, respectively
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7.2.1.4 Maritime Transportation: Karachi and Gwadar
Chinese firms have been involved in port construction and upgrading at three different sites.
Two—Karachi and Port Qasim—are located in the Karachi metropolitan area, in the south-
east, and were established ports long before China’s major commercial arrival. The third,
Gwadar, was until recently a smaller community along the less-populated western coast-
line. This section contrasts the two. First comes China’s relatively limited participation
in the established ports; second is its almost singlehanded construction of a new cluster of
activity at Gwadar.
Chinese firms are known to have been involved in three upgrading projects at the Port of
Karachi and Port Qasim, and none appears to have been funded by the Chinese government.
As far back as 2008, China Water & Electric received $177 million21 to dredge the ship
channel at the Port of Karachi. In 2010, China Harbour Engineering earned $168 million22
for a new quay wall at Port Qasim. These were both well before CPEC’s 2015 announce-
ment and China’s major economic entry into Pakistan. In 2018, China Harbour added
another $164 million for two terminals at Port Qasim (Karachi Port Trust, 2020).
These deals may have been positives for Sino-Pakistani relations but were relatively low-
profile. The two ports next to the major city of Karachi have less difficulty attracting
business, and Chinese firms are among many different players. They also have less strategic
significance than Gwadar, to the west. The idea of a port at Gwadar has been circulating
for some time. The site was purchased from Oman in 1958 with an eye to its location near
the Strait of Hormuz (Rafiq, 2017, p. 6). In the 1970s, the United States turned down an
offer to build a port there; a British consortium signed a contract to do so in the 1990s, but
2119 billion rupees, converted to USD per Oanda (2020) at the contract completion date of December 2014.
2218 billion rupees, translated using the same methodology as the previous figure.
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it later fell through (Small, 2015, p. 100). In 2000, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf
pitched the idea to President Jiang Zemin, the most powerful person in China at that point,
and Premier Zhu Rongji, a leading figure in China’s economic reform. Pakistan had its
own reasons for doing so: this was not long after the Kargil War with India, and the specter
of an Indian blockade of Karachi in the east added some appeal to the idea of a second,
Persian Gulf-facing port in the west (Markey, 2020, p. vii).
China was originally less than interested. Markey (2020) writes that:
To Beijing, Gwadar looked like a big waste of money: a white elephant with
little commercial necessity, disconnected from Pakistan’s transit and commu-
nications networks and surrounded by impoverished fishing villages as well as,
more menacingly, Baloch separatist groups waging a decades-long insurgency
against the state. The Chinese side was so skeptical of Musharraf’s proposal
that more junior diplomats were immediately sent to ask their Pakistani coun-
terparts whether Pakistan’s leader was serious. (viii)
By 2001, though, while Zhu Rongji was visiting Pakistan, China changed course and for-
mally agreed to go along with the plan. The terms were unusually lenient. China was
providing $500 million in grants and $598 million in loans; Pakistan’s government only
needed to contribute $50 million. To alleviate the concerns surrounding Gwadar’s isola-
tion from other major population centers, China added $200 million in credit to build the
Makran Coastal Highway running along the coast from Gwadar to Karachi (Dreher, Fuchs,
Parks, et al., 2018). The Pakistani government added $50 million of its own funds to the
highway, and the Frontier Works Organization was involved in construction (Small, 2015,
p. 101). The transfer of half a billion in wealth via a grant is still one of the largest one-
off grants in China’s history and is unusual even by today’s standards, not to speak of the
much less affluent China of 2001. This was an extreme case: China’s closest diplomatic
and security partner was making a request, and this not long after the leader took over in a
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coup and felt short of legitimacy (Markey, 2020, p. vii). The contracting process was also
exceptionally generous to Pakistani interests. Frontier Works Organization played a promi-
nent role in construction of the highway. This was all despite the fact that as in the case
of the Karakoram Highway, China was fairly upfront about its doubts about the project’s
commercial viability. China was eager to maintain good relations, wanted a share in an
Indian Navy-resistant window on the Persian Gulf, or both.
The next wave of plans for Gwadar, though, do not indicate that China meant to monop-
olize the site. After the completion of the first wave of construction, China intended to
add at least $600 million in improvements including an oil refinery and a road inland to
Quetta, but this mostly did not happen (Small, 2015, p. 101). This was at least partially
because of friction with the port operators. The Port Authority of Singapore had been
brought in to operate the port in 2007. The Singaporean state-owned organization antici-
pated making $5 to $8 billion in eventual investments at the site over its forty-year term as
operator (Aziz, 2007). Like the second wave of Chinese construction, this did not happen
as planned. Chinese diplomats’ original concerns about economic viability were proving
founded, and Gwadar was drawing very little traffic away from the two Karachi-area ports,
which enjoyed access to a major market.23 There were also problems with the water supply
owing to underfunding in the local desalination plant (Kugelman, 2017, pp. 22–23). See-
ing the financial writing on the wall, Singapore withdrew from the project; at this point, the
port had reportedly not hosted a ship in four months (Small, 2015, p. 100; Markey, 2020,
p. viii).
With a planned Singaporean presence in the billions of dollars, China was clearly not trying
23This is similar to the failure of the Chinese-built port at Hambantota, Sri Lanka, to keep up with the
competition at Colombo. The Sri Lankan case will be discussed alongside other instances of distressed debt
in Chapter 8.
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to monopolize the Gwadar project, but it soon came to do so anyway. Singapore’s departure
left a vacancy at the same project which the United States had avoided and British interests
had abandoned. This was not a financial winner. The Port of Authority of Singapore is a
state-backed institution, but the Singaporean city-state bears no pretense of extra-regional
power projection and was not inclined to pour further resources into a financial bottomless
pit. Time dragged on, and it was not clear that any other third parties were willing to invest
in the port. At the same time, Chinese security policy was changing. Some of this was due
to a secular upward trend in China’s military strength. Figure 7.4 shows that while China
has always had a lead in regional military spending, its advantage has grown enormously
since the 2001 agreement to build Gwadar. Stationing troops overseas is no longer an
impossibility; indeed, in January 2016, China announced its first overseas base in Djibouti
(Chappell, 2016).24
In September 2015, not long before the January 2016 Djibouti deal, China formally en-
tered the void left by Singapore at Gwadar. The China Overseas Port Holding Company
(COPHC) spent $1.62 billion to buy a forty-year leasehold on the port (American Enter-
prise Institute, 2019; Markey, 2020, p. viii). COPHC is something of a mystery. It was
created specifically to manage Gwadar and claims to be registered in Hong Kong, but in-
vestigative journalists have found that its “shareholders” in Hong Kong are themselves shell
companies with the appearance of engagement in various industries but no sign of actual
activity. All are registered to the same address in Hong Kong (Business Recorder, 2018;
COPHC Pakistan, 2015; Y. H. Khan, 2019a). Several experts interviewed for this disserta-
tion privately viewed it as a fig leaf for the Chinese government or the Ministry of Defence.
24This was part of a major trend toward greater assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy which also involved
more incursion into disputed waters of the East and South China Seas and building artificial islands in the
South China Sea.
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Figure 7.4: Estimated Defense Budgets of China, India, and Pakistan, 2001-2019
China in Red; India in Orange; Pakistan in Green
Based on data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2020).
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Indeed, China is home to several of the world’s largest shipping companies, and it is not
clear why a special-purpose company would be set up for Gwadar unless the site was seen
as unique in some way. While the value of a window on the Persian Gulf far from Indian
waters is obvious,25 there is no real evidence that Gwadar is going to be a fully functional
naval base for China or Pakistan either one in the immediate future—the state of infras-
tructure simply would not support it. The long-term possibility, though, is there (Iwanek,
2019). Any future presence of Chinese forces would obviously require Pakistani approval.
Given the skepticism with which many members of the Pakistani public view China and the
fact that Balochi separatists have already carried out attacks on Chinese workers in Gwadar,
this would be a politically difficult decision for the Pakistani leadership to make. It may
also expose Pakistan to unwanted involvement in a potential Sino-American conflict. Bei-
jing thus faces two interrelated sets of incentives at Gwadar: 1) quantitatively, to put up as
much money as is necessary to build the project, especially in the absence of other potential
backers; and 2) qualitatively, to do so on as favorable terms as possible so as to maximize
the chances that Pakistan would ever agree to a base.
A revamped Phase II of port upgrading is now underway. The Chairman of the Gwadar
Port Authority has told reporters that he expects development of the site to take twenty to
twenty-five years, indicating longer-term and probably larger-scale ambitions (Y. H. Khan,
2019b). In the near term, though, China’s efforts to develop the site have been more mod-
est and perhaps less of a financial burden. Funded mostly by loans at a generous 3 percent
interest rate, China is progressively adding a $786 million series of improvements to the
port (Butt, 2015). These include a $123 million breakwater, some undisclosed proportion
25Small (2015, pp. 102–103) points out that the U.S. Navy could perhaps more easily blockade Gwadar
than the Strait of Malacca. This would suggest that a potential base would be more useful for local contin-
gencies in the nearby Persian Gulf than for a conflict with the United States.
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of which is grant-funded; $27 million for dredging, backed by a $22.3 million Exim loan;
$140 million for a highway connecting the site of the port to the existing road from Gwadar
to Karachi; $230 million for an airport; and $114 million for water treatment (CPEC Au-
thority, 2020; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; Haider, 2015).
These have undergone changes in the financing terms over time. Figure 7.5 shows that
Pakistan’s government debt burden fell significantly following an IMF restructuring in the
early 2000s but began to creep up afterwards. By 2015, there was some concern that debt
could begin to rise to less sustainable levels, and the track record since then has proven
these concerns founded. At this point, China agreed to lower the interest rate on these
loans from 3 to 1.6 percent. This includes both the aforementioned Gwadar projects and the
$1.3 billion Chinese-funded stretch of the Karachi-Lahore Motorway. Some of the Gwadar
projects were actually even further discounted. The expressway connecting Gwadar to the
main highway ($140 million) was converted into a zero-interest loan, with any outstanding
interest permanently written off. The airport ($230 million) was turned into a grant (Butt,
2015; Haider, 2015). Clearly, China was willing to act quickly to preemptively avoid any
bilateral frictions due to debt. The gift of a quarter-billion dollar airport is particularly
unusual. At the same time, China is adding on to a local hospital with a $100 million grant
and building a new vocational school with a $10 million grant (CPEC Authority, 2020).
Rafiq (2017, p. 16) refers to these (along with the water treatment plant) as “goodwill
projects,” and along with the atypically high grant content of the infrastructure projects
reflects the geostrategic significance of this particular cluster of activity. There were some
commercial interests involved as well—southern China’s Zhuhai Port Holding was brought
in to do much of the construction work—but from Pakistan’s perspective these were still
clearly favorable terms (X. Zheng, 2015).
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Figure 7.5: Pakistani Central Government Debt as Percentage of GDP, 2000-2018
Based on data from Mbaye, Moreno Badia, and Chae (2018).
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Even with the preemptive Chinese relief, Pakistan’s debt did begin to climb. Most of this
did not have all that much to do with Gwadar, but some of the solution did. In January 2019,
Saudi Arabia committed $20 billion in new financing to Pakistan, including $10 billion for
a refinery at Gwadar. Around the same time, the UAE sent $3 billion to Pakistan’s central
bank to help with foreign exchange pressures (Yousafzai, 2019). The Persian Gulf states
have their own stake in the success of Gwadar as a point of entry for their energy exports.
This serves as a reminder that Pakistan does have agency in how the port at Gwadar is used.
Chinese or any other access to the facility would require continued robust economic (and
security) outreach, and even this is no guarantee of success.
Overall, Chinese money was not necessary to enhance the ports near Karachi but was in-
dispensable for the less economically viable but geostrategically better-located Gwadar
complex. To ensure Gwadar’s success with minimal strain on Pakistan, China also showed
a fairly impressive willingness to lose money through grants, debt write-offs and write-
downs, and very low interest rates on loans. This is similar to what happened in the road
sector. Later phases of the strategically important Karakoram Highway overhaul were
completed on a partial grant basis. Other strategically important roads were handled by
Pakistani or third-party interests, though, and China only involved itself financially in the
toughest ones. The same pattern can be found in a third area with geostrategic implications:
telecommunications.
7.2.1.5 Communications and Technology
China’s engagement in Pakistan’s communications and technology sectors mirrors that in
the highway and port sectors: direct state involvement in strategically important projects,
but more arms-length transactions elsewhere. Specifically, a fiber optic cable connecting
7.2. CHINESE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN PAKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN 417
the Chinese border to Pakistan’s coastline received a loan, while most other projects have
been undertaken on more market terms. I first cover the market-based projects, which came
first chronologically.
Chinese corporate interests made an early entrance into Pakistan in mobile communica-
tions. In 2006, Huawei landed a $550 million contract to build a 3G network for Ufone
(American Enterprise Institute, 2019; Huawei, 2006). The following year, China Mo-
bile purchased Paktel, Pakistan’s fifth-largest mobile provider, for $464 million.26 This
was China Mobile’s first overseas purchase, which has some symbolic value for the Sino-
Pakistani relationship (Small, 2015, p. 108). At the same time, this was one of many sim-
ilar investments both by China Mobile and competitors. China Mobile itself added $500
million in investments in 2009, $520 million in 2014, and $200 million in 2017 (Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute, 2019). Then, China Mobile’s local affiliate Zong competes with
Russian-owned Jazz, Norway’s Telenor, and Pakistan’s Ufone for market share (A. J. Sid-
diqui, 2020). In a sign of intra-Chinese competition, Huawei built Ufone’s 3G network,
and ZTE built Telenor’s (Telecom Lead, 2012). These were essentially market-based deals.
They may have benefited Pakistan through better cellular service, lower prices to con-
sumers, and royalties paid to the government, but this does not appear to be the result of a
coordinated Chinese government strategy.
More recently, Alibaba has also entered Pakistan on its own terms. Its fintech subsidiary
Ant Financial in 2018 bought a 45 percent share of Telenor Microfinance for $184.5 mil-
lion (American Enterprise Institute, 2019; Z. Khan, 2018). This had the aim of leveraging
Alibaba’s domestically honed expertise in increasing popular financial access and handling
remittances from overseas, but only in the context of a “strategic partnership” in which the
26This was $284 million to buy a majority stake up front and $180 million later to buy the remainder of the
company’s shares (Small, 2015, p. 108; American Enterprise Institute, 2019).
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Norwegian partner would continue to hold a majority stake (Geng, 2018; He, 2019). In that
same year, Alibaba paid $150 million to buy Daraz, a Pakistan-based South Asian ecom-
merce platform, from Germany’s Rocket Internet (American Enterprise Institute, 2019;
Russell, 2018; Sheahan, 2018). This amounts to horizontal expansion into new markets for
Alibaba’s core business and does not have any overt connection to a Chinese government
strategy.
These more marketized transactions stand in contrast to one strategically important tied
loan. A fiber optic cable from western China to Gwadar is the digital equivalent of (par-
tially) Chinese-built above-ground highways, providing an alternate route for communi-
cations in the event of disruptions elsewhere. Valued at $37.4 million, the cable is not
particularly expensive but did receive 85 percent financing from Exim at the highly favor-
able interest rate of two percent (Butt, 2015; Markey, 2020, p. 63). As for the highways,
China wanted to ensure digital connectivity between Gwadar and the Chinese mainland and
was willing to commit debt resources to counteract the risks of building across topograph-
ically difficult and (in parts) politically unstable territory. Huawei is building the cable and
is also involved in two future projects: a cloud data center agreed to during Pakistani Prime
Minister Imran Khan’s 2019 visit to Beijing and a 5G network to be built with China Mo-
bile. Financing details for these new projects are not yet known as of this writing (Huawei,
2018; Moss, 2019).
Finally, CPEC’s register of projects also includes a $4 million grant toward a pilot project
for digital television broadcasts (CPEC Authority, 2020). The use of a grant may reflect
China’s desire to make sure that influence over the airwaves remains a possibility, although
it may also reflect the low financial costs involved. This is similar to the larger television
projects in Africa and is worth watching for the future.
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China’s geostrategic concerns in Pakistan are concentrated in the transport and communi-
cations sectors, which in absolute terms are a minority of CPEC expenditures. A majority
belongs to the power sector; other areas such as water treatment and agriculture play sup-
porting roles. These areas typically cater more toward Pakistan’s own interests, or occa-
sionally to those of third-party funders like the Asian Development Bank. As such, China
engages in them either for mostly commercial reasons on relatively strict terms or on laxer
terms as a favor to an important partner. Deals on either end of this spectrum can be found
in the power sector, the largest focus of CPEC’s earlier projects and the topic of the next
section.
7.2.1.6 The Carrot: Electricity Generation
Pakistan’s electricity shortages detailed earlier in this chapter are a significant source of
popular discontent and a domestic political issue. Demonstrations surrounding the issue
took place in the early 2010s. In response, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (2013-2017) made
electricity a part of his campaign platform. His tenure coincided with China’s purchase of
the concession at Gwadar as well as the 2013 inauguration of the Belt and Road and the
launch of CPEC itself. While China was mostly interested in a “strategic backdoor” from
Xinjiang to the Indian Ocean, Sharif and Pakistan were more interested in electricity (E.
Downs, 2019, pp. 13–14). Given China’s domestic strength in building up power capacity
and its interest in offshoring some older, more polluting generation capacity, there was a
natural coincidence of interests.27 The bulk of CPEC’s earlier projects have thus been in
power generation (Rafiq, 2017, pp. 10–11).
27Experts have expressed some doubt that new capacity coming online will do all that much to address
Pakistan’s underlying problem with the effect of subsidized pricing on power producer financial viability.
Nevertheless, the optics of new power plants are good for elected officials. See Kugelman (2017, p. 19) and
Markey (2020, pp. 58–59).
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There is useful variation both across and within the different types of power generation. The
cornerstone of CPEC’s early stages has been thermal generation, mostly using coal. Fast-
moving coal projects are politically expedient for a Pakistani leadership intent on showing
its worth domestically by quickly improving the electricity situation and are also a priority
for a Chinese coal sector suffering from domestic overcapacity. I begin with thermal plants
by looking at variation between more internationalized projects with greater financial vi-
ability and less viable projects in which China has put greater resources as a carrot to the
Pakistani leadership. I then look at hydropower and other renewables, which tend to move
more slowly and have been proportionately more often implemented at arms-length from
the Chinese state. I conclude with the special case of nuclear power, for which the politics
of nonproliferation plays a diplomatic spoiler role not present in less politically sensitive
sectors.
Fossil Fuels Coal contributes significantly to carbon emissions and China’s major air pol-
lution problem, and the government aims to diversify toward greater use of cleaner power
sources like natural gas and renewables.28 At the same time, there remains more capacity
to produce coal generation equipment in China than the authorities could or desire to use.
Faced with a shrinking market at home, companies look abroad, sometimes with govern-
ment assistance where the risk requires it and the number of jobs at stake merits it. From the
Chinese perspective, then, there is an incentive to be tough on Pakistan in order to preserve
the beneficial impact of coal-sector employment on domestic stability. Factors within Pak-
28The trend so far has been that China’s domestic coal capacity is still increasing in absolute terms but as a
shrinking share of new capacity (E. Downs, 2019, pp. 24–26). There is an active debate as to how far China’s
turn away from coal will go or to what degree it will be kept up. (Joanna Lewis, forthcoming.) Either way,
coal plants now coming online in China tend to use newer, cleaner technology, while older, dirtier (and less
politically connected ones) have been shut down. (Denise van der Kamp, forthcoming.) This opens the door
to outsourcing of the biggest polluters to other countries. See also Y. Wang and D. Li (2019).
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istan, though, might push China in the opposite direction. Coal is the fastest, cheapest way
to generate large amounts of electricity within a political cycle; hydroelectricity and other
renewables, while fully workable in Pakistan’s mountains and deserts, take more time to
come online and are thus less politically useful (E. Downs, 2019, pp. 24–29). Pakistan also
wants coal for its own energy security purposes. It currently relies heavily on imported fuel
oil from the Persian Gulf and hopes to replace it with its historically little-utilized domestic
coal deposits in the Thar Desert (National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, Pakistan,
2015, p. 5). The quality of the coal there is such that many major multinationals have
remained skeptical, but domestic companies or Chinese firms with government backing
might be persuaded to take the plunge. (Or, at the very least, Pakistan could import cheaper
high-quality coal instead of more expensive fuel oil.) (Ebrahim, Kugelman, and Small,
2016; Rafiq, 2017, p. 19) China faces incentives to provide coal plants on more favorable
terms in order to amplify the benefits to bilateral relations of providing a political win to
the Pakistani leadership.
Which of these incentives wins out—stricter terms in order to help Chinese firms deal with
their domestic overcapacity issues, or laxer ones to provide China’s Pakistani partners with
a domestic political boost—depends on the exact contours of the projects involved. I find
that the projects can be sorted into four basic categories. First is an early, pre-CPEC project
notable for its heavy use of debt. As the only clearly pre-CPEC item analyzed, this is a sort
of control case for what happened before Chinese incentives for favors to Pakistan were
quite as strong. Second is a contemporary grouping of mostly large, internationalized plants
along the coast running on higher-quality imported coal. Due to their better prospects,
these typically drew more Chinese and other foreign equity investment. A third cluster
of activity in the Thar Desert, on the other hand, uses lower-quality domestic coal and is
422 CHAPTER 7. GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS
significantly motivated by the Pakistani leadership’s desire to curb fuel imports. The Thar
projects could in some instances be considered products of political interference in the
power sector and on average carry higher levels of risk, but are they also more valuable to
bilateral relations than the import-burning plants. Because of these competing priorities,
Chinese organizations have here found a middle ground between the hands-off approach
of the earliest projects and the highly engaged coastal plants. Then, fourth are two large
transmission projects. These were held up at one point because of a dispute over pricing—
a hallmark of political risk in Pakistan’s power sector—but have gone through with the
help of Chinese banks. This demonstrates the value of debt as a fallback when absolutely
necessary. Chinese banks were less involved in power generation and did not feel the need
to intervene if a power plant was failing: the sheer number of plants being built meant
that it was not worth the financial sacrifice or potential bilateral tension of using to debt
to prop up a weaker one. Transmission upgrades from the new power-producing areas,
on the other hand, were indispensable to the entire power upgrading initiative, which in
turn was the focus of CPEC’s earlier wave of activity. China felt the need to ensure the
transmission project’s success even at significant cost. I sequentially look at each of these
four categories.
First, the power plant at Guddu is an early example of Chinese engagement. Although lo-
cated in the coal-rich Thar Desert, the Guddu plant actually uses production from a nearby
natural gas field. Construction was begun (in 2009) and completed (2014) before CPEC
formally existed, and so Guddu has not been as politicized in the context of Sino-Pakistan
relations. So, the terms were not particularly generous. The $602 million project was 85
percent funded by a loan from China Exim (American Enterprise Institute, 2019; Asso-
ciated Press of Pakistan, 2014; Dawn, 2009). This did not imply any type of long-term
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commitment by the Chinese contractors; to the contrary, USAID is contributing to repairs
and maintenance on the site (United States Agency for International Development, 2013a).
Before Pakistan’s geostrategic location began to figure quite as much into Chinese strategy,
the terms of financing were relatively less forgiving.
This changed in the mid-2010s with four plants using imported coal. First was the Sahiwal
coal plant. It is not clear that Sahiwal began as a conscious Chinese government strategy to
reach out to Beijing. China Western Power originally agreed to build the plant in 2013 but
withdrew the following year (H. A. Siddiqui, 2017). The reasons for its departure are not
clear, but this indicates that the deal was either not being actively pushed by the Chinese
government or was not being pushed hard enough to incentivize China Western. After
China Western’s departure, a 50-5029 joint venture of Huaneng Shandong and Shandong
Ruyi took its place (The News International, 2015). The large project received $1.44 billion
in loans from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) (E. Downs, 2019,
p. 36). At the same time, the Huaneng Ruyi joint venture also took an equity stake of
$150 million—not much in comparison to the total budget, but certainly more than had
been taken at Guddu, and still a continued commitment to the plant’s smooth functioning
(American Enterprise Institute, 2019). Since the loan was from commercial lender ICBC,
Pakistan also had more leeway to select contractors than might have been the case with a
loan than from policy banks Exim or CDB with their strict procurement rules. Pakistan
bought forty locomotives from General Electric to move coal from the coast to the inland
Sahiwal site as well as to another plant (General Electric, 2017). This part of the project
did not appear to be covered by the ICBC loan, but had Exim or CDB funded the railcars,
it is a safe bet that a Chinese firm would have provided them. The Sahiwal plant was still
29This was reported in some sources as a 51-49 split, but SEC filings at Huaneng Power International
(2016) indicate an even 50-50 divide.
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under construction when CPEC was announced but was retroactively designated as part
of the initiative, indicating a degree of political benefit to go along with the slightly more
generous terms (CPEC Authority, 2020).
Sahiwal’s location in populous Punjab puts it near major consumer markets but away from
the coast and thus coal shipping. Two other projects avoided the need for rail to carry
freight inland and built along the coast. These were slightly larger than the inland site but
are mostly distinct in Chinese and other foreign firms’ willingness to make major equity
investments in them. First came a coal plant at Port Qasim, begun in 2014. Located in
Karachi, Port Qasim enjoys access to both a major consumer market and the coast. Of its
$2.085 budget, 75 percent ($1.564 billion) was funded by a loan from Exim. The remain-
ing $521 million in equity is split between Sinohydro (51 percent) and Al-Mirqab Capital
(49 percent), which is partially owned by the sovereign wealth fund Qatar Investment Au-
thority (PowerChina [-˝5˙], 2015). The share of debt financing continued to creep
downward from 85 percent for the Guddu gas project, to 80 percent for the inland Sahiwal
coal plant, to 75 percent for the coastal Port Qasim project. This correlates well with to
what degree projects were aimed at political incentives to promote energy self-sufficiency
in Pakistan’s interior versus market incentives to rely on imported coal; indeed, the feasi-
bility study for Port Qasim makes it clear that domestic coal from Thar has high enough
sulfur and lime content that “it is difficult [...] to meet the quality standards from the in-
dustrial clients” (PowerChina, 2014, pp. III–5). Qatar’s near-equal ownership stake further
indicates an expectation of profitability beyond that necessary to attract Chinese stimulus
funds, and the financial arrangement puts proportionately less strain on Pakistan’s state
budget than the previous two plants. Lest Chinese interests be forgotten, Exim’s involve-
ment means that most of the contract value necessarily went to Chinese businesses, which
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in this case included Harbin Electric and Dongfang Electric for the plant proper and ma-
jority owner Sinohydro for a coal importation dock (Ebrahim, 2019; Power Technology,
2020d). The favorable economics of the Port Qasim project allowed China to put excess
industrial capacity to work at less risk to relations to Pakistan.30
In 2015, a second coastal plant was announced, this time on the outskirts of Karachi. The
“Hubco plant,” so called after the Pakistani investor, drew relatively similar terms to Port
Qasim. The $1.912 billion budget was again 75 percent debt financed, although this time
from a wide consortium of banks led by CDB but also including Exim and three of the four
largest commercial banks (Xinhua, 2017b; E. Downs, 2019, p. 15).31 Of the remaining
equity financing, China’s State Power Investment32 holds 74 percent to Hubco’s 26 percent
and has further provided a $300 million shareholder loan on top of the roughly $1.5 bil-
lion on offer from the CDB-led consortium (American Enterprise Institute, 2019; Business
Recorder, 2017). The name of the project places credit on Hubco’s shoulders, but China
is doing much of the heavy lifting. This has not implied, however, purely dictating terms.
The main contractors were China’s Northwest Electric Power Design Institute and Tian-
jin Electric Power Construction Company, but boilers were provided by General Electric
(Kugelman, 2017, p. 22; Power Technology, 2019a). This is clearly atypical for a plant de-
scribed by the joint venture CEO as “the first overseas thermal power project developed by
State Power Investment Corporation under the Belt & Road Initiative” (Power Technology,
2019a). In 2020 remarks to a Washington audience, the Pakistani Ambassador to the United
States commented that China had allowed the use of GE equipment at Pakistani insistence
30Port Qasim is currently in financial trouble, but this is due to an uptick in coal prices which the relevant
parties may not have anticipated (Ebrahim, 2019).
31Namely, the Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and ICBC. The fourth of the “Big Four,” the
Agricultural Bank of China, tends to be more domestically focused.
32State Power Investment was known as China Power Investment until a 2015 merger, and the original
Hubco deal was agreed to under the old name.
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(A. J. Siddiqui, 2020). It is unclear whether he was referring to the Hubco plant or other
similar instances discussed later in this chapter, but either way, Pakistan was able to exer-
cise some agency. Again, a combination of lower project risk and preexisting incentives to
curry favor with Islamabad led China to adopt a more accommodating stance.
Most recently, a gas-fired plant at Bin Qasim, near the Port Qasim coal plant, is currently
in its early stages. Harbin Electric and Germany’s Siemens are the primary contractors
on the $650 million project, which uses imported gas brought in by sea. The Bin Qasim
station is owned by Pakistan’s K-Electric. While Chinese firms are not active investors in
this project, the risk was manageably low enough that they did find space to earn a share of
contract revenues (Dawn, 2019; Power Technology, 2020a; Siemens, 2019).
A would-be fifth plant is the exception that proves the rule of the commercial viability of
these coastal facilities. Like Port Qasim and Hubco, the Gadani plant would have also been
located near Karachi and would have used coal imported on a purpose-built jetty. The pri-
mary difference, though, was its scale. The $5.16 billion projected price tag for ten separate
reactors raised eyebrows, especially since other new capacity was already coming online.
The jetty alone was to cost around $1 billion, and China was reportedly not interested in
paying for it. Even after downsizing to four planned reactors, the project was eventually
scrapped (Rafiq, 2017, pp. 17–19, 56). Chinese firms were willing to make long-term,
majority investments in Pakistani power plants, but only when appropriately sized for the
market.
The mostly coastal import-burning plants can be contrasted with another cluster of activity
using coal from Pakistan’s Thar Desert. Financial arrangements for the Thar plants repre-
sent an intermediate between China’s pre-CPEC loan-based activity and the equity-heavy
plants burning imported coal. This is because of mixed incentives. These projects present
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higher financial risk, meriting stricter terms; but also greater benefits to diplomatic rela-
tions, meaning laxer ones. As the feasibility study for Port Qasim made clear, Pakistan’s
domestic coal is of lower quality and is less popular with investors. However, another
official Pakistani document outlines the positives to Pakistani policy priorities of greater
domestic coal usage:
The existing energy mix of the country is heavily skewed towards the costlier
thermal Generation Facilities/Power Plants, operating on Imported Furnace
Oil. The Import of Furnace Oil not only creates a pressure on the precious
foreign exchange reserves of the country but also causes an increase in the
consumer end tariff. The increase in the consumer end tariff not only results in
higher inflation but it also affects the competitiveness of the local Industry with
its foreign peers. In order to address the said issues, the Authority considers
it imperative that efforts must be made to change the energy mix based on rel-
atively cheap fuels. (National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, Pakistan,
2015, p. 5)
Imported coal trims Pakistan’s current account deficit relative to imported oil, but not as
much as domestic coal. A shift toward domestic fuel sources makes sense from a Pak-
istani government point of view but might come across as political interference in markets
to investors. This puts Chinese organizations in a dilemma between contributing to a na-
tional priority of a major partner—best done via equity, which puts less financial burden
on Pakistan—and protecting their own financial interests via debt. The result was hedging
between the debt-heavy strategy seen before CPEC and the greater use of equity for the
coastal plants.
The first of the Thar Desert plants in which China was involved was the Thar Block II sta-
tion, an integrated mining and generation project. The World Bank was at one point looking
into the possibility of backing this project but opted out in 2010, reportedly over concerns
regarding the relocation of local communities. This left a void which took several years to
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fill. After finding few takers, a 2014 agreement finally established a joint venture led by the
Pakistani conglomerate Engro. The project drew several new investors over time, and the
ownership structure differs between the mine and power plant. The mine is majority (52.1
percent) owned by the Sindh provincial government, with the remainder dispersed across
Engro (12.8 percent); the Pakistani business conglomerate House of Habib (12.8 percent)
and the affiliated Habib Bank (9.5 percent); power generator Hubco (8.5 percent); and the
China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) (4.3 percent) (Ahmadani, 2018; Em-
bassy of the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan, 2018d; Sindh Engro Coal Mining
Company, 2020). The power plant is owned by Engro (50.1 percent); CMEC (35 percent);
Habib Bank (9.5 percent); and Liberty Mills (5.4 percent), a Karachi-based industrial group
(Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan, 2018d; World Bank, 2019b). For
both components of the project, the relevant Chinese firm is a minority owner, but in a
much more substantial way for the power plant. The same goes for the Pakistani private
sector: the power plant has no direct Pakistani state ownership, while the mine is majority
state-owned. This may reflect a greater vote of confidence in demand for electricity than in
the use domestic coal specifically. Budgeted at $995.4 million, the power plant has received
$621 million in credit from Chinese banks, evenly split between one policy bank (CDB)
and two commercial banks (the China Construction Bank (CCB) and ICBC). It has also
received another $210 million from a grouping of eleven different Pakistani banks (World
Bank, 2019b). This means that the power plant is majority Chinese-financed, but a rela-
tively soft majority at 62.4 percent of total project value. (Single-source Exim and CDB
loans typically cover 80 to 85 percent of costs.) It is also not overwhelmingly Chinese-
built: while CMEC was the primary contractor, it procured boilers from (again) General
Electric (Power Technology, 2020c). This is a hybrid of China’s more typical tied loan and
equity arrangements. CDB did provide financing bound for a Chinese firm, but only as a
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minority partner next to less constrained Chinese commercial and Pakistani banks. So, the
contracting process was more open, leading to non-purely Chinese procurement, and the
debt burden to China was proportionately lower than the usual for CDB or Exim. Some
of the shortfall from the lack of debt financing was made up by equity investment by the
contractor itself, but only as a minority stakeholder and not to the same degree as for the
coastal power plants.33
Thar Block II began operations in 2019, and as of this writing a new set of nearby plants are
in their earlier stages (Power Technology, 2020c). Two which had originally been desig-
nated as the second phase of Thar Block II are now standalone operations under construc-
tion (Global Energy Monitor, 2019). The Thar Energy Limited (TEL) and Thalnova plants
are budgeted at $497.7 million apiece, with CMEC continuing from Thar Block II its role
as the primary contractor. The ownership and financing structures are not identical between
the two but both follow similar patterns to Thar Block II with minority CMEC ownership
and partial Chinese financing. TEL is majority owned by Pakistan’s Hubco (60 percent)
and Fauji Fertilizer (30 percent), with CMEC rounding out the remaining 10 percent (Daily
Times, 2020; The News International, 2018). The power plant is funded by $262 million in
credit from the China Development Bank, with the rest of the project’s debt coming from
Pakistan’s Habib Bank (E. Downs, 2019, p. 15). Local funding has left some leeway for
Pakistani (and American) agency in the procurement process, with General Electric again
securing $60 million in contracts to provide boiler equipment to be installed by CMEC
(World Coal, 2018). Thalnova is similarly 10 percent owned by CMEC, with the remain-
33Financing details are only partially confirmed for the mine. E. Downs (2019, p. 15) puts the budget at
$1.47 billion for the mine alone. Per the Associated Press of Pakistan (2015), China’s total lending was $1.2
billion across both the mine and the power plant. Loan details for the mine were never published, but given
$621 million for the power plant, this would imply roughly $579 million for the mine, or under half of the
$1.47 billion budget.
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der dispersed across several different Pakistani groups led by Hubco (37.5 percent).34 Fi-
nancing for Thalnova also involved CDB and Habib Bank but also brought in two Chinese
private banks, Zheshang and Minsheng (Global Energy Monitor, 2019; Sinomach, 2019).
In this instance, the contracting Chinese firm took a small equity stake—enough to indicate
the intent of long-term presence, if not all that much in the way of project financing. Debt
made up the difference, but involving two private banks with no requirements for the use of
Chinese contractors and only a limited track record in overseas projects of this nature. Like
Thar Block II, its two successor plants both deployed hybridized elements of tied lending
and equity investment.
Three projects exhibit variation from this overall trend. One exhibits greater Chinese com-
mitment, and two show less commitment. First, Beijing Jingneng has bet big by taking a
78 percent stake in a planned “mine mouth” plant—a coal plant next to a mine—with an-
other 9.9 percent belonging to a Sinohydro subsidiary. The remaining 12.1 percent, though,
belongs to the UK’s Oracle Energy (Mir, 2018). Investors in the other Thar coal projects
were notably all either domestic or Chinese. The presence of a firm from a third country
could be taken as a multinational “vote of confidence” akin to the Qatari stake in the Port
Qasim coal plant. Chinese and multinational—in this case, British—investors appear to
have made similarly favorable risk-reward calculations for this project.
On the other hand, two projects have taken place with less direct Chinese involvement;
one of these has gone through with a Chinese firm involved as a builder but not owner,
and another has been canceled altogether. The project which is still happening is another
mine mouth plant 100 percent owned by Pakistan’s Siddiqsons. Siddiqsons originally hired
Harbin Electric to build a plant along the coast in the vicinity of Port Qasim, but the $262.5
34This does not account for 20.5 percent of the shares whose ownership is unknown. See Global Energy
Monitor (2019).
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million contract was transferred to CMEC when the project was moved inland to be closer
to the fuel source (American Enterprise Institute, 2019; ET News, 2018; Sinomach ⇣˝
:∆‚⌘, 2018; Zawya, 2018b). The plant is domestically funded, meaning Siddiqsons
has discretion to make such decisions as it sees fit (National Electric Power Regulatory
Authority, Pakistan, 2018, p. 8). The competition between Chinese firms would also seem
to indicate that the involvement of the government in Beijing in securing contracts for them
was limited at most. Here, local capital presented an opportunity for Chinese firms, which
needed to neither buy equity stakes nor use loans to bring the project to fruition.
The inverse took place at the Salt Range project. Originally to be built by CMEC, the
Chinese contractor withdrew from the $590 million initiative over a dispute with the lo-
cal authorities over electricity tariffs. Pakistan’s subsidized electricity prices can be hard
on producers (Kiani, 2016a; Rafiq, 2017, p. 17). The Chinese government could have re-
sponded to price risk by propping up CMEC with debt, but this could have later created a
diplomatic issue if the project predictably lost money and the Pakistani government could
not afford to pay for it. CMEC’s withdrawal was in the long run probably better for Sino-
Pakistani relations than a loss-making white elephant would have been. The diplomatic
costs of debt are only worth it where there are clear benefits to compensate.
This brings us to the last category of power sector financing: transmission. None of the
above plants are useful without improved transmission infrastructure to handle the addi-
tional output. Plans are underway to build power lines from both the coastal and Thar
Desert plants northwards to the Lahore and Faisalabad metropolitan areas. Like the Salt
Range project, the transmission lines were at one point held up because of a disagreement
over tariffs between State Grid, the Chinese grid operator brought in to manage the new
Pakistani power lines, and the Pakistani regulator (Kiani, 2016b; Rafiq, 2017, p. 20). Unlike
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the case of the Salt Range project, the Chinese state-connected financial sector was there
to ensure that project moved forward. Even before the dispute, the China Development
Bank committed $3.55 billion to the power lines (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). Of
this, $1.76 billion has already been budgeted to State Grid to build and operate the Lahore
lines, with the remainder presumably to go to the Faisalabad lines, which are being built
later (American Enterprise Institute, 2019; Kiani, 2016b). This is the only such major use
of debt to ensure a Pakistani power project happens. This author does not claim any knowl-
edge of what was said behind closed doors, but the circumstantial evidence does show that
Chinese banks did not massively intervene for individual, dispensable power plants but did
so for transmission projects central to the Pakistani government’s entire energy plan (and
China’s participation therein). This is consistent with the idea that the political costs of debt
are usually only incurred where necessary: for risky highway projects important to Chinese
strategic interests or to safeguard a much larger program of electricity-based outreach to the
Pakistani government.
In summary, China’s financing to the fossil fuel power sector varied based on risk level and
importance to overall bilateral relations. The first plant built came before CPEC and the
centrality of the power sector to Sino-Pakistani diplomacy, and so China used tough loan
terms without as much concern for political considerations. The relative lack of political
considerations also meant a much lower overall volume of finance. As electricity grew
as a Pakistani political issue and CPEC hit its stride, though, this changed. The volume of
Chinese financing kept up with Pakistani demand, and increasingly along favorable, equity-
heavy terms. There was some variation as well between equity investments plants using
imported coal, which is commercially more viable but politically less useful, and more
hybridized debt-equity models for higher-risk but politically useful plants burning coal
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from Pakistani mines. These power stations are highly important to Sino-Pakistani relations
in the aggregate, but each individual one might reasonably be considered expendable. Not
so for a network of transmission lines connecting the two primary clusters of generation
activity at Karachi and the Thar Desert to consumers in the cities of Punjab. When the
transmission project ran into trouble due to a pricing dispute with the Pakistani regulator,
funds from the China Development Bank ensured that it kept going regardless.
Renewable The early wave of CPEC has focused on coal plants partially due to Pak-
istan’s desire to quickly bring online large amounts of new generation capacity. Coal can
do this, but hydropower projects tend to take more time, and wind and solar projects tend to
be smaller. This section will discuss the less politically useful renewable sectors. It begins
with hydro, for a which a historical Chinese focus on freelance contracting and occasional
loans has shifted toward equity in the CPEC era. I then look at wind and solar, for which
very few tied loans have been used, and equity is more common.
Table 7.2 on the following page lists known Chinese-built hydropower plants from 1997 to
May 2020.
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The sheer number of hydro plants greatly exceeds the number of coal plants, largely be-
cause China was heavily involved in hydropower from a much earlier date. Much of
China’s involvement came via third-party financing: of the thirteen projects before 2012,
when the first CPEC-designated35 dam was agreed to, only four36 received financing from
China, and two of these were in conjunction from loans from the Islamic Development
Bank (the Allai Khwar project) or Persian Gulf governments and OPEC (Neelum-Jhelum).
Otherwise, multilateral development banks like the World Bank and bilateral agencies like
Germany’s KfW tend to feature more heavily. There was space for Chinese firms to make
money building dams in Pakistan, but typically using funding arrangements from else-
where. There was less incentive for China to put money behind them before Pakistan
played quite as large a role in China’s geostrategic planning.
This changed, of course, with CPEC, but even as the quantity of Chinese financing in-
creased, the terms did not entail any more debt on Pakistani balance sheets. Chinese in-
terests have taken large majority stakes in two of the three projects currently designated as
part of CPEC.37 In a gesture that had to be noticed in Islamabad, the Karot dam was the
first investment made by the Silk Road Fund, a Chinese government fund aimed at fos-
tering equity investment along the Belt and Road (Silk Road Fund, 2015). The Silk Road
Fund’s 15 percent stake, though, was far exceeded by builder Three Gorges’ 70 percent and
was matched by 15 percent from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World
Bank Group’s designated equity investor (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in
Pakistan, 2018b). Talking about third-party participation in Chinese-funded power plants,
35The Diamer-Bhasha dam was already being planned when CPEC was announced and was retroactively
added to the list of projects. It was taken off the list for several years while the project was stalled but may
be added back to the list after China recommitted to the dam in May 2020. This episode will be discussed in
greater detail later in this section.
36This is not counting the Bunji project, which stalled before financing details appeared to be fully settled.
37The official list of CPEC projects can be found at CPEC Authority (2020).
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E. Downs (2019) writes that:
It is probably safe to say that these companies would not purposely invest in
unsustainable power plants. This is especially true for the IFC, a global devel-
opment institution with a mission to help the private sector end extreme poverty
and boost prosperity. The IFC is supporting the Karot Hydropower Project
to end Pakistan’s power shortage and improve the sustainability of Pakistan’s
power sector. (40)
In other words, the equity partners and IFC in particular do not see this as makework
for Chinese excess capacity. The partners have also assumed the risk of 80 percent debt
financing from CDB, Exim, the Silk Road Fund, and IFC (E. Downs, 2019, p. 36; World
Bank, 2019b). The Three Gorges-led consortium is to own and operate the finished product
for thirty years while paying interest rates averaging 3.8 percent above LIBOR, which at the
time came out to 5.1 percent total (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan,
2018b). This interest rate is not necessarily high, but it is high enough that the operating
consortium does bear appreciable downside risk. Gezhouba has gone even further at Suki
Kinari, owning 98 percent of the 75 percent debt-backed project.38
Lower risk at Karot and Suki Kinari allowed Chinese firms to serve Pakistani interests with
minimal pressure on the Pakistani budget. Political risks due to terrorism and rivalry with
India, though, have stood in the way of other projects. First, Chinese firms started work on
the Gomal Zam dam in August 2001, only a month before attacks in the United States fun-
damentally changed the political calculus surrounding a dam located in South Waziristan,
not far from the Afghan border. In 2004, two Chinese engineers were kidnapped and killed,
leading to the consortium’s withdrawal. The Pakistani military and (temporarily) a Turkish
firm took custody of the site for three years before Sinohydro finally agreed to enter, now
38The third CPEC-designated dam at Kohala is currently stalled without a definitive source of financing.
This will be discussed later in this section.
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with backing from USAID (Dawn, 2005; Shakir, 2010; Small, 2015, pp. 109–11). Unex-
pected political risk blocked a contracting arrangement for years before it could revived
by funding from a government with a pronounced interest in Afghan-Pakistani stability; in
this case, that meant American funding.
Risk from Afghanistan, though, has factored into fewer dam projects than risk from In-
dia. The Neelum-Jhelum, Bunji, Diamer-Bhasha, and Kohala dams are all in Pakistani-
controlled but Indian-claimed territory to the north. An Indian dam upriver has presented
problems for some by restricting the flow of water. It would not be accurate to say that the
India factor is the only reason some of these dams have stalled: cost has also been a factor
for the multi-billion dollar installations. However, Indian opposition does appear to have
been a factor for Kohala. Kohala was originally to be built by the same Three Gorges-IFC
consortium involved in other hydro projects in Pakistan, and a World Bank organization
was loath to involve itself in India-Pakistan politics (Bhutta, 2019). At Diamer-Bhasha as
well, the World Bank had intended to fund the project but withdrew after failing to gain
India’s assent (The Nation, 2012). The United States and Asian Development Bank opted
out partially for similar reasons (S. Shah, 2011).39 In 2017, Pakistan withdrew from a
deal that would have seen China take ownership of the dam and collateralize it against the
revenues from another dam (Rana, 2017). China recognized the risk involved and, in the
absence of the same direct political stake as in nearby highway projects, was acting accord-
ingly. As of May 2020, China is returning in the form of a joint venture between Sinohydro
(70 percent) and the Pakistani military’s Frontier Works Organization (30 percent) (Hari-
haran, 2020). This does not undo China’s majority ownership of the project, which may
have been aimed at ensuring it was completed and maintained, but it does do away with
39In the American case, the Abbottabad raid also played a role.
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the much thornier collateralization of unrelated revenues, which as for collateralization oil
in Ecuador was generally unpopular. Funding is reportedly coming from China as well,
although as of this writing the details are still unclear (Chaudhury, 2020; Hariharan, 2020).
Diamer-Bhasha may be going forward at relatively favorable terms despite high political
risk but has traversed a rocky road on the way.
While there have been a few dams for which Pakistan owes debt, there have been none for
wind or solar power. Table 7.3 lists the relevant projects.
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In no case did a wind or solar project entail the Pakistani government going into debt to
China. Where Chinese banks made loans, they were always payable by Chinese, Pakistani,
or third-country firms. In several cases, Chinese firms were brought on as contractors to
build projects owned by groups like Pakistan’s Habib and Malaysia’s Tenaga. It is not
always clear where funding for these projects came from, but Chinese commercial banks
did in at least one case (Sachal) lend to a Pakistani firm, albeit in order to then pay a Chi-
nese contractor for work done. In other cases, Chinese firms were actively involved in
managing and owning the end products. Three Gorges again partnered with the IFC for
three related wind farms. The IFC’s strict profitability requirements and system of risk
assessments would indicate that these are lower-risk projects in which Three Gorges could
reasonably to expect to earn a return on investment. Similarly, the the provincially man-
aged first ($190 million) phase of Quaid-e-Azam solar project was built by China with
funding from a provincially-owned bank, but Chinese investors took a more direct stake in
the second phase. Zonergy, an energy-focused subsidiary of tech giant ZTE, invested $1.5
billion in what was then the world’s largest solar plant (Ebrahim, 2015). This exposed them
to substantial political risk. Within a year of signing the contract, they were involved in a
lawsuit against the local regulator over tariffs, which had been slashed by 36 percent from
the contractual amount reportedly over the falling cost of solar equipment (Saeed, 2016).
Fortunately for Zonergy, their investment was 80 percent backed by CDB and Exim, and
they were able to push through the dispute and complete the project. Xi Jinping attended
the opening ceremony (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan, 2018g).
Zonergy—and, more to the point, its financial backers—were exposing themselves to con-
siderable risk for Pakistan’s sake, with clearly demonstrated positives for bilateral relations.
UEP made a similar point about its own leveraged equity investment in wind power: a com-
pany release states that “through its efforts and diligence in Pakistan, United Energy has
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made and is continuing to make contributions to the energy development of Pakistan, and is
doing its part in support of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor strategy” (United Energy Group, 2015).
Of all of these projects, the Zonergy solar installation is far and away the largest and most
able to contribute to Pakistani energy security. It parallels the Thar Desert coal plants in that
Chinese firms are assuming risk in the name of a Pakistani domestic priority. Many smaller
projects were more able to find local funding, meaning less Chinese state involvement was
necessary.
Nuclear Nuclear power is inherently more sensitive than other types of power genera-
tion. It is even more so in the context of Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry. Most countries’
aversion to working with the Pakistani nuclear sector has left a vacuum for China to fill,
with attendant baggage both political and commercial. As Small (2015) puts it,
China’s investments in Pakistan’s civil nuclear power sector [...] do have com-
mercial utility—–they give China’s nuclear industry the opportunity to show-
case power plants outside its home market. But they have also been inextri-
cably bound up with the longstanding programme of Sino-Pakistani nuclear
weapons cooperation and, in more recent years, the response by Islamabad
and Beijing to the US-India nuclear deal. (108)
China has backed all but one of Pakistan’s nuclear plants; the exception was a Cold War-era
reactor built with Canadian assistance. While these are large and hypothetically lucrative
contracts, what financing information is available for them tends to skew toward Pakistani
interests, and Chinese firms appear to be making money at lenders’ expense. As Small
points out, there is some benefit to creating a “loss leader,” or a series of investments meant
to lose money but act as advertising for future customers. The real benefit to China, though,
is in strengthening political relations. Nuclear tests in the 1990s, the A. Q. Khan prolifera-
444 CHAPTER 7. GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS
tion scandal of the 2000s, and lasting concerns over extremism or conflict with India have
all cast the Pakistani nuclear program in a negative light. China’s continuing support for
it—on favorable terms, none the less—underscores the “all-weather friendship” between
China and Pakistan.
This section sequentially juxtaposes these historical events with the development of the
Chinese-assisted “Chashma” series of five nuclear plants in Punjab as well as the “KANUPP
II” plant in Karachi. While the exact situation surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear program has
varied over time, it has never gained broad international acceptance, and China has consis-
tently stayed with it regardless.
Perhaps because of the strategic nature of the work in question, Sino-Pakistani nuclear co-
operation goes back further in history than in other power sectors. Pakistan’s “Chashma
I” power plant had its roots in French cooperation in the 1970s, but France backed out,
leaving an unfilled void until the China National Nuclear Corporation entered in 1991. The
IAEA approved the work, which began in 1993. Work was still underway in May 1998,
when Pakistan tested several nuclear weapons. The tests were in response to Indian explo-
sions weeks prior, leading to international fears of nuclear rivalry (Federation of American
Scientists, 2000; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011). Work continued on the plant regardless.
It was completed in 2000, after which China supplied the new reactor with fuel (National
Electric Power Regulatory Authority, Pakistan, 2003, pp. I–1).
Financing information for Chashma I is not available, but is at least partially so for sub-
sequent construction. This merits a cautionary word about the unique nature of nuclear
investments. Because of the sensitivity of nuclear power, foreign ownership is simply not
on the table. All plants are owned and operated by the Pakistani authorities. For different
reasons, it would also be difficult to fund projects in the hundreds of millions to billions
7.2. CHINESE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN PAKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN 445
of dollars using grants. So, the default has been a mix of loans from China and Pakistani
domestic funding. Where Chinese money is concerned, the question then becomes loan
terms. These are not available for Chashma II but are known for more recent plants; these
are discussed in chronological order.
Chashma II’s $490 million budget was partially funded by $350 million in Chinese loans
(American Enterprise Institute, 2019; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; World Nuclear As-
sociation, 2020a). The loans were committed in 2003; the following year, it came to light
that Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan had been selling nuclear technology to countries
including Libya and North Korea. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did
not revoke its blessing, though, and despite international concerns, China stayed with the
project (Agence France-Presse, 2006). The “all-weather friendship,” to use a state propa-
ganda term, was indeed weathering a rainstorm.
More is known about Chashma III and IV, for which China National Nuclear Corporation
(CNNC) continued its involvement from the previous two plants. These were jointly cov-
ered by $1.912 billion in credit from China meant to cover 82 percent of the $2.37 billion
budget. One source lists these as “low-interest loans” payable over a generous twenty-year
timeframe, although the exact interest rate is unclear. (World Nuclear Association, 2020a).
China also again agreed to provide fuel (National Electric Power Regulatory Authority,
Pakistan, 2016; World Nuclear Association, 2020a). By the time this new deal was an-
nounced in 2010, the A. Q. Khan scandal did not cast quite so long a shadow, but the plants
remained controversial. Despite the IAEA’s approval, the deal had yet to win the assent of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multilateral grouping focused on nonproliferation.
Small (2015) writes that:
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In 2010, observers were surprised to discover that China National Nuclear
Corporation had signed agreements to provide two new 300-MW reactors at
Chashma, with Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute
providing the reactor design. Initially there was scepticism among foreign of-
ficials and informed observers—Pakistan appeared to have been over-selling
the prospects of a Chashma deal, and this may well have been more of the
same. But the agreements were real. Attention quickly moved to the NSG and
how China would approach the process of securing international consent. Its
approach was simply to brazen it out. When China was asked for clarification
at the NSG plenary in Christchurch, New Zealand, in June 2010 it responded
a few months later with the position it has maintained ever since: that these
reactors had been grandfathered in China’s original 2004 agreement. None of
the other NSG members accepted this position. But there was little consensus
about how to respond. While the violation was blatant, there was no real ap-
petite for a serious fight with China over a couple of power plants under IAEA
safeguards, and for many of those who had opposed the US-India deal in the
first place there was a dose of “We told you so”. (Chapter 3)
The last sentence’s reference to the US-India deal is central. In 2006, India and the United
States had worked out a deal to cooperate on civil nuclear technology despite the con-
tentious politics of Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition and the dueling tests of the 1990s.
China’s decision to continue with assistance to Pakistan despite international opposition
was in this sense geopolitical, signaling continued commitment to a partner which might
otherwise fall behind its principal rival in a strategic technological area.
After Chashma IV, China and Pakistan branched out from the Chashma location and piv-
oted toward the Karachi Nuclear Power Complex (KANUPP), where Canada had already
helped build a reactor during the Cold War. Again based on Chinese blueprints, the
KANUPP II plant was much larger, requiring 6.5 billion in loans from Exim against an
estimated $10 billion budget. This time, more details are available on loan terms: 2.647
billion RMB at one percent interest; US $4.001 billion at two percent interest; and $2.250
billion at six percent interest (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). The last installment is
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at more market-like rates but constitutes less than half of China’s total lending. Billions
in loans at interest below the rate of inflation are not quite a grant, but they are not very
demanding of the recipient, either. Motivated by some mix of geopolitics and a desire to
advertise its nuclear sector, China wanted to make sure that Pakistan could build the new
plant despite its limited budget.
As of this writing, Chashma V is in the planning stages. No details are yet available, but
Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation continues, and the historical track record would indicate
that Pakistani interests will be accommodated.
7.2.1.7 Mining and Oil
Many of the power plants discussed had domestic political ramifications for Pakistan and
demonstrated Chinese commitment to Pakistani priorities. I now pivot to the extractive
sector, which is less politicized and has been treated more at arms’ length. Pakistan is not a
major producer of most minerals. China has made some modest contributions to Pakistan’s
mineral sector but usually without putting many demands on the Pakistani government in
terms of debt obligations. Pakistan’s potential contribution to Chinese resource security is
simply not enough to justify the type of tactics seen in countries like Ecuador with more
minerals to offer.
An early example of Chinese engagement in Pakistani commodities came in 2001 with an
oil pipeline connecting an inland refinery in Punjab to the coast at Port Qasim. The pipeline
did not approach the Chinese border and is of limited strategic use to China. Chinese
commercial interests were involved only in a limited capacity. Of the $480 million budget,
$102 million was funded by Exim; this was reportedly only the part of the budget for which
foreign exchange was necessary. The rest of the $360 million in debt funding came from
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Pakistani banks. The remaining $120 million in equity financing came 51 percent from a
joint venture of the Pakistani (60 percent) and Abu Dhabi (40 percent) governments, with
the rest belonging to Pakistani State Oil and Western-based multinationals (Dawn, 2002;
Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; PetroEnergy Information Network, 2004). A CNPC
subsidiary shared contracting duties with Pakistan’s Techno Engineering, again indicating
that this was not a China-specific project (Business Wire, 2005). CNPC may have seen
a business opportunity and gotten help from Exim, but this was not the type of tied loan
contract which has been known to cause controversy.
Also in 2001, the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) invested in the Saindak cop-
per and gold mine, near Pakistan’s triangular border with Afghanistan and Iran. MCC
agreed to invest $350 million in exchange for a leasehold through 2017. As part of the
leasehold, MCC could keep 50 percent of the profits, leaving 48 percent to the national
government and 2 percent to the provincial government of Balochistan (Muhammad, 2013;
Rafiq, 2017, p. 39). These terms have found few critics in the central government but
many in Balochistan, where regional identity runs deep. The five-year extension of the deal
past the original 2017 deadline for handover to Balochistan province has added fuel to the
flames, with many Balochis worried the copper and gold might be mostly exhausted by
then (Dispatch News Desk, 2017; Notezai, 2018; S. A. Shah, 2018). It is not clear whether
MCC had any say in the 48-2 split between the central and provincial government, and it
is even less clear that the Chinese government had any say in it. Still, what happened in
effect was that MCC signed onto a deal which clearly granted better terms to Islamabad
than to Balochistan. The theory predicted tougher terms to lock down natural resources
but did not take into account that there could be more than one recipient. The center-local
divide usually does not factor prominently in Chinese finance to developing countries, but
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in this exceptional case, a Chinese firm managed to cut a favorable deal for itself and the
partner national government at the locals’ expense. From the firm’s perspective, the na-
tional government has more power over mineral licensing and controls the military, which
is used to protect mining investments in a volatile area. From the Chinese government’s
perspective, the leadership in Islamabad is by all estimates more consequential than any
individual province. From both perspectives, it made sense to accede to a deal favoring the
central government.
The following decade was much slower. MCC in 2005 entered into a second deal, a
joint venture with two Hunan provincial firms to mine zinc and lead in Pakistan. The
small ($72.6 million) deal was 80% supported by CDB (China Metallurgical Group, 2007;
Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). Another major Chinese mineral investment did not
come until significantly later, in 2010, when an exogenous shock on the opposite side of
the world created an opening for new entrants to Pakistan’s oil industry. Specifically, fi-
nancial pressures due to lawsuits following Deepwater Horizon oil spill prompted British
Petroleum (BP) to sell off many overseas assets, including its holdings in Pakistan (E. Ng,
2012). Hong Kong-based United Energy purchased BP’s Pakistani upstream operations
for $775 million (British Petroleum, 2010; United Energy Group, 2011). By 2012 United
Energy was already planning another $200 million in investments to expand capacity in
cooperation with Pakistani state oil companies (Green Car Congress, 2012). The South
China Morning Post noted that under a prominent mainland-born boss, United Energy en-
joyed a $5 billion line of credit with CDB (E. Ng, 2012). In 2018, United expanded further
by buying the Pakistani assets of Austria’s OMV for $192 million (Baloch, 2018). Access
to policy bank credit allowed United to expand on the opportunity created by the faraway
Gulf of Mexico oil spill, sometimes including Pakistani state oil firms in the process. Oil is
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not central to the Sino-Pakistani relationship, but United’s investments could not have hurt,
either.
7.2.1.8 Other Infrastructure
Chinese firms were involved in several projects related to infrastructure not covered by the
previous categories, but these never received overt Chinese funding. Examples include a
plant to turn city waste into fertilizer or methane fuel ($100 million); World Bank-funded
irrigation in Sindh and Punjab ($72 million and $130 million, respectively); and airport
construction in Islamabad and Lahore ($230 million and $380 million) (American Enter-
prise Institute, 2019; World Bank, 2018b). Of these, information on the source of financing
is only available for the World Bank irrigation projects, but they generally reflect Pakistani
(or World Bank) desire to raise living standards and productivity—or attract tourism—the
airports, whose location by major cities makes them much more useful for commercial avi-
ation than the more remote, potentially military-friendly airport at Gwadar. In the absence
of major foreign policy or geostrategic concerns, Chinese firms will sometimes engage in
projects just to earn money, but home government support will be less forthcoming, even if
participation in the projects could contribute to a positive image of China.
One major project outside the sectors previously discussed has actually received major
credit from China. The new, $1.63 billion Orange Line of the Lahore Metro is supported
by Exim. At 6 percent interest over 15 years and only 2 years’ grace, this loan is quite a
bit tougher than most of those used in more strategically important areas (CPEC Authority,
2020; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). The Lahore Metro is an oddity in Pakistan: a
project mostly being done for Pakistani consumption and Chinese commercial gain, with-
out any other factors obviously at play. Provincial politics have presented difficulties that
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could have made Chinese firms more reticent about the commuter system. The Nawaz
Sharif administration was often seen as partial to its home territory of Punjab, where La-
hore is located. Rafiq (2017, p. 15) writes that “because of the controversy stemming from
the perception that the ruling party was favoring Punjab, commuter rail projects in other
provinces have been added [...]” The Asian Development Bank is funding an approxi-
mately $1 billion bus system in Peshawar, most of which has not yet been allocated but
small amounts of which have already gone to Jinlong, whose buses are ubiquitous in many
Chinese cities (Asian Development Bank, 2020b). Plans for Karachi and Quetta may fol-
low (Rafiq, 2017, p. 15). Coal plants represented a Chinese carrot to Pakistan’s electorate,
and nuclear plants were especially appreciated by the security establishment. The Metro’s
appeal was much more limited, which perhaps is why China saw it as a less useful public
relations tool and treated it as a more commercial transaction.
7.2.1.9 Conclusion: Pakistan
Pakistan’s geostrategic importance competes with and sometimes interacts with factors in-
cluding political risk and commercial interests to shape Chinese development finance deals
in complex but theoretically predictable ways. H3A predicted that geostrategic factors at
their most basic lead to laxer terms. This was on full display in aid to Afghan refugees
and in a more limited capacity for loans to build surveillance systems and a satellite, which
were too expensive to be done via grants but were instead funded by particularly favorable
loans. Indeed, not all projects are cheap enough to be done by grants: apart from the excep-
tional, centrally important case of the complex at Gwadar, grants and zero-interest loans
were scarcely used for infrastructure. Where a project’s price tag implies greater commer-
cial interests, a more typical choice would be between freelance contracting, equity, and
debt. Freelance contracting was less observed in Pakistan, probably because of chronic
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shortages of capital, but did sometimes exist in areas of local or Bretton Woods priority
like clean energy or the social sector. In practice, China was pushing capital into Pakistan
via either equity or debt, with the former being more preferable from the perspective of a
Pakistani government with chronic structural debt issues.
This choice had to also factor in risk. Equity investors are more exposed to risk than
firms which receive loans from China but bear no long-term responsibility for the project
they are building. Chinese equity investors enthusiastically embraced, for example, coal
plants using imported coal, thereby fulfilling a Pakistani government priority. At the same
time, Chinese firms used a somewhat more lackluster mix of debt and equity in plants us-
ing lower-quality domestic coal. These deals were essentially driven by Pakistani politics
and viewed less favorably by the business community. China employed enough debt to
convince firms to take on the jobs, but not so much that Pakistan resented the arrange-
ments.
In areas of high risk and high geostrategic importance, H3B would predict tougher terms.
In Pakistan, China did indeed sometimes had to use the risk-management value of tied debt
to push firms to do its bidding. Within the highway sector, then, debt was used to repair the
Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan with western China and to build a transnational fiber
optic cable serving as its digital equivalent. Telecoms and road projects in less sensitive
areas, though, were more likely handled with third-party or domestic funding and did not
always involve Chinese firms. The terms of loans to geostrategic projects were frequently
highly concessional as well; lower-interest tied loans still lower risk to Chinese firms but
place less burden on the recipient, so long as the Chinese bank (and its state owners) see it
fit to sacrifice some wealth. Pakistan’s significance is such that higher-interest loans were
little used with an exception for the Lahore Metro, which was domestically controversial
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and of limited political use to offset its utility to Chinese companies.
Apart from a smattering of mining and oil investments, Pakistan has relatively limited
significance to Chinese (or global) resource security. This dissertation’s last full case study
looks at what happens when the patterns of political risk and natural resource production
observed in Ecuador meet a degree of geostrategic significance paralleling that of Pakistan.
As we shall see, these competing interests lead to an intermediate strategy between the
extremes seen in resource-poor Pakistan and (from China’s perspective) geostrategically
distant Ecuador.
7.2.2 Kazakhstan
Chapter 3 conceptualized the secure transportation of goods to and from China as a geostrate-
gic interest; this notably includes oil and gas imports. Oil and gas production, however,
was conceptualized as a “resource security” interest. Pakistan is home only to the former,
at least in any significant volume, but Kazakhstan is home to both. To begin with, there is
some tension when China uses debt and other risk management tools to push firms toward
geostrategic projects, in the knowledge that this may undercut relations with host countries
on whom China will rely to maintain access to the completed infrastructure. This is even
more complicated in a case like Kazakhstan in which China also faces incentives to push
capital toward oil and gas production, which in a relatively high-risk country might in some
cases mean heavy debt or even resource-backed debt.
This has not happened in Kazakhstan, which because of these competing priorities emerges
as an intermediate case between the tougher stance seen in Ecuador, where geostrategic
access is not a major issue, and the laxer terms used in Pakistan, where commodity pro-
duction is minimal. Following 1) a brief introduction to relevant background of the Kaza-
454 CHAPTER 7. GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS
khstani case, I outline Chinese development finance in Kazakhstan by sector. 2) Overland
transportation projects exhibit intra-sector variation as China leaves more market-oriented
highway projects to international organizations like the World Bank and allocates its own
capital to more ambitious but riskier railways and eastbound pipelines of more interest to
itself than to most other financiers with westward centers of gravity. Despite a history of
Kazakhstani government encroachment, 3) upstream production of oil and gas is done on
relatively favorable terms to the government, partially because the risk is not quite as high
as in Correa-era Ecuador but also because China needs to maintain healthy relations with
Kazakhstan for its own reasons. China also skews toward minority joint ventures, indi-
cating that Kazakhstan’s institutions may to some degree deter equity investment, albeit
in relative but not absolute terms. The same is true in some instances for 4) other miner-
als. Kazakhstan’s uranium sector is fairly established and internationalized and is home to
many joint ventures similar to those used for oil, but the metals sector is prone to graft and
has been more of a target for debt. Similar intra-sector variation in risk and development
finance outcomes can be seen in 5) the productive sectors of agriculture, industry, and fi-
nance. Finally, 6) aid to border security and law enforcement shows similar concerns to
those on display in Pakistan, but not to nearly the same extent.
7.2.2.1 Background: Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan’s post-Cold War history has followed a trajectory which has affected its rela-
tionship with China in several ways. First, it is historically characterized by high levels
of political risk and corruption, but risk has tended to fall over time. Second, while gover-
nance risk has abated over time, border security and terrorism have increased in importance,
as has China’s ability to build trans-Eurasian connectivity projects. Third, Russia’s influ-
ence is always palpable but has receded since the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially
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following the financial crisis and the invasion of Crimea. Fourth, Kazakhstan’s domestic
leadership in the 2010s began to turn toward foreign-financed infrastructure as a growth
strategy, creating a natural coincidence of interests with China.
The legacy of Russian imperial and Soviet rule has left with Kazakhstan with high levels
of entrenched corruption. The Central Asia scholar Alexander Cooley (2012) writes of
Central Asian states that:
All of the Central Asian regimes have been aptly described as “patrimonial.” In
such polities, rulers maintain their positions of authority in return for distribut-
ing resources to a network of supportive political clients. Political competition
takes place informally and at the elite level, rather than through elections or the
aggregation of interests via political parties. (16)
This pattern, he continues, is the result of a Russian imperial and later Soviet system in
which the government in Moscow delegated significant influence to local elites who were
relied upon to distribute resources across their territories. These local elites were in a po-
sition to profit from their offices and continued to do so as leaders of independent nations,
with the caveat that Russia was now a foreign country and money from Western multina-
tionals entered the picture (Cooley, 2012, pp. 16–25). Like the other former parts of the
Soviet Union, Kazakhstan went through a chaotic period in the 1990s as elites used pri-
vatization as an opportunity to take control of lucrative assets. Over time, though, power
was consolidated under Nursultan Nazarbayev. This was not exactly rule of law, but it was
a form of stability, anyway. This presents a different kind of political risk than existed
in Pakistan. Pakistan’s challenges to investors had to do with state weakness: inability
to collect taxes or balance its budget, lack of control over its own territory, and perennial
challenges from neighboring India. Kazakhstan’s leadership did not face serious domes-
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tic challenges40 but was also known to demand percentages of major contracts for itself,
potentially in excess of those originally agreed upon. This type of political risk is more
similar to that faced in Ecuador than in Pakistan, but nevertheless generates similar results
for Chinese development finance.
The type of risk from extremist groups best exemplified in Pakistan does exist in Kaza-
khstan, though, and has come into greater focus over time. As for Pakistan, the September
11 attacks made China increasingly cognizant of these dangers in Central Asia. The Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization including China, Russia, and the Central Asian states has
emerged over time as a leading counterterror forum in the region. Kazakhstan’s long bor-
der with Xinjiang and a small ethnic Kazakh population on the Chinese side of the border
make it especially pertinent (Cooley, 2012, Chapter 1; T. Miller, 2017, Chapter 2). While
terrorism is less of a concern in Kazakhstan than in Pakistan, China still faces incentives to
maintain economic stability there in order to safeguard Xinjiang.
China’s outreach to Kazakhstan has been constrained by the continuing influence of Russia,
albeit less over time. Most Kazakhstanis are bilingual in Kazakh and Russian, and the
influence of their large neighbor to the north is unlikely to ever totally disappear. Still, the
economic balance of capabilities has clearly shifted with China’s high-speed growth. The
section on oil and gas will demonstrate that Russian (and Western) firms were more able to
lock down the Kazakhstani market through the mid-2000s but began to recede thereafter,
especially following the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Russia’s influence took a further hit
with the 2014 invasion of Crimea and ensuing Western sanctions (T. Miller, 2017, Chapter
2). Russia’s shrinking economic power has not been immediately matched by a comparable
decline in military power, though, as Russia continues to maintain military access rights as
40This could change following Nazarbayev’s 2019 retirement but was true during the period being studied.
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a legacy of post-Soviet agreements. The Central Asian adage “Russia is a rifle and China
is a purse” speaks to this awkward state of affairs (Markey, 2020, p. 107). Whether this
is financially sustainable from a Russian perspective is an open question, but for the time
being it means that Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states are in a position to play
Russian and Chinese interests against one another to extract a better deal (Gabuev, 2016;
Markey, 2020, p. 95). This competitive effect on financial bargaining is similar to that
created by the draw of countries with stronger governance environments but in this case
comes about for exogenous historical reasons.
Most recently, Kazakhstan has begun to focus on physical infrastructure and industrial
upgrading as part of its Nurly Zhol economic development program. Nurly Zhol, which
began in 2014, dovetails nicely with the Belt and Road, which was launched by Xi Jinping
during a visit to Kazakhstan the following year. Nurly Zhol and the Belt and Road have
been formally linked by a bilateral agreement. Implementation of related projects has been
slow, and it is too soon to fully evaluate how much will come of this partnership, but the
latent potential still exists (Kassenova, 2018).
I begin the analysis of specific projects with overland connectivity, a core concern for China
in Kazakhstan.
7.2.2.2 Overland Transportation
Kazakhstan’s central place in Eurasian geography earns it a central place in the Belt and
Road. Overland routes to Europe simply do not work as welll without it. As mentioned
previously, the BRI itself was launched there. China is pursuing Malacca-free routes to
Europe of several varieties. First are highways. China’s participation in the Kazakhstani
road sector is actually fairly small relative to major multilaterals like the World Bank and
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the Japanese-led Asian Development Bank. China is more involved in a second type of
connectivity: railways. Economists at the multilaterals tend to see highways as more ap-
propriately scaled for an area of low population density and limited traffic, but China’s
ability to bet big using government support here manifests itself via subsidized rail traf-
fic. Third, oil and gas pipelines shed some light on the competitive dynamic with Russia,
which before China’s economic emergence had had a functional monopoly on Kazakhstani
hydrocarbon exports.
Road China’s involvement in Kazakhstani road-building is not all that well-correlated
with individual roads’ importance to China. Instead, China is more likely to be involved
when roads are important to its interests and no one else is funding them. Where other
funders enter the market, Chinese firms may use the opportunity to turn a profit, but the
government and state-owned banks will keep their distance. This section looks at the Kaza-
khstani section of a transcontinental highway which, despite its obvious value to China, is
not very heavily Chinese-built. The same goes for a road improving access to oil-producing
regions near the Caspian Sea. China’s only loans for Kazakhstani roads are concentrated in
the northeast, in the portion of the country which abuts China but was not covered by the
transcontinental project.
The Western Europe-Western China highway is an enormous undertaking. Costing billions
to connect its two titular locations, the Kazakh portion is funded by $2.125 billion from
the World Bank, $678 million from the Asian Development Bank, $170 million from the
Islamic Development Bank, $103 million from the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), and $68 million from the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) (World Bank, 2009; Asian Development Bank, 2017, pp. v–vi). The highway is
potentially enormously important to Chinese interests but contains minimal Chinese con-
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tent (Markey, 2020, pp. 87–88). The World Bank-funded section included two contracts to
Sinohydro for $171.4 million: not small in absolute terms, but less than 10 percent of the
Bank’s $2.125 billion budget (World Bank, 2018b). The parts funded by the smaller banks
hired no Chinese firms at all (Asian Development Bank, 2017, pp. 27–28). The major mul-
tilaterals saw eye-to-eye with China on the utility of a highway, and there was no need for
China to actively intervene.
Something similar happened for a small road between Aktobe and Makat. Aktobe is along
the Western Europe-Western China Highway, while Makat is close to the hydrocarbon-rich
Caspian Sea. The Islamic Development Bank is contributing $273.0 million and the Asian
Development Bank $240.3 million to build the road (Asian Development Bank, 2020a).
Project documentation from the Asian Development Bank (2020a) explains the motivation
for the project.
The existing Aktobe- Makat road [...] connects the CAREC corridors 1b and
6a [the Western Europe-Western China Highway], as well as the capitals and
administrative centers of the oil- and mineral-rich provinces of Aktobe and
Atyrau, where approximately 1.7 million people live. Most of the existing
road pavement is either non-existent or damaged to the extent that ordinary
passenger cars cannot move faster than 30 km/hour. As a result, many vehicles
divert off the road and travel on parallel dirt paths. This largely deters both pas-
senger and freight operation from using the road. Many passengers traveling
between Aktobe and Atyrau have to use infrequent railway services instead,
and much goods traffic is diverted to the northern Aktobe -Oral- Atyrau route,
but the detour takes more time needed with an additional distance of 360 km.
Poor road connectivity has also become a key social issue contributing to the
growing income disparity between rural and urban areas.
The dual concerns of resource transportation and rural-urban inequality drew two multilat-
eral organizations to the project. China’s contribution was limited to Shanghai Construction
Group’s undertaking of a $53.1 million contract—again, as for the transcontinental high-
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Figure 7.6: CITIC Construction-Built Roads in Kazakhstan
Original source: CITIC Construction (2020). English labels added by author.
way, a fraction of the total budget (Asian Development Bank, 2020c).
The only area where China did need to substantively involve itself was in the northeast, near
its border but away from the southerly transcontinental project. In 2016, CITIC Construc-
tion agreed to build $940 million in Kazakhstani roads with funding from Exim (American
Enterprise Institute, 2019; CITIC Construction, 2020). A map of the roads (Figure 7.6)
shows a clear pattern.
The multilateral consortium built the road between the commercial capital of Almaty and
the main Chinese border crossing at Khorgos. China instead handled the less-trafficked
areas to the north which the continent-spanning mega-project would not take care of on its
own. A few red stretches of road appear in other spots on the map, including the political
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capital of Astana, but these are not the lion’s share of Chinese activity.
Rail Non-Chinese actors have been less interested in rail than road construction. Rail can
move larger quantities of goods faster than highways, but it is more expensive and typically
does best in areas of high population density. Kazakhstan does not fit this description, but
China has other reasons to focus on rail there. Rail can move supplies more efficiently in the
event of a crisis which blocks movement of goods at sea. If successful, it also has greater
potential to boost the export capacity of China’s less developed inland western provinces.
Building a railway operating at below capacity also fits well with the “new structural eco-
nomics” ideas discussed in Chapter 2. Authors such as Lin and Y. Wang (2017) aim to use
infrastructure investments to slowly attract clusters of economic activity which can over
time become self-sustaining. It remains an open question whether transcontinental rail will
become profitable, but at least some in China are hoping for it. Geostrategic interests are
clearly part of the equation, but so are commercial interests, especially as pertain to the
narrowing of China’s inequality between East and West.
The balance between geostrategic and commercial interests vary across both time and
space. In the 2000s, before China realistically had the capacity to implement major strate-
gic navigational projects, its involvement in Kazakhstani rail was driven by loan-backed
sales of rolling stock with only limited geostrategic implications. This is similar to the
pre-Belt and Road gas plant in Pakistan, which was done on much tougher terms than
BRI-era plants. In Kazakhstan as well, geostrategic interests emerged to the forefront in
the 2010s, and China is sinking large amounts of capital into maintaining a rail route via
Kazakhstan and Russia to Europe. This stands in contrast to a more costly southern route
to Europe across the Caspian, on which little progress has been made to date; and a Nur-
Sultan-area light rail network, which has been implemented on much tougher terms than
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the trans-Eurasian rail. I cover these events chronologically as China’s ability to achieve its
geostrategic aims increases over time.
China and Kazakhstan have shared a rail connection since 1991, when as the Soviet Union
disintegrated a connection was established at Dostyk (the middle border crossing in Figure
7.6 (Weitz, 2013). For most of the 1990s and 2000s, the railway was never all that active,
though. In the 2000s, China took part in the post-Soviet rebound of Kazakhstani rail by
contributing rolling stock. In 2002, Exim lent $172 million for Temir Zholy, the Kaza-
khstani national railway, to buy rolling stock. The loan was payable over 14 years at 5.3
percent interest, a relatively high rate by Exim’s standards. Temir Zholy took out another
$200 million in credit in 2006 for a similar arrangement (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018).
Russia, which at the time had a near-monopolistic status in Kazakhstani rail, attempted to
block this second round of carriages, but credit from Exim (and the domestic Development
Bank of Kazakhstan) pushed the deal through regardless (Péyrouse, 2007a, p. 39). The
Russo-Chinese competition at this point was essentially about long-term market share and
not geopolitics—overall Sino-Russian relations were fairly strong at this point—meaning
that China faced incentives to use tough terms—in this case, tied loans—to promote its
commercial interests. From China’s perspective, tied loans also helped manage the politi-
cal risk that Kazakhstan could back out of the deal due to pressure from Russia.
As China’s power grew over time, actual achievement of geostrategic goals became more
feasible. A major step in this direction occurred on its own as a byproduct of Chinese
growth. In the late 2000s, Hewlett Packard sponsored a project to connect its plant in
Chongqing, in inland southwestern China; to Duisburg, Germany. The line entered service
in 2009, mostly using Soviet-era rail through Kazakhstan and Russia. The real difference
between the Duisburg-Chongqing line and what came before was the route: it crossed
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between China and Kazakhstan at Khorgos, to the south of the old crossing at Dostyk and
thus on a more direct route to Kazakhstan’s commercial capital of Almaty (T. Ma, 2019;
Weitz, 2013). This raised the prospect of a more financially sustainable Europe-China rail
connection. The hope was that rail could fill a niche as a middle tier between cheap but
slow maritime shipping and fast but expensive air freight. It might also begin to attract
more business as labor costs rose in China’s coastal manufacturing belt and factories (like
Hewlett Packard’s) began to open further inland (Farchy, 2016; Hillman, 2018). If rail
could become financially sustainable, then China would have a reliable, Malacca-free route
to Europe in perpetuity without having to put in all that much effort in the long run.
In 2013, while Xi Jinping was visiting Kazakhstan, China announced that it would invest
$100 million in a railway terminus at the eastern port city of Lianyungang (Weitz, 2014).
The announcement from the heart of Central Asia of new construction on the Pacific Coast
might come across as odd, but this was the first step in connecting eastern China’s logistical
networks to western Eurasia. At the opposite end of China, a “dry port” opened in Khorgos
in 2015. This is necessary to handle transshipment of goods between the different rail
gauges used by the Chinese and Kazakhstani/Russian systems. Jiangsu province, where
Lianyungang is located, contributed $600 million in investments to “logistics and industrial
zones” at the site (Farchy, 2016). The use of wealth from a developed eastern province to
bolster the West indicates the railway’s significance to China’s commercial interests and by
extension its social stability.
From a Kazakhstani perspective, this arrangement has mixed implications. On the one
hand, almost all of the construction has been on the Chinese side of the border.41 A new
expansion in Kazakhstan has the Port of Lianyungang and China Ocean Shipping Com-
41Technically, this domestic development finance is outside the scope of this dissertation, but I include it
anyway because of its importance to international projects.
464 CHAPTER 7. GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS
pany (COSCO) investing $38 million to take 24.5 percent stakes apiece in a new special
economic zone on the Kazakhstani side of the border, with the 51 percent majority stake
belonging to the local government (Louppova, 2017; Shepard, 2017b). This small invest-
ment is much less substantive than the hundreds of millions on the Chinese side of the
border, but it does avoid downside risk on the Kazakhstani balance sheet. The Kazakhstani
SEZ was announced in May 2017; in January 2017, COSCO had “secured a 180 billion
yuan ($26.1 billion) financing pledge from China Development Bank to support Belt and
Road projects” (Goh, 2017). Even if most of the activity is taking place on Chinese soil, the
Chinese partners were assuming the relevant risk (and debt), and the benefits to Kazakhstan
from trade and investment are probably the same regardless. Indeed, Dubai-based logis-
tics giant DP World has signed a memorandum of understanding to expand infrastructure
on the Kazakhstani side; DP World already operates the Kazakhstani facilities (Container
Management, 2019; Sarmad Khan, 2019). China’s assumption of the lion’s share of the
financial burden could be taken as a friendly gesture. With echoes of the extravagant Kigali
Convention Centre (Chapter 5), the lavish “Chinese Cultural House” (-˝á Ü; Figure
7.7) on the PRC side of Khorgos may be intended to convey largesse.
The most important way in which China supports Kazakhstan via the rail, though, is
through subsidies, which are in effect government grants of transportation services to both
domestic and international customers. Chinese provinces provide significant subsidies to
incentivize shipping from their home turf. Subsidies have declined somewhat from their
peak, but even in the late 2010s there were instances of empty containers being shipped just
so companies could receive the subsidies. There was something of an arms race dynamic
as provinces, particularly those in the West or at rail hubs, competed for shares of a fairly
limited pie. At one point, Shandong province’s subsidy exceeded transportation costs by
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Figure 7.7: Chinese Cultural House (-˝á Ü), Khorgos
Source: Gao Guanzhong [ÿs-] (2018).
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20 percent. This was not necessarily motivated by the central government, although the
goal of developing western China was shared by Beijing. Actors connected to the central
government began to respond. In 2019, China Railway limited empty containers to 10
percent cars per train (Leng, 2019; T. Ma, 2019; SinoTF [-˝8◆—çQ], 2019; Sun
Lichao⇣Y= ⌘, 2019). The story on empty train cars was broken by Chinese inves-
tigative journalists, a rarity in contemporary China and often a sign that the government
wants a problem to be addressed (Sun Lichao⇣Y= ⌘, 2019).
This does not mean, though, that subsidies have gone away. The issue is that the train is
not financially viable in the short term, and even the long term is an open question. While
subsidies for empty cars going to Europe may have been cut back, many cars returning
from Europe are empty simply because of the trade imbalance. This problem is shared
by maritime freight, but maritime freight is much cheaper. Many analysts contend that
cutting subsidies in the short term would have a crippling impact on demand (Farchy, 2016;
Knowler, 2019). In effect, the Chinese central government is enabling local governments
to provide tied grants of freight services to trade partners, Kazakhstan included. The basic
principle behind paying Chinese rail operators to move freight is the same as paying them
to build, for example, a hospital overseas on a grant basis; the difference is that in this
case, a service is being granted instead of a building. The private sector built the physical
infrastructure on its own, but this was not enough to keep the railway financially stable
and consistently operational enough to be of benefit during a crisis. So far, provincial
subsidies have been enough to keep Beijing’s Eurasian “strategic backdoor” running, and
limited subsidies (if not outright wasteful ones) have received the central government’s
tacit blessing. A tougher test of the theory would come if provinces were no longer able to
keep the railway afloat and the central government had to intervene, although this has not
7.2. CHINESE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN PAKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN 467
happened to date.
While the railway to Europe is being propped up by a steady stream of grant financing,
two others have been treated at greater arms-length. First, another trans-Eurasian route
branching southward has received only intermittent Chinese interest and is stalled for the
time being. In 2015, it was announced that a $2.7 billion route would be built between
Khorgos and Aktau, on Kazakhstan’s oil-rich Caspian coast (Farchy, 2016). From Aktau,
freight could be shipped across the Caspian and moved back on to rails on an existing line
connecting transiting Azerbajian, Georgia, and Turkey (Bizhanova, 2018, pp. 62–64). The
logistical costs of transshipment across the Caspian are such that the route is roughly ten
times as expensive as ocean shipping (Markey, 2020, p. 88). The benefit of the route is
that it avoids Russia, and in particular Russian sanctions on European agricultural products
imposed in retaliation for post-Crimea EU sanctions on Russia. Agricultural produce is
a natural area for rail: it is relatively time-sensitive, meaning ocean shipping is not ideal,
but its ratio of value to weight is not always high enough to justify air freight. Whether
refrigerated produce cars can singlehandedly keep the Khorgos-Aktau line afloat is another
question (Shepard, 2017a). Furthermore, major infrastructure works last for decades, and
it is not guaranteed that the current geopolitical situation will last forever. The Khorgos-
Aktau line may eventually be built, but at the very least China has less to gain from it than
from the more efficient overland route through Russia. So, the Chinese central government
has to date watched its provinces funnel resources into one rail line but has mostly ignored
another.42
42I do not discuss rail traffic between China and Iran. China has renewed train service to Iran using
existing infrastructure, mostly along Soviet-era rails. It is possible that these trains are subsidized. Because
they run fairly infrequently and have less immediate upside, they receive less attention than the European
trains. There has been discussion of upgrading related rail infrastructure, but this would have to wait until
American sanctions are lifted. See (Duhalde, Arranz, and M. Hernandez, 2017; Goble, 2020; Xinhua, 2016a).
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Then, an entirely domestic system serving the capital area of Nur-Sultan43 has no imme-
diate geostrategic value to China and exhibits high risk but could both drum up business
for Chinese firms and provide something of value to the Kazakhstani leadership. The Nur-
Sultan Metro has been done using more debt and has run into some of the same problems
as tied loan projects in Ecuador and elsewhere. From the beginning, the project was riskier
than most. The Asian Development Bank opted not to fund it due to financial viability
concerns, but the Kazakhstani leadership stayed with the project in hopes of building it in
time for the Expo 2017 fair in Astana (Asian Development Bank, 2013). The Metro bears
some similarity to Correa’s dams in Ecuador in that its motivations have as much to do with
domestic politics as economic return. China again used risk management tools to enter the
void. In 2015, China Development Bank committed to fund $1.5 billion of the $1.9 billion
project at an interest rate of only 2.5 percent over 20 years (Kumenov, 2019; Satubaldina,
2019; S. Zhang, 2017). This interest rate is highly concessional compared to most CDB
loans but is still more demanding of Kazakhstan than subsidies from Chinese provincial
budgets as are used for the geostrategically important trans-Eurasian rail. On the other
hand, the tied nature of the loan led to a lucrative payday for the builders, a consortium led
by China Railway (S. Zhang, 2017). Low interests rates on a tied loan kept Chinese excess
capacity at work without doing as much to harm relations with Kazakhstan.
President Nur-Sultan Nazarbayev’s unexpected March 2019 resignation presented a shock
to this equilibrium. China Development Bank funds had been routed through the Bank of
Astana, which collapsed. Of the $313 million which CDB had actually disbursed, $258
million were unaccounted for (Gizitdinov, 2019). Much of this clearly came at the expense
of actually completing the project. Workers for one contractor went on strike after not being
43Formerly known as Astana.
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paid for months, despite their employer having only $23,000 in liabilities on the books
(Kumenov, 2019). In August 2019, the city of Nur-Sultan trimmed the budget by $350
million. In October, Nazarbayev’s successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, froze construction
and began an investigation into corruption by city and Metro officials (Vaal, 2019). As
discussed in Chapter 2, the use of debt as political patronage is extremely common in
China and here may have been replicated in an overseas setting with its own history of
patronage. Leadership turnover (and perhaps unsustainable levels of skimming by local
officials) interfered with this relationship. The pressures of repayment also made the issue
more acute than would have been the case for an equity investment or grant, which would
have been better for avoiding what has become an irritant to bilateral relations. Indeed, the
subsidized but geostrategically important trans-Eurasian railway has not generated these
diplomatic problems; nor has the Caspian railway for which loans have not even been
disbursed.
Pipeline Rail, which can transport many different types of goods, was treated as an es-
sentially commercial project through the mid-2000s but obtained greater preferential treat-
ment due partially to geostrategic significance thereafter. Pipelines transporting one type
of good of interest also exhibit discontinuity following the mid-2000s but in a different
way. Pipelines can be very expensive, and China was simply not in a position to involve
itself in the business in the early 2000s while it was using loans to sell smaller volumes
of locomotives and rail cars to Kazakhstan. This changed with growth in China’s finan-
cial resource base and demand for commodities, though. Earlier projects tended to use
third-party financing, but the share of Chinese debt has grown over time. This backs the
quantitative finding that China uses debt to push firms into high-risk projects important to
national interests, with the caveat that the Chinese government’s ability to do so increased
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over time.44 After a brief introduction to the significance of pipelines in Chinese strategy,
I cover this trend chronologically.
Pipelines from Central Asia in particular can contribute to Chinese energy security in two
different ways. The more obvious way has to do with avoiding the Strait of Malacca, as has
been discussed previously in this work. There are also more subtle benefits, though, from
opening new sources of supply.
More important than physical security, however, is the value to Beijing of en-
ergy supply diversification. The more supply options China has, the less vul-
nerable it is to any single source. As China energy expert Erica Downs noted in
her 2015 testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commis-
sion, “China appears to have successfully used the price it pays for Turkmen
gas to drive a hard bargain with Russia for the price of the gas it will import
through the Power of Siberia pipeline.” (Markey, 2020, p. 89)
The Turkmen gas in question is directly relevant here: China’s pipeline from Turkmenistan
transits Kazakhstan, which took on some debt to build the pipeline and earns some tran-
sit fees in return. Indeed, Kazakhstan has played a similar diversification game. Before
China’s arrival, Soviet-era pipelines to Russia and Europe gave Russia a near-monopoly
over Kazakhstan’s exports, with monopoly pricing to match (Coburn, 2010). Kazakhstan
(and several of its neighbors) have used new opportunities to the east to negotiate better
deals to the west.
Interest in doing so materialized fairly quickly after Kazakhstani independence, but actual
construction (and fundraising) took much longer. Talks began in 1997, and construction
of the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline started in 2002 (J. C. K. Daly, 2004; Rakhmetova,
n.d.; Reuters, 2002; Xinhua, 2016b). The pipeline was divided into three phase, which
44In the quantitative model, a time binomial controlled for time-specific effects. Chinese development
finance consistently increased until the financial crisis of the late 2000s and plateaued thereafter.
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were not all funded the same way. The first phase built a stretch of pipeline eastward from
the Caspian production hub of Atyrau. This was a 51-49 joint venture of KazMunayGas
(KMG), the Kazakhstani national energy company, and China National Petroleum Corpo-
ration (CNPC) (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2005). China was
a (large) minority shareholder and contributed little to financing: most of the $190 mil-
lion project’s funding came from $150 million in private eurobond issues (Reuters, 2002).
Indeed, funding was enough of an issue that KMG later restructured via an $81.6 million
loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 2005). Even as funding materially delayed the project,
help came more from Europe than China.
This pattern changed only minimally for the second phase, which in 2004 began to work
westward from the Chinese border at Alashankou. Funding still came from third parties,
in this case $600 million from JP Morgan and $600 million in Eurobonds. The JP Morgan
loan was guaranteed by CNPC, meaning that China was indirectly taking on some financial
risk (Rakhmetova, n.d.). The ownership structure shifted slightly but significantly: the slim
Kazakh majority became an even 50-50 divide for the second phase (Kazakhstan-China
Pipeline, 2019). Majority ownership was reportedly a major sticking point in negotiations
for the first phase, and the extra one percent ownership does give China more say in gover-
nance of the company, if not reliably so in an atmosphere with weak rule of law (J. C. K.
Daly, 2004). As China grew stronger, it was contributing slightly more funding, if only in
an indirect way, and asking for slightly more in the way of financing conditions.
By 2008, China was in a much stronger position to contribute to funding for the third phase
of the pipeline. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the Netherlands’
ING Bank cofinanced a $1.18 billion line of credit for the third, middle phase connecting
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the completed western and eastern stretches. Kazakhstan again opted to later refinance,
but this time, Chinese interests were able to handle the burden themselves. In 2013, ICBC
extended $300 million in credit to refinance the original loan. The refinancing trimmed the
interest rate from six-month LIBOR plus 4 percent to six-month LIBOR plus 3.75 percent.
These rates are not drastically different from those carried by KMG’s commercial paper:
four months prior to the rescheduling, KMG had issued bonds at 4.4 percent interest over
ten years, the same term carried by the original ICBC-ING loan (KazMunaiGas, 2018,
pp. 107–110). Based on LIBOR at that point in time, ICBC’s interest rate dropped from
4.4 percent (the same as the bond yields) to 4.15 percent.45 It may be that China wished to
present a friendlier face than impersonal international markets, that a successful bond issue
gave KMG leverage, or both. Regardless, this episode fits a similar pattern to that seen for
many geostrategically important cases in Pakistan: using debt to encourage firms to take
on projects, but doing so at terms that do not strain relations with the host government.
This reflects the mixed incentives to maintain good relations with geostrategically impor-
tant countries through laxer terms (H3A) but also to use enough risk management tools to
encourage firms to enter (H3B).
As the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline was in its later phases, China began to turn its at-
tention to gas. This in and of itself is a byproduct of China’s growth: wealthier Chinese
citizens and factories both use more (mostly coal-fired) electricity than their predecessors
and are more likely to pressure the government to address the resulting air pollution (Zha,
2010, p. 9). Natural gas is one part of the government’s response but due to limited reserves
at home is largely imported. In October 2008, two months after the loan for the third phase
of the oil pipeline, the China Development Bank lent $7.5 billion for the Kazakhstani phase
45Based on a six-month LIBOR rate of 0.397 at the beginning of August 2013, the month in which the
rescheduling was issued. LIBOR data per Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2020).
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of the China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline, which carries Turkmenistani gas through Uzbek-
istan and Kazakhstan before reaching China. China set up 50-50 joint ventures in each of
the three countries, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan receiving transit fees for gas brought
across their territory from abroad (Cooley, 2015, p. 2; KazMunaiGas, 2018, p. 110. The
50-50 joint venture modality was the same as for the latter two phases of the oil pipeline,
but the funding arrangements were different. This time, a Chinese bank was not sharing the
burden with a private European-based multinational. The use of China Development Bank
is also significant: as a policy bank, it comes with stricter pro-Chinese procurement require-
ments than the commercial bank ICBC. On the other hand, this being a policy bank with
some latitude to lose money, the interest rates were lower, ranging between 2.15 percentage
points to 2.9 percentage points above three-month LIBOR. The “Chinese characteristics”
in Chinese financing were emerging over time: banks risking their own balance sheets in
the name of national interests, but also using tough procurement rules to ensure that firms
do not share their sacrifice.
The most recent pipeline was similar to the China-Central Asia Gas pipeline, with the ex-
ception of taking place entirely within Kazakhstan and using Kazakhstani gas. The Beineu-
Shymkent Gas Pipeline connects Caspian gas fields to existing pipeline infrastructure near
Almaty. In 2012, CDB (again) entered, this time with $1.8 billion in credit to a similar
50-50 joint venture. The interest rates were higher than for the Turkmen pipeline, ranging
between 2.35 and 3.45 percentage points above three-month LIBOR, although this may
simply reflect a longer loan term of sixteen years as opposed to the Turkmen project’s
ten (KazMunaiGas, 2018, p. 110). Interestingly, a 2018 project to expand the completed
pipeline was backed not by China but by the EBRD, for 300 million euros (at that point, US
$357 million) (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2018; Rights in De-
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velopment, 2019). Depending on one’s perspective, this could be either evidence that China
never completely edged out the competition or that its own domestic slowdown and falling
oil prices by the late 2010s limited its propensity to spend on pipeline infrastructure.
This same basic story—rising Chinese influence in the 2000s, and perhaps a dip in activity
in the late 2010s—is even more readily observable in upstream oil and gas production. The
next section addresses this topic.
7.2.2.3 Upstream Oil and Gas
Chapter 3 predicted that there could be two causal mechanisms linking governance and
development finance stringency—1) Chinese demand for stricter risk management tools
in difficult environments; and 2) the ability of financiers to impose terms in higher-risk
markets avoided by most others. The pipeline sector demonstrates the former, as China
used tied loans to counteract governance risk to its firms. The latter, though, is tougher to
observe. Russia was clearly a competitor in that it owned the network of pipelines moving
oil and gas westward, but by dint of geography Russia and China never actively competed
for the same projects. They do compete, however, for production sites, as do some Western
multinationals. This section traces the history of Chinese involvement in the upstream
sector. In the 1990s and early 2000s, China struggled to gain a foothold in Kazakhstani
oil and gas production, frequently losing bids to more established rivals. This began to
change with its deepening pockets in the mid-2000s, and the tables turned completely with
the financial crisis in 2008.
Table 7.4 lists known Chinese investments in Kazakhstan oil and gas production.
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Some basic trends in the data are worth pointing out before proceeding to in-depth case-by-
case analysis. First, equity investment predominates. Despite Kazakhstan’s flawed insti-
tutions, a post-Soviet “gold rush” meant that there was ample competition for its oilfields,
meaning China was never in a position to impose resource-backed loans. There is a rea-
sonably strong parallel with Ecuador before Moreno, where the government had a track
record of reneging on deals but not to the extent that investors began to back out. The
2009 KazMunayGas and MangistauMunaiGas deals were part of a leveraged equity deal in
which CDB simultaneously backed the acquisition of oil assets and unrelated development
projects. This was labeled as a “loan-for-oil” in several press outlets but is not the same
as the actual collateralization arrangements observed in Ecuador and elsewhere (W. Lee,
2009; Xinhua, 2009).
Second, there was a clear uptick in large multi-billion dollar investments following the
2005 acquisition of Canada’s PetroKazakhstan by CNPC. This deal marked a turning point
in China’s ability to keep up with the Russian and Western competition: before this, there
were a series of failed bids for large deals. These “dogs that didn’t bark” are more difficult
to observe and I do not include them in the table, but the known examples are informative
and will be included in the detailed analysis that follows.
China’s first major entry into Kazakhstani oil and gas was the 1997 purchase of 60 per-
cent of Kazakhstan’s fourth-largest producer, Aktobe Munaigaz, by CNPC. This was tied
from the beginning to the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline. China pledged $4.3 billion in
investments over twenty years as well as the assumption of $71 million in debt and a fea-
sibility study for an eastbound pipeline. The debt assumed was small as compared to the
total planned investment but appreciably large next to the $320 million paid up front (Er-
ica Strecker Downs, 2000, pp. 15–16). In 2003, CNPC purchased another 25 percent of the
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company for $150 million, a price clearly not commensurate with the $4.3 billion pledged
for the first 60 percent. Indeed, CNPC itself originally valued the second deal at $600 mil-
lion. It later emerged that in addition to the $150 million sale price, roughly $165 million of
CNPC’s funds found their way to a British Virgin Islands company controlled by the pres-
ident’s son-in-law.46 This is not an exclusive indictment of Chinese business interests—in
another high-profile case, American investors allegedly did something similar—but it does
indicate the risks involved in doing business in Kazakhstan, especially in the immediate
post-communist era (Cooley, 2012, pp. 139–40). In this instance, graft may have played in
China’s favor by deflating the purchase price, but unpredictable officials could just as easily
change their minds and leave CNPC with no legal recourse. As we shall see, this negative
scenario for China did later take place.
Two subsequent Chinese deals were not to happen. In 1997, around the same time as the
successful Aktobe Munaigaz entry, CNPC also bought a stake in the Uzen oilfield, with
$400 million short-term and $900 million long-term in investments planned Erica Strecker
Downs, 2000, p. 16. This deal fell apart for reasons that had little to do with Kazakhstani
governance: American sanctions scuttled a plan to build a pipeline to Iran, and reserves at
the site were not what China had hoped for (Péyrouse, 2007a, pp. 51–52).
A failed 2003 deal, though, had more negative overall ramifications. CNOOC and Sinopec
intended to buy one-twelfth apiece of the enormous Kashagan oilfield from the UK’s BG
Group. Even these modest percentages would have cost $615 million to each firm (China
Daily, 2003). This would have been the largest deal since 1997 but was foiled by a group of
Western shareholders’ exercise of the right of first refusal to allow transfer of the shares. An
angered President Nazarbayev responded by revoking a previously agreed tax exemption
46A detailed accountinng of the complex transaction by which this took place can be found in Cooley
(2012, pp. 140–42).
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but was in no position to do more to drive away the investors, a group of heavyweights made
up of Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, and Eni (Roberts, 2003, p. 95; Cooley, 2012, p. 137). The
Kazakhstani oil and gas sector was only partially operating according to the rule of law,
and the raw balance of power tended to favor the incumbents. Péyrouse (2007a, pp. 47, 52)
sees this as China being locked out of Kazakhstan’s most lucrative project.
Over the course of 2003 and 2004, China did find its way into a series of smaller deals. The
North Buzachi oilfield ($210 million), Big Sky Energy ($160 million), and the Konys and
Bektas oilfields were footholds, albeit much more limited ones than Kashagan would have
been. The Big Sky deal was especially useful in that Houston-based Big Sky had often
worked with Russian firms and could present a bridge for Sinopec to Russian business
interests (Péyrouse, 2007a, p. 55).
Still, a major change of fortunes had to wait until the CNPC’s 2005 purchase for $4.18
billion of Canadian-incorporated PetroKazakhstan. There were elements of both victory
and defeat in this deal. On the plus side, CNPC had secured a major Kazakhstani asset
for the first time in eight years, reportedly outmaneuvering formidable rivals in India’s
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Russia’s Lukoil (Cooley, 2012, p. 137;
T. Miller, 2017, Chapter 2). PetroKazakhstan constituted 12 percent of Kazakhstani oil
production. Its purchase was the biggest overseas deal in Chinese history at that point and
made Kazakhstan CNPC’s second-largest overseas production site, following Sudan. On
the other hand, the unpredictability of the Kazakhstani regime here turned against CNPC
where it had supported them in 1997. Kazakhstan’s legislature threatened to block the deal
and ultimately enforced the transfer of 33 percent of shares back national oil and gas firm
KazMunayGaz. (The original deal had been for CNPC to buy 100 percent of the shares.)
They also forced PetroKazakhstan to sell off its strongest refining asset (Péyrouse, 2007a,
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pp. 53–54; O’Neill, 2014b, p. 152). The deal went through with the required modifications
but led many in the PRC to quietly reassess Kazakhstan’s political risk profile. An investor
guide from the State Taxation Administration of China [˝∂ °;@] (2019, p. 16)
makes a thinly veiled reference to the incident. The Kazakhstani perspective was that the
country needed to preemptively act to ensure that their interests were taken into account, in
particular the transfer of know-how and technology to locals (Orazgaliyev, 2018). While
it is true that Kazakhstan did act before a deal was finalized rather than after the fact,
the law requiring transfer of the shares was passed ad hoc in response to the companies’
announcements, and it is not clear that CNPC or the government in Beijing would have
seen this as an instance of restraint on the part of the Kazakhstani government.
China’s mixed success in buying PetroKazakhstan carried forward into future deals. The
following year, sovereign wealth fund CITIC bought the Kazakhstani assets of another
Canadian firm, Nation’s Energy, for $1.91 billion (American Enterprise Institute, 2019).
In this instance, CITIC gave national oil firm KazMunayGas (KMG) an option to buy half
of the shares plus one, and KMG exercised the option the following year (O’Neill, 2014b,
p. 153). As Orazgaliyev (2018) points out, Kazakhstan had understandable reasons to want
to exert some influence over its own resources and surrounding technology and skills, but
in the absence of stable rule of law, foreign investors could not be sure that the government
would not try to further these goals through extralegal means. O’Neill (2014b) sees giving
Kazakhstan majority ownership of this and many other projects as meant to preemptively
ward off any future encroachment. In effect, political risk was lowering the amount of
space available for equity investment without completely eliminating it. As part of the
deal, CITIC via its subsidiary CITIC Construction agreed to enter into a joint venture with
KMG to contribute to building an asphalt refinery. The $290 million facility was funded
7.2. CHINESE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN PAKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN 481
by $232 million in credit from the Bank of China, a commercial bank which unlike the
policy banks was legally able to loan to a 50-50 Chinese-Kazakhstani joint venture with a
similarly mixed group of construction contractors (Ospanova, 2014; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks,
et al., 2018; KazMunaiGas, 2018, p. 109). Partially Kazakh-owned and Kazakh-built, the
asphalt refinery contributed to national goals of industrial upgrading beyond raw materials.
CITIC’s agreement to build the plant on favorable terms could be seen as similar as its slight
minority partnership in oil production. At the same time, Kazakhstan was able to enforce
these terms at least partially because of the presence of competition: if the CITIC deal had
failed, then the assets would have simply reverted to Canadian ownership. Kazakhstan’s
institutions do create risk for investors and curtailed the volume of capital that CITIC could
contribute, but they are also not so risky that CITIC or others have completely vacated.
This sets Kazakhstan apart from Moreno-era Ecuador or other highly risky countries where
most non-Chinese firms have looked to the exits and China resorts to debt, sometimes with
resource backing.
Following these deals, Chinese firms owned somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 to 50
percent of Kazakhstani oil production.47 Having accomplished much in a short time, Chi-
nese firms rested and consolidated their gains until an opportunity came with the 2008
financial crisis, which sent oil prices and most multinational oil investment downwards (T.
Miller, 2017, Chapter 2). Three post-crisis deals illustrate variation in how Chinese firms
were able to fill the void. To be specific, large state-owned firms with better access to
capital were able to make use of debt, while a private Chinese firm—the first to appear in
this narrative—had less such access. The private firm illustrates what could happen in the
absence of the major state support which enables giants like CNPC to continue to expand
47The exact number is publicly understated because of political sensitivities (Cooley, 2012, p. 92).
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during downturns.
The private firm came first. In December 2008, as oil prices approached what was to the
bottom of a months-long tailspin, Xinjiang Guanghui bought 49 percent of Kazakhstan’s
state-owned Tarbagatay Munay for 250 million RMB, or US $40.5 million. Tarbagatay
Munay owns both oil and gas assets associated with the Zaysan oilfield (China Knowledge,
2009). As for the immediate previous deals, Kazakhstani interests maintained a narrow
majority. The deal remained much smaller, though, indicating the private sector’s much-
diminished status in the state-dominated Chinese oil sector. The deal’s denomination in
renminbi may suggest less access to foreign exchange, a scarce commodity given China’s
capital controls. Xinjiang Guanghui in 2014 became the first private Chinese firm to receive
an import license (Du, 2014). Guanghui also built a liquefied natural gas plant across
the border in its home province of Xinjiang. Details of the plant reveal a similar lack of
funding or economies of scale relative to the state-owned competition. Instead of a pipeline,
Guanghui uses trucks to transport gas from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang. Tarbagatay Munay has
also taken a 10 percent stake in the Xinjiang plant and the option to buy 14.9 percent more
at $37.5 million (Reuters, 2008a). Kazakhstani capital moving into China has not been
observed in the state-owned sector, where foreign participation is limited and access to
bank credit makes it unnecessary. It is also worth noting that Xinjiang Guanghui is not a
small firm. In addition to being the first Chinese private firm to win an oil import license,
it is also one of the province’s largest companies, holding a market capitalization of $2.49
billion48 and even sponsoring Urumqi’s Chinese Basketball Association team.49 Still, its
position in China’s state-centric, bank-centric domestic political economy meant that it had
4817.799 billion renminbi as of May 28, 2020. See Yahoo! Finance (2020).
49Xinjiang Guanghui made a second purchase of Kazakhstani upstream assets in 2012, but it folded in
2018 due to lower-than-expected oil quality (Tao Ziwei [vPá], 2018).
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less access to some of the risk-management tools used by state firms.
The state-owned sector, on the other hand, was able to make use of access to capital to
push much larger deals. Sovereign wealth fund CITIC in 2009 succeeded where CNOOC
and Sinopec had failed in 2003—it bought 11 percent of the Kashagan oilfield for $940
million (O’Neill, 2014b, p. 153; American Enterprise Institute, 2019). This is a more
favorable deal for China than the roughly $1.2 billion offered by CNOOC and Sinopec
in 2003 for a larger percentage (12.5 percent) of the asset. This deal was kept relatively
quiet at the time but apparently was not blocked by any of the other shareholders. An even
larger and more illustrative package deal came in April 2009. This time, $10 billion in debt
was involved. Of this, $5 billion was a loan from CNPC to KazMunayGas (KMG). This
portion of the deal financed CNPC’s purchase of 50 percent of KazMunayGas, which then
used $1.3 billion of the proceeds to establish a $2.6 billion joint venture with CNPC to
buy out MangistauMunayGas (MMG). In keeping with precedent, KMG held a one-share
majority of the MMG joint venture. Then, the other half of the $10 billion in financing was
a loan from China Development Bank to Kazakhstan Development Bank (Cooley, 2012,
p. 92; O’Neill, 2014b, pp. 151–53). It is still unclear what this credit was used for. As one
person interviewed by O’Neill (2014b, p. 153), put it, “Who knows where that money is
going?”
It is not clear how many other actors would have had the access to capital or the risk ap-
petite to buy out almost half of a national oil company during a downturn and provide
billions in no-strings-attached credit to boot. Indonesia’s Central Asia Petroleum, whose
shares in MMG were bought out, certainly did not. The heft of the deal bears comparison
with oil-backed packages like those in Ecuador, although there are crucial differences. The
Kazakhstan loans were part of a deal by which a Chinese oil major gained an equity stake
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in upstream operations, but they were not actually collateralized in oil. For the $5 billion to
KMG, the equity stake also means that CNPC is responsible for repaying almost as much
debt as KMG. For the other $5 billion (to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan), the to-
tal lack of clarification of the use of funding gives the appearance more of a blank check
than a strict loan deal. This is a less demanding form of finance than that implemented
in Ecuador. This is partially because while the 2008-2009 recession did dampen investor
enthusiasm in Kazakhstan—Markey (2020, p. 90) sees Russian firms’ retrenchment as par-
ticularly relevant—it did not damage it to the degree that Correa’s policies did for Ecuador.
Kazakhstan could have said no to oil collateralization. Even absent the recession, China
might not have wanted to place undue strain on its relations with Kazakhstan due to its
geostrategic significance. Within the oil and gas sector, China was at that point already us-
ing debt to build the Kazakhstani stretch of the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and could
ill afford to upset the Kazakhstani leadership.
There were several years of calm following the post-recession shopping spree, but another
flurry of deals took place from 2013 to 2015. This time, the Chinese private sector gained
in strength. Private firms still lagged far behind their state-owned peers, but their ability to
make an appreciable impact overseas in their own right is a sign of China’s overall increas-
ing strength vis-à-vis international competitors.50 In 2013, CNPC followed CITIC’s lead
and acquired an 8.3 percent stake in the Kashagan oilfield for $5 billion. ConocoPhillips
was selling its stake, and India’s ONGC had bid. In response, the Kazakhstani government
exercised its right of first refusal, purchased the stake itself, and resold it to CNPC for a
profit (T. Miller, 2017, Chapter 2). This deal followed the pattern established by prede-
50China’s market liberalization largely halted after Xi Jinping’s 2013 inauguration. To the degree that
private firms’ gains were because of domestic reform, it would have been reforms made in prior years, and
even these were limited.
7.2. CHINESE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN PAKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN 485
cessors in that 1) China had deeper pockets than its competitors; and 2) the Kazakhstani
government made sure to receive a cut of the proceeds. Indeed, CNPC’s $5 billion for 8.3
percent of the oilfield exceeds the amount paid by CITIC for 11 percent, although some of
this may have been because oil prices had risen in the interim. Any excess value in the deal
may also have been meant as anti-expropriation carrot to the Kazakhstani leadership similar
to the majority shares preemptively offered to the government in other instances.
The following year, the private firm Geo-Jade Resources made its own entrance by buying
95 percent of Kazakhstan’s Maten Resources for $526 million (American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 2019; Q. Li, 2015). Like Xinjiang Guanghui, Geo-Jade meant to eventually gain an
oil export license. It would be in a position to do so: at some points in time, it has been the
largest listed private oil firm in China (Q. Li, 2015). In 2015, Geo-Jade added another as-
set with $320 million acquisition of 100% of Kazakhstan’s KoZhan (American Enterprise
Institute, 2019; ChinaGoAbroad, 2015). Geo-Jade has upstaged previous private Chinese
investments in Kazakhstan, and even its name indicates some ambition: its Mandarin name,
Zhouji (2E), literally translates to “intercontinental.” This does not mean, though, that the
Chinese private sector has substantially closed the gap with its public competitors. Also in
2015, “Big Three”51 state-owned oil firm Sinopec bought a 50 percent stake in the Caspian
Investment Resources joint venture from Lukoil. This is certainly a sign of the state-owned
financial sector’s strength and possibly a sign of Chinese advance into a void left by strug-
gling Russian firms—this was not long after the invasion of Crimea and Western sanctions
on Russia. Geo-Jade’s investments were also dwarfed by CNPC’s $5 billion purchase, but
they still registered on the map vis-à-vis international competitors, in keeping with China’s
strengthened profile across the board.
51CNPC (PetroChina), CNOOC, and Sinopec collectively control most of China’s oil and gas sector.
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Overall, China’s ability to assert itself in the Kazakhstani upstream oil and gas industry
increased over time with its own wealth and the relative decline of Russian and Western
competitors, but this did not translate into dictating terms as many of the same Chinese
banks and firms did in Ecuador. The competition in Kazakhstan never fully receded, and
upsetting the Kazakhstani leadership with demanding terms might have endangered impor-
tant geostrategic interests. As a result, China generally remained with equity investment,
but at reduced ownership percentages in preemptive deference to the apparent risk of host
government encroachment. Even in the one instance in which debt was involved, it was
used to leverage equity investments in an arrangement in which China held part of the
concerned financial risk and Kazakhstan had a free hand with $5 billion in credit.
While central to the Kazakhstani economy, oil is not the country’s only commodity. The
next section applies a similar analysis to two smaller sectors: uranium and metals.
7.2.2.4 Mining
The uranium and metals sectors differ from oil and gas and from each other in two major
ways: 1) their relative importance to Kazakhstan; and 2) the strength of sector-specific
domestic institutions. I cover each of these two points and how they affect development
finance stringency before going into details of Chinese deals in the uranium and copper
sectors.
Oil and gas are by far more important to the Kazakhstani economy than are uranium or
copper. As of 2017, crude oil constituted 42.9 percent of Kazakhstan’s exports; natural gas,
4.8 percent. Of the largest metals exports copper made up only52 7.7 percent of exports;
ferroalloys, 4.2 percent; and uranium, 3.7 percent (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011). China has
52Includes both copper ore (2.2 percent of total exports) and refined products (5.5 percent).
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been involved in the production of all three of these minerals and has generally imposed
tougher terms there, especially for copper and ferroalloys, than for oil and gas. It may
be that the damage to bilateral relations from these smaller areas of the economy was
simply manageable, while the fallout from tough treatment of critically important oil and
gas investments might not have been.
Any disposition China might have to safeguard its commercial interests via stricter terms,
though, is also contingent on the quality of local institutions, which exhibit important vari-
ation by sector. In uranium, Kazakhstan has a long track record of cooperation with for-
eign firms. Russian and Japanese interests have a particularly strong presence. Canada’s
Cameco and France’s Areva have invested in a mine apiece as well (World Nuclear Associ-
ation, 2020b). There have been controversies—notably, the 2009 buyout of Canada-based
Uranium One, which holds significant assets in Kazakhstan, by Russia’s Rosatom carried
significant geopolitical overtones of a type which might cause investor jitters.53 Still, this
type of risk would not be totally alien to investors in the oil and gas sector or other areas
where Kazakhstan successfully draws foreign investment. Like their fossil fuel counter-
parts, uranium firms have mostly stayed in Kazakhstan, typically as minority or 50 percent
shareholders in joint ventures (World Nuclear Association, 2020b).
Kazakhstan’s metals industry has generally exhibited higher levels of risk. China has been
involved in both the copper and ferrochrome industries, both of which exhibit similar pat-
terns of market centralization under monopolies or oligopolies with weak corporate gover-
nance. For copper, the private company Kazakhmys owns 72 percent of domestic reserves
(Global Business Reports, 2015). Monopolies to begin with generate well-known prob-
53The former head of Kazatomprom was arrested on corruption charges while he was fighting against the
deal. Many outside observers saw him as a political prisoner until his 2020 release (Radio Free Europe /
Radio Liberty, 2020; Sorbello, 2020).
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lems for other market participants, and this particular monopoly is state-connected. For-
mer chairman Vladimir Kim has always held a substantial stake in the company, although
the exact percentage has fluctuated over time and has sometimes been shared with Kaza-
khstan’s sovereign wealth fund. He reportedly enjoys close ties to President Nazarbayev. In
2001, he testified in a Kazakhstani court that he had previously been forced to pay bribes to
Nazarbayev; the following year, he was nevertheless named a member of Nazarbayev’s
party’s political council (Ferreira-Marques, 2012; Global Witness, 2010; MacNamara,
2010). Another controversy emerged when in 2009 it came to light that Kim and CEO
Oleg Novachuk had pledged 9 percent of the company’s total shares against personal loans
(Onstad, 2009; Peaple, 2013). The ferrochrome sector has a similar problem and is largely
controlled by state-owned or state-connected interests. China has done business with the
Eurasia Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC), which in 2013 delisted itself from the
London Stock Exchange while under investigation in the UK for corruption. It was 26 per-
cent owned by Kazakhmys, which sold off its shares to a new group including Kazakhstan’s
sovereign wealth fund (Goodley, 2013; Wilson, 2013).
Foreign investment in the copper and ferrochrome sector has lagged. As recently as 2015,
one trade publication was touting Rio Tinto’s $6 million exploration agreement as a leading
achievement in attracting foreign investment to copper (Global Business Reports, 2015).
The ferrochrome sector overall has done better, but ENRC in particular has not, in no small
part due to corporate governance concerns (Neate, 2011).54 In the presence of high risk and
the absence of many interested parties, China has both the motive and the ability to impose
tougher terms. Given the secondary nature of copper mining to Kazakhstan’s economy, this
would not necessarily affect bilateral relations as much treatment of the oil sector. Before
54See also M. Castro and Aalto (2018).
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looking at individual metals deals, I first look at the uranium sector.
Nuclear In 2007, the state nuclear firm Kazatomprom agreed to invest in two uranium
mines via joint venture. One mine was done via 51-49 joint venture with China Guang-
dong Nuclear, with Kazatomprom holding the larger stake; the other was done with China
National Nuclear with the same percentage stake (World Nuclear Association, 2020b). In
2017, China National Nuclear further agreed to contribute a fuel processing facility, Kaza-
khstan’s first, again using a 51-49 joint venture (A. Chen and Rose, 2015; Markey, 2020,
pp. 89–90). Apart from this, less information is publicly available about these deals, but the
basic fact of equity investment is meaningful. This was not an option in Pakistan, a nuclear
weapons state in which the government maintains tight control over nuclear power, but is
an option in Kazakhstan. The 49 percent arrangements are similar to Chinese engagement
in the oil sector.
Metals Much more information is available about Chinese engagement in the metals sec-
tor, and it is strikingly debt-heavy. Two of the three deals by Chinese interests have directly
involved the private but well-connected giant Kazakhmys. The first was a 2009 loan for
$2.7 billion to open new mines at Boschekul (copper) and Bozymchak (copper and gold)
(Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). The terms were fairly tough. The fifteen-year loan
carried an interest rate of LIBOR plus 4.5 percent—roughly 5.36 percent at that point,
with the likelihood of future increases given the low interest rates of the post-crisis period
(Nurshayeva, 2010; Kaz Minerals, 2020, p. 49).55 This being a China Development Bank
loan, a Chinese firm (China Nonferrous) received the contract to build a concentrator at
Boschekul (China Nonferrous Metal Mining, 2014).
55Based on one-year LIBOR of 0.85906 at the date of the Nurshayeva (2010) article per data from Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2020).
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The following deal broke with precedent and was carried out as a 51-49 joint venture more
similar to those typical of the oil and uranium sectors. In 2010, Jinchuan formed a joint
venture with Kazakmys to develop the Aktogay copper deposit, which like the previous
two was undeveloped (Onstad, 2010). This was much smaller than the debt deal, though:
Jinchuan paid $120 million for its 49 percent share. Still, the deal had a relatively high
debt footprint. China Development Bank supported it with two loans of US $1.34 billion
and RMB $1 billion—approximately US $158 million. The renminbi component was 100
percent tied, placing it above the usual threshold of 70 percent for China Development Bank
loans (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). The interest rates ticked downward from the last
deal, now at LIBOR plus 4.2 percent for the dollar component and at the People’s Bank of
China (PBOC) benchmark for the renminbi component (Kaz Minerals, 2020, p. 49). At the
time, this came out to 5.19 and 5.94 percent, respectively, implying a rise in interest rates
relative to the previous deal for the RMB component but a slight drop for the much larger
USD component.56
The third deal was again entirely debt. In February 2011, China Development Bank lent
$2 billion to ENRC. Of this, $1.6 billion was for iron mining and $400 million for fer-
rochrome. (Kazakhstan domestically processes much of its iron production into steel and
other alloys.) In a sign of the company’s relationship with the state, the money was routed
through Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund (Nurshayeva, 2011). Apart from the risk of
state encroachment, this was a high-risk deal due to factors within the company. There
was a struggle within the board of directors over the continuing influence of the company’s
founders, 1990s-era oligarchs who had technically renounced their positions in the com-
pany but allegedly ruled by proxy. Months after the Chinese loan, the independent directors
56Based on one-year LIBOR of .99313 percent per Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2020) and People’s
Bank of China long-term benchmark of 5.94 percent per People’s Bank of China [-˝∫⌘ˆL] (2015).
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were kicked off the board (Neate, 2011).
Debt was reserved for a particularly risky sector of Kazakhstan’s political economy in
which tougher terms might be overlooked so long as Kazakhstan’s primary interests in
oil and gas received more favorable treatment. Indeed, even smaller sectors like uranium
were targeted using equity investment so long as risk remained tolerably low. The next
section finds similar patterns across the productive sectors of agriculture, industry, and
finance.
7.2.2.5 Agriculture, Industry, and Finance
Like many developing countries, Kazakhstan hopes to increase its share of value added to
its domestically produced commodities by attracting basic industry. Its relative scarcity
of labor but abundance of raw materials mean that is a natural candidate for heavy indus-
tries such as steel and cement in which China has excess capacity it intends to offshore.
Kazakhstan’s relative abundance of land also presents opportunities for growth in agricul-
ture and agro-processing. A deeper financial sector could improve the prospects of all the
above.
Industrial upgrading has some domestic political significance in Kazakhstan as the end
goal of the Nurly Zhol infrastructure drive beginning in 2014. So, Chinese activity in
industrial sectors could be seen as an exercise in bilateral relationship-building, albeit of
a different type from the more elite-focused oil industry. This section looks at differences
between productive-sector projects and finds familiar patterns based on governance risk.
The presence of Kazakhstani state-connected groups like ENRC is correlated with a higher
debt burden to protect against the additional risk, but recipient-friendly equity tends to
prevail elsewhere. Table 7.5 lists known projects to date.
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Several projects involve processing industrial raw materials, but there are substantial intra-
sector differences. A pair of metal processing plants involving ERNC both received the
familiar modality of tied loans from Exim. These fit the pattern established by loans to
ENRC in the ore extraction sector in the previous section. A pair of cement plants and a
fertilizer factory, on the other hand, did not involve higher-risk state-connected firms and
were done with fewer risk management tools in hand. One was built for French investor
Vicat in partnership with Kazakhstan’s Kazkommerts and IFC. The same logic from the
IFC-sponsored projects in Pakistan applies: the World Bank Group’s participation implies
a high degree of vetting and oversight which was able to draw in a consortium of private
banks and reassure China National Building Materials that it would be paid for its services.
Another cement plant is actually 70 percent owned by China’s Gezhouba, which thus holds
70 percent of debt from ICBC and associated risk. A potash mine and attached fertilizer
plant were debt-backed, but the actors involved imply greater confidence in their financial
prospects. As a commercial bank, ICBC is mandated to have a lower risk tolerance than
Exim did for its ENRC deals. Builder CITIC Construction is also associated with China’s
sovereign wealth fund and may have less latitude to lose money.
Projects in agriculture and finance tended to have more in common with this latter group.
Sovereign wealth fund CITIC and import-export holding company China Cloud Copper
have both invested in joint ventures with Kazakhstani interests in beef and feedstock, re-
spectively. The agricultural sector has not often been stricken by the same kind of graft
which afflicts many mineral commodities, and the Chinese investors may have seen this as
lower-risk than the ENRC metals projects. CITIC has also bought a majority (50.1 per-
cent) stake in the private Altyn Bank; China Tobacco, a state monopoly which sometimes
functions as a de facto holding company, owns another 9.9 percent, with the remaining 40
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percent belonging to local Halyk Bank. CITIC’s chairwoman of the board told reporters
that plans for the bank are to “serve more than 300 Chinese companies already working
in the former Soviet republic and would also develop private banking services for wealthy
citizens in Kazakhstan” (Auyezov, 2018). Given CITIC’s own investments in Kazakhstan,
there is a ready base of customers, as well as many unrelated projects which might need
funding. Of course, there is also a diplomatic component here: the chairwoman empha-
sized to the press that “Kazakhstan is the first stop along the Belt and Road” (Auyezov,
2018).
In another deal with more market implications and less downside risk for the host country,
the Shanghai Stock Exchange has taken a 25 percent stake in the new Astana International
Exchange. The Silk Road Fund owns another 5 percent. This is not, however, a closed,
purely Chinese venture: Goldman Sachs has also taken a 4.1 percent stake, and the relevant
technology is being provided by NASDAQ (Seisembayeva, 2017). The nature of a stock
exchange is that it is open to local participation; after all, large Chinese firms have ample
access to their domestic markets.57
7.2.2.6 Aid, Diplomacy, and Geostrategic Interests
A small amount of funds went to projects related to border security. China donated one
million yuan (2002) and $396,000 (2006) in equipment to the Kazakhstani border police
(Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). This confirms the theoretical expectation that border
security concerns would encourage less demanding types of financing like grants. Then,
57The future of China’s contribution to the productive sector is somewhat up in the air. A list of fifty-
five projects has been pledged since 2016, but as of January 2019, only four had been implemented. These
projects often move slowly and it remains to be seen how many of them will happen, especially in light of a
slowing economy. See Medeubaeva (2019) for the original list with notes in English and Bitabarova (2018)
for analysis of how the projects have unfolded in practice.
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in 2019, China funded upgrades to Kazakhstan’s border checkpoints with both China and
Uzbekistan using a two billion yuan ($280 million)58 Exim loan. While this was debt, it
was not very demanding: an interest rate of two percent repaid over twenty years indicates
the intent to aid Kazakhstan more than to make money (Levina, 2019).
The most striking thing about these projects is their scarcity, at least relative to Pakistan,
where China at one point offered $400 million in grants at once and has built networks
of security cameras in multiple cities. Pakistan’s much more serious terrorism problem is
reflected both in the content of Chinese development finance and its terms: the types of
very low-interest loans made for security-focused projects are not as often seen in Kaza-
khstan.
7.2.2.7 Conclusion: Kazakhstan
Two trends are readily on display in Kazakhstan. First, China’s ability to use development
finance to achieve its foreign policy goals increased significantly over time, especially rela-
tive to a shrinking Russian economic footprint and stagnant Western investment following
the financial crisis. Second, the terms at which China began to assert itself were highly
uneven based on sector and political risk. Projects like the transcontinental highway are
undoubtedly in China’s interests, but World Bank, ADB, and other funding abrogated the
need for China to be involved beyond a few of its companies winning a handful of related
construction contracts. Where China did get involved in internationally popular projects
like oil production, it was on terms favorable to the Kazakhstani leadership. Debt was re-
served for exceptionally high-risk items like those involving state-connected mining com-
panies with checkered track records.
58As of June 1, 2020.
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7.3 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the interactive relationship between geopolitical interest, po-
litical risk, and Chinese development finance terms. All else equal, H3A held that geostrate-
gically interests would be correlated with laxer treatment, with H3B’s caveat that this re-
lationship can weaken or reverse as political risk increases. Both Pakistan and Kazaksh-
tan are relatively high-risk, albeit with substantial variation across sectors, but the relative
weight of geostrategic and commercial interests is not the same. Kazakhstan’s lucrative
mineral reserves and relatively affluent market make it a more natural partner for China’s
construction and energy firms. Pakistan has less to draw these firms, but threats to overland
navigation and even to China’s own internal security are much more real there. The exact
terms of geostrategically important projects varied in response. In Kazakhstan, China was
relatively hands-off: an important highway was funded by major multilateral development
banks with only low levels of Chinese participation, and a railway was built by the private
sector but subsidized by Chinese provinces. In Pakistan, major multilaterals and private
investors were less forthcoming. The higher-risk portion of the Karakoram Highway was
built using Exim loans, and the critically important Gwadar complex was built using a
combination of loans and, after generous treatment of distressed debt, grants. Gwadar in
particular shows the lengths that Chinese development financiers are able to go to when 1)
a project is deemed to be in the national interest; and 2) others are not filling the need. Pak-
istan also received many more grants and highly concessional loans to refugee resettlement
and law enforcement, whereas this was only a minor part of the story in Kazakhstan.
This chapter and the three before it have covered China’s basic tools of development fi-
nance, ranging from grants and zero-interest loans for small aid projects to blockbuster
billion-dollar commodity-secured deals. This leaves one last secondary issue: what to do
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with more demanding loan deals when borrowers encounter trouble repaying. The next
chapter establishes a secondary hierarchy of more and less concessional financing tools for
the special case of distressed debt and finds relationships with the independent variables
that broadly parallel those for the initial inflow of capital.
7.4 Appendix



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The previous four chapters covered how China goes about financing projects from the out-
set, but the story does not always end here. There is always some risk that borrowers will
run into trouble repaying their debts, and this risk is elevated for large projects in develop-
ing countries. When borrowers fall behind on payments, China faces a second iteration of
the tradeoff between being as understanding as possible and maintaining warm relations or
being more demanding and securing its commercial interests. On one end of the spectrum
is outright forgiveness of debt; this is akin to grants in China’s initial decision tree. The
second most concessional way of handling debt would be restructuring or rescheduling,
meaning some combination of extending the payback period and/or breaking the debt up
into smaller individual payments. Third are debt-equity swaps, meaning that China either
forgives or assumes responsibility for debts in exchange for an equity stake. This is similar
to equity investment itself, which was an intermediate option between more demanding
debt and less demanding aid. Debt-equity swaps are not costless to the recipient, but they
do reduce debt burdens and thus the immediate economic impact of a financial crisis. The
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toughest of China’s measures then, is to hold out and demand repayment in full, potentially
subjecting the borrower to immediate economic pain.
I address the secondary decision regarding distressed debt using a structure similar to that
with which previous chapters addressed the decision to issue development finance to begin
with. Following a brief section on data and methods, I break down cases of debt renegoti-
ation by the independent variables involved. These are, in the order presented: 1) general
diplomatic interests;1 2) territorial disputes; 3) geostrategic interests; and 4) commercial
interests.
8.1 Data and Methods
Of the outcomes of interest in this chapter, China’s treatment of distressed debt is the most
difficult to analyze quantitatively. Most loans are repaid without any ado. This means that
the universe of cases is fairly small—Kratz, A. Feng, and Wright (2019) found only forty
instances of renegotiation between January 2001 and April 2019. These renegotiations
can result in a spectrum of outcomes ranging from forgiveness to demanding repayment
in full, each of which constitutes an even smaller set of observations. Only two debt-
equity swaps have taken place to date. The small sample size also adversely affects the
ability to test some of the independent variables because of selection effects—countries
bordering China, for example, have been disproportionately less likely to need debt relief
than those in Africa or the Pacific, and countries at strategic chokepoints have also done
well economically. Finally, the missing data problem is more acute for distressed debt, as
1While this was second in the order of analysis for the other chapters, it comes first here because it is to
some degree present in all cases but generally comes to the forefront in the absence of more pressing interests.
So, I treat cases without any broader geostrategic or commercial significance as a type of “control” for those
in which China has deeper interests.
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both China and many borrower countries prefer to keep negotiations behind closed doors
and avoid bad press. Kratz, A. Feng, and Wright (2019) caution that their data is likely
missing several debt renegotiations for this reason, so we should take the results of this
section with a larger grain of salt than for other sections of this chapter.
To deal with these issues, I use a more in-depth, qualitatively oriented analysis of combined
data from Kratz, A. Feng, and Wright (2019), who list all known Chinese debt renegoti-
ations between 2001 and their publication in April 2019, and Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.
(2018), whose data covers the years 2000-2014. The Kratz, A. Feng, and Wright (2019)
data provides more detail as to what happened in each individual case, meaning that the
sample set is divided between a series of outcomes (“write-offs,” “deferment,” “reschedul-
ing,” “asset seizure,” etc.). It should be cautioned that the Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.
(2018) and Kratz, A. Feng, and Wright (2019) datasets cover substantively different sets
of cases. Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018) include only forgiveness and rescheduling
and rely more on press or official announcements. Kratz, A. Feng, and Wright (2019), on
the other hand, looked for further verification and thus included many fewer items of for-
giveness or rescheduling, but also expanded the sample to include stricter handling of debt
renegotiation such as not restructuring debt at all. I include both sets of data, but readers
should be aware of the differences.
8.2 Results and Analysis
The analysis in this section divides the sample by independent variables of interest. One
section looks at cases in which the Taiwan and South China Sea disputes are involved;
another, geostrategically important countries; another, on commercial interests with a par-
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ticular focus on resource-backed loans in distress. General diplomatic motives are always
present to a certain extent in China’s calculations, but may or may not compete with other
priorities depending on the country. So, I create a residual category of countries which
are not coded as important for any of the other variables of interest in the expectation that
general diplomatic interests will prevail here. This residual category also provides a base-
line for expectations of Chinese behavior before other national interests enter the picture;
e.g., the theory would predict diplomatic interests to lead to more debt forgiveness, but this
could be counteracted where substantial commercial interests are present. So, I look first
at 1) the basic, diplomacy-only cases (H2) before proceeding to territorial disputes (H1),
geostrategic interests (H3) and finally commercial interests (H4). This is obviously distinct
from the order of presentation in the hypotheses but makes sense in this instance.
8.2.1 General Diplomatic Interests
The theory would predict all else equal, diplomatic interests will lead to more forgiving
treatment of distressed debt. The data on debt renegotiations absent other Chinese interests
back this prediction.
Table 8.1 summarizes cases for which no interests other than diplomacy were identified
in comparison with the rest of the sample set. The “Diplomacy Only” group is a residual
category of the states remaining once we exclude those home to “Other Interests.” Namely,
the “Diplomacy Only” category excludes states which recognize Taiwan; are members of
ASEAN; border China; are located at maritime chokepoints; are located along Belt and
Road routes; or have received resource-backed loans. The differences between the two
parts of the sample set are stark. The residual “diplomacy only” category skews lower-
income than the countries with geostrategic importance, resource security implications, or
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Table 8.1: Borrower Countries Which Have Renegotiated Chinese Debt
Diplomacy Only Other Interests
Low Income 44.4% (16) 25.9% (7)
Lower Middle 25.0% (9) 55.6% (15)
Upper Middle 27.8% (10) 18.5% (5)
High Income 2.8% (1) 0.0% (0)
Africa 69.4% (25) 44.4% (12)
Forgiveness 91.7% (33) 66.7% (18)
Deferment / Restructuring 13.9% (5) 44.4% (12)
Debt-Equity Swap 0.0% (0) 7.4% (2)
Moratorium 0.0% (0) 11.1% (3)
Ongoing negotiations 5.6% (2) 14.8% (4)
Total 100.0% (36) 100.0% (27)
Income classifications per World Bank as of 2018.
Columns may not add to 100% where countries received different types of
distressed debt treatment in different instances.
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importance for China’s territorial disputes. It also is much more African. Home to fifty-
four United Nations General Assembly votes and many sympathetic governments, Africa
has played a disproportionate role in China’s diplomatic outreach and is the region of the
world with the greatest need for debt relief.
Based on these characteristics, the theory would predict that the “diplomacy only” coun-
tries will receive more favorable treatment, and this is indeed the case. Thirty-three of
the thirty-six (91.7 percent) received at least some debt forgiveness; only five were asked
to defer or reschedule loans, and none faced moratoriums on new lending or debt-equity
swaps. Forgiveness was also the most common outcome where China had other interests,
but occurred in “only” two-thirds of countries as opposed to over ninety percent. Instead,
tougher loan repayment treatments become much more common when diplomacy is only
one of multiple Chinese interests.
Of course, it was predicted that countries with significance for China’s territorial disputes
or with geostrategic importance would also receive more favorable treatment. Where com-
mercial interests prevail, on the other hand, the theory predicts tougher treatment. The
remaining subsections in this section address these theoretical predictions.
8.2.2 Territorial Disputes: Taiwan and the South China Sea
Because China loans less money to South China Sea disputants and almost none to coun-
tries which recognize Taiwan, there are relatively few instances in which we can test theo-
retical predictions for the relationship between debt renegotiation outcomes and territorial
disputes, but the little empirical evidence that exists supports the theory. With respect to
the Taiwan issue, countries which recognize Taiwan are only going to receive debt relief
from mainland China if they received loans from China, which typically means they previ-
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ously recognized Beijing. This has happened three times: in Nauru (2002), Senegal (2006),
and Chad (2007). In 2002, Nauru briefly switched recognition from Beijing to Taipei, but
reverted to recognizing Beijing after less than two weeks as a domestic political struggle
resolved itself in mainland China’s favor. During this period, there was a predictable uptick
in both Taiwanese and mainland aid to the small island country. As part of a larger aid pack-
age, China agreed to write off $77 million in Nauruan debt. This included not only loans
owed to China, but much more unusually also included Chinese assumption of responsi-
bility for Nauruan debt owed to General Electric (Chu, 2002; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.,
2018). Less information is publicly available on the case of Senegal, which recognized
Beijing from 1971 to 1999 and Taipei from 1999 to 2005. It is known, however, that China
forgave roughly $18.5M in Senegal’s debt in 2006, immediately after Senegal switched
recognition to Beijing (BBC News, 2005; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018; Shinn and
Eisenman, 2012). A similar story played out in Chad, which recognized the mainland from
1972 to 1997, Taiwan from 1997 to 2006, and the mainland again since 2006 following an
$80 million package including $33 million in debt forgiveness (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.,
2018). Repeated changes of allegiance between Beijing and Taipei are infrequent enough
that our sample size is limited, but the three known cases do indicate a role for debt forgive-
ness as a concessional tool, often used alongside grants. The observed temporal pattern is
also similar to that observed for grants: no cooperation at all while a country recognizes
Taiwan, but extremely favorable treatment once they switch.2.
The available evidence is more limited for the ASEAN issue. None of the rival South
China Sea claimants have renegotiated any debt with China, at least partially due to a lack
2In all three of these cases, the “Taiwan” variable was coded as zero in the quantitative analysis due to the
fact that the countries recognized China for part of the year in which the deal take place (Nauru) or all of it
(Senegal and Chad).
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of borrowing to begin with. Three non-disputant ASEAN members—Cambodia, Laos, and
Myanmar—did receive debt write-offs.
Of the three, Cambodia’s write-offs have the clearest connection to the South China Sea
dispute. Cambodia has been China’s most stalwart defender within ASEAN, in no small
part due to Chinese economic generosity. China wrote off $200 million in Cambodian
debt as Cambodia was hosting the November 2002 ASEAN Summit at which ASEAN and
China agreed to a Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations and People’s Republic of China, 2002; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.,
2018). The Declaration of Conduct was a non-binding document discouraging the use of
force and encouraging peaceful dispute resolution, albeit without any concrete proposal for
how this would be achieved. The dispute remained relatively contained until Chinese policy
began to take a more assertive turn in the late 2000s. In March 2009, a group of Chinese
ships surrounded the USNS Impeccable, an American naval surveillance ship, seventy-five
miles from the Chinese coast and demanded that it leave the area. The location of the
dispute was within China’s vaguely defined claim to the South China Sea, but well outside
China’s maritime territory per international law and custom. The United States began to
send armed escorts alongside future surveillance missions in the area, and at the July 2010
ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the first time
publicly referred to freedom of navigation and peaceful dispute resolution in the Sea as
an American “national interest” (Clinton, 2010; Douglas, 2017). The dispute was clearly
heating up, and few were taking China’s side. In November 2010, China wrote off another
$200 million in Cambodian debt. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled
against many of China’s maritime claims in a lawsuit brought by the Philippines. Several
days later, China announced $600 million in new grants to Cambodia (Sok Khemara, 2016).
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(For reference, China provided $1.04 billion to all countries in the sample set combined in
2014).3 Cambodia kept any mention of the court ruling out of that year’s ASEAN joint
statements. In October 2016, Cambodia was rewarded for its trouble with $59 million in
new loans, $178 million in grants, and the a $90 million debt write-off. China wrote off
more debt to Cambodia than it issued in new loans, and this even before the grants (Wingo,
2019b).
Debt write-offs for Laos and Myanmar, on the other hand, are less clearly connected to the
South China Sea dispute. While Laos has in recent years leaned toward the Chinese posi-
tion, the $45 million write-off mentioned by Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018) occurred
in 2006, when Laos was relatively neutral. Myanmar received write-offs of $72 million
in 2002 and $30 million in 2006, but until 2016 took care to avoid public mention of the
dispute, and when it broke its silence expressed more sympathy for the Philippine position.
Other issue areas were more important to the Laos and Myanmar cases. Unlike Cambodia,
both Laos and Myanmar share borders with China. Transnational crime is a problem in the
region, and the border regions of northern Myanmar have been plagued by insurgencies.
Both are also home to important overland transportation projects. A major railway con-
necting Laos to China’s landlocked Yunnan province is currently under construction and
may eventually connect to ports in Thailand, thus bypassing the contested waters of the
South China Sea (Wingo, 2019a). The Laos railway was in 2006 still only a hypothetical
future prospect, but overland transportation projects in Myanmar were already more ac-
tive (Oraboune, 2008). Myanmar possesses natural gas deposits off its coast in the Bay of
Bengal, and talks regarding a gas pipeline were made public in 2004. An oil pipeline was
later added, and both are now operational. Road upgrades and a new railway are still under
3The most recent year available from Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018).
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consideration. These overland projects do not connect to so lucrative a market as Thailand,
but they are probably better for strategic purposes: unlike the Lao-Thai route, they bypass
the Strait of Malacca completely (Lintner, 2019; Nan Lwin, 2019; Storey, 2006).
Overall, we find evidence that China has used debt forgiveness to reward countries which
move embassies from Taipei to Beijing or which back its stance on the South China Sea.
Evidence for the South China Sea dispute is limited to non-disputants but supportive of the
theory.4 In Laos and Myanmar, geostrategic interests also played much more of a role than
the South China Sea dispute.
8.2.3 Geostrategic Interests
This leads us to the prediction that geostrategic interests will lead to laxer treatment of
distressed debt. The Lao and Myanmar write-offs support this prediction, but they are not
isolated incidents. Testing the other cases is complicated by the fact that some geostrategic
factors tend to overlap one another. Namely, countries in the parts of Belt and Road corri-
dors bordering China experienced more debt distress than those further away, meaning that
there is a high degree of collinearity between border security and transportation corridor
interests. The weight of border security vis-à-vis overland transportation concerns varies
by country, so it is best to disentangle the two factors on a case-by-case basis. Table 8.2
lists all known cases of debt renegotiation in countries that border China, lie along Belt and
Road corridors, or have coastlines along maritime chokepoints. I also include one case,
Vanuatu, which is not coded as geostrategically important per these three criteria but has
4Disputant country Malaysia has bargained down the price of a multi-billion dollar debt-backed rail
project, but Kratz, A. Feng, and Wright (2019) code this as a project renegotiation before construction is
complete rather than a repayment negotiation after the fact. In any event, the price markdown was the result
of Malaysian domestic politics: a new administration threatened to cancel construction due to concerns over
cost and corruption and revived it only with a reduced price tag. This was clearly not part of Beijing’s original
plan.
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security ramifications to be explained in this section.
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Overall, there are many more instances of write-offs than rescheduling, and only one debt-
equity swap. I discuss these outcomes in turn for all countries listed in Table 8.2 except
Sudan, whose debt renegotiations involved oil-backed loans and will be discussed along-
side other resource-backed loans in the “Commercial Interests” subsection.
The write-offs often reflect particular geostrategic interests. Afghanistan is one of the most
obvious examples. China worries about linkages between Afghan militants and Uyghur
separatists in Xinjiang across the short Sino-Afghan border. After the toppling of the Tal-
iban regime by the 2001 American invasion, China had a clear interest in a strong, sta-
ble Afghan government. Canceling Afghanistan’s debts could ease the financial burden
on the new government while building healthy bilateral ties(Eisenman, Heginbotham, and
Mitchell, 2007). Border stability was also a factor in the aforementioned Myanmar case,
and to a lesser extent with respect to managing transnational crime issues along the Lao
border. Countries at maritime chokepoints have also received favorable treatment. Few of
these countries have needed to renegotiate their debts, but Eritrea and Yemen did receive
write-offs. Worth watching is the case of Djibouti, which is currently seeking relief for
debts surrounding a railway, port, and industrial complex abutting China’s only overseas
naval base to date overlooking the Bab-al-Mandeb. Vanuatu is not at a maritime choke-
point, but its location to the east of Australia could provide a window on shipping traffic to
and from a U.S. ally. China’s 2017 write-off of $5M in Vanuatu’s debt came shortly before
press reports of negotiations for a potential Chinese naval installation there (Wroe, 2018).
Subsequent reports have raised the possibility that the island nation could host a facility for
the Chinese space program, many of whose rockets splash down in the Pacific (M. Chan,
2018). Whichever (if either) of these plans actually materializes, debt forgiveness could
play a role in its implementation.
8.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 515
That being said, China did not offer the most generous possible terms to some geostrategic
partners in distress. This tended to happen for very large deals: the only items over $1
billion were all either restructured (Kazakhstan and Mongolia) or converted into equity
(Sri Lanka). Losses of this magnitude may be simply too much to stomach. This reflects
the prediction of Hypothesis 4 that commercial interests will lead to stricter terms.
However, there were also other factors at work. In Kazakhstan, a planned urban railway
project has stalled for a variety of reasons. The bank which housed funds received from
China Development Bank ceased operations in the midst of a nationwide financial panic
spurred by falling oil prices. It has since emerged that many of the funds were not actually
spent on the railway, and the new Kazakh leadership is mounting an investigation for cor-
ruption. China Development Bank has withdrawn from the project rather than risk further
losses (Gizitdinov, 2019; Vaal, 2019). Given this course of events, it is not totally clear that
continuing to back the project would have been a positive for China’s relations with a large
bordering country, and the commercial downside to doing so became extraordinarily clear.
The commercial need for stricter terms won out over the political demand for laxer.
The Kyrgyzstani and Mongolian cases were much less dramatic. China restructured $250,000
in overdue debt as part of a 2002 multilateral agreement between Kyrgyzstan and the Paris
Club, an organization of mostly developed-world creditors. The amount was very small and
part of a deal designed more by other creditors than by China. In 2008, however, China
wrote off approximately $7 million in remaining Kyrgyzstani debt. This write-off came
after trilateral talks between Kyrgyzstan, China, and India (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al.,
2018; World Bank, 2003). In a smaller grouping, China presumably had more room to
maneuver talks to its liking, and as a result has written off much more Kyrgyzstani debt
than it has restructured. This is in keeping with China’s desire to manage bilateral relations
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and economic stability in a bordering Central Asian country.
Mongolia’s debt to China has been restructured twice. In 2002, China postponed repayment
of $903,000 in overdue debt by another ten years. Although not outright forgiveness, a ten-
year delay is very generous, especially given that the earliest of the loans in question dated
back to 1958 (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). In any event, loans totaling less than
$1 million are unlikely to have a significant effect on bilateral relations. A much bigger
issue came with Mongolia’s financial crisis in the mid-2010s, during which it drew on a
bilateral currency swap agreement with the People’s Bank of China, the Chinese central
bank, to bolster its foreign exchange reserves. Like China’s other swap agreements, the
Sino-Mongolian arrangement was renewable every three years by mutual consent but was
set to expire in early 2017. Mongolia might have struggled to repay the money, and Beijing
opted to renew the agreement for another three years. Central banks are not known for
formally writing off debt, but the extension of the agreement did buy Mongolia enough
time to repay the funds, which had to have been appreciated in Ulaanbaatar. This lifeline
did not come free of charge. McDowell (2019) writes that:
[...] prior to receiving the new BSA commitment from China, the Mongolian
Foreign Minister spoke to his Chinese counterpart by phone; in that conversa-
tion he expressed regret that the Dalai Lama had been allowed to visit Mon-
golia the previous year, affirmed that ‘Tibet is part of China’, and noted his
appreciation for China’s financial assistance (Zhang, 2017). While Mongolia’s
capitulation to China may be unrelated to Beijing’s financial assistance, the
timing of this suggests otherwise.
China’s exact configuration of interests in the Mongolian case explains this outcome. Seek-
ing diplomatic support on Tibet’s status is a constant across all of China’s bilateral relation-
ships, but it is particularly salient in Mongolia, a majority-Buddhist country with centuries-
old ties to Tibetan Buddhism and a much more recent history of hosting visits by the Dalai
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Lama. The preservation of financial stability was enough of a carrot for the Mongolian
leadership to break with this tradition (E. Wong, 2016). Mongolia’s location along China’s
border and the Belt and Road’s northernmost corridor could also play a role. However,
China’s neighbor to the north presents drastically fewer security concerns than many to
the west and south. Maintaining macroeconomic stability in an important Belt and Road
component country would be a more logical motivator, although this was obviously never
stated in public and had to be weighed against the desire to recoup the hundreds of millions
which Mongolia reportedly still owed.
China’s hand was forced into taking a tougher stance on the Kazakhstani project, and the
Kyrgyzstani agreement was not particularly tough on the borrower. Mongolia’s debt exten-
sion did come with strings attached, but in a way consistent with the theoretical prediction
that financial generosity can buy diplomatic loyalty. This leaves two last example of an
outcome other than forgiveness: debt-equity swaps. These have only taken place twice to
date, in Tajikistan (2011) and Sri Lanka (2017). Debt-equity swaps are an intermediate
option between laxer terms (e.g., forgiveness) and tougher ones (not writing off the debt at
all), and in both cases, these swaps were a compromise between different sets of Chinese
interests pushing for tougher or laxer treatment.
China and Tajikistan had a territorial dispute dating back to Qing and Russian imperial
expansion and inherited by the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union, but the
end of the Cold War presented an opportunity to put it to rest. In 2011, the Tajikistani par-
liament ratified an agreement settling the dispute under which China would receive 1,000
square kilometers of disputed land—not a trivial sum, but only 5.5% of the disputed total.
In exchange, China wrote off an undisclosed amount of Tajikistani debt reported to be in
the hundreds of millions. Tajikistan received over 90% of the land it claimed and received
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a financial bonus to boot, but China did gain something out of the deal. The portion of
the claim which went to China abuts the Wakhan Corridor, the narrow Afghan-controlled
mountain pass which separates Tajikistan to the north from Pakistan to the south. The
particular strip of land concerned allows China to better police traffic between its territory
and Afghanistan. Furthermore, a Chinese firm has since invested in gold mining in the
ceded territory, and there are may be small uranium deposits there as well (BBC News,
2011; Eurasianet, 2018; Reynolds, 2018). Perhaps most importantly, Chinese troops are
now stationed on the Tajik side of the border and reportedly into the Afghan portion of the
Wakhan Corridor. These troops are well-positioned to manage transit between Afghanistan
and China (International Crisis Group, 2018b; G. Shih, 2019). The Washington Post’s map
(Figure 8.1) highlighting the troops’ location illustrates the point.
The Tajikistani debt-equity swap came about as the result of a tug-of-war between com-
peting Chinese interests. On one hand, China faced an obvious incentive to boost bilateral
relations to improve its own security situation. On the other, possession of a small por-
tion of the disputed land could do even more for its security, and commodity interests also
called for a tougher take on the land dispute. The small part of land that China ultimately
received was surgically targeted at serving these interests while otherwise being as accom-
modating as possible to the Tajikistani parliament, which had understandable jitters about
negotiating an issue of national sovereignty with a much stronger neighbor.5 Negotiating
military access to the Tajik-Afghan border is arguably better for China’s border security
than claiming the full disputed land area ever was, and Beijing’s strategy appears to have
5While border security usually leads to laxer terms, the actual bargaining away of land itself can lead to
the opposite dynamic. This is an uncommon situation for China, although not an unheard of one: China’s
settlement of its border dispute with Pakistan allowed China to keep one strategically important mountain
pass while granting enough to Pakistan to settle the dispute and remove an obstacle to cooperation to counter
India.
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Figure 8.1: Map: the Wakhan Corridor
Source: G. Shih (2019).
paid off.6
The notorious Sri Lankan case followed a similar pattern. Sri Lanka, which sits at the
middle of the critically important shipping lane connecting the Persian Gulf and Europe to
the west to China to the east, has long been the subject of rumors regarding a future Chinese
military base. As a bloody civil war wound down in the 2000s, Sri Lanka’s government was
6Granted, an ample historical track record suggests that stationing troops in Central Asia could backfire
on China by turning it into a target of extremism. This does not appear to have been Beijing’s calculation,
however.
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internationally isolated and in need of reconstruction funds both from the war and from the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. China was one of the few parties willing to overlook its human
rights record and market risk and began to bet big on the island. China’s involvement
extend to a range of different projects, but of particular note where a pair of ports. China
Merchants Port Holdings Company, a part of the major China Merchants conglomerate
group, took a majority equity stake in a new terminal at the port at Colombo, the largest
city, with the backing of a $300 million loan from the Japanese-led multilateral Asian
Development Bank. China Harbour Engineering Company (“China Harbour”), a subsidiary
of the behemoth China Communications Construction Company, took over $1 billion in
loans from China Exim to build a second port in the town of Hambantota, on the island’s
tsunami-ravaged southern coast. Home to only 40,000 people, Hambantota was not an
obvious site for a major investment of any kind. A 2002 feasibility study had labeled the
project non-competitive with the existing Colombo port, but Hambantota just so happened
to be the hometown of then-President Mahinda Rajapaksa. American, Indian, and Japanese
investors reportedly turned down the chance to participate, but China Exim moved in to the
void, backing not just the port but also a nearby airport and cricket stadium. Once built, the
port and airport (predictably) could not draw traffic away from Colombo and quickly ran
into trouble servicing debt payments (Wingo, 2020a).
By 2014, it had become clear that a course correction was necessary. In September of that
year, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Sri Lanka and promised $391 million in new
equity investments in the Hambantota Port by both China Merchants and China Harbour.
This was not a debt-equity swap—the old debt was still on the books—but China real-
ized that Sri Lanka could not afford to borrow more. The entry of China Merchants, the
backer of the Colombo expansion, was also telling: China Merchants was capitalizing on
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China Harbour’s loss-making misstep to gain market share on the island. A much larger
blow to the project, however, came with the January 2015 election of Maithripala Sirisena
to the Sri Lankan presidency. The new administration secured assistance from the IMF,
which wanted the government to cut loss-makers. Having run on an anti-corruption plat-
form, Sirisena saw his predecessor’s loss-making patronage project at Hambantota as an
easy target. The new Sri Lankan government approached the Chinese Embassy with a pro-
posal: erasure of all project-level debts in exchange for Chinese ownership of the port and
airport. China refused; the Chinese Ambassador told the press that such a deal “was not
possible according to China’s laws” (Sunday Times, 2016). Ambassador Yi did not specify
which of “China’s laws” he meant, but any objections were almost certainly to the losses
to Exim and not to the gains to Chinese firms. By October 2016, the parties had found a
way around this issue. The Hambantota port was to be placed under the custody of a joint
venture in which a Chinese investor would take a majority stake. In exchange, the Chinese
investor would assume the port’s remaining debts, meaning that Exim would have claims
on the port’s future profits (were they to materialize). Sri Lanka was given a choice be-
tween China Merchants and China Harbour as the investor and ultimately sided with China
Merchants, which had earned itself a good name with the Colombo port expansion (Wingo,
2020a).
This deal allowed the Sri Lankan government to remove a financial albatross from its shoul-
ders and improve repayment capacity through new investments; China Merchants to edge
its competitor out of Sri Lanka; and China Exim to reduce its losses. Notably absent in this
deal is the Chinese security establishment, which have may have maintained its previously
existing refueling station and gained in the intelligence and sanctions-busting arenas but
lost the larger prospect of permanent naval deployments to Hambantota. The handover deal
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“bars foreign countries from using the port for military purposes unless granted permission
by the government in Colombo” (Abi-Habib, 2018). A warship is an extraordinarily dif-
ficult thing to hide, and Sri Lanka maintains the ability to refuse naval port calls if it so
chooses. That being said, the company tasked with providing security for the port is 53.4
percent owned by a subsidiary of China Merchants–—49.3 percent as part of a publicly
disclosed partnership with the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA), and another 4.1 percent
via a less-publicized equity stake in the SLPA itself (Thorne and Spevack, 2017).7 The
people tasked with preventing, say, contraband bound for Iran or surveillance equipment
from entering the port answer to a major Chinese conglomerate.
While much has been made of China’s “debt trap” as a precursor to a Sri Lankan military
base, the actual course of events has made it clear that no Chinese warships will be refuel-
ing at Hambantota (or anywhere else) without local permission. Equity ownership of a port
may make it easer to conduct intelligence-gathering activities, but not actual naval resup-
ply. From a geostrategic standpoint, it is in China’s interests to be as friendly to Sri Lanka
as possible so as to maximize the odds of naval access. This was the idea behind Xi’s
announced equity investments, which might have (if successful) helped Sri Lanka repay
its debts in the long term while China overlooked missed payments in the near term. The
election of a new president interrupted this plan, however, and China Exim flexed its con-
siderable muscle within the Chinese system to prevent a total loss of its $1.1 billion. The
debt-equity swap kept Exim’s hopes of repayment at least partially alive by transferring
liabilities to the new Chinese owners, and granted the security establishment intelligence
access, if not the more substantive militarized presence it might have liked. In a com-
promise between geostrategic and commercial interests, neither side got all of what they
7The author is thankful to Zach Haver for this point.
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wanted.
China will generally be more understanding toward distressed debt owed by important
geostrategic partners which it would not wish to alienate. In some instances, however, this
imperative must be weighed against commercial interests or against a desire for access to
individual geostrategically important projects. These findings are most immediately rele-
vant for the minority of countries in which China has any appreciable geostrategic interest.
In most states, however, economic considerations will far outweigh geopolitical ones, al-
though general diplomatic goals will still weigh against businesses’ desire to minimize risk
and maximize profits. I now turn to cases in which commercial interests, namely resource
security, come first.
8.2.4 Commercial Interests
In all debt renegotiations, banks will have an interest in minimizing losses. As established
in the previous section, they tend to get their way more often when large amounts of money
are on the table. In this section, I extend this logic to renegotiations of resource-backed
loans. It remains true that the banks will be more willing to hold their noses and take smaller
losses than larger ones, but the issue is here made more urgent by the fact that repayment of
these loans can affect China’s resource security. In this section, I analyze renegotiation of
debt in countries that have received resource-backed loans. The most obvious observable
implication of the theory would be that China will be less likely to write off resource-
backed loans and more likely to find a way to maximize repayment, but there is a second
implication that is more easily observable qualitatively than quantitatively. Many countries
which receive resource-backed loans may also receive more traditional cash-based loans
or equity investment. In these cases, it makes sense for China to be more forgiving with
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respect to repayment of cash loans so that the recipients can reallocate fiscal resources to
commodity production. The two sets of commercial interests involved in resource-backed
loans—construction exports and commodity imports—will demand stricter terms than the
more limited interests involved in cash loans.
Table 8.3 lists recipients of resource-backed loans who have also renegotiated Chinese
debt.8
8I exclude the case of Niger, which received a $25 million write-off in 2001, twelve years before its 2013
$1 billion oil-backed loan.
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Table 8.3 contains a higher proportion of rescheduling and lower proportion of forgiveness
than was observed for countries receiving conventional cash loans. While no resource-
backed loans ended in debt-equity swaps—per the theory’s prediction, this option is typ-
ically reserved for geostrategically important assets—several did end in moratoriums on
future credit pending repayment of older loans. This can be a fairly harsh option and ab-
sent some rescheduling or refinancing of the troubled assets does not appreciably improve
the borrower’s finances.
However, some countries in Table 8.3 did receive favorable treatment. This can be ex-
plained by sorting debt renegotiations in countries which have received resource-backed
loans into two camps. First are renegotiations of older cash-based loans in countries which
also either owe or are considering borrowing resource-backed debt. China has written off
debt in some of these instances, especially where erasing cash debt makes repayment in
commodities easier. Second are negotiations surrounding resource-backed debt proper. In
only one case do these appear to have ended in a write-off; in general, China is very tough
about defending its commodity security interests. I discuss the first group before the sec-
ond.
In four cases, renegotiation of preexisting cash-based debt came around the time of ma-
jor resource-backed loan packages. In three—the Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and
Ethiopia—renegotiations resulted in forgiveness. The Republic of the Congo received
$75M in debt relief in 2001 before a $238M oil-backed loan for a hydroelectric dam which
began construction in 2004. Nigeria received a $2.3M write-off in 2003, around the time
that a pair of power plants backed by $206.3M in loans-for-oil were announced (2002) and
began construction (2005). Finally, in 2007, China wrote off $18.5M in Ethiopian debt;
this came the year after a $500M loan collateralized with proceeds from Ethiopian exports
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to China, most of which at the time came from sesame seeds.9 The theory presents two
possible causal mechanisms behind these cases. First, China’s desire to maximize its re-
source security will lead it be tougher on commodity-backed loans than elsewhere. This
causal mechanism fits the Congolese case better: China functionally commuted $75M in
conventional cash-based debt into oil-backed debt. In Ethiopia and Nigeria, however, debt
forgiveness of a small percentage of the value of the loans would not much matter for the
borrower’s capacity to repay. Here, a second causal mechanism makes more sense: simple
bilateral relations management, possibly to counteract the demands put on the borrowers
by resource collateralization.
The fourth of these cases was Zimbabwe, where China has rescheduled more debt than it
has written off. Between 2004 and 2011, China extended at least $1.17B10 in loans backed
by Zimbabwean tobacco, platinum, and diamonds. The 2000s were boom years for many
African economies, but not for Zimbabwe, which was stricken by mismanagement, reces-
sion, and eventually hyperinflation. China’s early industrial projects in Zimbabwe began
to run into trouble as China was still entering some African markets, and many Chinese
commercial actors’ patience quickly wore thin. In 2003, a pair of loans were restructured.
A floundering Zimbabwean state-linked steel firm had fallen into default on a $42 mil-
lion debt to China Exim, which agreed to reduce the firm’s monthly payments. Another
Exim loan for $18 million to a cement venture was also rescheduled and handed off to the
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa. Exim kept the steel company loan
on its books but was forced to reschedule again in 2010, as the firm was still in default.
It is possible that the 2003 reschedulings were meant to open fiscal space for forthcom-
9Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018); email correspondence with China-Africa specialist, June 2019.
10Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al. (2018) list an additional platinum-backed loan that would bring the total to
$1.66B, but Atkins et al. (2017) do not. I include this item in the “high” resource-backed loan scenario but
not the “low.”
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ing tobacco- and platinum-backed infrastructure projects, but the available facts make this
seem less likely than in the Republic of the Congo, for example. While platinum does
have industrial applications, neither it nor (especially) tobacco are as central to Chinese
resource security as are many other commodities. So, while there was ample incentive to
write off Congolese debts to boost oil production or Ethiopian debts to increase Chinese
food security, there was less such incentive in Zimbabwe. If anything, Zimbabwe’s debt
woes illustrate the risk-management function of resource-backed loans—Chinese lenders
began to demand resource collateralization after having been burned on earlier projects.11
Even in 2015, after the worst of Zimbabwe’s crisis had subsided, China wrote off $40
million in debts coming due only in exchange for Zimbabwe’s promise to use Chinese ren-
minbi as legal tender. During the period of hyperinflation, Zimbabwe had taken to using
international currencies instead of its own, but mostly limited itself to readily convertible
currencies such as the U.S. dollar and South African rand instead of the non-convertible
renminbi. Zimbabwean use of the renminbi not only supported China’s gradual push for
currency internationalization but also meant that Chinese creditors could be repaid in their
own currency rather than relying on Zimbabwe’s woefully shallow foreign currency mar-
kets. China sacrificed a small amount of the credit owed it in order to save the rest (Agence
France-Presse, 2015; Dzirutwe, 2015).
In the Republic of the Congo, debt forgiveness opened space for resource-backed loans;
in Zimbabwe, where China had less pressing commodity interests, resource-backed loans
were used to enter a market already struggling with (unforgiven) debt. In these cases, the
debts being renegotiated were not themselves resource-backed, but this has not been true in
all cases. I now turn to distressed resource-backed loans. In all but two such cases, China
11As Bräutigam (2009) said of China’s post-crisis deals in Zimbabwe, “these were not terribly friendly
agreements” (288-89).
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has opted for a tougher approach to loan repayment. This came via some combination
of two strategies: 1) deferring repayment of the resource-backed loans so as to gain the
same amount of access to commodities stretched over a longer timeframe; or 2) easing the
borrower’s financial strain elsewhere so as to maximize repayment capacity of the more
important resource-backed loans. I begin with the more typical cases of Ukraine, Ecuador,
Angola, and Venezuela, where China has declined to write off any resource-backed loans.
I then move on to Ghana and Sudan, which present exceptions to this trend.
In 2012, China agreed to loan $3B to Ukrainian agricultural investments in exchange for
future wheat shipments. Since the 2008 global food price spike, the Chinese leadership
had been nervous about its domestic agricultural situation and looked abroad for insurance
against another such event. The Ukraine was one partner in this effort, but the loan deal
was not to last for long. Viktor Yanukovych’s government, which had negotiated the deal,
fell from power in 2014, and his successors were lukewarm about the loan deal. Not long
after, Russia’s invasion had a serious effect on state finances. Recognizing the gravity of the
situation, China agreed to defer repayment. Ukraine’s State Food-Grain Corporation has
still struggled with its debt burden—the company’s Chairman of the Board told reporters
that in 2016, profits could only cover 47% of payments due—and China has since sought
international arbitration to recoup its losses (Interfax-Ukraine, 2017; Kratz, A. Feng, and
Wright, 2019; Yan, 2017). Even with the difficulties of Ukraine’s situation, China still
hopes to maximize benefits to its food security.
If Ukraine is a case of the first strategy (deferment of resource-backed loans), Ecuador is
more of a case of the second (refinancing loans other than those backed by resources). The
left-leaning government of Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa relied heavily on Chinese
oil-backed loans to fund an infrastructure push, but the strategy’s limitations became ap-
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parent as oil prices slid during the 2010s. Ecuador for years managed to make payments,
but with minimal room for error: at one point, deals with China claimed over 90% of
Ecuador’s crude output (Schneyer and Medina Mora Pérez, 2013b). As Correa left office
in 2017, however, the situation was becoming increasingly untenable, and his successor,
Lenín Moreno, sought to renegotiate Ecuador’s debts. At the time, it was unclear what
leverage Moreno really had—after all, almost all of Ecuador’s oil deposits had already
been mortgaged, and further oil-backed loans were not a realistic option.12 Nonetheless,
during President Moreno’s December 2018 visit to Beijing, China and Ecuador managed
to reach an understanding. Ecuador borrowed another $969.3 million in conventional cash
loans, $69.3 million of which were given at a highly favorable 2 percent interest earmarked
for reconstruction following a major earthquake. The remaining $900 million were lent at
6.5 percent interest due in six years—not concessional by any conventional measurement,
but still better than Ecuador’s two sovereign bond issues in that year at 7.875 percent inter-
est (ten years) and 10.5 percent (three years). Another $30 million in grants was designated
for the defense budget (Cbonds, 2019; Pipoli, 2018). The $900 million was not designated
for any specific area, although Xinhua’s official Chinese coverage stated that “Xi expects
the two sides to jointly promote cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, production
capacity, agriculture, information technology, new energy and environmental protection”
(Mu, 2018). In other words, the funding was either highly concessional and directed to ar-
eas of specific need (earthquake reconstruction), or at least cheaper than international bond
markets and capable of filling budgetary shortfalls as needed during the worst of Ecuador’s
debt crunch. This would put Ecuador in a better position to commit resources to crude
production and service the oil-backed loans.
12Conversation with China-Latin America specialist, Washington, DC, July 2018.
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In Angola and Venezuela, China opted for a mix of the deferment strategy used in Ukraine
and the refinancing strategy deployed in Ecuador. Both countries were hit by the oil price
slump of the 2010s, although Venezuela much more so.
I start with the Angolan case. In 2014, as Angola’s debt position was growing shakier amid
low oil prices, China extended $2 billion in additional credit to bolster Angolan energy
production toward loan-for-oil repayment (Meidan, 2016, p. 5). This staved off crisis for
a short time, but the more mundane (if significant) impact of falling oil prices was soon
compounded by corruption. In October 2015, it emerged that the Central Commission
for Discipline Inspection was investigating former Sinopec chairman Su Shulin and local
fixer Sam Pa for inflating the price at which Sinopec bought five Angolan oil production
blocks (N. Yu, Huang, and Yanwen Yang, 2015). (Su was later convicted.) Cost inflation in
these equity investments had generated losses for Angola’s national oil company, Sonangol,
leading to further difficulties in repaying loans-for-oil. The 2014 $2 billion package was
not going to be enough, so in December 2015, the China Development Bank forwarded
another $5 billion to Sonangol and renegotiated oil purchasing terms in Angola’s favor.
Chinese refining giant Sinochem also agreed to buy additional crude from Angola (Meidan,
2016, pp. 5–6). The 2015 renegotiation certainly made a difference, but by 2018, Angola
was still in some degree of distress, and China added another $2 billion in credit, some
of which was designated toward repayment of older creditors (Vines, 2018). As of 2017,
Angola supplied 12.5 percent of China’s crude imports, a share exceeded only by Russia
and Saudi Arabia (United Nations, 2018). China, ever preoccupied with resource security,
has been loath to write off any commodity-backed loans, not to mention ones with such
immediate, short-term ramifications. However, a succession large cash infusions toward
repayment of loans combined with restructuring of the original oil repayment agreements
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were enough to allow Angola to repay the full value of the oil debt, albeit at a slower pace
than originally planned.
Venezuela has received more attention than probably any other case of Chinese loans-for-
oil, and for good reason. China has disbursed at least $43.2 billion13 in resource-backed
loans to oil-rich Venezuela, more than to any other country. The Venezuelan government
used the windfalls from the high oil prices of the 2000s to fund major social programs,
and much was lost to corruption as well (Kaplan, 2016). Having already spent most of
this windfall wealth, however, the oil price crash of the 2010s hit Venezuela particularly
hard, none the less because Venezuela’s heavy, tar-like crude is scarcely profitable to refine
at low oil prices. Venezuela’s oil industry has struggled to maintain enough money in
the bank to maintain production, to disastrous effect. Per capita economic output shrank
by roughly half between 2014 and 2018.14 The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees estimates that 4 million of Venezuela’s 31 million citizens had fled as of June
2019.15 Venezuela represents a particularly dramatic test of the theoretical prediction that
resource motives will lead to stricter Chinese treatment of distressed debt. On one hand,
there is a more pressing case for debt relief here than anywhere else. On the other, China’s
commercial stake is larger here than anywhere else.
As in the other cases, China has taken great measures to minimize its losses. As Venezuela’s
downturn began to accelerate in 2014, the China Development Bank (CDB), which handled
most lending there, faced a stark choice. Kaplan and Penfold (2019) write that:
13Author’s own calculation based on methodology outlined in the “Resource-Backed Loan” section of this
chapter.
14The IMF estimates that in 2011 dollars (purchasing power parity), Venezuelan per capita output fell from
$17,040 in 2014 to $9,595 in 2018 (International Monetary Fund, 2019d).
15United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2019). Population of 31 million as of end of 2015 per
World Bank (2018c).
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Without reform, China was walking a delicate financial tightrope in Venezuela.
If Chinese policy banks had cut their financing to Venezuela out of concern
that the country’s historic crisis would jeopardize its debt servicing capacity, a
likely default would have impeded the flow of Venezuela’s oil shipments to the
Middle Kingdom. Chinese policy banks were thus willing to renew tranches
under the original joint development financing scheme (FCCV) to foster debt
repayment, but did not offer Venezuela any new funding facilities. (27-28)
The “joint development financing scheme” was the China-Venezuela Joint Fund (Fondo
Conjunto Chino-Venezolano, “FCCV”), a fund through which CDB’s oil-backed loans were
routed. Faced with the prospect of losing some of the oil it had originally anticipated,
China opted to extend $9B in credit to the FCCV during Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit to Caracas.
Notably, none of the new credit was oil-backed; these were cash loans to roll over $9B
in previous tranches. As Kaplan and Penfold (2019) put it, “China’s policy banks did not
offer any new loan-for-oil deals because they first wanted to recover their oil collateral on
previous bilateral debts before extending any new funds” (28).
The crisis continued to deepen, however, and China had take additional measures. In 2016,
Beijing agreed to a two-year moratorium on principal repayment and rescheduled interest
payments according to a more forgiving timeline (Kaplan and Penfold, 2019, pp. 30–31).
This combination of using cash loans to support resource-backed loans and loosening re-
payment terms was similar to what was concurrently being done in Angola, but under more
difficult circumstances. At the same time, Beijing disbursed $2.2B of the $9B credit line
extended in 2014 with the goal of boosting crude production (Ulmer, 2016). The repay-
ment moratorium and loans toward crude production were clearly not the debt forgiveness
many Venezuelans might have hoped for, but neither were they complete stonewalling that
might have alienated the Venezuelan leadership. Kaplan and Penfold (2019) also situate the
moratorium in the context of China’s broader diplomatic outreach to developing countries
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as a “South-South” partner—not so strict as to make it look like China were abandoning a
friend, but not so lax that it looked China were propping up a regime on which neighboring
Latin American governments were beginning to turn (31).
This basic policy has since continued. Nicolás Maduro returned from a September 2018
visit to Beijing with $5B in new credits; the Venezuelan Minister of Finance told reporters
that the loans could be repaid in either cash or oil (Bloomberg News, 2018). If this is true,
then it is a sign that China is holding out hope that Venezuela’s crisis could bottom out
and oil shipments toward debt repayments could rebound. China is also doubling down on
a series of joint ventures between the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA); state oil companies from China and Venezuela,
respectively. Cash infusions to these joint ventures could boost production and improve
repayment capacity (Ulmer, 2016; Kaplan and Penfold, 2019, pp. 33–34.) CNPC even
boosted its ownership stake in the largest joint venture, Sinovensa, from 40 percent to
49.9 percent, just short of the maximum allowed by Venezuelan law. Sinovensa blends
heavy Venezuelan crude with lighter fuels to create a medium blend suitable for Asian
refineries; the implications for China’s loans-for-oil are fairly clear (Blanchard and Ulmer,
2018; Kaplan and Penfold, 2019, pp. 33–34.) This is not a debt-equity swap per se—the
deal does not immediately erase any debt—but it does aim to use equity investment to
eventually whittle away at Venezuela’s oil obligations. As is true for debt-equity swaps
proper, this option represented a medium between writing off debt—a non-starter given
China’s financial and energy security interests—and not renegotiating at all. Given the
implosion of Venezuela’s economy, it was probably China’s best chance of minimizing its
losses.
Only in the immediate prospect of default on billions in oil-backed loans did China even
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begin to reschedule them or provide cash infusions toward repayment, and this in the midst
of one of the most urgent economic crises in living memory. Contrast this with the series
of write-offs and renegotiations for non-resource-backed projects, and it is clear that China
takes commodity-collateralized repayment particularly seriously. However, there have been
two exceptions: Ghana and Sudan.
First is the relatively simple case of Ghana. The recipient of a planned $3B oil-backed loan
package, Ghana had only received the first of two $1.5B tranches when oil prices collapsed
in 2014 and the Ghanaian leadership began to have doubts about the loan. Ghana did not
renegotiate the terms of the $1.5B it had already received, but it did opt not to borrow the
second half. This was Ghana’s decision and does not represent any intent on the part of
China, although China might have been spared the headache of debt renegotiation in the
long run (T. Chen, 2016).
The only true example of a resource-backed loan write-off, then, may have taken place
in Sudan. Between 2004 and 2009, China put $1.45B in oil-backed loans into various
Sudanese infrastructure projects. Under international sanctions due to human rights abuses
and the Darfur crisis, the Sudanese government had little access to capital and posed a
relatively high credit risk. In 2001, China wrote off $40.1M in Sudanese cash-based debt,
or over half of the owed to China at that point. Another $70M was written off on February
2, 2007; two days later, Exim agreed to back a new gas-fired power plant with an oil-backed
loan to the tune of $518M. While the lack of transparency surrounding these deals means
that it is not immediately apparent whether the debt written off in 2007 was cash or oil-
based, the evidence would point to cash: cash loans through 2006 amounted to $1.75B, as
opposed to $94M in loans-for-oil. Then, in 2010, China wrote off a $5.9M zero-interest
loan dating back to 1995 (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, et al., 2018). This situation was essentially
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similar to what happened in the Republic of the Congo, where write-offs of cash debt
cleared the way for oil-backed loans.
The loans-for-oil scheme took a serious hit in 2011, however, with the independence of
South Sudan. Most of Sudan’s oil deposits had been in the South, and its capacity to repay
oil loans was seriously compromised. Sudan attempted to make due by renegotiating transit
fees for oil passing from landlocked South Sudan to the (North) Sudanese coast, but this
was still only a fraction of the revenue necessary to service the loans. In January 2012,
the transit fee dispute led South Sudan to shut down crude production, and an ensuing
armed conflict further damaged output (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019).
The following month, China granted Sudan a five-year delay in repayment. It was clear
that Sudan could no longer meet the volume of crude production originally expected, but
Beijing was holding out hope that the debt could be slowly whittled down, anyway. Beijing
promised further forgiveness if peace could be reached in (North) Sudan’s southern regions;
in other words, a peace settlement that increased oil production might be worth forgiving
cash-based debt (Reuters, 2012; Sudan Tribune, 2012). A peace settlement did come by
the end of the year, but this only partially mitigated the reality that Sudan had lost most
of its oil. In 2014, an official at the Sudanese Ministry of Finance announced that the
loans were being commuted to a “more convenient timeline,” although further details were
not forthcoming (Sudan Tribune, 2014). By 2017, Sudan had already missed the five-year
window granted in 2012, and $2B in debt was reportedly still on the books. In 2018, China
announced $88M in grants to Sudan alongside a $160M write-off (Kratz, A. Feng, and
Wright, 2019; Sudan Tribune, 2018). Details are, as usual, sparse, but it is possible that this
write-off was for the oil-backed loans. If so, this would be the only instance in which China
has forgiven a resource-backed loan. Even in the depths of Venezuela’s crisis, there was
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still oil in the ground, and China would be sure that it would be drilled toward repayment.
Only in the Sudanese case did the borrowing government completely lose access to (most
of) its oil.
8.3 Conclusion: Distressed Debt
Distressed debt presents the lender with a second iteration of the initial choice between im-
posing tougher terms to secure one’s own interests and maintaining good will in the recipi-
ent country. In countries where China has few interests other than diplomacy, debt forgive-
ness is the overwhelming favorite. China will be especially understanding to states willing
to move their embassies from Taipei to Beijing, although this happens only occasionally
due to the simple fact that states which recognize Taiwan have rarely borrowed from the
mainland. However, this changes with the introduction of other interests. Resource-backed
loans are almost never written off. This supports the underpinning microfoundation of the
theory (Chapter 3) that interests directly related to financing terms—meaning, financial re-
turn or collateralization thereof—lead to tougher enforcement terms, but those unrelated—
diplomacy, for example—lead to laxer terms. In many bordering states or states with value
to strategic navigational routes, China faced a tug-of-war between these two alternatives.
It could preserve its positive image in borrower capitals, or it could protect the billions of
dollars that were in some cases at stake, but doing both was tricky. Outcomes varied by
country based on the respective weight of geostrategic and commercial interests. In some
instances, China and the partner country were able to work out cleverly crafted solutions
to guarantee China’s specific interests while otherwise remaining friendly to the borrower
country. For example, China relinquished all of its claims on disputed territory with Tajik-
istan except those necessary for border security vis-à-vis Afghanistan and in the process
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wrote much of Tajikistan’s debt, thereby maintaining healthy relations with a partner in a
restive border region. The same goes for the deal with Sri Lanka under which China Exim
was able to simultaneously recoup at some of its losses and lower Sri Lanka’s debt burden
by transferring debts to a Chinese firm, which in turn gained control of the Hambantota-
based competition to its more profitable operations in Colombo.
This tug-of-war between competing interests exists to a certain extent for all states (or
international organizations) engaged in overseas development finance, but this chapter and
those before it have shown that China handles it quite differently from most who have come
before. The next and final chapter summarizes this dissertation’s findings and lays out new
issues which merit further investigation.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This dissertation’s theory is simple at its core but manifests itself in complex ways. All
else equal, diplomatic and geostrategic interests lead to laxer terms as the donor is incen-
tivized to maintain good relations with the borrower. There is an exception if political
risk mandates stricter terms for projects of geostrategic significance that simply need to be
built. Commercial interests, on the other hand, lead to greater financial stringency as the
donor can use terms and conditions to lock down export opportunities for its firms, access
to critical goods, or both. Again, there is an interactive term between resource security and
political risk as tougher terms become more necessary to push commodity firms into the
most difficult business environments.
How these predictions map onto the Chinese case, though, is much more complex. Con-
founding factors include intra-Chinese institutional divides and different subtypes of na-
tional interests within broader categories such as “diplomatic” or “geostrategic.” These
shades of difference are both a source of complexity and a source of variation which was
tested against the theory. In the concluding section, I move beyond the basic hypotheses to
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look in-depth at some of these subtle differences and how they relate to the basic projec-
tions of the theory in ways that would have been difficult to project ex ante. First, I look
at shades of difference within the dependent variable, summarizing findings for individual
types of financing both in isolation and in relation to each other. Second, I look at dif-
ferentiation within the independent variables, turning to topics such as different types of
diplomatic interests or the divide between raw geographic measures of geostrategic impor-
tance and China’s interpretation thereof through the Belt and Road Initiative. Third, I list
potential areas for future research.
9.1 Summary of Findings: The Dependent Variable
This dissertation has arranged China’s numerous financial tools in terms of stringency and
generally found that less stringent tools are better for diplomacy or outreach to geostrategic
partners but that tougher tools can manage risk and lock down commercial interests. How
this works in practice is contingent on China’s history and internal bureaucracy.
9.1.1 Grants and Zero-Interest Loans
The most basic part of China’s overseas development finance bureaucracy is the govern-
ment ministries, especially the Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs, which tra-
ditionally handle grants and zero-interest loans. These aid-like flows were predicted to
be aimed at geostrategic partners or general diplomacy, with the caveat that zero-interest
loans are obviously more stringent than grants and might serve as a negative signal. This
was largely found to be the case, especially for diplomatic variables. Case studies further
revealed slightly different causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. Most obvious
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would be a simple transaction of aid for diplomatic support on a particular issue. This was
certainly the case for Cambodia on the South China Sea, for example, or for Burundi on
several different issues of interest to China. There may also be an element of longer-term
relationship-building independent of any immediate United Nations vote or controversy.
In some instances, aid can carry overtones of ideological affinity. Burundi’s Presidential
Palace, for example, was completed even as many other donors were nervous about trends
toward unrest and repression. This is not always the case—China gives aid to many coun-
tries which are ideologically different from it—but the doctrine of “non-interference” does
continue to carry some weight among governments in which many outsiders might see it
fit to interfere. Highly concessional flows and grants in particular can also be meant to
directly strengthen a partner country. This might happen in a generalized way, as for fi-
nancial support for the regime in Burundi; or in a particular way, as for aid to Pakistan’s
all-important law enforcement and counter-terrorism activities.
9.1.2 Contracts, Loans, and Equity
For larger projects, a greater number of actors enter the picture. Banks are frequently
necessary to source large volumes of capital. Being almost all state-owned, the banks are
often forced to strike a balance between their own interests and the government’s foreign
policy goals. State-owned firms must strike a similar balance, often with help from the
banks.
Perhaps counterintuitively, it is generally a positive for bilateral relations when the govern-
ment does not get directly involved in firm activity. To begin with, debt can be contentious,
especially when bills come due. In China’s case, potential repayment controversies are
magnified by the procurement model. Tied lending means that Chinese firms face no cred-
9.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 543
ible competition and can inflate costs, cut corners on quality, or even engage in corruption
with few consequences. This increases Chinese corporate wealth and can be a positive
for commercial interests, at least in the short term, but can also lead to anti-China back-
lash in the host country. This happened in Ecuador, for example, with a series of faulty
dams. Where the Chinese government is less directly involved, firms face actual incentives
to perform well. Where they do not, they suffer consequences, as happened for Beijing
Construction Engineering Group (BCEG) when it was booted from the Kigali Conven-
tion Centre for substandard work. BCEG’s departure represented a commercial loss for
China but kept Sino-Rwandan relations from deteriorating further; the same is true for
other firms which do not live up to their contracts. Then, even firms acting on a freelance
basis may receive some indirect government support such that the host country receives
an indirect subsidy. Because China’s state-owned construction sector is routinely subsi-
dized with tax breaks and cheap state credit—and because China is a lower-cost country
in general—Chinese firms are typically the bargain of choice for cost-conscious develop-
ing country governments, even when Chinese banks are not putting up money. Heavily
subsidized Huawei and ZTE, then, have become the default options for developing coun-
tries hoping to upgrade their telecommunications infrastructure and in the process have
become visible symbols of Chinese contributions to local growth. In the roads sector, no
less a figure than Paul Kagame has acknowledged the distinction between contractor na-
tionality and funder nationality. Official PRC documents make it clear that Beijing sees
its freelancers as a diplomatic asset. Freelancers can even go to countries which recognize
Taiwan, thereby providing a way around Beijing’s prohibition on official funding to these
governments.
Because of these downsides of loans, they are usually reserved for voids left unfilled
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by contractors, which in turn means areas of higher risk. This was seen both in cross-
national quantitative analysis and within-country, cross-sector case studies. Furthermore,
they are not targeted at all unpopular areas; instead, they go to ones that are of either
geostrategic (H3B) or resource security (H4B) significance. So, loans were used to back
remote, landslide-prone alpine portions of Pakistan’s Karakoram Highway, but local fund-
ing or even the British government handled more workaday projects further south. In the
commodity sector, resource-backed loans—the strictest deals of all—went predominantly
to countries like Ecuador which took measures to decrease investor confidence in previ-
ously established contracts, but not to lower-risk countries like Peru. The contrast between
resource-backed loans and other modes of entry reveals different causal mechanisms behind
the theory. Ecuador received resource-backed loans both because Chinese firms demanded
oil collateralization to handle the fiscal risk of a serial defaulter; and because Ecuador had
little choice but to accept.
Large-n analysis confirmed the risk-management value of tied loans and even greater risk-
management value of tied, resource-backed loans. Smaller-n analysis of details of individ-
ual loan contracts, where publicly known, confirmed this. Useful information came from
both more conventional loan terms such as interest rate and payback period; and unconven-
tional ones like variation in procurement.
Available information on interest rates and payback periods, while incomplete, did where
available support the prediction of interactive effects between political risk and geostrategic
interests (H3B); and political risk and resource security (H4B). For resource security, the
resource-backed components of China’s financing to Ecuador uniformly carried lower in-
terest rates than the cash components, indicating that China Development Bank saw oil col-
lateralization as mitigating their risk profile. What’s more, as Ecuador ran out of oil later in
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its borrowing cycle, the differential in interest rates between oil-backed and non-oil-backed
packages decreased. In other words, the risk-management value of oil collateralization is
proportional to the amount of oil available to be pledged.
This picture is somewhat more complicated for the interaction between political risk and
geostrategic interests. Resource security and political risk both lead to tougher terms,
meaning their effects on development finance tend to be mutually reinforcing. Geostrategic
significance, though, leads to incentives toward laxer terms because the donor must remain
in good enough standing to maintain access to strategic throughways. Where political risk
necessitates debt, this leads to a dilemma: the financier must be tough enough to push firms
into carrying out the project, but not so tough as to upset the host government. A com-
parison of Ecuador and Pakistan proves the point. Ecuador is not a major part of China’s
geostrategic vision, but has significant oil, which was the target of oil-backed loans at high
(6.0-7.5 percent) rates of interest. Pakistan is a major part of China’s geostrategic vision
but has few domestic commodities. So, China did use debt to mitigate the political risk
of doing business in Pakistan, but for geostrategically important projects did so on highly
favorable terms. Roads to China were funded at interest rates around 2 percent, below the
rate of inflation. Some interest and even principal was written off for the all-important
Gwadar complex. The use of tied debt protected Chinese firms operating in Pakistan, but
the banks themselves were operating at a loss, probably at the central government’s behest.
Similar patterns were seen in Kazakhstan, where China subsidized the continued operation
of a trans-Eurasian railway but charged relatively high interest for a commuter rail project
without geostrategic significance.
Then, a second set of less characteristically Chinese risk management tools similarly varied
in response to the independent variables. Namely, a minority of Chinese lending is done
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by commercial banks, which while state-owned act more like private organizations in that
they are expected to turn a profit and operate on more market terms. The same goes for
CITIC, the sovereign wealth fund. CITIC and the commercial banks were more likely
to collaborate with third-country banks and more likely to hire non-Chinese contractors.
These organizations maintain some recipient government control of project operations and
thus represent less of an imposition on them. They also scarcely ran into the issues with
cost inflation, quality control, and corruption associated with the tied procurement model
used by the policy banks, CDB and Exim.1
If freelance contracting is favorable to the recipient and debt is less so, then equity comes
out somewhere in between. Legal ownership does ask something of the host government
but is ultimately less significant than debt payments which can have a much more deleteri-
ous effect on the economy. The large-n results for equity place it in an ambiguous middle
ground—not quite oriented toward diplomacy, but not overwhelmingly commercial either.
In practice, individual equity deals could fall closer to one end of the spectrum or the other.
In some cases, Chinese firms took on substantial financial risk to the host country’s benefit.
This was more likely to happen where projects had broader significance to Chinese foreign
policy goals, such as StarTimes’ investments in African television broadcasting. In other
cases, equity might even be offered in conjunction with some debt to the host government.
This hybrid model was used in cases where there was an incentive for China to stay on
friendly terms with the host government but there was also quite a bit of risk. Some of the
higher-risk power projects in geostrategically important Pakistan fit this pattern, as did the
leveraged buyout of geostrategically important Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGas.
Some variation in equity investment also came from the nature of the firm. The nature of
1There were unfortunately too few commercial bank loans in the data to definitively analyze them quan-
titatively.
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China’s domestic political economy is such that large state-owned firms and a few large,
prominent private firms enjoy preferential access to low-interest state credit, while smaller
provincial or private organizations do not. Overseas, this manifests itself as differences in
the ability to contribute to host country growth. In Kazakhstan, for example, giants like
CNPC spent billions at a time on oilfield assets and built new pipelines to match, while
private firms like Xinjiang Guanghui made smaller deals using trucks as transportation.
The privilege bestowed upon anointed firms within China was effectively transferred to
host governments who benefited from their largesse.2
9.1.3 Distressed Debt
The continuum of development finance stringency makes a second appearance in the event
that borrowers have trouble repaying loans. The best possible outcome for the borrower
would obviously be a write-off. Short of this, restructuring via delaying repayment and/or
breaking the payment stream into smaller installments can provide a next-most favorable
option. In rare instances, China has also substituted equity ownership for debt. Like equity
itself, this is an imposition on the recipient, but not as much of one as leaving debt on the
books and prolonging the borrower’s crisis.
The findings for this section were the same as for China’s initial market entry decision.
Commercial interests were found to lead to tougher terms. Larger packages were less
likely to be written off—or if they were, it was only a small portion of the total volume
due. The most basic commercial interest, repayment itself, was not easily sacrificed in
the absence of other countervailing factors. Resource-backed loans were also almost never
written off. Given China’s long-term structural vulnerability to global commodity price
2Financing information for equity deals is not available in any kind of comprehensive way, but known
cases do fit theoretical predictions.
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shocks, it makes more sense to leave these arrangements in place and simply accept that
they will underperform during periods of low prices and could perhaps regain lost ground
if prices rebound. In some instances—Venezuela is an important one—China also lent
or invested money in commodity production capacity. If these arrangements do indeed
help to repay the initial resource-backed loans, then the new loans constitute a de facto
restructuring whereby resource-backed loans are commuted to regular cash loans. This
is less demanding of the borrower than resource-backed loans themselves but does not
actually sacrifice China’s commodity security interests.
On the opposite end of the spectrum are countries where diplomacy is paramount. Where
resource and geostrategic interests are not at play, China tends to use smaller and more
concessional financing packages to begin with. This means both that commercial inter-
ests are more limited—less loss is associated with write-offs—and that diplomacy is being
emphasized to begin with. It thus comes as no surprise that the balance tips toward debt
forgiveness in these countries, many of which are lower-income and more apt than most
to appreciate the value of write-offs. China displayed even greater leniency where recipi-
ents’ stances on Taiwan or the South China Sea were at play, as happened, for example, in
Cambodia.
Finally, geostrategic variables represent an intermediate. Smaller packages were written
off for similar reasons to the diplomacy-only cases: bilateral relations with these countries
are simply worth more than the repayment of small financing packages. Larger packages
were more likely to be restructured instead. The only two debt-equity swaps in the sample
set also belonged to this category, paralleling the strong attraction of equity investment in
general to geostrategically important countries where China wants to build projects without
burdening recipients with debt.
9.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 549
9.2 Summary of Findings: The Independent Variables
One of the benefits of focusing on one large donor over many different ones is the ability
to study more detailed national interests than be easily replicated cross-nationally. While
perhaps not as distinctive as China’s tools of financing are from those of more established
actors, China’s foreign policy goals were in this work elaborated in greater detail than
can be provided by basic categories such as diplomatic alignment or commercial interests.
This section summarizes the within-category findings of three independent variables: 1)
diplomatic interests; 2) geostrategic interests; and 3) commercial interests.
9.2.1 The Hierarchy of Diplomatic Interests
Cross-national studies frequently use United Nations General Assembly voting patterns as
the basis for measurement of diplomatic alignment or coincidence of interests. This has
the benefit of being easily comparable across all UN members but is limited by the scope
of UN votes, most of which are not particularly relevant to any given country. In China’s
case, we find a hierarchy of interests. The Taiwan issue is consistently the most salient.
While it only applies to the small number of countries which either maintain embassies
in Taipei or might consider switching, it is definitively important in these countries. The
prohibition on extension of official finance to these countries is one of the few iron-clad
rules in a system that does not emphasize the rule of law. The only obvious exceptions
have to do with states which were either in the process of changing recognition or appeared
to be considering it. Beijing sees the Taiwan issue as a matter of domestic sovereignty and
prioritizes it over more “foreign” issues. The notable exception was for freelance contrac-
tors, who because they do not receive project-level finance from the PRC government are
not bound by official development finance rules. These actors are able to extend their role
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as unofficial goodwill ambassadors to states which cannot be reached by their officially
sponsored colleagues.
After the Taiwan issue comes the South China Sea. Beijing also claims most of the features
of the South China Sea, but the generally uninhabited islands pose fewer problems for
China than the public of Taiwan, which has little interest in being part of the PRC. The
South China Sea dispute is thus not so overwhelmingly strong a predictor of Chinese policy
as Taiwan recognition, but it is still fairly substantial.
The role of aid in both the Taiwan and South China Sea issues can be seen in a pattern
contrasting disputants and non-disputants. Countries at odds with Beijing—by maintain-
ing either embassies in Taipei or South China Sea claims overlapping the PRC’s—receive
systematically fewer grants and zero-interest loans. However, looking within Ministry of
Commerce aid flows, disputants receive a higher proportion of grants over zero-interest
loans. These reflects mixed incentives when using aid to change states’ behavior. On one
hand, extending aid could be perceived as tacit acceptance of a state’s position; on the
other, not extending aid does not incentivize any change in behavior. China’s answer is
to generally avoid aid unless a change in policy appears possible, and then to issue it on
as favorable terms as possible so as to demonstrate the benefits of coming to see things
Beijing’s way.
Following the Taiwan and South China Sea issues are a series of smaller issues and general
alignment as operationalized via UNGA voting. UNGA voting was found to be positively
correlated with grants (in some specifications) and freelance contract revenues, but was
generally a less reliable predictor of Chinese activity than the Taiwan or South China Sea
issues. Case study evidence also reveals a more significant role, at least in recent years,
for Xinjiang. Unlike Taiwan or the South China Sea, PRC control over Xinjiang is not
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actively disputed, but a major campaign of repression there has damaged China’s interna-
tional image. This is difficult to measure cross-nationally, not least because it has come to
the forefront only recently,3 but case study evidence shows that it is playing a significant
role. The contrast between Burundi’s and Rwanda’s stances on Xinjiang shows the power
of aid to persuade. In a different way, the specter of instability in Xinjiang has motivated
Chinese aid to Kazakhstan and Pakistan, whose internal dynamics have a (potential) direct
bearing on events on the PRC side of the border.
9.2.2 Geostrategic Interests: Geography vs. the BRI
As discussed in Chapter 2, geostrategic importance is to a certain degree in the eye of the
beholder. All would agree, for example, that the Bosporus is a strategic waterway, but Rus-
sia and Turkey pay more attention to it than do Japan or the United States. In China’s case,
geostrategic interests have been articulated through the Belt and Road Initiative, which lays
out a series of navigational corridors designed to both facilitate commerce and create more
secure alternatives to prone maritime chokepoints.4 Along given geographic corridors of
interest, different countries might or might not be designated as part of the Belt and Road.
Djibouti, where China has a naval base, counts. Yemen, just across the Bab-el-Mandeb,
does not.
These two types of geostrategic significance—the more objective one based on geogra-
phy, or the subjective one based on constructed foreign policy goals—affect development
finance in slightly different ways and based on different causal mechanisms. Raw geog-
3As of this writing, data on many independent variables and some types of Chinese financing is not yet
available for years in which major diplomatic statements were made about Xinjiang.
4Later iterations of the Belt and Road strategy have been more global in scope and expanded beyond the
original Eurasian focus. I instead look more at the Belt and Road in its original, more geopolitically salient
formulation.
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raphy in the form of bordering China or location along a maritime chokepoint was found
to affect the allocation of zero-interest loans, freelance contracts, and equity investments.
In bordering countries, grants are favored over zero-interest loans both to maintain good
relations with neighbors and, as could be seen in the Kazakhstani and Pakistani cases, to
actively build capacity in areas like law enforcement which are important to border secu-
rity. Contractors and equity investors were drawn to maritime chokepoints not just because
the Chinese government might have encouraged this activity but also because countries at
these locations present inherent commercial opportunity.
BRI designation was more important for equity investors and lenders, the latter category
increasing in importance with political risk. Chinese state-owned firms exist in something
of a gray area between their “state-owned” and “firm” identities. Sometimes they act on
their own (profitable maritime chokepoints), and sometimes they might be nudged to act
in state interests (the BRI). State-owned banks, on the other hand, answer more directly to
the government and are used to plug gaps where political risk prevents firms from entering
on their own. In this case, that meant higher-risk components of the Belt and Road. This
could be seen both at the cross-national level via the quantitative results and within coun-
tries; again, banks were brought in to handle only the higher-risk components of Pakistan’s
strategic throughways.
9.2.3 Commercial Interests: Exports, Imports, and Money Itself
Like diplomatic and geostrategic interests, commercial interests are not a monolith. In
China’s case, imports of commodities; manufactured exports, especially in the construc-
tion sector; and project financial value itself are all salient. In practice, exports and fi-
nancial value are highly correlated. Tied procurement means that majorities of contract
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value go to Chinese firms, meaning that the value to be repaid to banks and the value to
accrue to Chinese firms move together in lockstep. The larger the project, the more strin-
gent China is likely to be in locking down its commercial interests. Table 3.8 at the end
of Chapter 3 shows a close relationship between the size of projects and their modality of
financing. Grants are the smallest per project, at less than $10 million per commitment;
zero-interest loans, slightly larger at closer to $30 million per commitment and slightly
more stringent; interest-bearing loans are much larger, averaging in the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars; resource-backed loan packages average above $1 billion. This pattern
made a second appearance in the analysis on distressed debt, which is much more often
written off for smaller, more concessional items.
Chinese export motivations and the value of repayment—via debt repayment or return on
equity—are highly correlated with one another and exist in virtually every deal. So, they
are difficult to disentangle statistically. Resource security, though is not a constant and
presents statistically measurable variation. In the large-n analysis, resource concerns were
found to be positive predictors of equity investment across the board and of loans only in
the presence of high political risk. The correlation with loans was much larger for resource-
backed than for conventional cash-based loans, indicating that resource-backed loans both
offer extra protection to lenders against political risk and additional access to revenues for
commodity firms. In the aggregate, then, the relative weight of equity and debt skews
toward equity in safer commodity-producing markets and toward debt or even resource-
backed debt in riskier ones. Just as debt was used to fill out higher-risk parts of the Belt and
Road, it was also used to enter higher-risk commodity-producing markets. This could be
seen cross-nationally both in the statistical analysis and in the comparison between Ecuador
and Peru. It was also true within-country. Kazakhstan’s metals sector, for example, has a
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dodgy track record of corporate governance and relationship to state actors, and China
involved itself there mostly through debt, but Chinese firms were willing to make large
equity investments in the more established, stable oil and uranium sectors. The inverse was
true in Ecuador, where government impingement on previously agreed-upon oil contracts
necessitated oil-backed loans, even while Chinese firms were making equity investments
in the politically less central copper sector.
9.3 Areas for Future Research
This work has provided a relatively complete accounting of Chinese development finance,
but it is always possible to do more. Indeed, Chinese development finance is a moving
target and continues to rapidly evolve. In this final section, I address four areas that could
be better addressed in future works. First, the two causal mechanisms linking political risk
to stringency—demand for risk management from the lender versus lack of competition
in riskier markets—were both found to be significant in this work but might be better dis-
entangled using specifically focused methodologies. Second, while this dissertation has
focused on the determinants of different types of Chinese development finance, it has only
in passing looked at their effects. Third, Chinese development finance is evolving toward a
more equity-centric, (perhaps) financially sustainable model. How far this trend goes is an
open question but it should certainly shape future research. Fourth, while China’s domes-
tic political economy is unique enough to inhibit perfect comparison, some useful lessons
might be drawn from comparison with other emerging financiers.
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9.3.1 Competitive Dynamics
Competition with other major financiers permeates this work. Ecuador’s resource-backed
loans came about because of the government’s rupture with the Bretton Woods institutions,
bond markets, and (to a certain degree) private oil companies. Peru’s lack of resource-
backed loans, then, was the product of competition between numerous parties. This com-
petitive effect is closely correlated with the financier’s inherent incentive to demand more
protection in riskier markets and is difficult to disentangle, but future work could attempt
to do so. Research so far has focused more on the effect of Chinese financing on West-
ern or Bretton Woods policy, finding that Chinese money does in fact compete in the same
markets as Western bilaterals and leads to weakened policy conditionality and a smaller de-
mocratizing effect thereof (D. Hernandez, 2017; Kilama, 2016; X. Li, 2017). This would
seem to be putting the cart before the horse, though, since the World Bank arrived on the
scene long before China. Urdinez et al. (2016) do find that countries in Latin America
where US influence waned in the 2000s did tend to turn toward China, but many of these
(Venezuela, Ecuador, etc.) also experienced institutional changes which deterred investors,
and this does not necessarily speak to the type of financing extended from China. More
work could be done to fill this gap in knowledge.
9.3.2 The Effects of Chinese Development Finance
Through its focus on development finance stringency, this work did incidentally illustrate
that certain types of financing might be more prone to negative outcomes. Tied procure-
ment, for example, limits competition and enables firms to bypass quality standards or
engage in corruption without any real fear of consequences. Chinese firms’ troubled hy-
dropower deals in Ecuador would be leading examples. Resource-backed loans can also
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multiply a country’s inherent vulnerability to commodity price downturns. Equity invest-
ment, on the other hand, did not exhibit the same tendencies; nor, for the most part, did
non-tied commercial loans. Works such as Russel and Berger (2019) already point to these
differences, and future research should systematically assess them.
With respect to raw economic output, de Soyres (2018), de Soyres, Mubdalic, and Ruta
(2019), and Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, et al. (2014) find a positive effect of Chinese financing
on growth, although de Soyres, Mubdalic, and Ruta (2019) caution that in some cases the
additional output might be outweighed by the cost of infrastructure. This aggregate positive
effect probably masks substantial heterogeneity. Similar work should be done to isolate the
effects of aid, equity, tied loans, and resource-backed loans. This newer work could also
integrate risk analysis, especially given infrastructure’s sensitivity to shocks to global trade
and resource-backed loans’ exposure to commodity price fluctuations.
With respect to corruption, Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018) find that Chinese finance is
affiliated with greater corruption at the local level. This does not actually speak, though,
to the national level. It would be difficult for any one project to influence national politics,
but over the longer term large aggregate outflows could conceivably do so. Such an effect
would probably be easier to detect by separating out higher-risk categories such as tied
loans from lower-risk ones like equity.
9.3.3 Changes in Chinese Development Finance
Some of the patterns identified in this dissertation may be subject to change over time.
As the problems with tied procurement and resource collateralization in particular have
become clear with a number of deals gone bad—Ecuador is an example, and Venezuela
a better one—some Chinese policymakers have begun to put greater emphasis on these
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models’ “governance deficit,” to borrow the phrase of X. Wang (2017). While the intent of
tied procurement was to give firms a guarantee against local risk, it has also enabled bad
behavior such as poor planning of unprofitable projects, insufficient consideration of social
and/or environmental factors, weak quality control, and corruption. If left unaddressed,
these problems could damage the Belt and Road’s brand name and lead to a degree of
partner country distancing. At the same time, China’s export boom and inexorably rising
foreign exchange reserves are a thing of the past, and the national budget constraint has
tightened along with the domestic slowdown (Rolland, 2019).
A number of measures are being taken in response. One is a new China International De-
velopment Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) overseeing grants, zero-interest loans, and some
concessional loans. As of this writing, CIDCA is still in its early stages, and most of
China’s aid budget remains with the Ministry of Commerce. There are substantive coun-
tervailing factors that might stand in the way of its full implementation. Especially as
China’s economy slows, the incentives toward economic stimulus are only strengthening.
Not bailing out firms in trouble could potentially cost Chinese jobs, and it remains to be
seen whether the government will refrain from assisting firms struggling with problems of
their own making (Rudyak, 2018; Wingo, 2019c).
Another set of changes focuses on improving firm incentives earlier in the project cycle,
before problems emerge. In general, there may be a shift away from tied procurement and
toward debt. Already, Chinese debt outflows peaked in 2013-2014 (Atkins et al., 2017;
K. P. Gallagher and Myers, 2019). Public-private partnerships under which Chinese firms
participate in project management and/or ownership are likely to increase in prevalence
as Chinese firms gain experience overseas (Leutert, 2019). Chinese finance may also be-
come less insular. The China Development Bank and Exim have established a series of
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regional funds aimed at co-financing with regional institutions; providing capital for equity
investment; or both (Myers and K. P. Gallagher, 2019, p. 5). The China-LAC Cooperation
Fund’s contribution to Peru’s Inter-American Development Bank-funded, multinationally-
built Metro line is an early example. Co-financing in particular will mean that China cannot
impose procurement requirements—Line 2 of the Lima Metro, for example, was mostly
European-built—but comes with the benefit of leaving a better impression in the host cap-
ital by giving them more autonomy over procurement decisions.
Similarly, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the first Chinese-led multilat-
eral bank and in some ways has more in common with the World Bank than with Chinese
bilateral lenders. The AIIB does not use policy conditionality, and 50 percent of its shares
are Chinese-held, but it does require studies in areas like economic impact, the environ-
ment, and community relations which have often been lacking for Exim and CDB. It also
occurs with substantial foreign participation—most major developed countries other than
the United States and Japan are members, and many senior staff come from the World Bank
or regional development banks. Most important, it practices open procurement, meaning
that (again) the Chinese government cannot force large portions of contract value to its
firms but that a variety of problems in project governance are averted.5
Even resource-backed loans may be due for an overhaul. Two recent deals in Ghana and
Guinea both have Chinese firms taking equity stakes in the relevant mines, meaning that
they share more of the risk than under previous arrangements. There is also discussion of
modifying the commodity pricing model such that China holds more risk, thereby hope-
fully avoiding a Venezuela-like scenario in which the borrower simply cannot keep up
with payments amid falling global prices. Tellingly, both of these deals are for bauxite, of
5For an overview of the AIIB’s legal framework, see Lichtenstein (2018).
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which China processes over half of the world’s supply; and not for oil, a previous focus
for which China is one of many consumers and one of many potential investor countries.
The experiences of Venezuela, Ecuador, and elsewhere may be leading bureaucrats in Bei-
jing to retrench and refocus resource-backed efforts in countries where it is more necessary
(Wingo, 2020b,c).
Across the board, these changes constitute a shift toward a lower risk profile and greater
use of equity. It remains to be seen whether the newer modes of business grow beyond
their current modest shares of China’s overall portfolio, though. At the moment, the old
tied debt model remains quite strong, raising the possibility that China could be moving
toward a “two-track” system in which the AIIB or regional funds handle different types
of projects than the bilateral organizations. Future work should focus on this trend, es-
pecially as information about new methods of doing business shifts from hypothetical to
empirical.
9.3.4 Other Emerging Financiers
China’s outflows drastically outpace those from other emerging financiers, and this work
has covered the lion’s share of non-OECD financing. However, China is not entirely alone.
Other members of the BRICS are active in development finance, as are Malaysia, Turkey,
and the Persian Gulf states, to name a few. Parts of this dissertation’s findings may apply
to other cases, but China’s distinctive domestic political economy presents a challenge.
Brazil’s Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), for example,
serves a similar function to the China Development Bank but differs in that its clients
are mostly private firms, albeit private firms with close relationships with the state. How
connected financiers and firms are to the state varies cross-nationally. In India, for example,
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there may be a greater degree of distance. In the Persian Gulf monarchies, ruling families
may directly own relevant organizations. This presents an opportunity for cross-national
analysis building on this dissertation’s framework.
Another of China’s quirks, the limited role of law in economic governance, presents an-
other opportunity for cross-national analysis. Some countries, like Brazil or Russia, may
nominally operate according to the rule of law but frequently find it circumvented by cor-
ruption. Others may more strictly adhere to it. These different sets of countries might
exhibit different levels of tolerance for late repayments of loans or requests for extralegal
payments to government leaders, for example. This in turn will affect the risk profiles of
their overseas portfolios and what types of financing are used.
Rule of law could be considered a subset of a third type of variation: beliefs. This dis-
sertation has not firmly sided with either materialists or constructivists, but more could be
done to illuminate the role of ideas on how to best promote growth and development. There
may be a degree of variation within China, with organizations like CITIC and the People’s
Bank of China making occasional appearances as more pro-free market actors. However,
much more variation would appear in a cross-national comparison. There also exists use-
ful variation over time. China’s nascent turn toward more open procurement models and
more equity investment could yet constitute an ideational change for at least parts of the
establishment in Beijing. Comparison cases for this change are not necessarily currently
emerging financiers so much as past ones. Japan and South Korea have historically shown
less aversion toward tied aid and resource-backed loans.6 This (shrinking) degree of intra-
OECD variation could also be juxtaposed with the Chinese case. Going further back in
history, some Western states also tied aid during the Cold War era but have clearly changed
6Of the two, Japan has gone much further in phasing out tied loans. Both sometimes use resource-backed
loans.
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their thinking over time. This dissertation’s focus on China has substantially broadened the
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